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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of an ethnographic study of a pilot program initiated in one of the 
Western provinces to address the circumstances of youth with the psychiatric diagnosis of 
conduct disorder. The Facilitating Program employs attachment theory in a perspective 
critical of the medical model and the concept of conduct disorder presented in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (D.S.M.) of the American Medical Association. The Program claims 
that the interests of the adolescent and the community alike are best served not by seeking 
to cure or to "fixn the individual through institutionalized treatment but by producing a care 
plan to "re-affixn the youth in supportive relationships in the community. 
This study examines the Facilitating Program's production of knowledge to determine 
whether this allegedly innovative approach challenges or perpetuates the medical model. 
Specifically, the extent to which the Facilitating Program attempts to understand the 
behaviour of adolescents independent of its relationship with each individual is addressed. 
In addition, the degree to which this mental health initiative is critical of or complicit with 
prevailing structural inequalities of class, gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity and age 
which may contribute to the appearance of the perceived troublesome behaviour is 
evaluated. Finally, general implications for the making of facts by professionals are outlined. 
As a cultural critique, this thesis documents the contemporary circumstances which 
led to the inception of the Facilitating Program as well as traces historical precedents for the 
resolution of the alleged behavioural problems of adolescents. A case study approach 
offers the means to investigate the professional discourse and practice whereby the 
departments of psychiat? psychology, social work, education, child care and nursing 
coordinate their efforts to fadhion a plan for the care and management of the youth. This 
includes an evaluation of the professional technologies employed to construct an account 
of the individual's identity and cohduct as well as an assessment of the significance of the 
professional's lived experience on the findings. 
In its development and application of a cultural Marxist perspective, this thesis 
constitutes a meditation on the possibilities and limits of expert authority. It argues that a 
critical, reflexive dialogue most adequately addresses the partial, positioned and partisan 
nature of all knowledge, a conclusion which calls for the re-framing of social enterprises of 
this kind as inclusive, collaborative ventures. 
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CHAPTER ONE - CROSSROADS 
I s Chris going to attend today?" 
The speaker is seated at the end of the conference table, the morning's clearing 
skies evident in a shaft of light burnishing his crown of curls. A burly man appearing to be 
in his early 50's, his voice is friendly and engaging. His question is directed to a woman half 
his age intently searching through a sheaf of papers spread before her. 
"No. He told me yesterday that he didn't want to come." 
"Did he give a reason?" 
" He said he didn't want to hear about the sexual assaults or the shoplifting 
incident. I asked him if he'd changed his mind when I saw him at breakfast 
this morning, but he told me he wasn't interested." 
"O.K. Well, perhaps before Ken presents the social history, we could make sure that 
everybody knows each other. I'm Keith Johnson, the psychiatrist assigned to Chris' care 
plan during his stay with us at Crossroads." He turns towards the woman sitting on his right. 
"I'm Karen Sargent, Chris' mother." A dark haired woman in her early thirties, she 
acknowledges each of the people at the table in turn, her gaze steady and deliberate. 
"Bill Steele, Chris' social worker." The faded jeans and Nike running shoes convey 
a sense of youth belied by the weariness in the speaker's voice. He had arrived at the 
conference room moments before, complaining that highway crews mopping up after a 
semi-trailer spill had cost him an hour's travelling time. As if having to get up at 3 to get here 
wasn't bad enough. Cradling a styrofoam cup in his hands, he momentarily straightens in 
his chair as though trying to shake off the mood of irritability settling over him like a cloak. 
"I'm Jan Newcombe. I'm with Crossroad's psychology department and I'll be 
presenting the psychological report on Chris." Attention shifts to a small woman, her short 
brown hair framing an alert, soft featured face that complements the earnest warmth of her 
voice. 
"John Bogardus. I'm a graduate student in anthropology and I'm doing a research 
project here at Crossroads." There is no need to explain further as everyone in the room is 
familiar with me and aware of the nature of my project . Some weeks earlier, I had 
approached each of the staff in attendance to explain that I was interested in how the 
various participants in the care plan process went about forming their understanding of 
Chris' identity and the nature of his community.' All of them had been very co-operative, 
signing the various forms which gave me permission to interview them individually and which 
granted me access to the information routinely available to the Crossroads staff for the 
purpose of compiling their care plan reports. Karen, Chris and Chris' social worker had 
consented to my involvement during the intake meeting which marked Chris' entry into the 
four week Facilitating Program of Crossroads Youth Mental Health Centre. 
At that time, Chris had been informed that his placement was not intended to change 
his behaviour but to gain a better understanding of his situation. At thirteen, he was three 
years under the minimum age to be considered responsible for his health care. As his legal 
guardian, his mother's signature was sufficient to secure Chris' admission to the program. 
However, Chris was also offered the opportunity to indicate whether he was a willing 
participant and he chose to sign the consent form. This was to be the case for each of the 
six teenagers I followed through the program, a response the intake social worker assured 
me was typical of most of the adolescents admitted. He also mentioned that if the 
individual's sixteenth birthday happens to fall during the stay at Crossroads, he or she is 
officially discharged pending his or her authorization of consent for treatment, a formality 
which almost invariably occurs without incident. 
The introductions continue, the room now completely awash in the weak February 
light. There are nine of us in all. In addition to the psychiatrist, social worker and 
psychologist, three other members of Crossroads' staff are present. These include Donna, 
a young woman representing the child carelnursing staff of the residential unit where Chris 
stayed during the past three weeks and Narinder, an educational psychologist from the small 
school across the courtyard from the meeting room. In addition, a community support 
worker sits directly opposite me. Typically, Alan would chair the discharge meeting which 
routinely occurs a week after the care plan meeting. This would be his initial responsibility 
in a process supporting the implementation of the care plan in the home community until 
Chris reaches the age of nineteen. 
"Chris' referral to the Facilitating Program came about as the result of a longstanding 
history of difficult behaviour, l1 Ken begins, reading from the typed document on the table in 
front of him .... 
Situating the Fieldwork Site 
C rossroads is an institution for the treatment of youths judged to be suffering from the most severe psychiatric and behavioural problems. Located in one 
of the western provinces, the facility is funded by the provincial Ministry of Health in 
conjunction with the Ministries of Social Services and Housing, Education and the Solicitor- 
General. Its mandate is to provide non-correctional care to adolescents between the ages 
of twelve and eighteen who are judged to exhibit thought disorders and, most commonly, 
conduct disorders. The recent introduction of a pilot project for conduct disordered youths 
marked a shift in treatment orientation from a centralized residential model towards a 
decentralized format. Over the past five years, Keith Johnson's initiative - the Facilitating 
Program - has used a short term assessment period in order to formulate care plans 
designed to guide and support these individuals upon their return to their home 
communities. 
Conduct disorders are regarded as problems of a behavioural rather than a 
psychiatric nature. They are classified as the major category of anti-social behaviour among 
children and adolescents by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(D.S.M.) in both its revised third (D.S.M.-Ill-R, 1987) and fourth (D.S.M.-IV, 1994) versions. 
Chronic disregard for the rights of others and persistent norm violations are considered to 
be the primary behavioural indicators of conduct disorder. Symptoms typically take the form 
of aggressiveness, irritability, defiance and destructiveness (Crossroads, 1992b:3). The 
Facilitating Program staff considers these individuals to have failed to achieve or to maintain 
the primary bonding or affiliation with another person essential for the development of 
trusting, prosocial relationships. The identified problematic behaviours are perceived to be 
a result of this experiential deficit. In effect, the Facilitating Program shifts attention away 
from the traditional goal of "fixing" the teenager to that of "re-affixing" the youth within a 
supportive relationship. With this approach, the team considers that it has embarked upon 
a unique system of care, rather than treatment (Crossroads, 1992:7). Accordingly, long 
term, institutionally based therapy has given way to a model of commun'w care and support. 
The care plan is seen as the essential tool to guide the primary care givers and the 
community in carrying out this objective. This plan is compiled during the teenagef s thirty 
day stay in one of the co-ed units. It is drafted by a psychiatrist with input from the 
departments of nursingkhild care, education, social work, and psychology and in 
consultation with the adolescent, care givers, significant professionals and interested 
members from the community. It is adopted in a collective session of all these contributors. 
The care plan's purposes include orienting the primary care givers in establishing and 
maintaining relationships with the teenager as well as providing direction for the organizing 
of suitable mental health and education programs for both the individual and the care givers. 
Each care plan is intended to be in effect from the time of the youth's re-entry into 
the community until his or her nineteenth birthday. Community support workers from the 
Facilitating Program maintain an active file on the individual during this period and a member 
of this team is available for consultation by telephone or in person if requested by the youth 
or care givers. In addition, provision for hiatus support of up to two weeks is available 
through the Facilitating Unit. This is designed to provide short term separation of the youth 
from the care givers so that all parties might regain and sustain their commitment to one 
another. Currently, an evaluation of the program is in effect with a community support 
worker conducting a telephone survey of the youth and the care giver at six month intervals 
during the initial two years of the program. Analysis of these questionnaires is intended to 
assess the impact of the care plan process on the teenager's circumstances. 
In both its theoretical orientation and its methods of work, this project is considered 
by its initiators to be a distinct departure from conventional practices. In their estimation, it 
challenges current thinking in psychiatry and psychology by extending the consideration of 
bonding issues beyond the period of early childhood and into the teenage years. It attempts 
to break from a conception of conduct disorder which places the perceived problem within 
the individual and which seeks its resolution through counselling conducted by mental health 
professionals, typically within a residential facility. Instead, the focus is upon cultivating the 
social relations within the community which will foster support and care for the youth. 
For these reasons, the staff of the Facilitating Program regard their approach to 
stand in contrast to the medical model of treatment. They state that their use of psychiatric 
terminology and standard clinical procedures owes more to the pragmatic expediencies of 
establishing credibility within the health profession and of securing funding from government 
and allied agencies than to the upholding of the principles and practices of medical 
discourse. Through their efforts, they hope to transform both the prevailing perception of 
conduct disordered youths and the actual nature of services available to these individuals 
on a province wide basis and beyond. 
Situating the Researcher 
M y decision to undertake fieldwork at Crossroads came after a chance encounter with Crossroad psychiatrist Keith Johnson at a regional 
conference entitled "Children and Youth at Risk." My objective in going to this gathering was 
to acquire information about the systems of care currently available for teenagers targeted 
as being candidates for a homeless existence, involvement with prostitution, confinement 
to a psychiatric ward, incarceration in a youth detention centre or admission to a morgue. 
I had returned to university six months earlier after leaving a youth worker position at a small 
adolescent treatment centre and I hoped to use this material as part of an ethnography 
based on my experiences in the child care field. My intention was to keep my involvement 
in the conference proceedings to a minimum, concentrating instead on taking notes and 
collecting handouts. To my surprise, the conference was a decision making body structured 
around a series of workshops designed to formulate policy based on consultation with the 
participants. I soon found myself voicing my concerns with other mental health workers 
similarly disgruntled with the level of support and care available to children and youths. It 
was upon witnessing my interventions in this gathering that Keith suggested I consider doing 
fieldwork at Crossroads. 
Keith explained that Crossroads had recently embarked on a pilot project in an 
attempt to shift the care for so-called troubled teens from institutionalized settings back into 
the community. As he outlined some of the features of this initiative, I realized that they 
addressed many of my own concerns. During seven years working in a centre for so-called 
"high risk" youths, my frustration with the agency's ability to achieve its stated purpose had 
steadily grown. Our immediate objective was to establish relationships with these teenagers 
as a means to direct their energies away from activities likely to cause harm to themselves, 
to others and to property. Yet it was becoming increasingly evident to myself and to other 
members of the staff that our efforts were largely unsuccessful. 
I had come to view the most immediate obstacle standing in the way of building 
relationships of trust and support to be the ratio of staff members to residents. Budget cuts 
had resulted in an increase from five to seven in the number of teenagers accommodated 
in the turn of the century facility that served as our treatment centre. Located in an inner city 
neighbourhood, the former farm house predated and overshadowed the modest homes that 
had sprung up on grounds once given over to orchards. Yet even its relatively imposing bulk 
was not sufficient to absorb the additional house residents, their restless energies only 
intensifying with the space constraints. 
The teenagers found the overcrowded conditions to be stressful and, by their own 
account, unsafe. The staff members were severely taxed in connecting with them as there 
was little time available for one-to-one discussions and outings. Group norms and 
standardized provisions began to take the place of flexible arrangements designed to meet 
the changing needs of individual residents and staff members alike. Crowd control 
procedures replaced personally negotiated expectations as efforts by the staff to maintain 
some degree of stability resulted in a formality and rigidity which could only exacerbate the 
very circumstances they were intended to improve. This deteriorating climate led to a 
situation in which the seven residents of the house became so in name only. One, two and 
sometimes more of the teenagers became phantoms, choosing to seek out their own often 
perilous shelter arrangements rather than endure the increasingly rule-bound, impersonal 
living conditions at the centre. Threats to the safety of person and property escalated as 
house regulations eclipsed individual relationships. The centre came to resemble a 
barracks rather than a home. 
These troubling developments compounded other misgivings which dominated my 
thoughts during my final years at the centre. My overriding sense was that our program 
lacked a sensitivity to cultural issues and that this shortcoming was preventing us from 
establishing relationships with the residents. In my opinion, we were ill-equipped as a staff 
group to deal with the subtleties and complexities of providing adequate care to persons 
from other than the dominant culture, a way of life that I crudely characterized at the time as 
being "white, male, middle class and heterosexual." Yet my attempts to name the problem 
often revealed my own uncertainties. While I was drawn to a cultural explanation, I was 
hesitant to essentialize culture, intuitively resisting a tendency to stereotype people of a 
particular group or category as necessarily sharing a common experience. Likewise, I was 
unconvinced that individuals of similar ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender or class are, by 
definition, more compatible than those who do not have these attributes in common. As a 
result, I was reluctant to argue that our problems would be solved by simply matching the 
cultural differences represented in our resident population with a staff group of similar 
diversity. 
Nonetheless, I found myself playing an active part in our ongoing struggle to provide 
the shifting population of male and female residents with primary workers of the same 
gender and I sought to extend the consideration of cultural issues to other dimensions of the 
program. The lack of a Native presence on the staff of a facility typically numbering one or 
two teenagers of Native origin among its residents was an obvious shortcoming. In addition, 
I had long been concerned with the dissimilar economic backgrounds of the staff and the 
residents. With few exceptions, the families of origin of the teenagers were either low 
income or welfare recipients. The child care counsellors, on the other hand, tended to 
originate from more privileged backgrounds. Our outlooks were informed by our parents' 
employment in the unionized trades, ownership of small businesses or careers in so-called 
middle class professions such as teaching and social work (Ehrenreich, 1989:136). 
The job requirements for a position on the treatment centre staff did little to lessen 
this contradiction. On paper, qualifications for child care positions were limited to a high 
school diploma and six months experience working with adolescents. In reality, a tightening 
job market and the perceived demands of relating to supposed "high risk" teenagers had led 
to the expectation that counsellors possess specialized training as well as more extensive 
experience. For example, my psychiatric nursing credentials and Masters degree in 
Sociology in the area of adolescent alienation were becoming less exceptional. Recent 
additions to the staff roster included people with college backgrounds and university degrees 
in child care, criminology and social work, some with more than fifteen years experience in 
the field. 
At the time, this trend towards a more highly educated work force simply lent 
credence to my impression that the experiential discrepancies between counsellor and 
adolescent were widening. The staffs tendency to extrapolate from recollections of their 
own teenage work experiences only magnified these dissimilarities. Current job prospects 
for the residents were more sharply limited than those faced by their adult care givers in their 
youth. While my grasp of these issues remained tentative and impressionistic, I could not 
shake my belief that these differences in experience undermined our ability to find common 
ground on which to build relationships with the youthful residents. My conclusion was that 
these dissimilarities could best be described as matters of culture, ways of life that co- 
existed but did not cohere. 
It was becoming painfully obvious to me that I lacked a clear analysis in which to 
situate these fragmented images. Certain issues appeared to be of critical importance yet 
in the absence of theoretical clarity my recognition of their significance merely added to my 
sense of frustration. I had been vaguely conscious of gender's impact on an individual's 
experience for as long as I could remember. However, an awareness that people of 
different classes may approach reality with dissimilar assumptions and expectations had 
been an abrupt awakening. I had seized on this truth in my early adulthood and had 
encountered no reason to question its legitimacy. It had found its place in the bundle of 
other revealed truths so entrenched in my mind set that its contours had blurred into that ill- 
defined expanse known as common sense. It was now no less self-evident to me than the 
fact that fundamental differences existed which justified a gender matching of key workers 
and residents. Both assumptions had infiltrated the bedrock of my beliefs and values, 
uncharted terrain notoriously resistant to both scrutiny and change. An additional part of my 
difficulty lay in the fact that sentiments still vague and ill-formed were intermingled with 
longstanding convictions which I now suspected to be marbled with rigidity and dogma. 
T he core of these persistent attitudes could be traced to an embracing of Marxism during postgraduate study in the early 1970's. Not unlike others of 
my generation, I subsequently rejected the opportunities beckoning a person of my class 
background. I chose instead to concentrate on left wing politics while eking out a living with 
working class jobs. Many of my current assumptions were shaped during years of anti- 
imperialist support work and trade union involvement. In the company of other political 
activists, I shared both a naive certainty of the accuracy of our analysis and the justness of 
our cause and an equally exaggerated optimism that others soon would be persuaded of the 
validity of these beliefs. In the meantime, we would work to strengthen the democratic 
processes already in place and strive to include ordinary people in existing decision making 
structures so that their interests might be reflected more fully, immediately and in the long 
term. 
It was my Marxist analysis which informed me that the treatment centre was part of 
the ideological apparatus of the state (Althusser, 1970). This perspective told me two 
important and seemingly contradictory things. First, my reading of Marx had convinced me 
that the state was not neutral. Under capitalism, it served the interests of the prevailing 
order by ensuring the conditions necessary for the accumulation of capital, by legitimizing 
itself and the status quo and by maintaining social control (Hall et al., 1978:204-206). 
Youths were expected to comply with the expectations of capitalist society by becoming 
productive workers, respectful of themselves, others, existing social structures and property. 
Those who displayed behaviours contrary to these norms risked being monitored by the 
state. At the same time, interventions by the state deflected attention away from the 
underlying structural contradictions. This conciliatory function was aided by re-framing 
instances of social contradiction and conflict in individual, psychological terms (Conrad and 
Schneider, 1980). This opened the door for the re-integration of disruptive persons through 
the personalized remedial services offered by mental health professionals. 
On the other hand, my understanding of the same Marxist theory advised me that the 
treatment centre was a place of care as well as control. Administered as it was by the 
welfare state, it owed its existence, in part, to the efforts of working people to secure a safety 
net for the less fortunate (Wilson, 1977). 1 was convinced that our program had the potential 
to be a positive, supportive response to the needs of working class youths. Its existence 
could serve to inform society of their circumstances and of the structural inequalities which 
contribute to their plight. I was equally certain that short term measures to lessen the 
predicament of these teenagers were not enough. It was necessary to transform the 
structural contradictions inherent in a patriarchal, capitalist society. Ironically, my frustration 
at improving the residents' day to day situation seemed to increase in lock step with the 
decline in my certainty that this cherished new order would see the light of day. 
With long term objectives unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future, what else 
was there to do but focus on the pragmatics of the immediate? On the other hand, at what 
point did a preoccupation with short term tactics lead to the indefinite postponing of long 
term objectives? Funding cuts had forced the custodial treatment of allegedly troubled 
teenagers in warehouse conditions. Did this merely expose the fact that, despite the 
compassionate rhetoric of government officials and the best intentions of the staff, social 
reform programs were little more than agencies of social control? Was it the case that no 
amount of selective hiring or staff education could change the resident's status as an 
administered object under the surveillance of the state? 
But perhaps I was being utopian in my expectations and dogmatic in my judgment. 
Besides, didn't I find my current working conditions infinitely more agreeable than what I had 
faced in the sawmill and the foundry or on the construction site? I enjoyed working with 
teenagers. Not the least of my satisfaction came from what they taught me about myself. 
Was it simply a coincidence that I was becoming critical of the social control aspects of my 
job at a time when I was experiencing a growing unease in my interactions with the house 
residents? 
It was undeniable that I was feeling more ineffectual in my work. I was beginning to 
question my ability to form relationships with the teenagers. I sensed a deepening reserve 
on my part, as though I was inflating a cushion between myself and the kids. I rationalized 
that this buffer had become necessary to ensure some stability for myself and the residents 
in circumstances which all too frequently teetered on the edge of chaos. Or perhaps I was 
just catching my breath for a moment. After all, I knew that bum-out was an occupational 
hazard for child care workers. I was working in a setting in which most people lasted two or 
three years. Whatever the reason or reasons for feeling ill at ease, I decided that 1 would 
have to take a step back and re-assess the politics of my occupation and my continued 
commitment to this line of work. I owed it to myself and to the teenagers to try and figure out 
what was happening with them - and to me. I had reached my own personal "crossroads" 
and I was looking for experiences which would guide me through my impasse. 
Opportunity and Challenge 
W hen I arrived at Crossroads, I was motivated by a desire to uncover what Jean-Paul Sartre has called "the mystery in broad daylight". I was seeking 
to disclose a truth that I believed was right before the eyes of those of us who worked as 
mental health professionals but which our ways of seeing prevented us from recognising. 
I had come to think of these youngsters as modem mine canaries, those sacrificial birds 
from a bygone era released in the depths of mine shafts to measure the air's ability to 
sustain life. Death of the bird meant conditions were too toxic for human existence. To my 
mind, the attention seeking outbursts of these teenagers were a modern day counterpart to 
the fluttering protests of these earlier winged messengers. The waming they carried was 
of social conditions which were hazardous to health. They were simply the least powerful, 
so most vulnerable members of tenuous networks of people whose lurching from crisis to 
crisis too often meant that any semblance of a human community was in name only. Deep 
furrows of despair cut across their everyday existence. Domestic violence, poverty, 
dilapidated housing, haphazard attention to physical and emotional needs, sexual insults 
and violations - these struck me as the outward expressions of structural processes so 
engrained, so commonplace to have been rendered virtually invisible. To my way of 
thinking, they were manifestations of patterns of social life whose importance were somehow 
diminished in the naming: sex, class, race - termed the holy trinity by some for the almost 
numbing predictability of their reciting. The list, of course, has now been updated in 
language deemed more politically acceptable and extended to be more inclusive: gender, 
sexual orientation, class, ethnicity, race, age. 
These terms were the markers that I chose to bring to bear on the passing scene. 
Certainly, they didn't spring from the lips of teenagers in mobile McTherapy sessions while 
waiting for our order at the neighbourhood drive through window. Their personal narratives 
- so unique in the details yet somehow eerily similar in the overall telling - did not concern 
themselves with these matters, at least not directly. Neither did these concepts pepper the 
reports and punctuate the conversations of the social workers, probation officers, family 
court lawyers, alternate school teachers and youth workers that I encountered regularly in 
the course of shepherding my 'key kids" through another meeting to have their school 
suspension lifted or sitting in while their probation officer reminded them once again of the 
terms of their court ordered area restriction. These were categories that I imposed on what 
I saw. But I was convinced that if I was freed from the demands of mopping up after one 
crisis or another, if I got some distance from the in-your-face immediacy of caring for a 
suicidal sixteen year old or a despondent thirteen year old with his lingering scent of acetone 
then I would be able to see clearly what had been going on in front of me all these years. 
And I was convinced that the answer would come in a variation on the sex, class, race 
theme. These were the ways of life - the cultures - that connected these kids, the very 
ones that seem to elude the countless professionals whose livelihood relied on continually 
sorting through the particulars of the upsets, the outbursts, the noise of these teenagers' 
lives. 
My experience in a residential treatment centre had convinced me that our focus on 
the specifics of a teenager's history led us to overlook these broader patterns that our own 
interventions were in danger of perpetuating. Specifically, I saw us developing fleeting 
relationships with a succession of youths who came through our front door only to have that 
connection severed as they returned to their families, group homes or independent living 
arrangements 6 months to 2 years later. Not only were these relationships terminated but 
all too frequently the community to which they returned bore the same alienating and 
oppressive dynamics that I believed had contributed to the teenager's difficulties in the first 
place. Mothers were still faced with unemployment or underemployment, working a number 
of low paid jobs to make ends meet. Their spouses or partners didn't appear to be any less 
neglectful of the children in their care. In some instances, the scrutiny of social service 
agencies seemed to have lessened the likelihood that the youth was returning to particularly 
violent or rejecting circumstances. But, too often, any evidence of a supportive community 
was not apparent to my eyes. 
The Facilitating Program appeared to offer the opportunity that I was looking for. It 
based itself on the premise that relationships were at the heart of the teenagers' present 
difficulties and it provided me with the chance to view these relationships up close. I would 
be given access to literally hundreds of files providing indepth profiles of the youths and 
detailed accounts of the nature of their connections with their communities. And I initially 
presumed that I would be able to conduct interviews with each of them, their care givers and 
the various professionals associated with their daily activities. My assumption was that the 
"insults to attachmenr which the Program maintains are at the core of the youth's difficulties 
express themselves along fault lines marking oppressive relations of class, gender, sexual 
orientation, race, ethnicity and age. I expected that consulting the admission files, the care 
plan reports as well as the transcripts of my own interviews with the staff, teenager, care 
givers and community professionals would enable me to populate these categories with the 
stories of real people, bringing empty concepts to life in a convincing fashion. 
Little did I realize that not only would I not be in a position to gather the information 
that I was after but also I would find these cherished sociological concepts to be as much 
of a hindrance to understanding as the desocialized psychiatric categories which I was so 
quick to criticize. Unwittingly, I had been drawn into an experience that can best be 
described as a kind of free fall. Johannes Fabian has remarked that 'precisely because 
critical anthropology demands that the research process be open, dialectical-interactive, 
historically situated and therefore contingent, there is no way of knowing in advance what 
kind of consequences - changes in ourselves and in the people we study - our projects will 
bring about" (Fabian, 1991 : 182). In retrospect, his words make good sense. They remind 
me of the wag who said, "if people knew what they were getting themselves into, they 
wouldn't do anything." But, at the time, I was quite sure that these cautionary remarks didn't 
apply to me. After all, I had embarked upon this investigation after working with teenagers 
who fit the description of the Program's clients. During that time, I had mulled over what was 
systematically missed by social service agencies and mental health professionals in their 
work with these individuals. With the pressing demands of kids in crisis and the narrowed, 
disciplinary lens fitted during training in their respective professions, it seemed to be a pretty 
straightfoward case of not being able to see the forest for the trees. With my list of social 
categories in hand, I would simply gather the personal histories and anecdotes, slot their 
details into the appropriate columns and fashion an account that supported my point of view. 
What I hadn't reckoned on was the relevance of Nietzsche's assertion that 'convictions are 
more dangerous enemies of truth than are lies." But it was to be some time before I would 
recognize, let alone heed, the wisdom in those words. 
u pon returning to university, I was to have my assumptions severely shaken. The first onslaught came as I struggled to find my bearings in a discipline 
with which I was no longer familiar - anthropology. I had re-entered the field to take 
advantage of its expertise on the question of culture and to become skilled in the mechanics 
of doing ethnography. I had arrived on the scene at a time when the discipline's self- 
destruction seemed imminent, my re-entry having all the earmarks of a death vigil. What I 
found was the concept of culture in shreds and fieldwork conventions under suspicion. The 
profession was beset with a succession of critiques, the last seemingly more desperate than 
the one before. Each was evidently trying to make sense of the past in order to capture its 
influence on the present with the hope that this might offer the promise of a future. 
My re-acquaintance with the more familiar terrain of social theory was to prove no 
less disconcerting. The very foundations of my thought were now called into question by 
a challenge which knew no disciplinary boundaries - postrn~demism.~ I soon found myself 
on a two-pronged mission of salvage anthropology, sifting through both the tattered remains 
of anthropology ' itself and the shards of modernist sociology to try to determine which 
concepts were keepers and which ones would have to be chucked. These excavations 
occurred virtually concurrently and they proved to be trying labours. I was forced to 
determine whether Marxism possessed any enduring qualities to support a renovated 
construction of social reality as well as to make sense of this messy business called culture. 
CHAPTER TWO - THE LENS OF PERCEPTION 
m h e  foundation of anthropology is man [sic] himself, not as the object of 
practical Knowledge, but as a practical organism producing Knowledge as 
a moment of its praxis. 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1 96311 968: 179; original emphasis) 
Thinking only begins at the point where we have come to know that Reason, 
glorified for centuries, is the most obstinate adversary of thinking. 
Martin Heidegger (McGrane, 1989:43) 
M y project seeks to explore a moment in the ongoing production of knowledge. A central task is to examine how the Facilitating Program staff represent 
the identities of the various youths in its care. I intend to dismantle the authoritative 
positions of the Program staff by documenting the concrete conditions within which these 
representations take shape. My objective is to determine whether the knowledge produced 
by these mental health professionals challenges conventional understanding or whether 
their findings serve to reinforce existing structural inequalities. My investigation rests on a 
consideration of possible economic, political and ideological determinants shaping meaning 
creating practices. This cultural critique encompasses the institution and its historical setting 
as well as the specific professional disciplines and individual traditions of selected staff 
members. 
As an anthropologist, I am an active participant in this interaction, accountable for 
providing an inventory of the attitudes and experiences I bring to this encounter. Rather than 
bracketing my heritage, my ways of life - my cultures - there is a need to embrace these 
traditions in an open yet critical way. Here I would suggest that valid criticisms raised under 
the umbrella of postmodernism can be addressed best by turning towards those traditions. 
These include perspectives featured in the current debates as well as those which have 
been suppressed or neglected. Some traditions are justifiably suspect but contain elements 
that can be profitably integrated into a non-foundationalist perspective. Others have been 
identified too closely with modernism's supposedly universal rationality and have been 
dismissed too readily. 
The approach I take falls within a critical interpretive perspective.' Termed the 
"hermeneutics of suspicion" (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:xxii; Marsh, 1988:180) by Paul 
Ricoeur, the outlooks gathered under its umbrella are diverse, its various advocates loosely 
grouped according to whether the work of Marx, Freud or Nietzsche serves as their 
reference point. They share a common concern in deciphering the immediacy of perceived 
reality to expose concealed contradictions, be they exploitive, repressive or oppressive in 
nature. Consistent with the Marxist current, I see myself involved in a dialectical relationship 
with other people, a relational unity in which each of us interacts with others in a purposeful 
way within a particular cultural setting. The meaning of any encounter is dependent upon 
its specific context. It is informed by the perspectives each of us brings to this exchange 
by virtue of our individual lived experience as well as being a collective product of our 
interaction. 
This view recognizes that we are not fully conscious of the cultural influences that 
shape our meaning systems, a significant portion of our point of view being rooted in 
childhood history which lingers on as unreflected attitudes and beliefs. So too, many of our 
current actions have consequences which are unintended, not the least being those through 
which we unwittingly perpetuate existing structural inequalities. These oppressive 
arrangements typically comprise important dimensions of our present awareness, inscribed 
as they are within the folds and recesses of our habituated outlook, those largely unreflected 
beliefs that make up our common sense view of the world (Bourdieu, 1980/1990:62). A 
critical interpretive position maintains that social conflicts are due not only to 
misunderstandings in communication, but also to the fact that people's interests and actions 
are shaped by these interiorised structural inequalities. The resistance we encounter when 
we challenge the self conception and world view of ourselves and others is due to the 
interested or partisan nature of our knowledge, a sense of being-in-the-world which tends 
to cling to its particular interpretation of the world mistaking it for the world itself (Fay, 1975: 
93-104; 1987; Marsh, 1988). 
Conducting fieldwork within this perspective means that our task is not one of 
discovering an objective order secreted within a free standing reality. Social reality is 
interactively constructed, having more to do with the dynamics of power than the routines 
of science. In fact, science itself can be characterized as a power play, a claim to authority 
through the use of a particular style of reasoning marshalling a corresponding set of truth 
claims (Aronowitz, 1988). And the practice of ethnography has less to do with detached 
observation than with confrontation (Fabian, 1991 b; Richer, 1988), meaning being an open- 
ended product not of contemplation but of collaboration. This raises issues of dialogue, 
engagement, negotiation, reflexivity, critique and self-critique. Fieldwork is not so much 
completed with the facts gathered and ordered as interrupted or abandoned with the 
discourse left dangling (Lutz, 1988). 
The Marxist Tradition 
I believe that the elements necessary for constructing a comprehensive framework worthy of these challenges exist within the Marxist tradition. We need to 
recapture some of the concepts which have been neglected or maligned due to 
contradictions and inconsistencies in Marx's own work and in its subsequent interpretation 
by others. This will enhance our ability to distinguish between postmodernism's advances 
and its excesses. At the same time, I contend that a closer look at Marx's early work will 
provide us with a basis for the inclusion of those dimensions of social differentiation 
(Gottlieb, 199250) such as gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, and age too frequently 
underestimated or neglected in conventional Marxist accounts (Aronowitz, 198111 990:141; 
Foley, 1 990:3O; Witheford and Gruneau, 1992: 18-1 9). Conversely, this re-examination 
should counter a too common trend within gender relations and ethnic studies to dismiss 
Marx's analysis of capitalist society as being yet another product of Enlightenment thought. 
This attitude has hindered efforts to arrive at a more sophisticated conception of the 
separate yet mutually constitutive systems of patriarchy, class and race and has detracted 
from our ability to understand the workings of hegemony. Finally, perhaps the most 
significant benefit to be gained from a return to Marx's thought will be the makings of an 
ethical frame for our work. A point too often lost on generations of Marxists nurtured on a 
belief in Marxism as a value-free science is the fact that Marx's project was founded on a 
normative premise: philosophy's role was not simply to interpret the world but to change it 
(West, 1991: 68). 
I join with others in the view that Marxism should not be approached as a fixed body 
of work (Gramsci, 1971 ; Williams, 1977; Grossberg and Nelson, 1988; Gottlieb, 1992; 
Nelson et al., 1992). It is a dynamic project modified from without through its interaction with 
other theoretical traditions and from within by alternative interpretations. This is no less true 
of Marx's own writings, which contain ambiguities and tensions that have prompted a 
number of differing readings and counter traditions to emerge within Marxist studies. In 
broad terms, one school subscribes to a more positivist conception, typically involving the 
elaboration of universal laws of the type commonly associated with the natural sciences 
(Williams, 1977:64) and represented in social theory by modernism. This point of view, 
associated with a Soviet orthodoxy but not exclusive to that school, provides a relatively 
constant reference point during this century and stands in opposition to another notable 
strand in the Marxist tradition. This second tendency, frequently referred to as Western 
Marxism or cultural Marxism (Grossberg and Nelson, 1988:7; Marcus and Fischer, 1986:88), 
is more accommodating of an ethical dimension and argues that Marxist social theory should 
be viewed as a systematic, interpretive project concerning itself with critical observation and 
historically based analysis of processes of social development. 
As a theoretical current within a perspective notably concerned with the affairs of 
social groups, cultural Marxism provides the conceptual tools to illuminate the meaning 
creating practices of individuals. Alienation, commodity fetishism, ideology, reification, and 
hegemony are terms conventionally employed by Marxists to make sense of the 
consciousness of classes of people. They are equally applicable to the distinctive 
historically and socially grounded processes of the "ensemble of the social relations" (Marx, 
185911 970:122) which constitute the humanity of a single person. Discourse, subjection and 
normalization complement these earlier concepts, providing an explanatory power capable 
of shedding light on how knowledge is produced - and how the interests of certain groups 
are reproduced - within and between individuals. 
The theoretical possibilities inherent in such an approach too often have been 
ignored by contemporary Marxists. Instead, the debilitating influence of positivism has been 
supplanted by the lure of poststructuralism, often with equally crippling results. The current 
task is one of navigating between the shoals of positivism with its aversion to reflexivity, on 
the one hand, and those of poststructuralism with its hyper-relativity, on the other. This 
requires a scavenger hunt across the pages of Marxist accounts both past and present, 
beginning with the work of Karl Marx himself. 
Karl Marx 
M am's writings contain passages that reject notions of universal criteria or timeless foundations to philosophy. While it is true that evidence of such 
foundationalist views can be found in his works, I choose to focus on those sections which 
support a radical historicist outlook. Here I am particularly indebted to the analysis of Comel 
West where he draws upon Marx "in his best moments" (West, 1991 :xxii). What is apparent 
in reading these early writings is the normative dimension of the critical interpretive stance 
Marx adopts to understand the basis for what he perceives to be the existing conditions of 
human misery (Marx, l927/1964:44). Whether writing newspaper articles upholding the 
traditional right of peasants to collect kindling (Arthur, 1970:12) or engaging in philosophical 
discourse with his contemporaries on the relation between the German state and civil 
society, Marx locates his analyses in concrete historical conditions. Rather than attempting 
the impossible task of detaching himself from the flow of history, he consciously immerses 
himself within an historical tradition by critically digesting the values of a specific community. 
In this way, he grounds his research in existing circumstances at a specific time and place, 
including the contingent agreements made by community members with respect to 
particular norms and objectives. 
For the radical historicist, ethics serves not as a body of unassailable and 
unchanging justification for moral positions but as a conditional, community specific basis 
for rational persuasion intended to enlarge consensus (West, 1991 :1-4). Marx compares 
the rhetoric of the dominant normative discourse with the prevailing conditions experienced 
by various groups in their daily life. He then seeks the material bases for the existence of 
discrepancies between the two realms. This supports the contention that Marx is best 
viewed not as an ahistorical scientist but as a 19th century ethnographer employing 
concepts which are culturally embedded artifacts rather than unchanging natural truths 
(Gaines, 1991 :230). 
Matx considers the role of philosophy to be one of changing the world (Marx 18881 
1967:123) and his analysis attempts to reveal any discrepancy between the realities of 
society and the ethical discourse which spells out norms and values. His investigation leads 
him to conclusions which are well known. Under capitalism, there is a basic discrepancy or 
contradiction standing in the way of social equality and freedom. It consists of a mode of 
production in which one class produces commodities, the sale of which generates profit 
appropriated by another class. The two classes are not equal neither is social freedom 
possible, for the actual producers do not have control and ownership of the means of 
production. The attainment of full social freedom and equality would require the actual 
elimination of this underlying contradiction, radically transforming society in the process 
(West, 1991:157). 
In Marx's view, the state itself is a product of this fundamental contradiction. The 
transition from feudalism to capitalism, Marx argues, has witnessed the transformation of 
state affairs from those pertaining to a ruler and servants, distinct from the general i 
population, to matters concerning every citizen. The state under capitalism claims to stand 
, , 
for the common or universal interests of all citizens. It accomplishes this feat by declaring 
t 
that distinctions made on the basis of education, wealth, occupation, religion, race that exist 
in actuality in civil society are non-political distinctions which do not affect the individual's 
standing as a citizen (Arthur, 1970:7-10). Formally, all are pronounced to be equal partners 
but the rhetoric does not coincide with the reality (Marx, 192711 964: 1 1-1 2). In this way, 
Marx regards the state to be a form of alienation in which people come to be dominated by 
an institution they have created themselves. 
Alienation, Dialectical Reason and Human Nature 
M arx determines that the alienation of labour constitutes the basis for this and all other forms of alienation by which human products come to confront ' 
people as "something alien, as a power independent of the producers" (Marx, 192711 959: 
196). In Mads view, the solution to this contradiction lies not in the reform of the state but 
in the transformation of civil society itself (Arthur, 1970:12). While aware that alienation is 
not a phenomenon unique to contemporary society, Marx tends to restrict his discussion to 
the context of the capitalist mode of production. Just as an anthropologist seeks the "point 
of view of the other", Marx deliberately adopts the perspective of the working class to better 
understand the nature of this predicament. His research leads him to conclude that 
mediations of private property, exchange and the division of labour intervene between 
working people and the objects of their labour. As a result, they find themselves alienated 
from their products, their productive activity, their own self-production or self creation and 
the recognition of their shared humanity (Marx, 192711 971 :122-131). 
Marx elaborates on Vico's dictum of humans making their own history by asserting 
that people, in fact, make themselves through the production of their means of livelihood. 
This formulation is considered by some to be ''the most important intellectual advance in all 
modem social thought" (Williams, 1977:19). With this bold stroke, Marx replaces the 
Enlightenment's idealist version of history as the advancement of reason and knowledge 
with a conception based on human labour, placing culture at the centre of material social ' 
processes. What distinguishes humans as a species is that we are inherently and 
essentially culture producing, i.e. meaning creating. Human nature is the historically specific 
product of our purposeful transformation of nature as social beings (Kessler, 1987:35-36). 
As a whole, culture can be understood as both the objectified legacy of the purposive activity 
of former generations and the current meaningful context for human action. Here 
anthropological distinctions between physical culture and the realm of ideas can be seen to 
converge in a materialist conception of culture as intersubjective, as the distinctly human 
I 
"way of being in the world" (Kessler, 1987:44-45). I I 
A critical component of this perspective is Marx's use of dialectical reason which 
stands in sharp contrast to analytical reason, the basis of conventional science. Whereas 
analytical thought attempts to grasp the essential qualities of static parts and their causal 
I 
sequences (Flynn, 1984:86), dialectics is concerned with the dynamic interrelationship of 
social phenomena. Social reality is not to be regarded as separate, bounded, interacting 
entities which can be defined in exclusive, discrete definitions. Rather, Marx considers the 
world to be a complicated network of relations internal to a social whole with particular 
elements constituted by virtue of their relationship to others. In this ongoing process, what 
is decisive are the relations among the units and not any notion of the analytic autonomy or 
boundedness of these units (Barnett and Silverman, 1979: 32; Sayer, l987:lg). T h i s 
situates Marx's rejection of a fixed notion of human nature. The human essence is the 
ensemble of social relations rather than an abstraction embodied by each individual (Marx, 
I 
l947/lWO:l22). As a self-creating species, our nature is historically contingent and subject 
to change (Austin-Broos, 1987:xxvi). At the centre of this dialectical view of society lies 
human praxis, ongoing purposeful activity intended to overcome existing problems and to 
address prevailing needs. It embraces a conception of 'humans being" which acknowledges 
the specific constraints of historical circumstances while recognizing the human capacity to 
surpass existing conditions through material labour (manual and mental), shaping our own 
nature in the process. 
An historical materialist conception of the dynamic interplay of social conditions and 
human agency acknowledges that the prevailing mode of life shapes our being initially but 
through our practice we are capable of simultaneously transforming both our circumstances 
and ourselves (Arthur, 1970:23; Marx, 188811 967:121). Endowed with the capacity to reflect 
on history, our own and that of others, we have the ability to educate ourselves and to 
change our practice accordingly (Marx, 184711963:121). Nevertheless, the precise 
relationship between the social realm and individual agency remains disputed to this day and 
continues to be a critical problem for social theory (Giddens, 1987:60; Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 1991:9). A discussion of the concepts of commodity fetishism and reification 
reveals the centrality of this issue. 
I 
Commodity Fetishism 
, t i  
I 
w hile alienation's frame of reference is seen to be relatively wide, describing J as it does certain relationships from ancient times through to the present 
day, commodity fetishism refers to an historically specific period. In Marx's view, commodity 
fetishism constitutes the prime source of mystification in capitalist society, residing as it does 
at the core of the dialectic of commodity production (Shroyer, 1971:124). A commodity is 
a duality composed of both a use-value and an exchange-value. The idea of use-value is 
readily understood: human labour transforms an object into something useful or serviceable 
to the individual. Exchange-value is more problematic. Marx contends that an article 
created in a capitalist society acquires an abstract relation in addition to use-value. This 
abstract component, exchange-value, refers to the object's worth on the market, the value 
of one commodity with respect to other commodities being expressed in terms of money 
I 
(Shroyer, 1971 : 127). According to Marx, it is "just this ultimate money form of the world of 
commodities that actually conceals, instead of disclosing, the social character of private 
labour and the social relations between the individual producers" (Marx, 188711 967:87). The 
individual tends to lose sight of the actual purpose of human labour - the creation of useful 
objects - and the recognition of actual relations between persons and products becomes 
an increasingly difficult undertaking. As a consequence, people fail to recognize that having 
made the social world, they have the capacity to change it. 
Economic mediations, supported by the political interventions of the state, are not 
the only causes of this misperception. Commodity and capital when viewed as universal 
givens rather than socio-historical constructs serve an ideological function, furthering the 
interests of dominant classes by portraying exploitative social relations as part of the natural . 
order. Conventional political economy, for example, takes exchange-value and surplus " , 
i .  
value and dehistoricizes them by viewing them as timeless categories. Capitalist social i 
relations are also transformed into immutable phenomena (Geras, 1971 : 77). Once again, 
people are cast in the role of being spectators in a world of their own making. 
Here we have the sketchy beginnings of a critique suggested by Marx's original 
account of the different cultures existing within capitalist society. Rather than comprising a 
single, unified, homogeneous domain, culture as a way of life can be seen to be 
differentiated into two components. Their actual composition is derived from the relationship 
of the groups - the propertied class and the working class - to the means of production and 
to each other. While both can be seen to be victims of Marx's earlier concept of alienation 
and of commodity fetishism, the manner in which these oppressions are lived begin to take 
on distinctive forms. For working people, no benefits are the result. For the propertied 
class, these conditions provide the distorted basis of their power. Nevertheless, a tendency 
towards a shared world view does exist as Marx maintains that the dominant ideology is the 
ideology of the capitalist or ruling class. 
Ideology 
I deology's career began as an Enlightenment inspired science whose objective was to provide a rational account of the laws governing the occurrence and 
development of ideas (Williams, l977:56; Eagleton, 1991 :66). With Marx and Engels, 
ideology initially means quite the opposite, referring as it does to an alienated product of 
mental labour which comes to exert a power over people as an autonomous entity 
(Eagleton, 1991:70-71). Not only is the sense of ideology modified, but it also takes on at 
least three distinct meanings with its contact with Marxism: a belief system which reflects the 
distinct interests of a particular class or group, a system of false beliefs which stands in 
opposition to objective or scientific knowledge and, finally, the universal process by which 
ideas and meanings are produced (Williams, 1977:55). It is Marx's emphasis on the first 
sense that captures the imposition of the interests of the dominant or ruling class on others 
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991 :22-23). This definition refers specifically to "the concealment 
of contradictions" (Larrain, 1983:208) and it is this conception of ideology which will concern 
US. 
Here Marx's criticism of conventional thinking is not based on the fact that it is class 
determined as such, but that it denies its determined nature. For example, his analysis of 
capitalist society results in his conclusion that the fundamental contradiction between labour 
and capital can only be resolved through the collective efforts of working people to transform 
the social relations of production. Seeking to grasp the obstacles facing such a project, 
Marx acknowledges the social determinedness of his own thought and consciously attempts 
to take the point of view of working people (Larrain, 1983:209). Rigorous and systematic 
though it may be, Marx's project is informed by a partisan impulse. It consists of a socially 
constituted perspective which privileges the point of view of a particular class. That 
qualification alone nullifies any claim to neutrality (Aronowitz, 1988:530). 
Georg Lukacs 
G eorg Lukacs' contribution deepens our understanding of the impact of economic, political and ideological elements on human consciousness. His 
pivotal conception of reification is based on a Marxist interpretation of concrete totality. 
Contrary to conventional knowledge in which social phenomena are viewed as isolated 
elements, Marxism considers society to be comprised of interrelated aspects (West, 
1 991 : 142). These components include individuals as well as broader social relations, 
productive forces and cultural formations, all of which are vital elements in an ongoing 
process. Lukacs primarily uses the term mediation to refer to the interconnection and 
interaction of the parts within the overall complex, an aspect in question being viewed in light 
of its unique position within the intricate system of mediated relations (Meszaros, 1970:71).' 
A person's level of awareness of the hierarchy of mediated complexes indicates "the 
degree of clarity to which a man [sic] has attained concerning the foundations of his 
existence in these relations, i.e., the degree of consciousness of himself' (Lukacs, 1971: 
185). As the individual penetrates the immediacy of these perceived complexes and begins 
to appreciate their mediated nature, action designed to eliminate the reified character of 
these relations can begin. Whereas the capitalist clings to the illusion of having some 
control over commodity production, the worker comes to see the same process as one of 
total enslavement. As the working people as a class become more aware of their exploited 
situation, they begins to recognize the necessity for collective action. 
Recognition of the overall character of social reality is an essential component of 
class consciousness, a prerequisite of the collective enterprise demanded if objectified 
relations are to be abolished leading to the reconstitution of individuals as truly human 
beings. Here Lukacs seeks to substantiate Maw's claim that perception of the totality of 
social reality has fallen prey to the destructive influence of commodity production. In his 
view, the human relations implicit in commodity relations have so faded from view that it is 
difficult to detect them at all. Commodities have taken on the appearance of natural objects, 
independent entities which seem to bear no relation to human productivity. They appear to 
be governed by natural powers, forces which come to dominate the very people who are 
responsible for their creation. 
Lukacs charges that the wholesale application of methods from the natural sciences 
to the study of social reality testifies to the pervasiveness of this reified consciousness or 
reification, the tendency to view interrelated social processes as fixed entities or things. The 
methods used in both administrative and scientific practices are those which best serve to 
divide the world into isolated complexes, lending themselves to quantitative calculation. 
Empirical facts are valued as ends in themselves as the objective world is fragmented into 
successively smaller components in an attempt to gain control over discrete aspects of 
reality (West, 1991 : 143-144; Lukacs, 1971 :6). The preoccupation of conventional thinking 4 
with such facts serves to support the status quo for it denies the legitimacy of any theory 
which would challenge the immediacy of reality (Lukacs, 1971:184). 
Much as mainstream social science is a product which reflects the interests of the 
ruling class, Marxist dialectics embodies the interests and biases of the working class, 
providing the means for understanding social reality in a manner which encourages an 
active engagement in shaping the ongoing historical process (West, 1991 : 144). Empirical 
facts which once appeared to be fixed and static come to be recognised as aspects of an 
ongoing process with the working class as the active force capable of transforming society. 
Simultaneously, the reified consciousness of working class individuals is transformed as 
they move from considering their class to be a fixed and unchanging part of society to 
increasingly recognising its collective potential to reconstruct the social whole. The 
movement to alter existing conditions is initiated by the realization that there is a discrepancy 
between the prevailing normative discourse and the actualities of everyday life. 
What is especially valuable for my purposes is that this provides the elements for a 
nonfoundational cultural critique. As Lukacs observes, it is an approach that begins from 
the norms and values of a particular society, the normative discourse including positions 
both supportive and critical of existing social arrangements and indicating the styles of 
reasoning judged to be valid for establishing truth claims. Discrepancies between beliefs 
and the daily reality encountered within the system of production, specific social relations, 
legal arrangements and other cultural formations are then explored and the source of the 
contradictions sought (West, 1991 :153). In this way, Lukacs stresses Marxism's critical 
interpretive nature, endeavouring to understand how actual people respond to their lived 
experience under particular conditions (Ulin, 1984: l28)." 
Antonio Gramsci 
A ntonio Gramsci is clear in his demarcation from foundational knowledge of any kind. He pointedly rejects any claims of Marxism itself to constitute the basis 
of universal criteria for knowledge.' Here Gramsci locates himself squarely within a radical 
historicist reading of Marxism, advancing our understanding of ideology on a number of 
fronts and elaborating the concept in a more positive direction. 
In his view, ideology constitutes the ''terrain on which men [sic] move, acquire 
knowledge of their position and struggle, etc" (Gramsci, 1971 :377). He denies that there is 
a direct correspondence between the social structure and ideological expression. While it 
could be argued that structural relationships impose a certain realm of possibility upon 
individuals of a particular group, the patterns of thinking and doing that tend to result more 
accurately correspond to discernible cultural logics rather than to iron clad laws. This is due 
to the fact that people have varying levels of awareness of the implications of their common 
circumstances. The determination of the course which best advances their shared concerns 
is an imperfect exercise, drawing on lessons from past occurrences, everchanging demands 
of the present and anticipation of future eventualities (Larrain, 1983: 86-87). 
Whereas ideology can be understood as an articulated system of beliefs and values 
expressive of the interests of a particular class or group, Gramsci's concept of hegemony 
takes the form of a common sense experience of the world which defies ready identification 
precisely because it is taken for granted (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991:23). Hegemony 
refers to the encouragement of voluntary co-operation or consent as a means to achieve 
domination without a reliance on the use of force. As such, hegemony's relatively recent 
emergence is judged to be testimony to the increased complexity of capitalist society. In 
Gramsci's view, the education system, organised religion and the media constitute 
ideological apparatuses which buttress the state's capacity to use force to achieve its ends 
(Larrain, 1983: 85).1•‹These institutions play a crucial role in the cultivation and maintenance 
of hegemony which, by definition, supersedes the identifiable beliefs and values contained 
within ideological systems. 
Hegemony is a way of life comprised of the lived subordination and dominance of 
specific groups which so saturates the entirety of living - shaping our sense of self, our 
perceptions of the world, our sense of reality - that its influence is all but absolute (Williams, 
1977:llO). Here culture takes on an asymmetrical character, enveloping the individual 
within a realm of possibilities skewed by the presence of class or group interests which act 
as constraints on belief and behaviour. These phenomena need not originate solely from 
a class dimension but may be reflective of gender or other socially significant distinctions. 
Yet despite its apparent pervasiveness, hegemony's position of domination is neither static 
nor final. Counter forces are continuously resisting and contesting its effects, challenging 
its claim to domination and constantly forcing it to defend, modify and reinvent itself 
(Williams, 1977:112). Thus, processes both emergent yet subordinate, residual yet active, 
perpetually contest society's constitution (Williams, 1977: 121 -1 22). 
This is no less true in the dynamic of the self. Gramsci confirms Marx's conception 
of the individual as a vital creation, both the "synthesis of contemporary relationships" and 
the "summary" of the entire past" (Manzani, 1957:48). Clearly, it is insufficient to simply 
examine the totality of interconnections at a given instant. One also must comprehend how 
the various relations came into being and are changed over time. Only in this way will it be 
possible to gain an understanding of one's identity, the central organising principle which 
provides cohesion to this lived experience. "The starting-point of critical elaboration is the 
consciousness of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself as a product of the historical 
process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory" 
(Gramsci, 1971 :324). " 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
J eanPaul Sartre's aim is to clarify the individual's singular being-in-the-world at this intersection of history, social structure and biography. Sartre directs his 
attention to the study of the uniqueness of each individual's lived experience, striving to 
disclose the exact historical sequence whereby the person acted in terms of the possibilities 
at hand and was acted upon in turn. He believes that the composition of a person's makeup 
should be accessible to a properly applied psychoanalytic technique. The reconstruction of 
an individual's history should be feasible by first isolating certain initial determinations and 
then tracing the person's progress through a succession of choices and actions (Manser, 
1 97 1 1346-347). 1 
Sartre is intrigued with the notion that people, conditioned by the social situation in 
which they find themselves, are nevertheless able to surpass these current circumstances, 
altering or conditioning their environment in turn. Sartre regards the project to be the 
person's choice of one course of action from among a number of alternatives. The cluster 
of options does not remain fixed, but rather is continuously being modified in accordance 
with the changing social circumstances which act as mediations constraining human 
activities. For Sartre (1 96311 968:99), praxis refers to purposeful human action, the actual 
surpassing of the existing situation in order to realize the particular end outlined in the 
project itself. l2 Totalization refers to the ongoing conscious synthesis of the various parts 
of the social whole, the continuous constituting of the field of meaning upon which the 
person sums up the present situation (thesis), projects into the future (antithesis) and 
subsequently acts (synthesis). 
With this line of inquiry, Sartre expands and enriches our conception of culture. It 
now becomes possible to conceptualize the individual - a girl, for example - as being a 
fundamental unit of cultural analysis. The individual is shown to be concurrently a distinctive 
cultural product and an equally singular cultural producer. She exists not as a solitary, 
asocial individual but as a social being-in-the-world who stands in relation to herself and to 
others mediated by her distinctively novel interpretation of her experience, past and present. 
Sartre notes that a person exists within specific social conditions and makes choices 
and decisions on the basis of the perceived objective possibilities available. Yet during 
childhood, the individual acts without comprehending the constructed nature of the existing 
social context, typically encountering and internalizing attitudes as virtual absolutes. 
Particular patterns of behaviour are learned, contradictory requests made by adults are 
frequently experienced, anxious attempts to break free of confusing situations occasionally 
occur - all this takes place in a situation only vaguely understood by the child. Adults 
function as mediators in this process, introducing children to a class-biased conception of 
reality which is accepted by youngsters as the natural order of things (Gorz, 1959:59). This 
groping to comprehend social reality and to move beyond what are often bewildering 
predicaments is considered by Sartre to provide the basis of the fundamental quirks and 
deviations of a person's character. The reverberations of our initial efforts to make sense 
of lived situations are still experienced in our activities as adults. 
Variations of Marx's concept of alienation and Lukacsl notion of reification illuminate 
this formative process. Sartre maintains that in the eyes of most Marxists, "everything 
seems to happen as if men [sic] experienced their alienation and their reification first in their 
own work, whereas in actuality each one lives it first as a child, in his parent's work' (Sartre, 
196311 968:62; original emphasis). The term alienation is first employed by Sartre in Being 
and Nothingness. This version seems to be a literal application of the one introduced by the 
German phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl 13, which focuses on interpersonal encounters. 
Sartre's later Marxist formulation recognizes that human practice is mediated by social 
structures as well as by other people (Sartre, 196011 976:79). 
According to Husserl, as the girl comes to realize that others are subjects for 
themselves as she is for herself, she is compelled to recognize that in their eyes she has an 
object-character as well as a subject-character. Moreover, she must acknowledge that their 
view of her has as much validity as hers of them. Another person thus serves as a type of 
mirror in which she perceives that she is not wholly subject, but also has the character of an 
object. Here she experiences herself as something "other', something "alien" to her 
subjectivity. In short, she experiences her "alienation" (Schacht, 1971 :228). In Sartre's 
words, "by the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position of passing judgment 
on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other" (Solomon, 1972: 
306). Sartre regards this momentary "alienation" from active subjectivity to be a common 
occurrence in everyday life.'' 
Sartre insists that it is only through the acknowledgment of the consciousness of 
others that self-recognition comes into being (Solomon, 1972:306-308). This view is 
strongly reminiscent of Hegel's contention that self-consciousness involves distinguishing 
between oneself and other objects in the material world with one's sense of self-esteem 
dependent upon being perceived by other people to be a unique individual. Hegel argues 
that, initially, a person wishes acknowledgment from others without granting recognition in 
return, a struggle for self-recognition which finds its most noteworthy expression in Hegel's 
discussion of the Master-Slave relationship (Plamenatz, 1963: 152-1 54).15 Sartre 
characterizes this struggle for self-recognition as being an attempt to avoid being objectified 
in the eyes of other people. Each person wishes to be seen as an active self-creating 
subject, not as a fixed entity comprised of static properties (Solomon, 1972:305). Yet with 
every purposeful action - every objectification of a project - the specific intentions of the 
individual are revealed. Other people are free to infer the presence of changeless personal 
characteristics on the basis of these significations. 
Lukacs' discussion of commodity fetishism and of the reification of consciousness 
are particularly relevant here. Reified thinking is predisposed to consider all phenomena as 
isolated empirical facts rather than as finite moments in a dynamic movement. 
Consequently, an individual's actions, words and gestures will in all likelihood be treated as 
statements of the static nature of the person's character. Reified thought is seen to be a 
feature associated with commodity fetishism, a style of reasoning prevalent in advanced 
capitalist society. Reification of consciousness hinders mutual recognition and non- 
distortive self-reflection, abstract thinking thereby acquiring an historical dimension." 
To some extent, childhood legacies are prototypes of the reifications of 
consciousness which people will encounter as adults. Yet Sartre maintains that youthful 
distortions are more profound, more fundamental, for they originate at a time when the 
individual is illequipped to make sense of them. The girl's state of physical and emotional 
dependence and her relative inexperience which act to constrain her powers of self- 
recognition combine with the probable prevalence of reified consciousness amongst adults 
to provide circumstances consistent with this explanation. Sartre also touches at the roots 
of Gramsci's notion of hegemony (Williams, 1 977:lO8-lll) by exploring how these 
reifications form part of largely unreflected memories of past encounters, lived as though 
they reflect reality. Early social constructions - reified due to being suppressed, repressed 
or simply inadequately examined - take on an essentialist cast.'' They coincide with what 
Victor Tumer calls "root paradigms", those "fundamental attitudes that are lived as matters 
of life and death" (Turner, 1974:64). 
Sartre (1 96311 968:106) argues that, in all its myriad forms, the project which is the 
individual's life is essentially the struggle to transcend these original skews and deviations, 
the residue of childhood alienations. The individual lives or exists these reifications, 
surpassing them yet preserving them in each act. One's personal history seems to unfold 
with the same critical deviations being broached, yet always in superficially new guises and 
at different levels of intensity. In Sartre's estimation, reflection can provide insight into the 
formation and maintenance of crucial reifications of consciousness. By situating decisive 
incidents in their social context, it becomes possible to identify the influences which were in 
play and to reconstruct one's role in the proceedings." By this point, Sartre's once 
controversial definition of existential freedom has shrunk to a more modest version, now 
being limited to that "small movement which makes of a totally conditioned social being 
someone who does not render back completely what his [sic] conditioning has given him" 
(Sartre, 1 969:45).19 
R ecent studies by Robert Connell (1987) and psychologist Edmund Sullivan (1984) use Sartre's model to explain how a person makes multiple 
constitutive choices, thereby shaping an ongoing sense of gender, sexual orientation, race, 
and ethnicity in a manner similar to that of class. The individual and society are mutually 
constituted by the process in which human agency encounters social structures, social 
constraints on individual practice. These elements comprise critical axes requiring 
negotiation by the individual in relating to everyday social situations, practice always 
occurring within a specific setting or realm of possibilities which is the precipitate of human 
history. Objective structures (Bourdieu, 198011 990; 1989) - including those related to status 
groups, ethnicity and gender as well as class (Bocock, 1992:147) - mediate the 
representations and practice of individuals of a particular group. It is in the context of these 
ongoing encounters that identity as a "socialized sense of individuality" (Epstein, 1987:29) 
is formed, maintained and altered. 
Structural contradictions expressed through the practices of care givers have a 
formative impact upon the child (Connell, 1987:221-222), yet they are not causally 
determinant. It may be the case that theinterpretive repertoire available is largely dependent 
on the realm of possibilities embodied by significant care givers. However, significant adult- 
child relations typically are not hermetically sealed from other social relationships. Neither 
does the self knowledge and behaviour of the child simply mirror that of significant adults, 
for individuals have the capacity to shape the meaning of existing cultural materials (Turner, 
1990:210). Sullivan indicates that the small element of freedom or creativity that exists in 
Sartre's concept of project can be seen to comprise a transformative dimension. This 
complements Pierre Bourdieu's recent, more conservative notion of "habitus" (Bourdieu, 
1977:78-79; 198011 990:54), specific values and attitudes embedded in significiant 
relationships of our childhood which form a common sense template filtering subsequent 
perceptions of reality (Sullivan, 1984:61). 
During the early years of a person's life, the sense of being-in-the-world appears to 
be particularly vulnerable to erratic, inconsistent or ambivalent responses from the social 
setting, particularly from significant care givers. Concurrent identity projects may come in 
conflict, requiring an expenditure of energy to maintain a sense of stability in the face of 
shifting external demands and contradictory responses from within (Connell, l987:22l). The 
resultant sense of 'ontological insecurity' (Laing, l959Il 965:39) may be momentary or more 
long lasting. This sensation of distress is also likely in conditions of oppression or 
domination when a person is objectified by others on the basis of possessing certain 
attributes. Especially abusive encounters of this type appear to be powerful vehicles for 
instilling an objectified sense of self with fixed characteristics. " This also suggest a way to 
decipher the experience of survivors of child abuse for whom personal trauma would appear 
to have precipitated reified self-concepts. Here we have a means to see the social origins 
of contradictions which are commonly constructed as psychological or emotional problems 
inherent in the individual (Jameson, l972:2l 8).21 
Patriarchy and racism appear to predate capitalism with their current expressions 
being mediated by historically specific capitalist formations (Sullivan, l984:9l-lOl; Gordon, 
1985:214; Foley, 1990:26-30). These systems of domination as well as ageism and 
homophobia lend themselves to this conceptual approach.22 In each instance, analysis is 
needed of the economic, political and ideological factors that perpetuate the discrepancy 
between normative rhetoric that trumpets equality and reality that perpetuates oppression. 
Here lived experience - both past and present, reflected and unreflected - reveals itself to 
be a multidimensional determining structure shaping perception and action. 
Structuralism, Poststructuralism and Beyond 
T his version of cultural Marxism tends to attribute power to individuals, but individuals embedded in a larger collectivity as ensembles of social relations. 
Structuralism, by contrast, eases the locus of power away from individuals as active 
initiators. From Louis Althusser through to the poststructuralism of Foucault, the emphasis 
is placed on 'structuring structuresm, social relations involving 'interpellation* (Althusser, 
19701 1971:163) whereby particular identities are hailed into existence. This approach 
neglects the individual's capacity to reflect on present and past relationships and to take 
action despite or in opposition to these determining relations. Despite these excesses, a 
lasting contribution of structuralists lies precisely in their appreciation of the issue of 
structure (Slack and Whitt, 19922582). Louis Althusser's conception of over determination 
is especially valuable in this regard. Here contradictions at different levels within a structure 
-- the economic, political, ideological - can be seen to overlap, resulting in a more 
consequential determination (Connell, 1983: 1 19). 
Contemporary poststructuralism continues structuralism's progression away from 
purposeful human action only now the notion of structure has been reduced to fragments 
and power is seen to reside primarily within d iscour~e.~~ Here poststructuralist Jacques 
Lacan uses structure to advance our understanding of human culture. He considers the 
initial structuring event to occur during a 'mirror stage' of human development. This 
psychoanalytic formulation predates Sartre's 'look of the other", a phenomenon to which it 
bears a striking resemblance. Lacan argues that any sense of a unified or whole self is a 
social product, the outcome of interaction with significant parental figures. The 'mirror stage' 
corresponds to when the girl, mirrored in the look of the other, imagines herself to be a 
whole person. This moment marks the entry of the child into active engagement with the 
prevailing cultural systems of representation (Lacan, 1966:97). 
According to Lacan, this initial identification structures the person's sense of self, the 
origins of which remain unconscious (Wilden, 1968/1981:160). Throughout our lives, he 
argues, we strive to recapture the fleeting sense of fullness associated with the 'mirror 
stage'. We seek to substantiate this wholeness from our perceptions of how we are viewed 
by others. Our preoccupation with securing a stable identity takes the form of ongoing self- 
constructions through which we attempt to integrate diverse and often divergent self- 
impressions into a coherent and consistent whole (Hall, 1992c:287-288). For Lacan, It is 
this sense of absence expressed through desire that sparks cultural creation, the will to 
represent, to express, to make sense, to make meaningful (Trawick, 1992:145). 25 
The dynamic nature of structuring relationships cannot be underestimated. Identity 
understood as the central organizing principle of multiple identifications (Hall, 1992c:287; 
Moore, 199464) can not be presumed to hold sway solely by means of the inertia embodied 
at its inception. As a social construction, one's sense of identity is embedded in social 
relations immediately encountered, remembered and anticipated. It is a work in progress 
requiring continuous reflexive supervision, an overseeing activity that demands an 
expenditure of energy. In part, it is the shifting complexity of this configuration that explains 
the undeniable distinctiveness of each person in the midst of relationships held in common. 
In addition, cognitive and emotional tendencies (Trawick, 1992:216) distinguish one human 
from the next moments after emerging from the birth canal. They, too, constitute stfucturing 
elements, decisive constraints on our meaning creating practices. 
Michel Foucault 
A rguably one of poststructuralism's foremost figures, Michel Foucault seeks to fashion a unique perspective by splitting the seams of conventional social 
theory. At the outset, he rejects phenomenology's notion of the meaning giving 
transcendental self. Similarly dismissed is structuralism's behaviourist conception of the 
individual preyed upon by rule bound stimuli emanating from prevailing social formations. 
Finally, he counters any claim that a hermeneutic is required to unearth meanings hidden 
from the individual, arguing instead that the positing of the existence of particular deeper 
meaning is merely a cultural construction which plays a regulatory function (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1982:xxiii-xxv). Foucault argues that all systems of interpretation are themselves 
structuring structures, constituting specific versions of human nature in the process of 
purporting to describe it2' This would account for his own "anti-theoretical stance" waitzkin, 
1991:21), Foucault avoiding an epistemologically coherent account for fear of imposing yet 
another interpretive grid which suppresses - and, potentially, oppresses - as much as it 
illuminates and reveals. 
Central to Foucault's approach is the concept of discourse, understood to refer to a 
group of statements which provide the means to discuss or represent a particular subject. 
These statements offer a language through which a topic can be talked about or constructed 
while simultaneously limiting the ways knowledge can be conveyed. Foucault uses 
discourse as an attempt to move beyond the limitations of the definition of ideology which 
promotes a false dichotomy between value-biased knowledge and value-free objectivity. He 
argues that all knowledge claims are produced within fields of power; as such, they are not 
immune to the interests of the individuals and groups who author them. Even - or, 
perhaps, especially - statements commonly understood to be factual are not value free 
(Hall, 1992d:291-293). 
What we understand to be social facts are representations about reality which are 
presented within a particular discourse (Rabinow, 1986; Hall, lgWd:292). Discourses are 
historically situated. Their associated claims to truth mobilize specific technologies 
commonly recognized to be legitimate mechanisms for distinguishing between accurate and 
inaccurate statements about social reality.*' The meaning that is produced is valid 
contextually, rather than universally. It must be situated within the economic, political, social 
and cultural processes at play at any moment (Hall, 1992c:13). This is no less true of the 
meaning giving practice that constitutes an individual's ongoing identity negotiations than 
it is of broad based accounts of social dynamics. The fields of power that are implicated are 
not limited to those focused upon in Mads classic account of capitalism. Significant forces 
exist in terms of race, gender, sexual orientation and other cultural traditions which inform 
economic phenomena associated with capitalist production much as they themselves are 
influenced in turn (West, 1993:266-268). 
In part, the recent emergence of the cultural politics of difference - identity politics - 
underlines the necessity to consider a variety of dimensions when attempting to carry out 
a cultural analysis. No meta-narrative or totalizing discourse can purport to offer a 
comprehensive account. Consistent with this view, Gayatri Spivak (1990:15) suggests a 
Marxist, feminist, deconstructionist sequence of analysis and even this list is not exhaustive. 
In addition, the relational nature of knowledge (Rosaldo, 198911 993:206-207) requires that 
the researcher be prepared to undertake a similar reflexive inquiry to supply the reader with 
adequate documentation of his or her own formative influences. We must resign ourselves 
to identifying the probable determining factors in order to arrive at a reconstruction of the 
precipitating events informing what is a uniquely individual interpretive process. Our 
rigorous labours notwithstanding, the outcome will be an informed speculation which is an 
approximation at best. 
Foucault employs the concept of discourse to direct attention away from a 
preoccupation with sovereign power housed in the state and towards a consideration of 
other techniques of domination which have emerged over the course of the past few 
centuries. Specifically, he identifies disciplinary power, a discursive mechanism which 
utilizes surveillance and is associated with the formation of new apparatuses of knowledge 
such as the human sciences (Smart, 1985:80). He points to the power of "men over women, 
of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, or medicine over the population, 
of administration over the ways people live" (Foucault, 198211 983b:211). In his estimation, 
the exercise of control in any of these areas is of little significance to the discussion of the 
economic aspects of power, yet these processes are crucial to the maintenance of power 
in a general way (Foucault, 1980: 1 16). They consist of power techniques pervading daily 
life in which people are categorized according to a specific identity, a dynamic which he 
terms subjection. 
Foucault uses subjection in two senses. First, as an object of dependence and 
control, the individual is subjected to discourses of knowledge and power. Second, an 
individual becomes a subject with a specific identity fashioned through the internalization of 
the information conveyed by these discourses, thereby acquiring a self-governing 
conscience (Foucault, 1982/1983b:212). Since the 1 8 0 0 ' ~ ~  subjection has been the basis 
of a subtle form of social control through the compiling of case files in which people are 
described, analysed and judged according to discernible particularities and differences. 
"The turning of real lives into writing functions as a procedure of objectification and 
subjectification" (Foucault, 1 975/l 979:l 92), measurement and calculation serving as 
mechanisms to individualize, train and discipline in a process Foucault terms normalization. 
The 19th century development of the prison system serves as an early example of 
normalization in which the prisoner and crime become the objects of scientific research and 
social control (Dreyfus and Rabinow, l982/1983: 189-1 94). Medicine, psychiatry and 
psychology are key players in this encounter, each fashioning a particular object in which 
knowledge of the individual is seen to be a prime requisite for rehabilitation. These 
specialized disciplines aid in the construction, classification and regulation of behaviour 
considered to be abnormal or anomalous (Foucault, 197511 979: 256). 
It is hardly a coincidence that the rise of these human sciences coincides with the 
growth in influence and sophistication of the modem state. The two are inextricably 
entwined, the disciplines of the human sciences simultaneously informing the ideological 
apparatus of the state and responding to its needs. Their similarities extend to the manner 
in which processes of normalization are central to their functioning. Recasting of political 
problems in the language of science is one way that the normalization process advances, 
expanding its realm of supervision and administration over social problems which it is ill- 
equipped to resolve. Failure to achieve its stated ends merely fuels calls to extend the 
authority of these human science specialists (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:189-198).~~ 
Contemporary Theory on The Role of the State 
I n one of his final essays, Foucault reverses his emphasis on local expressions of power (Bocock, 1986:16) by identifying the state as the main repository of 
subjection, the administrative moulding of the individual's conscience previously exercised 
by the church in the form of pastoral power (Foucault, 198211 983b:212-21 5).30 He calls for 
resistance both to the state in its incessant campaign to advance the interests of the status 
quo and to the normalized subjectivity propagated by the various agencies of the state. His 
targeting of "this kind of 'double bind,' which is the simultaneous individualization and 
totalization of modern power structures" (Foucault, 1982/1983b:216) is evocative of 
hegemony in which consent is secured under the guise of common ~ense.~ '  Similarly, the 
disciplinary "gaze" shares features in common with Sartre's "look" writ large. And his 
emphasis on the state's role in individualization is evocative of Mads depiction of the state's 
enshrinement of the rights of individuals to the detriment of those of the group. Here the 
state is not understood to be the direct, monolithic administrative arm of dominant classes. 
Rather, it performs its organising role with relative independence, containing and 
constraining conflicts between various classes and social groups yet doing so in a manner 
that maximizes the hegemony of dominant interests (Bottomore, 1983:464- 465; Giddens, 
1982; Ng, 1988:22). 
The late 19th and early 20th century witnessed the emergence of an increasingly 
sophisticated, centralized state in Western societies. The capitalist welfare state employs 
laws and social policy to support an ideology of free and equal exchange between 
individuals as conspicuously exploitative arrangements have given way to a market based 
economy in which such notions of equality and freedom are explicit. Each working person 
is considered to be equally able to exchange his or her labour power for a wage. Attendant 
principles of individual rights, responsibilities and self control are embedded as 
commonplace assumptions with the consolidation and expansion of the capitalist mode of 
production (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991 ; Foucault, 197511 979). In due course, traditional 
social relationships are supplanted by commodified relations of exchange between 
increasingly automatized individuals (Keat and Uny, 1975; Marx, 188711 967; Spitzer, 1983; 
Verlaan, 1991). 
Self mastery and individual responsibility are fundamental premises which underlie 
the systems of civil law, criminal justice and health under capitalism. The policies and 
practices of these apparatuses serve to fragment notions of class allegiance or political 
coherence by representing workers as individual citizens while simultaneously promoting an 
image of the state as the guardian of the interests of society in its entirety (Ratner et al., 
1987; Wilson, 1977). The state possesses a legitimacy to intervene and to exercise 
normalizing or social control functions when standards of behaviour are judged to have been 
violated. This is no more apparent than in matters of social justice which reinforce the 
individual wage contract. Justice is meted out through court cases, a mechanism whereby 
the state regulates relations between economic classes as well as ethnic, gendered and 
other social groups by re-casting them in individual terms (Taylor, 1983; Verlaan, 1991). 
The dialectical nature of the state's evolution is attested to by the fact that extension 
of the social safety net was largely due to political struggles waged by working people 
(Gough, 1979; Gramsci, 1988; Ratner et all 1987; Scull, 1984; Verlaan, 1990; Wilson, 1977). 
State benevolence takes the form of treatment and care for those individuals who are unable 
or unwilling to comply with the norms of individual responsibility, self-reliance and 
productivity. By the mid 19th century, workhouses and asylums were well entrenched as 
institutionalized markers of the deviant and the abnormal, this segregating function 
simultaneously reinforcing the dominant societal expectations of all its citizens (Scull, 19771 
1984; Spitzer, 1975). It is in this context that Foucault's concept of subjection gains its 
relevance as groups and individuals, finding themselves increasingly subjected to the 
disciplining influence of social policy and practices, interiorise normative expectations as 
self-monitoring references. " 
T he "discovery" of childhood (Aries, 1962) is an example of this phenomenon. With the designation of children as a distinct class of people came an 
accompanying assortment of rights, obligations and characteristics reflecting this special 
status. Perceived as being innocent, dependent and nonresponsible, children found 
themselves in a relatively powerless position with respect to society as a whole. Typically 
characterized as politically disenfranchised, economically dependent, socially unorganized, 
and physically weak, children were especially vulnerable to the sanctions and rules of more 
powerful adults who assumed responsibility for their well being (Conrad and Schneider, 
1 980). 
The establishing of childhood as a distinct category was furthered by the expansion 
of capitalism and the consolidation of the welfare state. The spread of wage labour served 
to erode the ability of the head of the family to support and control family members. The 
state assumed numerous responsibilities and rights formerly residing with this patriarchical 
figure (Gordon, 1988). The state's rights over children enshrined in the concept of parens 
patrie with its associated tutelary complex (Donzelot, 1979; Campbell, 1990; Conrad and 
Schneider, 1980; Ingleby, 1985) is perhaps the most striking instance of its paternal function. 
The essence of this benevolent role was the right and responsibility to determine what is in 
the person's best interests, regardless of the individual's point of view on the matter. This 
amounted to a legal sanction to ensure that children receive adequate resources for the 
passage from dependent and possibly deviant childhood to responsible adulthood (Conrad 
and Schneider, 1980). It was an attitude which would become legitimized and entrenched 
as a virtual common sense truism as state employed professionals with their supposed 
expertise increasingly extended the influence of the state into civil society (Ingleby, 1985; 
Conrad and Schneider, 1980; Lasch, 1977). 33 
Under contemporary conditions, this mandate is articulated by a variety of 
apparatuses - social service, housing, education, health, criminal justice - whose scope 
and sophistication far exceed anything remotely present during Marx's time. These sub- 
systems flourish with an ostensible independence which typically detracts from the 
investigation of how this illusory appearance of relative autonomy is itself a feature of the 
social whole. 
Legitimation of this process is provided by members of what Pierre Bourdieu has 
termed a "new cultural petite bourgeoisie" (Bourdieu, 1984466-472). This consists of 
workers in the area of health and social welfare whose leverage is due to their educational 
qualifications, or "cultural capital" (Bourdieu, 1984; Dickinson and Andre, l988:3OO). 
Termed "social regulators" (Suarez-Orozco, l987:232) by Foucault, these professionals "are 
in a position to articulate and change public perception through their power over knowledge 
via the media, professional journals, schools, universities, and popular culture at large" 
(Kenny, l986:8). This category includes both mental health workers ranging from 
psychiatrists and nurses to psychologists, social workers, family counsellors, child care and 
youth workers and involves the ideological "production of needs for public services as well 
as the provision of those services" (Lash and Urry, 1987:295). 
Members of the state's "social problems apparatus" (Morgan, 1981 ; Ng, 1988:27), 
these middle class professionals are employed either as individual consultants or as 
program staff to provide care to andlor social control of a designated population (Wilson, 
1977; Ng, 1988:99). This description includes the staff of the Facilitating Program engaged 
as they are in the delivery of mental health services primarily to adolescents who have been 
identified as being conduct disordered." Funded by the Ministry of Health, their role fulfills 
a tutelary function in the area of child and youth welfare. Specifically, it entails a regime of 
guardianship, orchestrated relations of discipline, instruction, care and protection (Dyck, 
1991:24) intended to address perceived instances of delinquency, child abuse and neglect. 
Here we are reminded of Gramsci's distinction between the use of legalized coercion 
by means of the courts, prisons, police, on the one hand, and the manufacturing of Consent 
through the dissemination of a specific set of values, beliefs and attitudes by the mass 
media, schools, religious institutions and the family, on the other. Both aspects are activated 
to advance the interests of the established order, yet it is the subtle mechanisms of consent 
that predominate within the practice of medicine (Waitzkin, 1991:15) and the health 
professions, in general. Within the daily practice of each of these disciplines, the plight of 
the individual is seldom situated within a cultural critique, an oversight which enables 
micro political encounters to maintain and reinforce prevailing social relations of society as 
a whole (Waitzkin, 1991 :9). 
Critical Medical Anthropology 
C ritical medical anthropology views biomedicine - Western medicine - as a cultural system which constitutes as well as expresses cultural meanings, 
conveying an experience of common sense reality or seamless immediacy. The 
practitioners of this approach typically hold to the view that biomedicine does not uncover 
facts so much as produce them, its empiricist premises and methods effectively sanctioning 
the existing social order by obscuring the feasibility of producing alternative views (Young, 
1980:144). The objective of critical medical anthropology is to throw into relief the ideological 
premises of conventional knowledge (Young, 1980: 136; Hammersley and Atkinson, l983:3- 
5; Aronowitz, 1988) generated and sustained by the interplay between biomedicine and 
broader cultural processes of Western industrialized society. 
Conventional knowledge commonly holds that human behaviour is largely 
attributable to the voluntarist, intra psychic motivation of each individual with society being 
the sum of these separate parts (Gaines, 1992). In this view, accuracy is supposedly 
secured with the transfer of the natural science's methodology to social concerns, the use 
of allegedly value free language ensuring objectivity (Young, 1980: 137). By contrast, critical 
medical anthropology contends that biomedicine's distinct theoretical orientation and specific 
social relations of knowledge production mystify by marginalizing or suppressing certain 
knowledge in the process of privileging particular empirical facts (Young, 1980:144; 
Rabinow, 1986; Waitzkin, 1991). It argues that biomedicine substitutes a desocialized unit 
of analysis for an actual human subject, thereby doing violence to the existence of personal 
meaning (Young, 1980; Kovel, 1988; Lock, 1987: 38). 
Critical medical anthropology contains within its ranks a distinctly Marxist current 
which maintains that biomedical terminology is infused with epistemological assumptions 
reflective of the capitalist mode of production in which it is fashioned (McLean, 1990:979). 
This approach considers conventional psychiatric categories - conduct disorder, for 
example - to be dichotomizing categories supported by the "rational individualist" (Comaroff, 
198257) ideology of contemporary Western capitalism which promotes the division of mind 
from body, subject from object, individual from society, etc. It also argues that biomedical 
treatment routinely favours pragmatic individual coping when the source of the predicament 
frequently lies at the level of social conditions requiring collective efforts to resolve (Waitzkin, 
1991). 
Critical medical anthropology strives to "approach health problems, conceptions, and 
institutions without separating the intimately related dimensions of contextual constraints, 
meaning systems, and individual experience" (Bibeau, 1988:404-405). A chorus of voices 
can be heard calling for a perspective capable of accommodating global, regional, local 
and personal influences within a "thick description" (Bibeau, 1988:402) reflective of their 
subtle interconnections in everyday life. One observer characterizes this situation as "a 
theoretical impasse ... which requires a welldifferentiated theory of power able to draw 
together theories of structure and theories of agency under one more advanced theoretical 
perspective1' (Pappas, 1 990:203). Consistent with the suggestions (Bibeau, 1988; 
Frankenberg, 1988:330) and the practice (Waitzkin, 1991) of some, the preceding 
theoretical discussion represents my own efforts to mine the cultural Marxist heritage to 
meet this challenge. In particular, I have focussed on ideological dimensions of knowledge 
production constituted in distinct economic and political conditions and constitutive of those 
circumstances in turn. What remains to be outlined are a methodology and methods 
compatible with this outlook. 
CHAPTER THREE - TOOLS, TOOLKIT, PRACTICE 
We do not see things as they are; 
We see them as we are. 
Talmud 
Anthropology ... does not simply describe its subject matter; it systematically 
constructs and produces it. 
Bernard McGrane (McGrane, 1989:4) 
M y methodology draws on the premise that we can never "legitimately claim access to demystified facts" (Young, 1982:277). Shared 
meanings, symbols and practices - in a word, cultures - are neither homogeneous nor 
neutral. Intewoven with power dynamics, this "multi-vocal and over determined" (Rabinow 
and Sullivan, 197911 987:7-8) field constitutes an intersubjedive realm in which there can be 
no final recounting, no privileged perspective from which to capture objective reality. The 
approach which appears to be the most suitable for documenting this relational knowledge 
(Rosaldo, 1989/1993:206-207) can be found within Mads dialectical methodology, an 
orientation which I attempt to refine by drawing upon subsequent developments in 
phenomenology. 
Dialectical Phenomenology1 
M a d s  method holds that the subject of knowledge and object of knowledge are united in a dynamic relationship which is grounded in time and place. 
This unity does not imply that subject and object are indistinguishable from one another, but 
simply that objects of our knowledge are understandable only with reference to the nature 
of the purposeful relationship, or way of life, that we have with those objects (Bologh, 
1979:4). Within this interpretive framework, attempts to understand other people requires 
not only an awareness of our relationship towards the observed but also an appreciation of 
their attitude towards us, an assessment which necessarily encompasses the potential 
impact of our presence on their behaviour. Each component of this interactional 
relationship, or "double hermeneutic" (Giddens, 1976: l52), must be considered in turn. 
Neither is this relationship constrained by time, the purposeful behaviour - meaninggiving 
practices or cultures (Bocock, 1992:234) - of both parties being informed by past 
occurrences, present circumstances and the anticipation of future eventualities. 
Marx claims that: '[mlen make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they make it under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from 
the past" (Marx, 184711 963: 15). Dialectical phenomenology must demonstrate an ability to 
capture this ongoing process in which social structure shapes human practice - including 
knowledge production - while being altered by human intervention. The progressive- 
regressive method introduced by Henri Lefebvre (1 971) and adapted by Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1 96311 968:51-52) represents a persuasive example of such an approach (Bibeau, 1988: 
403). Sartre's version of this technique begins with an analysis of the contending social 
structures in play at a particular moment. This is followed by what he terms a regressive 
step in which the stages in the development of each structure are detailed and those 
aspects which continue to survive are identified. He then follows the path of the individual 
in the midst of these social constraints as successive decisions within the existing field of 
possibilities result in historical actions, cultural products and simultaneous self-constitution 
(Sartre, 196311 968:146-147). 
This method offers a means to explore 'the social conditions of knowledge 
production" (Young, 1982:277). At a minimum, it situates various determining structures and 
episodes in chronological order and documents how the individual interacts with these 
influences. It suggests that an interpretation of this data will lead to insights into social 
factors which played a formative role in the person's self-creation and which continue to be 
revealed in present practice (Striven, 19841 19). Nevertheless, it is not enough to situate 
the person within specific circumstances and then attempt to pinpoint which economic, 
political and ideological elements are over determined. While social determinations act as 
a pressure on individual practice, they do not actually cause beliefs and behaviour. A 
person's consciousness acts as the ultimate mediator between social conditions and 
purposeful action. 
Marx's initial conception is further enriched by the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer which argues that mutual comprehension occurs when the distinct traditions 
embodied by each person overlap sufficiently to constitute a "fusion of horizonsn (Ulin, 
1984:99). Paul Ricoueur subsequently injects the issue of power into this ostensibly benign 
interaction, highlighting the play of contending discourses that infuse all cultural encounters 
(Ulin, 1984:105106). Intersubjectivity's contentious nature ensures that all understanding 
is less a matter of shared recognition and harmony than one of negotiated agreement and 
accommodation. People may share certain interests with other individuals due to coinciding 
realms of possibilities related to similar subject positions of gender, sexual orientation, class, 
age, etc. Yet the recognition of values and interests held in common are ultimately a product 
of interpretation on the part of each person, rather than due to the existence of an essential 
point of view that comprises each identity position (Marsh, 1988:203). 
The methodology of this radical historicist perspective includes notions of indexicality 
and reflexivity which enable us to move beyond the limitations of most interpretive accounts 
and to critique the shortcomings of certain postmodernist proposals. lndexicality indicates 
that meaning is context dependent; a statement must be located in a particular moment in 
place and time for its meaning to be grasped (Watson, 1991:76). Similarly, reflexivity 
highlights the fact that our discourse is tied to its setting. It both describes this context and 
modifies it in turn. In this manner, facts are not uncovered in a pre-existing reality but are 
produced by our discourse and are constitutive of that reality, effectively making it what it is 
(Watson, 1991 :79). 
Here we are reminded of Foucault's assertion that conceptions of truth and 
representations of the subject are social practices constituted in precise contexts of space 
and time (Rabinow, 1986:240). Insofar as any ethnographic representation takes the 
interaction out of its context, it remains a reconstruction of "partial truths" (Clifford, 1986:lO) 
- "no matter how extended the quotations from informants, how intensive the dialogue 
between interlocutors, or how many voices the ethnography speaks for" (Fox, 1991 94). 
Consequently, this approach cannot claim to represent the participants in the sense of 
"speaking for", only to re-present (Spivak, l988:275). 
Reflexivity and Self-Reflexivity 
Q uestions of reflexivity are complicated by the fact that human activity cannot be attributed entirely to rational thought, historically and culturally positioned 
though it may be. From Marx to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty to Foucault, phenomenology 
includes in its ranks thinkers who recognize the embodied nature of human knowledge. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, depicts the lived body as the primary organizer of 
experience, an integrator of skills (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:xxi) which is less susceptible 
to comprehensive understanding than Sartre's dialectical analysis would lead us to believe. 
A part of our lived experience surpasses the boundaries of conscious rationality, 
encompassing sensations more unconscious than conscious. Included in its repertoire are 
what Raymond Williams has called structures of feeling, an aesthetic concept which 
addresses how emerging values and meanings are felt and lived prior to being formally 
articulated. Here thoughts and feelings co-mingle within the continuity of practical 
consciousness (Williams, 1 977:129-135). 
Capturing this experiential realm in words is highly problematic. The interpretive 
exercise has been termed a 'triple hermeneutics (Richer, 1988:409), an intervention which 
begins with the 'tacit stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the constitution of 
social activity" (Richer, l988AO9). This 'practical consciousnessn (Giddens, 1979:s) 
consists of more or less reflected material, the product of the interaction of lived experience, 
the current cultural context and the unique predispositions inherent in our individual biology. 
Martin Heidegger reminds us that the meaningful practices which comprise this figure and 
field of human activity elude total comprehension (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:xxi; Marsh, 
1988:27), one aspect of the dynamic configuration being informed simultaneously by the 
other. Here the concepts of dominant, residual and emergent used to account for the 
dissimilar character of historically distinct and variable cultural traditions, institutions and 
formations (Williams, 1977: 121 -1 23) are equally useful in depicting that interplay of dynamic 
cultural processes which constitutes the consciousness of each individual. 
The second phase of interpretation is a collaborative project, practical consciousness 
being mediated by the observer. What results are reflections prompted by the researcher's 
line of inquiry, 'knowledge which actors are able to express at the level of discoursea 
(Giddens, 1979:s). The third and final moment of the hermeneutic occurs when the 
observer attempts to write up this encounter, an authored account which one ethnographer 
has characterised as 'an attempt to elicit what I experienced in light of what I now know" 
(Dumont, 1978:71). As is the case with each step in this interaction, the constituents of 
knowledge are transformed to some extent in this phase as well. 
Additional obstacles stand in the way of the understanding of self and other. For 
instance, the construction of a self-narrative necessarily involves the designation of certain 
incidents as having a decisive impact on one's interpretation of the world and upon 
subsequent behaviour. Yet the assigning of particular significance may change over time. 
Comprehension is always historically contextualized, influenced by current conditions and 
liable to be altered as these circumstances change. Our life story is 'always unfolding and 
always being revised" (Fay, 1987:174), revealing the existence of an authentic or genuine 
narrative disclosing our fundamental identity to be an illusion. Neither are meaning giving 
practices wholly cohesive and uniform. Each of us makes decisions which conflict with our 
belief systems which are themselves neither completely consistent nor free of contradictions 
(Abu-Lughod, 1991 ; Jackson, 1996). 
Our self-narratives may be disputed by historical events but it is important to 
recognize that historical narratives themselves are prey to differing interpretations (Spence, 
1982). They do not exist as value-free objective accounts. Each is subject to and the 
product of interpretation, aspects and elements shifting in emphasis as additional 
information and our evolving personal traditions are brought to bear on what are ostensibly 
singular events and incidents (Rosaldo, 198911 993: 131). 
Jacques Denida states that "deconstruction is not exposure of error; it is a vigilance 
about the fact that we are always obliged to produce truth" (Spivak, 1990:46). This 
suggests that within the dominant practices of Western knowledge production, we seem to 
be compelled to arrive at a single, irrefutable explanation for the actions of ourselves and 
others. In actuality, there may be multiple reasons lying behind human behaviour (Pratt, 
1978:67; Freire, 1992/1994:16). Although we may be able to identify what appears to be the 
most significant of the determining factors, we cannot presume to have exhausted all the 
possibilities. 
Our problems are compounded when we turn our gaze on another person. Paul 
Ricoeur, Paul Rabinow and Clifford Geedz (1 988) have commented on "the comprehension 
of the self by the detour of the other" (Rabinow, 1977:5), yet the corollorary is equally 
relevant. Our perceptions of the other are mediated by our own conception of selfhood (Fay, 
1987:173). An aspect of our personal tradition, our sense of self serves as a basis for the 
comprehension of other people, despite the inevitable limitations and opacities which this 
entails (Ulin, 198499; Cohen, 1992:ZX). Conversely, how we understand ourselves is 
partly a function of how we understand others. Conceptions of self are strengthened in 
some aspects and modified in others in the course of apprehending another person. In this 
sense, no clear distinction can be made between the interpretation of the self and that of 
another person as both representations are dialectically intertwined (Fay, 1987:172-173). 
The necessity for the inclusion of a personal inventory has only recently come to be 
acknowledged within anthropology, the influence of positivism having cast an imposing 
shadow on the conventions of ethnographic authority (Okely, 1992). Certainly, this self- 
scrutiny must be selective. It is not the case that 'anthropology should be 'about the 
anthropologist's self: rather, it must be informed by it" (Cohen, 1992:230, original 
emphasis).' Disclosure of significant life experiences is intended to instruct the reader on 
the depth and breadth of the ethnographer's sensibilities concerning the area of study. As 
a positioned subject, the ethnographer is able to comprehend certain human predicaments 
better than others. This is due in no small part to the fact that 'life experiences both enable 
and inhibit particular kinds of insight" (Rosaldo, l989Il 993: 19). 
M y own unique perceptual lens were forged in large part in the late 1960's and early 1970'~~ during the heyday of anti-Vietnam demonstrations, civil rights 
marches and student protests. I had been sympathetic to these causes but my involvement 
in their activities had been sporadic and largely peripheral. Try as I might, I couldn't find a 
way to connect my personal experience with the sweeping phrases and ringing generalities 
even while I found no reason to doubt their basic message. Instead, my energies had been 
devoted to trying to locate an inclusive perspective from the offerings of psychology, 
sociology, anthropology and literature that I encountered in the university classroom. 
I completed my undergraduate course work stymied. Where novels and poetry 
permitted a glimpse into the sensibilities of individuals, their musings scarcely seemed the 
stuff from which to fashion a personal code of ethics or a political plan of action. The 
apparent strengths of the social sciences proved to be their shortcomings as well. Rigorous, 
systematic and dispassionate to a fault, their concepts and procedures wrung the juices out 
of the processes they sought to capture. My own latent sense of alienation drew me to the 
plight of troubled teenagers. I was aware that psychiatrists enjoyed a greater degree of 
professional freedom than psychologists, despite the fact that I considered medical training 
to be more of a hindrance than an asset to the understanding of mental disturbances. I 
enrolled in medical school. 
Within three months, my growing misgivings could be ignored no longer. The 
minutiae of biological medicine failed to hold my interest. I lacked the time to continue my 
growing interest in progressive politics. 1 began to question whether I was entering this 
profession for power or for knowledge. If it was the latter, then it was knowledge which I was 
evidently poorly motivated to acquire and retain. The deliberate campaign by the faculty to 
transfer the aura of authority onto each of its new recruits crystallized my feelings of unease, 
offering a convenient outlet for my sense of frustration. A belated youthful rebellion had 
found an identifiable target. It was no less consuming nor righteous for its delayed 
occurrence. Yet my spuming of membership in the medical fraternity would not be without 
a struggle. I found myself clear in my head that I must leave medical school but in turmoil 
in my stomach about the consequences of such a move. The resulting conflict ended in a 
standoff. I simply was incapable of walking into the dean's office to announce my withdrawal 
from the program and I was utterly confused by my inability to take that step. 
After weeks of indecision and growing anxiety, I was faced with another crisis. 
Flooded out of my rented basement room, I was forced to return to my family home while I 
looked for other accommodations. Settled once more into the familiar surroundings of my 
childhood bedroom, I tossed and turned through sleepless nights, my mind whirling 
constantly, trying to make sense of my reluctance to act on what had become a foregone 
conclusion. While it was clear to me that I must quit medical school, I had begun to feel to 
do so would mark me as a failure. My anguish continued until the early hours of the third 
night when I pierced the membrane of the past and was once more fully immersed in its 
reality. I found myself as a nine year old standing in the family kitchen waiting with a 
tightening knot in my stomach as my parents looked over my report card. I knew that there 
would be the customary praise about the good marks in certain courses, but I stood 
anticipating the '...but why didn't you do better in [math], or [science]?" The engulfing wrinkle 
in time evaporated just as abruptly as it had materialized. I was deposited back in the 
present but my state of being had been transformed. It was as though an emotional 
abscess had been lanced and drained, leaving me calm, revitalised and totally resolved to 
carry through on my decision. 
I had no doubt that this revealed truth was just that. I was convinced that I had re- 
experienced an actual childhood event, understanding its implications clearly for the first 
time. My obsession with academic success had been instilled in me during childhood. In 
a family in which affection was rarely demonstrated in a direct, unequivocal manner, I had 
learned that doing well in school offered a fleeting moment of nurturance. But it was to be 
brief and always carried with it the qualification that what I had achieved was not quite 
adequate, that I was not quite good enough. As my mother would later explain, "we thought 
that if we told you that you were doing well, you would quit tryingw. My own interpretation of 
this memory was that the class expectations of my parents had caused them to push me to 
succeed, that I had interiorised a class biased perspective of what was expected of me. I 
concluded that by becoming a doctor, I would fulfill their unspoken aspirations for me. By 
turning my back on this career path, I would become a failure in their eyes. I decided that 
although I had left home many years before, the family remained instilled in me. This 
interpretation enabled me to move beyond my dilemma. It was to be some years later 
before it dawned on me that it also provided me with a means to shift responsibility for my 
indecision onto my parents. 
The possibility that my epiphany might have been an hallucination induced by sleep 
deprivation never entered my mind; neither did the fact that my growing attraction to 
progressive politics and my subsequent crisis may have informed both the content of my 
experience and my conclusions. To my way of thinking, I had shattered the class constraints 
of my upbringing and was now bound and determined to make certain that I would never be 
duped in this manner again. Armed with my heightened awareness of the roots of my own 
oppression, I found common cause with others involved in new left politics. Simultaneous 
with this new found activism, I entered a graduate program in sociology, embarking upon an 
exploration of how class biases are transmitted during childhood. 
I began my studies with R.D. Laing's Divided Self (Laing, 195911965) which provided 
me with the words to describe the sensations I had encountered during my period of conflict. 
His analysis of ontological insecurity made intuitive sense to me and I soon devoured Self 
and Others (Laing, 1961/1971) and Sanity, Madness and the Family (Laing and Esterson, 
196411971). While I found Laing's accounts compelling, I was particularly drawn to the 
quotes and footnotes credited to Jean-Paul Sartre. They grounded Laing's analyses by 
attending to the social circumstances, situating personal lived experience within a broader 
political outlook. His perspective so mirrored my own that it never occurred to me that the 
version of reality contained in the pages of Search for a Method (Sartre, 196311 968) was 
anything other than reality itself. For a time, I superimposed a class analysis on every social 
situation that I encountered. I had moved from one absolute construction of reality to 
another, reducing the world's complexities to a single dimension in the process. 
Over time, I added other variables to this conceptual grid. My turn to conventional 
anthropology was initially informed by the desire to better understand the contours of class, 
race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and age, features of a 'multiplex identity" 
(Rosaldo, 198911 993: 166) which I understood to be ways of life or cultures. Yet I brought 
something with me as well. Much as Sartre sought to rehabilitate orthodox Marxism by 
revitalising its appreciation of the meaning producing practices of the individual, my agenda 
was to make a place for this version of cultural Marxism within contemporary anthropology. 
My initial forays were skewed by the fact that I shared Sartre's conviction that his 
methodology was capable of disclosing objective facts. Only through the influence of 
poststructuralist theory with its critique of the latent positivism informing much of modernist 
thought was I able to dispel this illusion. On the other hand, the implications of the grounded 
nature of knowledge provided me with a hedge against the seductions of the 
poststructuralist or postmodemist turn in social theory. A critical interpretive position neither 
presumes a neutral vantage point nor opts for radical relativism. It pursues a middle course, 
acknowledging that 'relativizing is a liberatory [sic] technique that must always arise from a 
contingent, but nevertheless real, Archimedean standpoint" (di Leonardo, 1996:29). It is 
from this basis that the critical interpretive perspective endeavours to convince people to 
"adopt a particular narrative account of their lives" (Fay, 1987:71). 
Discourse Analysis 
T hese formative influences have shaped the methodological premises that guide my cultural critique of the Facilitating Program's production of 
knowledge. What Howard Waitzkin (1991) contributes is an additional means to illuminate 
the discussions and documents which are integral components of the Program. Waitzkin's 
use of discourse analysis is limited to the examination of the use of language which he 
considers to be a determinant of human behaviour but not ultimately constitutive of people. 
Waitzkin combines this conception of language with lessons from deconstruction which 
argue that a critical reading of a text will reveal contextual concerns or contradictions which 
have been marginalized or excluded. Inconsistencies, omissions, breaks in logic become 
the basis for a critique of the text in light of its social context. 
Waitzkin indicates that ideology and social control may reveal themselves through 
absences, the "not-said" (Eagleton, 1978: 89). Specifically, he notes that there may be a 
lack of critical attention to underlying social contradictions, a skirting of structural problems 
or a failure to raise alternatives which would require changing prevailing social conditions. 
In particular, Waitzkin identifies categories of class, gender, age and race to comprise 
common systemic patterns of dominance and subordination. Here we can expect 
oppositional positions to erode the margins of the dominant ideology, exposing structural 
contradictions underlying the common sense immediacy of surface appearances (Waitzkin, 
1991 132-39). 
Waitzkin's version of discourse analysis appears to be a novel contribution from post- 
structuralism and deconstructionism. Yet it is effectively a methodological application of 
Marx's conception of ideology as communication which conceals contradictions. Certainly, 
Gramsci's notion of hegemony anticipates much that is presented here. So too does 
Raymond Williams' discussion of selective traditions (Williams, 1977:115) and Fredric 
Jameson's concept of political unconscious (Jameson, 1981 ; Connerton, l989:l). Each 
addresses the process by which the dominant patterns of communication shape everyday 
interactions in such a way that a limited range of options is apparent (Waitzkin, 1991:40). 
Each of these theorists indicates how the dominant discourse can be relied upon to 
suppress alternatives which promote the fundamental restructuring of social relations. 
Deconstructing Biomedicine 
B oth the progressive-regressive method and discourse analysis constitute promising methodologies for the identification of the social conditions of 
knowledge production. Yet my overall task is further complicated by the fact that a primary 
object of this inquiry is a program and staff situated within - yet in stated opposition to - the 
field of biomedicine, a domain of discourse and practice that stands in a mutually constitutive 
relationship to conventional knowledge. What is required is an approach which will enable 
me to disclose the "aura of factuality" (Rhodes, 1990:160-161) surrounding this body of 
knowledge. In short, I need the means to make biomedical discourse and practice 
distinctive. This task consists of separating biomedicine from commonplace assumptions 
with which it is intimately associated while drawing attention to the culturally constructed 
nature of both knowledge systems. 
Towards this strategic end, Lorna Amarasingham Rhodes (1 990:161) proposes three 
interrelated tactics. The first addresses biomedicine as a function of its historical context, 
an expression of a specific time and place rather than a timeless, value free "natural" 
science. The second unpacks biomedical categories revealing the social meaning which 
cements them together. The third procedure involves exploring the everyday practice of 
biomedical clinicians. What is at stake is the dispelling of the illusion of self-evident facts 
from what is, in actuality, culturally constructed evidence which provides practitioners with 
much of their claims to authority. While biomedicine comprises the dominant framework, 
the Facilitating Program purports to represent an emergent tendency, at once drawing 
credibility from its association with biomedicine while asserting its own claims to autonomy 
and legitimacy. Methods of demystification similar to those applied to biomedicine will be 
brought to bear on these practices as well. 
The examination of historical context, medical discourse and professional practice 
offers three avenues for the documentation of biomedicine as a cultural construction. These 
methodologies suggest a means to dismantle biomedical concepts which purport to reflect 
the "natural" world, thereby offering a mechanism to disclose ''the social facticity of facts" 
(Taussig, 1980:5). They offer avenues for tracing the interaction and intermingling of 
knowledgelpower between biomedicine - specifically, psychiatry - with its focus on mental 
illness and nonbiomedical social sciences - notably, social work and psychology -with their 
preoccupation with mental health (Dickinson and Andre, 1988:305). 
Their use has the potential for unearthing the seemingly contradictory processes of 
social control, support and empowerment that appear to co-exist within the apparatuses of 
the capitalist state. They enable me to probe the interpersonal dynamics implicated in what 
has been termed therapeutic efficacy, the ability of therapy to achieve its intended outcome 
(Kleinman and Csordas, 1990: 18). Here therapeutic intervention is considered to be less 
a discrete event than a mechanism which is embedded in a larger societal process of values 
and beliefs. As such, its culturally prescribed goal may be either one of adaptation to the 
status quo or societal critique, promoting personal transformation and social reform 
(Kleinman and Csordas, 199O:X). 
Nevertheless, the limitations of my approach must not be minimized. My account 
may avoid some of the fictions inherent in ethnographies inclined towards positivism, but it 
remains an instance of informed speculation all the same (Fox, 1991 :95; Lock and Scheper- 
Hughes, 1990:49). What we are left with is the possibility of presenting probable 
explanations, the impossibility of achieving total comprehension and the potential to 
transform conventional understanding in the course of constructing accounts that can only 
re-present, never represent. We may move further along the path to clarifying the material 
conditions which give rise to these significations but definitive empirical validity will always 
elude our grasp. 
Methodological Principles in Practice 
T he initial phase of my fieldwork consisted of a year of regular attendance at the weekly clinical meeting of the Facilitating Program. This session gathers 
together representatives from each of the major departments - management, psychiatry, 
social work, psychology, education, residential child care and community support - in order 
to address issues related to their daily operations as well as the long term prospects for 
program development. This interval was followed by an additional year spent on site, 
investigating the perspectives and procedures of the various components, monitoring the 
care plan process and situating the Program within its historical context. 
During this period, I participated in 3 regional conferences at which representatives 
of the Facilitating Program outlined the nature of their perspective to social service workers, 
teachers and mental health professionals. The first consisted of a three day meeting of 
social service and health professionals on the theme of "Bridging the Gaps in Mental Health 
Service." The second involved a one day conference of school and community 
professionals entitled "Partnerships for At Risk Youth in Transition" which centred on the 
coordination of services for supposed conduct disordered youths. The third was an 
afternoon presentation and discussion involving staff at a suburban hospital. 
I was in attendance at one provincial gathering of child psychiatrists where Program 
representatives presented a paper related to the conference theme of conduct disorder as 
well as at one national convention of child psychiatry where staff members convened a 
workshop on the results of their work. I also took part in an international conference on 
attachment theory in Toronto which was the first major gathering of its kind, attracting a 
number of prominent figures in the fields of psychology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis from 
England, Italy, the United States and Canada. 
A portion of the fieldwork data consists of documents pertaining to the background 
of the treatment centre and the Facilitating Program. This includes various reports related 
to the formation of the Program, graduate theses prepared by employees of the centre, 
annual reports and meeting minutes. This material is supplemented by transcripts of taped 
interviews with 18 staff members recounting their involvement with the centre and with the 
Program itself. Initial interviews varied from one to three hours in length. Additional 
interviews ranging from one to eight hours in duration were conducted with each of these 
individuals to document influences which they consider to be formative of both their personal 
and professional outlooks. 
In addition, I consulted the files of some 300 individuals who have participated in the 
care plan process since its inception. Permission was granted by the codirector to peruse 
the files for general themes or trends but to refrain from using any specific details as 
permission for the release of this information had not been obtained from the individuals 
involved. The files typically consisted of the social history, reports from psychology, 
education and child care and the care plan itself, a total of approximately 50 pages single 
spaced. I focused on those case reports included in the random sample which provided the 
data for the academic journal article produced by the Program and supplemented this 
material with a number of other files selected at random. By documenting 80 individual 
accounts, I was able to fashion a profile of the general characteristics of this population. 
Finally, I observed the passage of 6 individuals through the care plan process, 
having been granted full access to all information related to each of these teenagers. The 
related documents ranged from referral forms and reports from assorted professionals in the 
teenager's home community to the daily child care charts and the diagnostic tests used by 
the various departments in preparing the reports presented in the care plan meetings. 
Observation permission also included the opportunity to take notes during the compiling of 
the social history, a five to eight hour session conducted in the teenager's home. In addition, 
I was able to follow the teenagers during their daily activities and to witness the conducting 
of interviews and the administering of selected tests where my presence was not considered 
to be disruptive.' On those occasions when I was unable to take part, test papers and 
interview tapes were made available to me for consultation. From these 6 candidates, Chris 
Sargent was chosen to form the basis of a detailed presentation. 
The Case Study Approach and Representativeness 
A case study consists of an indepth examination of an event or a number of related events in order to demonstrate a general theoretical premise or 
principle. The case study may take the form of a life history of one individual or it may focus 
on a series of events involving a number of people. The selection of a specific individual or 
a particular sequence of events relates to the chosen material's ability to illustrate certain 
theoretical premises or principles rather than to its typicality or representativeness (Mitchell, 
1983: 191 -1 92; 203). 
Representing one person's passage through the care plan process offers more than 
an opportunity to attach individual features to what othewise would be the faceless 
diagnosis of conduct disorder. A case study offers the means to examine the practice 
carried out by the program staff in compiling facts about a specific person. By focusing on 
an individual care plan, it becomes possible to engage in a processual analysis (Mitchell, 
1983: 194; Rosaldo, 198911 993:92-93) of the making of the Facilitating Program's basic 
product, its reason for being. 
The Facilitating Program plays a significant role in the processes related to the 
construction and critique of the diagnosis of conduct disorder. Of equal importance is the 
part it plays as a system of expectations and social constraints to be interpreted and 
navigated by the youth, a social complex that may contribute to behaviour considered to be 
problematic by the dominant order (Wadel, 197311 989:127). A case study approach allows 
for the exploration of these relationships, not the least of which involve the explicit or implicit 
identification of causal correlations (Wadel, 197311 989:xi-xii) to account for the disturbing 
behaviour of the youth. 
The decision to focus on one teenager as a case study and the related selection of 
two staff members for biographical profiles raise the issue of ethnographic 
representativeness, a discussion which needs to be situated within the context of 
contemporary conventions in the social sciences. Social science discourse typically is 
credited with achieving standards of expertise and objectivity superior to those of 
conventional knowledge (McLennan, 1992:330). Representation of a detached, impartial 
inquiry is consistent with the location of its practitioners within the professional and 
administrative apparatuses of dominant social structures and with their accompanying status 
as experts whose considered judgments act as social regulators of public opinion. 
Legitimation as experts is aided by the professionals' use of a discourse of authoritative 
rhetoric which stands in contrast to the ordinary language of daily life. This serves to 
maintain a distance between the researcher and the people being described, a relationship 
of difference which inscribes a power hierarchy favouring the professional (Abu-Lughod, 
1991 : 150-1 51). Authoritative generalizations establish an aura of coherence and 
homogeneity which belies the inconsistencies and contradictions which exist within and 
between people of any given community. 
Traditionally, an ethnographer would offer detailed evidence of the characteristic 
features of the culture in question. Authority claims would base themselves on the 
assumption that elements held in common link the reality of all the members of a cultural 
category, each category being comprised of people who, despite other (secondary) 
differences, share particular fixed and essential characteristics. ' In a similar manner, 
socially constructed categories - e.g. juvenile delinquents, conduct disordered teenagers, 
abused youths, youths at risk - prune off differences and discrepancies in the course of 
identifying definitive criteria which enable the designation of specific individuals as members 
of this grouping. 
Once a supposedly homogeneous cultural field has been staked out, it becomes a 
fairly straight fomvard matter to select an individual case study to stand as the representative 
unit of analysis. Quantitative analysis finds favour with this approach as it typically uses 
statistical technologies "to liberate cases from contexts and to decompose distinctly messy 
lives into uniform and universal constituent elements" (Young, 1995:102-103). One of the 
dangers of this approach is that it tends to presume that it is possible to identify fundamental 
commonalities independent of the social constructions imposed by the viewer. In addition, 
the functional circularity informing the shift in focus from the whole to the part permits the 
researcher the illusion of unearthing corroborating evidence. In truth, she is doing little more 
than confirming the presence of factors that she deposited there in the first place (Willis, 
1976; McDonald, 1987). 
By contrast, the critical interpretive view recognizes the productive nature of 
knowledge while promoting the investigation of particular individuals not as representatives 
of a uniform cultural whole but as distinct agents, simultaneously innovative producers and 
social products (Rosaldo, 198911 993; Coombe, 1991 ; Fay, 1987). By focusing on the 
particular ways that people negotiate existing circumstances, it becomes possible to 
document the individual's meaning-producing practices which constitute this revised notion 
of culture (Abu-lug hod, 1991 : 150-1 53; Fox, 1991). This counter proposal calls into question 
the notion of representativeness which plays a central role in social science research. In SO 
doing, it challenges both the methodological conventions that guide the work of the 
Facilitating Program as well as traditional procedures of ethnography. 
Nevertheless, these critical comments are made with the luxury of hindsight. Much 
of my time on the treatment complex grounds was spent in pursuit of evidence confirming 
my own belief in the importance of gender, sexual orientation, class, ethnicity, race and age 
considerations in the manufacture of conduct disorder. I was convinced that a rigorous 
analysis of the contents of the Program's filing cabinets would disclose evidence of these 
subcultures. It then would be a simple matter to select a handful of candidates as they 
passed through the care plan process in order to give these abstract social categories 
human faces. It would be a short step from there to trace the causal links between 
oppressive social distinctions and expressions of distress as they unfolded in the lives of 
individual youths. 
What I had not anticipated was that the files would not render a clear profile of each 
individual on the basis of these subcultures. Face sheets frequently were blank next to the 
category of ethnicity. Occupation of care giver often was not specified nor was the sexual 
orientation of the youth. If I looked closely, I could detect traces of these issues on and 
between the lines. But I soon recognized that the files were not going to relinquish the 
evidence that I was looking for. It slowly became evident that these issues were 
marginalized or suppressed in the files themselves and in the care plan reports which were 
informed by this material. I was being confronted with systematic absences (Waitzkin, 1991: 
38). 
At the same time, I was becoming aware of the shortcomings of my own theoretical 
presumptions. The interrelationships of categories of gender, ethnicity, class, etc. 
complicate their identification as there are no fundamental characteristics inherent in all 
members of a category. Instead, representations of gender, for example, are mediated by 
a variety of cultural considerations including those of ethnicity, age, health, geographical 
location, historical experience to name but a few. These are active processes involving 
people defined in terms of their ongoing relationships, their significant social ensembles. 
The meaning derived from their associated realms of possibilities must be viewed in both 
their social and, ultimately, personal context. The presence of these intersecting factors 
eliminates the possibility of identifying homogeneous categories on which to base law-like 
correlations and from which to draw definitive representative examples. The facts that 
comprise an individual's identity are no different from other social facts which form the basis 
for claims to objectivity. All are products of specific historical and cultural processes, 
constructions fashioned in fields of power (Polier and Rosebeny, l98WSO). Neither do so- 
called acting out behaviours reveal their precise origins in form or content. As idioms of 
distress (Kleinman, 1980; Kenny, l986:9), they are culturally learned vehicles for 
communication whose content may make reference to a specific past precedent but whose 
appearance may be precipitated by quite unrelated contemporary contradictions. 
This shift in understanding enabled me to clarify the nature of my cultural critique of 
the Facilitating Program as a producer of knowledge. I followed the Program's conventions 
in determining what constitutes a case and itemized what the staff considered to be typical 
characteristics of conduct disordered youths. I subsequently consulted with the staff 
members to corroborate that the case study I had selected would be viewed by them to be 
representative of the teenagers referred to the Program. The individual chosen for my 
presentation met their criteria. As such, he is representative of a category constructed by 
a specific discourse, rather than typical of a free standing, objective category. I then 
analysed the information produced about Chris in order to demonstrate the nature and 
consequence of the Facilitating Program's approach. 
CHAPTER FOUR - HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
W hen I got here, Forensic had taken over and I discovered that they had a totally absurd notion of how to run a closed adolescent treatment centre. I tried to tell them that. I was working for mental 
health centres which was the right thing for me to have done because I got 
a view of the community. I was involved in the wider interests of mental 
health, literally, and I could see what was going on out there and I could see 
what people's issues were. I could see why people were mad at us at the 
treatment centre much more clearly and from a different perspective. They 
had quickly got into real trouble here. There was a number of reasons for it 
but, basically, what had happened was they were much more into a coercive 
approach with these kids. They upped the ante. The kids upped the ante. 
They upped the ante. It was, strictly speaking, a war zone here. 
The very first care plan I wrote was for a kid who had managed to get herself 
into such a jackpot that she'd been reduced to being locked in her room 23 
hours a day - 24 hours a day some days - with no clothes. They were 
scared to let her out to go to the bathroom, so they put a plastic bag in under 
the door so that she could pee in it. They served her food without utensils 
because they were afraid she would cut herself with them or swallow them. 
The clinical director was kind of threatening to lock these kids up forever and 
not let them out. He'd made it impossible for this kid to do anything and that 
made it impossible to run the place. So they were in a mess. 
What the clinical director did was push the system to the edge of absurdity. 
I'm flexible enough in my thinking that I could see how absurd it was to do 
that. I would maintain the place in such a way that it would have been 
humane. I'd have found a way of doing that. Consequently, I'd still be stuck 
with doing that. But it moved me being out in the community. It really 
moved me from the psychological position of coercion to the psychological 
position of taking the final step. Always before I had advocated for respect 
for kids but I hadn't taken that last step to say 'you can't be violent to kids, no 
matter what the circumstances are". This was because I had no answer for 
the question of what do you do when the kid does 'X". There's always that 
assumption that you have to do something to the kid because the kid has 
done 'X". I'd never taken my thinking past that point. 
I basically started thinking at that point and that thinking led to the Facilitating 
Program. Attachment thinking had always been my theme so it led me to 
explore this and to explore that. Because I was successful with the first care 
plan, somehow or other that made me credible so I ended up doing more. 
The more we did, the more the program moved forward. We sort of caught 
a wave. The community wanted us to do it and there were all sorts of 
political battles going on at the same time, moving juvenile services to the 
court in here and closing down one unit, moving another. 
Once you got it that having kids here is not healthy then the task becomes 
how do you look after kids in the community. I'd accepted the kind of political 
reality that there are some kids that are so toxic to their ecology or some 
ecologies that are so toxic to the kids that you have to have somewhere for 
kids to go and that this was as good a place as any. But once you give up 
the belief that this is as good a place as any and you begin to think that you 
can actually do better, then you start trying to do better. The Facilitating 
Program does do better. 
I guess having the paper accepted in the psychiatric journal is my 
contribution to this field. It doesn't look like much of one. It's 30 years work 
if you look at the themes but in reality it represents quite a shift. I still haven't 
solved the problem of how a society exists without violence. Once you start 
eschewing using dichotomous thinking - "hey, I'm not going to think of this 
in terms of right or wrong, or good or bad. I'm going to think about how the 
heck can I look after the situation the way it is" - once you start doing that 
your paradigm shifts quite a bit. You can clearly see that the individual and 
society's response to the individual is one of mutuality. The violence exerted 
on the people who are marginalized by the structures in our society is just as 
great if not greater than the violence they exert to try and defend themselves 
against us.' 
K eith Johnson's reflections on the origins of the Facilitating Program underscore a number of themes I encountered while canying out my fieldwork 
and library research. Keith begins with an observation on the convergence of forensic 
psychiatry with mental health treatment centres for adolescents. The former typically takes 
as its mandate the rehabilitation of the criminally insane while the latter directs most of its 
energies to the welfare of individuals who, as it turns out, are neither criminals nor insane. 
What is shared between these jurisdictions is a common concern with definitions of 
normalcy of thinking and conduct, the identification of that portion of the population which 
does not meet currently acceptable standards of thought and action, and the socially 
sanctioned authority to secure their compliance with the norm. 
Ruminations on coercion versus respectful care fuel the belief that issues of social 
control and mental health care are separate questions, correctly addressed under the 
auspices of the Ministries responsible for Criminal Justice and Health, respectively. A closet 
reading reveals a more complicated connection between control, be it coercive or 
persuasive, and care. Certain circumstances would suggest that control and care can best 
be described as two poles of a continuum, their specific form and content interconnected 
through a mutually constitutive process. Unfortunately, the use of this conceptual scheme 
tends to privilege one dimension while neglecting the other. A more promising approach is 
to regard them as primary and secondary contradictions within a single process. The 
relative significance of each is contingent upon the prevailing social conditions. A myriad 
of economic, political and ideological forces combine to propel one representation to the fore 
while the contending view is relegated to either a residual or an emergent status. 
On one level, this attitude coincides with the psychiatrist's call to move beyond 
dichotomous thought. Rather than use opposing concepts such as good and bad, right and 
wrong, control and care, this perspective encourages a processual reading. It affirms the 
dynamic relations of mutuality that exist between people, grounds meaning within a specific 
context and acknowledges that dominant readings are partial and conceal alternate ways 
of seeing. Where my outlook parts company with the psychiatrist's perspective is in its 
focus on the social and historical conditions which lead us to perceive "the situation the way 
it is". My conceptual model situates the discussion within a cultural critique requiring a 
reflexive evaluation of the attitudes of individuals and the roles of institutions, formations or 
processes within an historical context (Kovel, 1988). The cultural critique which follows turns 
initially to the situation immediately prior to the launching of the Facilitating Program before 
moving to a broader historical survey. My intention is to locate the Program's founding within 
social conditions which, I argue, influenced the occasion of its inception and continue to 
affect its discourse and practice. In particular, I draw attention to issues and incidents which 
demonstrate the exercising of care simultaneous with that of social control beneficial to the 
interests of the dominant order. 
The Facilitating Program: Pre-history 
P rior to the opening of the Facilitating Program, the provincial treatment complex for adolescents diagnosed with psychiatric disorders consisted of a 
facility accommodating sixty-six youths between the ages of twelve and seventeen years of 
age with the majority of the residents being fifteen years old or younger. The complex 
included three open cottages housing fourteen youths each and three locked units with eight 
residents each. One cottage was assigned to adolescents with psychotic disorders with the 
two other cottages and two of the locked units designated for youths with perceived serious 
behavioural problems who meet the definition of conduct disorder outlined in the D.S.M. 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual). The remaining locked unit served an assessment 
function. A school exclusively serving the needs of the facility shared the grounds with an 
indoor swimming pool, gymnasium and administrative offices. 
The mandate of the treatment centre was outlined in materials intended for the 
orientation of new staff: 
[tlhe [treatment complex] is administered by the Forensic Psychiatric 
Services Commission on behalf of the Ministry of Health. The [complex] is 
a designated provincial mental health facility mandated to provide treatment 
for all adolescents in [the province] who are psychiatrically ill (diagnosed as 
having a major psychiatric disorder, affective disorder, or incapacitating 
neurotic disorder), and for adolescents who have a serious behaviour 
disorder. Adolescents are defined as those who have attained their twelfth 
birthday, but not their seventeenth birthday .... Adolescents who reach their 
seventeenth birthday subsequent to admission may be detained until a 
period of treatment is completed or, when appropriate, may be committed to 
the adult mental health facili ty.... In accordance with the Mental Health Act, 
the parenfflegal guardian must consent to treatment up to the adolescents' 
sixteenth birthday. Upon reaching the age of sixteen the adolescent must 
provide hidher own consent .... Every effort must be made to also obtain the 
signed consent of the parenfflegal guardian when an adolescent is 
admitted ... as a voluntary patient. The exception to the above would apply in 
instances where the adolescent is certified as an involuntary patient. An 
adolescent will not be detained in a residential treatment subsequent to 
hidher nineteenth birthday. In accordance with the Young Offenders Act, the 
Director may consent to an admission on the basis of the Treatment Order. 
Admission at the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor In Council of young 
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to stand trial [may also 
occur]. 
Referrals to the treatment complex of designated conduct disordered youths typically 
originated from external government agencies, such as the Social Services or Health 
Ministries. Candidates for admission were priorized by two standing committees, the final 
decision being made by representatives of the provincial Ministries of Social Services, 
Community Mental Health, Education, the Attorney General and the complex's social work 
supervisor and director of community services. The expectation was that successful 
referrals would include only those individuals for whom the referring community had 
exhausted all other resources for continued assistance, although this stipulation finds no 
mention in the orientation document. 
The net result of this expectation was twofold. First, it prompted local agencies to 
place individuals in inappropriate facilities in order to demonstrate that all community 
possibilities had proven to be inadequate to the youths' needs. Second, this tour of duty 
through deficient placements resulted in the entrenching of existing behaviours and the 
probable worsening of the presenting problems. This gate keeping provision also 
contributed to the fact that the majority of referred youths during this period typically did not 
reside with biological parents, commonly having experienced numerous residential 
placements. Another shared feature were statements alleging neglect andlor physical, 
emotional or sexual abuse which routinely appeared on the admission files of the youths 
(Campbell, 1990). 
From the point of view of the treatment complex, the reason for referral was for the 
individual to receive treatment. From the referring community's perspective, the purpose for 
applying for admission to the treatment complex was to obtain treatment for the youngster 
and to control the youth's behaviour as the community considered that it no longer had the 
wherewithal to fulfill this mandate (Campbell, 1990). These functions have been ongoing 
features of the treatment complex from its inception. 
T he treatment complex opened its doors in 1969 in response to the perceived shortcomings of the foster care program implemented after 
World War II. Devised to correct institutionalized care's tendency to serve a custodial rather 
than a therapeutic function, the foster parent model was unable to meet the needs of 
children afflicted with more severe physical and emotional disabilities (Campbell, 1990). 
Residential care addressed these deficiencies with a "therapeutic community" (Campbell, 
1990; Jones, 1952; Mate, 1972; Mainprize, 1988) approach to care. 
Largely comprised of child care counsellors, the staff was under the overall authority 
of a psychiatrist who was available two days a week. The team approach meant that patient 
and professional alike had equal input into group discussions, no one person or group being 
held accountable for what became - in theory, at least - a community decision. This anti- 
authoritarian framework reflected an egalitarianism characteristic of that generation of youth 
workers which was diametrically opposed to the conservative government of the day 
(Campbell, 1990). This model was challenged with the appointment of the first full time 
psychiatrist in 1974 and the formalisation of treatment planning and daily charting. 
Ongoing power conflicts between the child care workers and the growing staff of 
psychiatrists led to a report filed by the Chief Medical Officer of the Health Ministry. It 
concluded that the therapeutic community should be replaced by a clinical approach based 
on the medical model. Citing the close connection between adolescent psychiatry and 
forensic psychiatry, the province's commission of forensic psychiatry assumed overall 
responsibility for the complex in 1981. Despite formal transfer of power to a medically 
based model, a covert power struggle persisted into the 1990's with members of each 
professional group - psychiatrists, child care counsellors, social workers, and psychiatric 
nurses - seeking to stake out their territory (Campbell, 1990). 
Treatment perspectives have varied over the years, ranging from behavioural 
modification, positive peer culture to psycho educational models. These approaches have 
undergone frequent modification with no one model achieving a position of dominance. 
What is especially noteworthy is the consistent failure of the complex to adopt a systemic 
or ecological outlook (Campbell, 1990). With the exception of occasional visits, outings or 
family counselling sessions, care givers are not active participants in the daily functioning 
of the various unit programs. One reason given for this oversight was the absence of 
ongoing family connections due to the youth's multiple placements prior to their admission 
to the complex (Campbell, 1990). 
The decision to launch the Facilitating Program as a pilot project represented a move 
away from this traditional focus on individual treatment which excluded the involvement of 
care givers, family members and other concerned members of the community. What began 
with a single unit accommodating twelve youths has since expanded to two units offering 
assessments, care plans and hiatus provisions for a total of twenty four adolescents. Each 
facility provides eight beds for the care plan process with four beds set aside for temporary 
hiatus. One unit accommodates youths fourteen to seventeen years of age. The other 
houses those eleven to thirteen years old with the ability to extend these services to ten year 
olds under exceptional circumstances. The community support service is a feature of both 
units. Its mandate is to deliver follow-up, consultation and training to care givers and 
community agencies. 
While the emphasis on community care represents an innovation in terms of the 
outlook of the treatment complex, this perspective and the multidisciplinary approach 
adopted by the Facilitating Program are not new ideas. They trace their origins to 
developments occurring earlier in this century, notably, with the professionalization of mental 
health workers (Ingleby, 1985). 
Childhood, Deviance, Mental Health, and the State 
C ontemporary state employed mental health experts owe their existence to the efforts of philanthropic crusaders who desired to improve the plight not just 
of delinquent children but of all those whose well being was threatened by the 
consequences of rapid industrialization. This group of 'child-savers" (Platt, 1969) was 
comprised primarily of women, many of whom were feminists. Their charitable venture was 
an extension of their traditional role as caregivers and constituted one of the few acceptable 
public activities then available to women (Platt, 1969; Conrad and Schneider, 1980). The 
term 'social work" was unheard of before 1900, yet by 191 0 schools devoted to the training 
of these service minded individuals were well established in a number of countries. Two 
years later, a state agency devoted to the issues of children was founded in the United 
States (Hacking, 1985). 
Increased public concern for the welfare of children was translated into 
extended state control over matters previously ignored or dealt with informally. Canada was 
no exception to this trend with legislators and reformers drawing on the American example 
in drafting a new Juvenile Delinquents Act in 1908 (Matters, 1986). This piece of legislation 
was enacted in response to the dominant view that young offenders were not to be regarded 
as criminals but, rather, as 'child[ren] of nature ...[w ho needed to] be directed home to the 
ideal once again" (Canada, 1908:976). By the provisions of this act, juveniles relinquished 
such legal protections as rules of evidence and legal defence in exchange for counselling 
(Matters, 1986). The Act's preamble made it clear that this would enable the young offender 
to be 'subjected to such wise care, treatment and control as will tend to check their evil 
tendencies and to strengthen their better instincts ....' (Canada, l908:975). From these early 
reformist activities, a type of child welfare ideology developed which tended to excuse 
children from accepting responsibility for their behaviour.' 
Juvenile court institutionalised this evolving discourse, effectively obscuring the 
distinction between issues of criminality and health (Parsons, 1951). The latter challenges 
social stability due to its impact on role performance; the former, due to its flaunting of social 
norms. However, the two forms of deviance part company when attributions of cause are 
considered. Crime is judged to be willfully motivated while illness is deemed to be unwillful. 
The objective of criminal treatment is to alter the individual's motivation to conform. It 
involves the agency of fully human beings. The treatment of illness, on the other hand, 
necessitates the altering of conditions which lie beyond the realm of human agency (Conrad, 
1980; Conrad and Schneider, 1980). With this emphasis on external forces, child welfare 
ideology neglected children's capacity for agency in favour of psychological, social or 
biological explanations (Conrad and Schneider, 1980). 
While the juvenile court did not employ medical rhetoric, it did adopt elements of 
the medical model such as the principles of early diagnosis and preventive treatment 
(Conrad and Schneider, 1980). The court's jurisdiction could be brought into play on the 
basis of a criminal offense, parental or guardian neglect or a status offense such as truancy, 
drinking, or being 'in danger of immorality" (Platt, 1969:139). Status offenses were age- 
related and appeared to have a class basis as 'they were primarily attributable to children 
of lower-class migrant and immigrant familiesw (Platt, 1969:139).' In the eyes of the juvenile 
court, the child was considered to be incapacitated rather than guilty or innocent (Kittrie, 
1971). The court's objective was to operate in the best interests of the child and society by 
offering protection and by seeking to understand the basis for the disturbing behaviour 
(Conrad and Schneider, 1980; Matters, 1986). The introduction of medical expertise and 
the allied professionalism of psychology was but a short step away. 
The space occupied by youths designated to be delinquent drew professionals like 
a magnet, authority over this area being contested by social workers, sociologists, 
criminologists and medical physicians alike. The 'politics of professionsw (Horn, 1986:58) 
suggests that the discipline with the most prestige is likely to gamer favour and funding. 
However, psychiatry's dominance in the area of juvenile crime was to be achieved despite 
its traditionally tenuous claim to medical legitimacy in the view of both the general public and 
the medical profession itself (Horn, 1986). 
The pioneering work of Chicago physician William Healy boosted psychiatry's 
fortunes. In 1914, Healy succeeded in establishing a psychiatric clinic to service the juvenile 
courts. The clinic's multidisciplinary team of psychologists, social workers and psychiatrists 
initially adopted a perspective of multi-causality, citing the interaction of a number of factors 
ranging from the biological and psychological to family background, neighbourhood and 
economic class. The social study of the individual was an important innovation introduced 
by Healy as was the use of the interdisciplinary team, both established features of many 
psychiatric clinics today. The detailed social history included an account of the home and 
neighbourhood situations, school and court history as well as personal interests and habits. 
A physical examination was given and psychological tests administered, including IQ, 
reading and vocabulary evaluations. Finally, the case history included the youth's own story 
which was thought to be invaluable for revealing mental factors which might influence the 
tendency towards delinquent activity (Horn, 1986). 
By the late 1 9201s, the influence of psychoanalysis resulted in a shift in the clinic's 
emphasis to one of intra psychic factors, including the unconscious. Emotional dynamics 
in the family became the prime focus with delinquent behaviour being viewed as meaningful 
conduct to the individual. The key to purposeful behaviour was seen to lie not in the 
individual's personality but, rather, in the existence of 'satisfactory human relationships" 
(Healy and Bronner, 1936:8-9). According to this perspective, delinquents were 'acting out" 
underlying anti-social impulses and psychological conflicts. Healy centred on the individual's 
family experience to uncover the bases for these conflicts and concluded that the delinquent 
child 'never had affectional identification with the one who seemed to him a good parent" 
(Healy and Bronner, 1936:lO). The resultant problems were considered to be the 
consequence of these unsatisfied needs. 
These findings were to be crucial to the emergence of a psychiatric approach which 
differed from the environmentally oriented views of sociologists and criminologists. 
Treatment was considered to demand parent education as a preventive measure with 
parent-child psychotherapy proposed once a problem was identified. Responsibility for 
resolving the problem lay with the family, the institution judged to be critical to child and 
youth conduct since the earliest days of juvenile justice. At the same time, the clinics sought 
to intervene at an earlier age and to expand their constituency to include middle class 
children (Conrad and Schneider, 1980). This underlines the continuing contradiction at the 
heart of the mental health profession: 'with one hand it supports the sacredness of family 
relations, with the other it infiltrates them and subjects them to its management" (Ingleby, 
1985: 105). 
The emergence of distinct psychiatric measures with an increased emphasis on the 
youth's personal psychology and family relationships was but one example of the growing 
phenomenon of the medicalization of social problems (Conrad and Schneider, 1980; 
Foucault, 198Zl983b). The origin of the problematic behaviour was sought in the individual 
life history of the child or youth. Later sociological studies of youth subcultures, gangs and 
the impact of poor job opportunities led to the modification of the individualized approach 
practised by Healy. Yet the child guidance clinic had become established as a significant 
institution in the area of delinquency treatment and prevention. Part of its legitimacy was 
derived from the popular belief that the medical health professions based their activities on 
science, in general, and the medical model, in particular. The medicalization of deviant 
behaviours effectively depoliticized them as the focus on individual treatment directed 
attention away from factors derived from shared institutions and meaning systems (Gusfield, 
1989). 
Mental disorders came to be understood not simply in organic terms but also 
according to psychological and social pathological considerations. This tendency was 
reinforced as more social workers and psychologists were integrated as members of mental 
health teams. While concepts such as symptoms and treatment continued to be employed, 
authority and legitimacy now had less to do with the use of the traditional medical model and 
more to do with the fact that mental or psychological problems were addressed within a 
framework derived from the natural sciences. This positivist outlook both reified and 
individualised behaviour. It denied the meaningful nature of human conduct and ignored the 
socio-historical context of all human activity (Ingleby, 1985). The objectifying effects of this 
attitude diminished the relational aspects of the encounter. This further facilitated the 
imposition of a tutelary arrangement (Kovel, 1980), reducing the patient to a passive role in 
which he or she must submit to a cure. A counter tradition arguing for a more relational and 
socially inclusive attitude existed, but its effects were limited. The authority derived from the 
dominant model's association with the scientific approach proved to be insurmountable. 
A number of noteworthy shifts in perspective occurred between the 1930s and the 
present day, the first occurring during the Depression when neglect began to be described 
in terms of emotional negligence or rejection rather than being viewed as a product of 
economic poverty (Conrad and Schneider, 1980). Equally significant was the fact that 
emotional neglect came to be considered as 'a gendered form of child abuse - only mothers 
could be guilty of ir (Gordon, l988/1989:24). A legal challenge arguing that juveniles were 
being denied their constitutional rights to protection accompanying due process curbed the 
courts' therapeutic intent and brought legal matters more clearly to the fore. This was 
followed in the late 1970's by a backlash against a perceived permissive attitude towards 
juveniles in the United States. The legislative changes enabling the cases of youths 
accused of murder and other serious crimes to be raised to adult court were echoed in 
similar attempts to toughen Canada's Young Offenders Act (Marron, 1992). 
Child Abuse as the Defining Gaze 
W hile the therapeutic role of the juvenile court has waned to some degree since Healy's time, the medical model remains lodged in a variety of 
services for deviant children. Many of these innovations owe their existence to the current 
attention being paid to the issue of child abuse. Physical injury, neglect and maltreatment 
of children have a long history but it is only in the past thirty years that child abuse has 
become identified as a medical and social problem. 
From the early 1 9 4 0 ' ~ ~  journal articles have appeared documenting x-ray evidence 
of physical abuse to children. This phenomenon finally was legitimated with the appearance 
of Henry Kempe's article on "The Battered Child Syndrome" in 1962 in the most prestigious 
American medical journal (Conrad and Schneider, 1980; Hacking, 1985; Manning, 1987). 
Physical abuse of children was transformed from a social problem to a disease. The 
perpetrators were considered to be sick, the incidence spanned all classes and the claim 
that the issue was one of health was attested to by the pioneering work of pediatric 
radiologists who first captured the public's attention with x-ray evidence of the "illness". 
Child abuse now became "visible* with the diagnosis of "battered child syndrome" providing 
the physician with a defining lens and a legitimate reason to intervene. It also enabled 
radiology, traditionally a marginalized speciality with limited prestige within the medical 
community, to raise its profile (Conrad and Schneider, 1980; Hacking, 1985). The model of 
child abuse which surfaced with this heightened sensitivity to battering situations was one 
which consolidated a "psychopathological" interpretation (Conrad and Schneider, 1980). It 
was presumed that "the parent who abuses his or her child suffers from some psychological 
disease which must be cured in order to prevent further abuse" (Gelles, 1973: 61 1). 
By 1965, child abuse was listed as a legitimate medical category. Within 20 years, 
the number of books published on the subject catapulted from zero to 600. This eruption 
of interest and concern spread across the English-speaking world. Despite the increasing 
involvement of social workers and legal authorities, the medical model continued to hold the 
position of prominence first attained with Kempe's breakthrough article. Early detection and 
the identification of probable abusive families, considered to be typical features of the 
medical model, were evident in the construction of the child abuse syndrome. Medical and 
psychiatric explanations were conspicuously prevalent. Abused children were understood 
to be the product of adult care givers who themselves had been abused: 
[plarents are studied in terms of what is wrong with them, so that abuse is 
seen as a problem with certain parents who are unusual, or different from the 
normal. Abuse results from some individual or family defe ct.... In the process 
other parents are seen as normal and the wider society is not seen as 
problematic .... The disease model legitimates the role of a variety of health 
and welfare professionals who are seen as experts on such exceptional 
problems (Parton, 1985: 149). 
Social factors were discounted in this equation as the disease model's reliance on 
the existence of a single causality or one structure of multiple causality held centre stage. 
Explanations which address possible structural causes tend to fall by the wayside as front 
line practitioners struggle with the immediate demands of reporting abuse, protecting 
individual children from further maltreatment and guiding abusers through treatment 
 program^.^ 
Meanwhile, the past thirty years has seen the concept of child abuse emerge as the 
defining metaphor for moral evil (Hacking, 1985). Feminism has provided the crucial ground 
for the convergence of child abuse, wife assault and the sexual abuse of children as 
decisive proof of patriarchal domination. Concern with child abuse has fuelled the rise to 
prominence of child's rights since the 1960's. This development is considered by some to 
be a foil to more traditional paternal or family rights. Ian Hacking, on the other hand, argues 
that the increase in state intervention afforded by recent child abuse legislation has spawned 
an exponential increase in the number of related agencies which speaks more to the 
extension of state power than to the protection of children. Supporting this view is the shift 
in government funding from programs targeting single parent poverty to the issue of child 
abuse, a reconceptualizing of social problems that allows for a cheaper and more effective 
means to control deviant families. Arguably, more good than harm has been accomplished 
by the child abuse movement, yet we need to be reminded of the moral and political 
dimensions of this social phenomenon (Hacking, 1985). 
When we turn from a widespread cultural proscription against child abuse to examine 
the definition of child abuse we find no unanimity.' Having established the right to treat the 
affliction, the medical profession showed little interest in ensuring the precision of its actual 
definition (Hacking, 1985). Child abuse is a 'normalizing concepr (Hacking, 1985:286), a 
term which does not have a fixed content but has evolved in response to social conventions. 
Its roots can be traced to 19th Century notions of cruelty to children. Significantly, people 
of the Victorian era did not medicalize cruelty by deeming offenders to be suffering from a 
sickness or a pathology. Medical intervention did not occur neither were there attempts to 
define normal family behaviour. By contrast, our understanding of what constitutes child 
abuse occurs within a cultural framework of pathology and normalcy. In fact, its career as 
a concept has helped shape contemporary standards of what is normal with the medical 
model providing the underpinnings of this framework. 
The trend towards earlier intervention in order to prevent possible disorders in child 
raising has been a distinct feature of this century. The regulation of the family's role in the 
socialization process has come under ever increasing scrutiny (Lasch, l977Il979; 
Sedgwick, 1982; Ingleby, 1985; Gordon, 1988ll989) with the popular usage of terms such 
as attachment and bonding fostering conditions for extensive surveillance and investigation 
(Ingleby, 1985). The meteoric rise of child abuse as a perceived social problem is linked to 
the characterization of troubling or troublesome children as passive victims who rely upon 
the benevolent intervention of experts and adults to remedy the affliction. Yet this 
widespread representation has by no means secured a position of dominance. Vying for 
that distinction is a view of troubled children as potentially willful, irrational victimizers intent 
on disrupting social order. 
The Victimizing Child as Cultural Other 
W e have seen how the social category of childhood offers the opportunity for the construction of the non-compliant 'underage" person as abused 
or delinquent. In either instance, the notion of guardianship or tutelage is invoked, 
prompting responses that run the gamut from the caring to the coercive. The individual 
becomes the administered object of responsible agents who take it upon themselves to act 
in the youth's best interests. Yet child saving masks a concurrent dynamic of child 
submission. As Stanley Cohen (1985) observes, the rhetoric of child saving enables the 
expansion of interventions and a blurring of the boundaries between caring measures and 
those of social control. The very concept of acting out is sufficiently ambiguous to ease the 
shunting of designated youths between the mental health system and its criminal justice 
counterpart (Jantti, 1989; Verlaan, 1991). 
A recent CBC-N docu-drama ,"Little Criminals" (January 21, 1996), focused on 
underage juveniles who defy the law without fear of reprisal due to their young age. In an 
accompanying documentary, 'The Making of 'Little Criminals'" (January 20, 1996), 
criminologist Neil Boyd characterized these young offenders to be simultaneously victims 
and victimisers. Penny Parry, Vancouver's child and youth advocate, commented on the 
fear people commonly feel towards youths, ostensibly due to their capacity to act as 
victimisers. 
These contending accounts of youths as victims and victimisers may be seen as 
principal and secondary aspects of a single discourse. The rise of a neo-conservative 
agenda to 'crack down" on youth crime (Marron, 1992) threatens to eclipse public concern 
about abused children as youths as a group are regarded with heightened apprehension 
(Hill and Fortenbeny, 1992). Indeed, we are led to believe that the 'failure of socialization" 
looms as a potential threat to humanity. Children now constitute the 'dangerous classes" 
once populated by 'criminals, mental defectives and vagabonds" (Ingleby, 1985:104). 
It would be a mistake to consider this ascendant representation of 'youths as 
predators" to be simply an anachronism, a throwback to an earlier view of young offenders 
as 'child[ren] of naturen (Canada, 1908:976) who have gone astray due to their 'evil 
tendenciesn(Canada, 1908:975). While it is true that this construct is symptomatic of beliefs 
outdated even when recorded almost a century ago, it would be a mistake to dismiss these 
sentiments so casually. The argument can be made that they are but the most recent 
expression of a deep seated cultural logic which shows no signs of dissipating. 
They are reminiscent of the dominant European society's depiction of the cultural 
other which traces its roots to the Enlightenment and beyond. It was in the course of its 
colonizing mission of those societies which did not share its defining characteristics - 
urbanized, secular, industrialized, capitalist (Hall, 1992d:277) - that European society 
constituted itself (Trouillot, 1991; Hall, 1992d:278). To a large extent, the self-representation 
of 'the West" was fashioned through comparison with its perceived cultural other. The 
perceived identity of "the Rest" - notably, people native to the 'New World" - tended to be 
informed by the idealized projections of the prevailing European culture, its aspirations, 
fears, self-confidence and guilt (Honour, l976:3; Hall, l992d:308). 
These images were essentialist stereotypes with the cultural other depicted in an 
exaggerated dualism of good or bad, civilised or uncivilised, innocent or depraved (Hall, 
1992d:308). To add insult to injury, this knowledge was productive, frequently moulding the 
self-conception of the people it was intended to represent (Hall, 1992d:278; Said, 1978:41- 
45). We would do well to take a closer look at this cultural dynamic. Its form echoes the 
alienated and reified thought described by Marx and Lukacs. And its relevance continues 
in contemporary dichotomous attitudes towards another cultural other, troublesome children. 
In an insightful essay, Gerald Sider (1987) mined the pages of the journals of 
Columbus and da Verrazano to present first hand accounts of their initial interactions with 
Native North Americans. The roots of what was to become an ongoing theme of 
dehumanization of Native peoples at the hands of non-Natives are exposed there with 
candid brutality. Central to Sidets argument is the premise that "the humanity of native 
people is denied in the context of an attempt to both create and incorporate the othel" 
(Sider, 1987:6; italics added) within a single system of cultural and social domination. He 
demonstrates how Columbus acted towards Natives as though their impending enslavement 
was natural and inevitable rather than a process initiated by specific individuals at a 
particular moment in time. In their early encounters, Sider argues, Europeans justified their 
own viciousness as a preemptive reaction to what they anticipated to be a similar response 
on the part of Natives. In a classic example of "blaming the victim1' (Ryan, 1971), the 
interlopers sought violent revenge for transgressions which existed only in their 
imaginations. They were absolved of any guilt by a rationalization Sartre claims is common 
among colonizers: 
since none may enslave, rob or kill his fellow-man [sic] without committing a 
crime, they lay down the principle that the native is not one of our fellow- 
men ... :the order is given to reduce the inhabitants of the annexed country to 
the level of superior monkeys in order to justify the settler's treatment of them 
as beasts of burden (Sartre, l961/1963:15). 
The dehumanizing contradiction inherent to the colonizing process involves the 
simultaneous construction of Native people as alien or other and as ultimately worthy of 
inclusion within the dominant culture. The first prompts acts of humiliation and hostility 
supposedly befitting their subhuman status; the second, overtures to assimilate as equals. 
Both serve the interests of the dominant order: the appropriation of land and resources 
(Dyck, 1985). Successful claims to ownership by the state require either that the present 
owners be represented convincingly as subhuman or that they be stripped of their aboriginal 
rights through the granting of citizenship. The conditions of tutelage which mark this stand 
off continue to this day. They are justified by Native people's liminality in the eyes of state 
power, forever on the threshold of full personhood but always coming up short. The status 
of being less than fully human is deemed to be warranted as the degrading conditions to 
which Natives have been subjected come to be presented as evidence of the people they 
actually are. 
This relationship bears a striking similarity to the so-called "double bind" situation 
argued by some to lead to a form of schizophrenia (Bateson, 1956; Laing, 195911965; 
196lIl971; Laing and Esterson, 1964; Lithman, 1984). In this scheme, the subordinate 
person -- typically, a child - is instructed to act in a certain way (i.e. see the colonizer as 
friend). At the same time, the dominant person's behaviour elicits a contradictory reaction 
(i.e. see the colonizer as foe). The way out of this impasse is sealed by the injunction to 
remain engaged within the interaction (i.e. domination perpetuates colonization). Continued 
exposure to these conflicting messages leads to frustration, desperation and possible 
mental disintegration (Laing, 196111971), an outcome similar to that produced by the 
systematic dehumanization of the colonized (Fanon, 1963; Said, 1993). 
Recently, public attention has been rivetted on a dramatic example of this 
phenomenon. The legacy of residential schools has produced an ongoing litany of 
allegations and convictions, making it clear that many Native children have been subjected 
to especially destructive treatment at the hands of "benevolent" guardians (Hanks and 
Hanks, 1950; Manuel and Posluns, 1974; Haig-Brown, 1988; Dyck, 1991, Furniss, 1995). 
Dominant representations of childhood and Native combined with the state mandated 
authority to protect, civilize and assimilate (Tobias, 197611 983) appear to have resulted in 
the dehumanization of more than one care giver and Native youth. Harrowing accounts from 
survivors of residential schools (Manuel and Posluns, 1974; Fred, 1988) are reminiscent of 
Keith Johnson's depiction of the progressively more severe measures used against youths 
in residential treatment by those who fear they will retaliate in kind. 
Representations of Native people and wayward youth as concurrently alien from and 
similar to the dominant conception of self resonate with a dichotomous style of reasoning 
characteristic of positivism. The mutually constitutive dynamic that informs the relationship 
between positivism, conventional thought and the medical model is precisely the one 
opposed by the Facilitating Program. To understand the Facilitating Program's efforts to 
counter this dehumanizing trend, it is first necessary to provide an account of the various 
economic, political and ideological currents at play at the Program's inception. 
CHAPTER FIVE - CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 
The [provincial] government is undertaking a fundamental restructuring of 
government. The goals of this restructuring are a more responsive public 
sector, an invigorated private sector and a fair sharing of the benefits and 
obligations of being a [citizen of the province]. 
The basic theme of restructuring is to move government closer to the 
people ... to improve the way government makes decisions by more directly 
involving the people the decisions affect. This is the heart of the 
government's decentralization program (Office of the Premier, 1989:l). 
A nnounced in 1989, this policy initiative was expected to have a major impact on the delivery of mental health programs to the province's citizens. In fact, 
the move towards decentralization had been in effect since 1987 when a plan was set in 
motion to downsize the province's central residential facility for adult psychiatric patients. 
While a major incentive for this development was cost effectiveness (Gordon, 1988; Verlaan, 
1991), the perceived well being of the clients was also cited as an important consideration.' 
Similar explanations would surface some years later in a parallel initiative to 
decentralize and deinstitutionalise mental health services to youths. This community centred 
orientation was mirrored in the provincial Child and Youth Secretariat which was established 
in 1990 to facilitate inter-ministry co-ordination and increased community involvement in 
health delivery to youngsters. The provincial Ombudsman's report which appeared the 
same year underlined a similar desire for the integration of individuals in the community. In 
its emphasis on the importance of high quality and effective services for youths, the report 
also cited:"concerns about the pressing need to integrate services and strengthen 
safeguards to ensure adequate protection and fair treatment for children and youth when 
special services are required" (Office of the Ombudsman, 1990:l). 
To realize these objectives, the Ombudsman called for 'more effective and integrated 
multi-disciplinary approaches to assessment, referral, case management, and service 
provision" (Office of the Ombudsman, 1990:6). It also stressed the necessity to review and 
to transform programs so that they might better reflect the actual needs of both children and 
their families. In part, this represented a re-alignment of government agencies towards a 
more community based, youth-centred system of care. 
Changes to the provincial Mental Health Act in late 1990 reinforced this youth- 
centred approach and dovetailed with the changes taking place in the treatment centre. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy of these relates to the section indicating that a youth has the 
right to be discharged immediately from a facility in which a review panel has judged that the 
individual neither has a mental disorder nor requires 'medical treatment, supervision or 
control for hislher own protection or the protection of others" (Crossroads, 1990b:l). The 
Facilitating Program's policy of short term residency for the purposes of clinical assessment 
reduces the likelihood that the review mechanism would be activated (Verlaan, 1991). 
Further evidence of a perceived urgent need for improvements in the existing system 
was to be found in the findings of an ambitious project launched in 1991 to consult mental 
health providers to 'children and youth at risk4 residing in the largest urban centre in the 
province. The purpose of the inquiry was to determine what was required to improve the 
health of children and youths in that area, in particular, and in the province, in general. The 
first part of this inquiry consisted of a survey drafted by the provincial Office of Health 
Promotion which was circulated among selected professionals. In addition, a two day 
decision making conference of these professionals was convened. The task force concluded 
that reform of the mental health system was considered to be the most pressing problem 
(Children and Youth At Risk Steering Committee [CYARSC], 1991 :i): 
[tlhe issues in today's system relate to funding, coordination, and consumer 
and community participation. Additional funding is required, especially for 
prevention, early intervention, and counselling services. An estimated 49% 
of our resources has been and continues to be consumed by children and 
youth who use high-cost residential and hospital services. Until we put more 
of our resources into prevention, this situation is unlikely to change. 
Uncoordinated services result in a scattering and diluting of efforts and a 
less-than-satisfactory outcome .... Consumer and community participation is 
sadly lacking. Currently, parents, children and youth, and service providers 
are not active participants in case planning and management decisions. 
Until consumers, providers, and the community are able to actively 
participate in the setting of policies and allocation of resources, the system 
will not be completely effective (CYARSC, 1991:i-ii). 
The project survey focused on the major urban centre for the province in which an 
estimated 24% of all the children reside. This high percentage was considered to be due 
to the fact that: 
[w]e tend to draw families from around the province who have needs for 
specialized services. We absorb 82% of new immigrants to [the province]. 
With the added pressure of urban crowding and poverty, it is not surprising 
that Dr. Dan Offord found that, 'Children in urban areas were significantly 
more likely to have one or more (psychiatric) disorders than children in rural 
areas.' Offord's findings came from a recent and extensive study of 3,000 
children in Ontario. He found the prevalence rate of psychiatric disorders in 
urban areas to be 19.65. This means that in a six-month period, one out of 
five children will have a diagnosable psychiatric disorder (CYARSC, 1991 :4). 
Offord's research is cited throughout the report, reflecting the steering committee's 
belief that it is applicable to the situation in their province. Prevention, early identification 
and early intervention were regarded to be the key priorities in providing 'an integrated 
continuum of care capable of responding to children who are at risk of or have a mental 
health problem" (CYARSC, 1991:15). The major risks faced by children were considered 
to be 'poverty, high-risk family situations and poor physical health' (CYARSC, 1 99l:l6). ' 
The project's emphasis on prevention, early intervention, and coordination of 
services was echoed in an earlier report entitled 'Foundations for the Futuren issued by a 
national body, the Federal Working Group on the Mental Health of Children and Youth 
(1 990) under the auspices of Health and Welfare Canada. The Working Group identified 
four principles which it considered to be essential for effective mental health programs for 
children and youths: 
1. The family is central to the provision of universal health for children and 
youth; consequently, the first priority must be afforded those aspects of 
health policy which strengthen the capacity of families to provide for their 
children; 
2. A distinct emphasis on the particular health needs of children and youth 
is essential to ensure that their needs are recognized, articulated, and met 
within the overall health services organization; 
3. The traditional emphasis on curing disease in institutional settings is 
insufficient, and must be balanced with more active community-based 
programs and initiatives. Of particular note is the need to reinforce and 
expand multiplicative models of service provision whereby a few specialists 
can actively support the interventions of many more persons in the 
community (e. g. teachers, child care centre staff, public health personnel, 
etc.) who are in direct contact with children and families; 
4. Health and access to appropriate services are possible only if there are 
more proactive programs available for those at risk and for those who 
currently do not avail themselves of existing services. (Federal Working 
Group on the Mental Health of Children and Youth, 1990:8-9). 
Anticipated financial savings to the state lend significant impetus to this desire to 
decentralize and deinstitutionalise mental health programs for children and youths. There 
is a tendency on the part of certain left wing commentators to associate this cost cutting 
policy with a conservative, or neo-liberal (Teeple, 1995:1), point of view which has gained 
prominence in recent years (McDaniel, 1993; Verlaan, 1991). Yet policies with a similar 
outcome are promoted by left leaning governments as well. This is attested to by the actions 
of the social democratic party which succeeded the conservative party which had approved 
and supported the reforms taking place on the grounds of the treatment complex at the end 
of the 1980's. The initiatives which, in the words of the complex's executive director, were 
launched by 'riding the decentralization wave" (Verlaan, 1991:83) were actively advanced 
by the incoming government under the rubric of 'community control". 
According to the executive secretary of the Minister responsible for Social Services, 
the government's perspective in terms of Health and Social Services was guided to a 
considerable degree by the work of John McKnight (lNinstanley, 1992). McKnight's thesis 
is that the necessary expertise for resolving perceived social problems lies not in the hands 
of so-called experts but with non-professionals at the community level. He argues that 
designated professionals should step aside to allow greater participation by members of the 
community, those whose expertise is not legitimized by professional degrees and 
employment in a govemment agency but by life experience (McKnight, 1984; 1984b; 1989; 
1990). McKnight also maintains that monies used to fund health professionals could be 
better spent in eliminating poverty which he considers to be the basis of many health related 
problems (McKnight, 1989). 
McKnight's populist views are mirrored in the conclusions of a legislative review of 
family and children's services submitted by a government sponsored community panel 
(Community Panel, 1992). This task force attempted to consult people beyond individual 
professionals and professional interest groups. They conclude, in part, that existing options 
'do not recognize the value of family and community networks, which are a rich and largely 
untapped source of alternative care options" (Community Panel, 1992: 152). They note that 
parents 'told us that connecting with other parents who were experiencing the same 
dilemmas was often more helpful than receiving professional services" (Community Panel, 
1992:70). The Community Panel goes on to state that 'given adequate resources, 
communities have within them the capacity to support and protect families, youths and 
children" (Community Panel, 1992:21). The findings of the Community Panel also 
supported reduced govemment involvement in terms of "secure care" for children and 
youths at risk: 
[tlhe question of what to do with people who are a danger to themselves or 
to others is an old one. It pits individual liberty against society's need to 
protect its members. 'Secure care" is, to a large extent, a euphemism; in 
plain English, it means locking young people up. No one wants to do it, but 
most people we heard from agreed that there sometimes seems little 
alternative .... 
The issue is further complicated by the division of authority between 
Ministries. The Young Offenders Act, administered by the Attorney General, 
provides for secure care but in so doing criminalizes the young person. The 
Mental Health Act, administered by the Ministry of Health, provides for secure 
care without criminalization but introduces the necessity of diagnosis and 
treatment. Neither is helpful to the parent who just wants a child kept off the 
street or a caregiver faced with severe 'acting out" .... 
The panel has difficulty accepting any solution that criminalizes children and 
we reject using a medical justification for restraint on personal liberty when 
the problem is clearly not medical. We cannot make any recommendation 
on this issue in this rep0 rt....( Community Panel, 1992:159-160; original 
emphasis). 
It would seem that it is this contradiction which the Facilitating Program attempts to 
resolve. In its efforts at reform, the Facilitating Program endeavours to offer what it 
considers to be non-judgmental care. To this end, it sees itself as: 
a programme with the primary objective of providing care for adolescents, 
rather than controlling their behaviour, delivering a message of deterrence 
or providing treatment. This program is based on the fundamental 
assumption that problematic behaviour is often a functional response to a 
dysfunctional environment. Consequently, the goal of this program is to help 
ensure the psychological health of the ecological systems in which the 
adolescents function, rather than to focus on the psychological health of 
individual adolescents alone (Crossroads, 1990:4). 
Nevertheless, as a facility funded by the provincial Health Ministry, the Facilitating 
Program's pursuit of its objectives falls within the boundaries set by the prevailing 
conventions of adolescent mental health. This requires that the adolescent disorders 
attended to by the Program are recognized by the psychiatric profession - the dominant 
cultural arbiter in matters of psychiatric disorder - and legitimated by its authorized manual - 
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. While the 
orientation and diagnostic categories of the D.S.M. have been widely criticized, this text 
remains psychiatry's authorized guide for determining acting out, i.e. culturally deviant 
thoughts and behaviours. In recent years, it has become a virtual best seller among mental 
health professionals (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992:128) and its influence on the daily functioning 
of the Facilitating Program is considerable. Specifically, it presents the definitive account 
of conduct disorder, the category which provides the Facilitating Program with its frame of 
reference. As an imposing presence within the mental health professions and beyond, the 
D.S.M. requires a closer look in order to appreciate the forces at play in both the constitution 
of the Facilitating Program's perspective and the nature of the challenges which it faces. 
The D.S.M. 
Psychoanalytic psychiatry bases truth on authority; something is true 
because Freud said so. Scientific psychiatry bases truth on scientific 
experimentation .... The old psychiatry derives from theory, the new psychiatry 
from fact (Maxmen, 1985:31, quoted in Kirk and Kutchins, 1992:7). 
0 r so supporters of this development would have us believe. In contrast to Freud who was interested in determining the origins or causes of mental 
disorders, the focus of Emile Kraeplin, Freud's contemporary, was on the classification, 
categorization and description of these disorders as discrete entities (Ellenberger, 1970; 
Young, 1991; Kirk and Kutchins, 19925). Kraeplin's approach came to dominate modem 
psychiatry with the publication of the D.S.M.-Ill in 1980, considered by some to represent a 
victory for objectivity. A less triumphalist view contends that the D.S.M.-Ill's alleged 
scientific orientation represented a manoeuvre on the part of an emergent group of 
psychiatrists to seize control of the internal organization of their profession and to challenge 
the decentralization of power to other mental health professions (Kirk and Kutchins, l992:8). 
Others characterize the power play in more ominous terms, judging the stakes to be the right 
to draw the fault line separating the normal from the abnormal: 'Classifications are less 
attempts to classify disease than to articulate an idealized cultural-, age - and gender- 
specific self by way of 'diagnosing', (meaning originally, 'to tell apart') self from others" 
(Gaines, 1 992:lg; original italics). 
Certainly, the manual offered legitimation for psychiatry's campaign to secure 
authority over a significant area of social policy. The development of the D.S.M.-Ill heralded 
a 'medicalization of deviance" (Conrad and Schneider, 1980:28), an occurrence which took 
place in the midst of a variety of social developments. An increased number of non-medical 
practitioners had gained entry to the mental health field, typically providing less expensive 
services than their medical counterparts. This was accompanied by a demand for greater 
efficacy of results coupled with a shift to a less dialogic, more social control orientation. 
Meanwhile, important advances had been made by the biological approach in promoting its 
perspective on mental disorders (Kovel, 1988). 
Recent years have seen mental health become a growth industry with the rate of 
increase in the number of American mental health professionals - psychiatrists, 
psychologists, clinical social workers, family and marriage counsellors - having more than 
doubled between 1975 and 1990 (Kirk and Kutchins, l992:8). However, the position of the 
psychiatrist atop this burgeoning enterprise has been compromised. ironically, this is due, 
in part, to psychiatry's success in promoting outpatient psychotherapy in both the United 
States and Canada during the mid portion of this century.' Psychiatry's decline in prestige 
in the eyes of those outside the medical profession was mirrored within the medical ranks. 
Traditionally devalued as a medical speciality, psychiatry's status could hardly be improved 
by its growing duplication of services offered by nonmedical professions specializing in 
psychotherapeutic practices of dubious scientific validity. Psychiatry's increasingly 
marginalized status helps explain part of the motivation behind research psychiatrists 
spearheading a campaign to re-align the classification of mental disorders along more 
scientific lines. This coterie which comprised the D.S.M.-Ill Task Force effectively carried 
out a coup, bypassing the objections of the Freudian psychotherapists who comprised the 
majority of the association and installing a new paradigm for the conceptualization and 
organization of knowledge related to mental disorders (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992:14). 
Earlier versions of the D.S.M. lacked precise conceptions, vague and general 
descriptions being the norm. Questions about diagnostic validity were legion but the 
D.S.M.-Ill Task Force managed to divert attention to a more manageable difficulty: reliability 
or the extent to which clinicians can identify D.S.M. designated symptoms to arrive at a 
D.S.M. designated diagnosis (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992:31). In this way, the thornier question 
of the conceptual definition of mental disorders gave way to a discussion about consistency 
in making diagnoses, an issue of questionable concern to clinicians who typically look 
beyond any single diagnosis when determining a plan of action. Critical to this manoeuvre 
was the promotion of a diagnostic system based on specific descriptions of observable 
behaviour. In this sense, it took an atheoretical approach as it bypassed any consideration 
of the possible causes of the behaviour and focused on perceivable symptoms. With this 
empiricist outlook firmly in place, the claim was made that the D.S.M.-Ill was no longer an 
"arbitrary stigma-producing exercise in labelling" (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992:105) but now was 
scientifically based. 
In fact, there is little that is objective about the diagnostic criteria (Kirk and Kutchins, 
1992:221). Each is dependent upon social context and subjective judgment. Diagnostic 
criteria include common experiences or behaviours that must be specified. Designations 
then must be made as to where normality leaves off and abnormality begins. If thresholds 
are too low, the inclusion of many common experiences will result in the diagnosis being 
ridiculed. High thresholds, on the other, will predetermine its 'abnormal" character, but may 
render the category to be useless due to its rare applicability. In addition, disorders may 
share criteria but not all criteria. Frequently, arbitrary boundaries are required with the 
positioning of these boundaries determining the prevalence of the disorder (Kirk and 
Kutchins, 1992:200). Perhaps most telling is the fact that the D.S.M.-Ill's lack of a clear and 
coherent understanding of mental disorder renders its efforts to provide specific descriptions 
irrational. The manual's editors state that "there is no assumption that each mental disorder 
is a discrete entity with sharp boundaries (discontinuity) between it and other mental 
disorders as well as between it and No Mental Disorder" (American Psychiatric Association, 
1980:6). Effectively, what they provide is a classification system without a clear conception 
of what it is that is being classified (Kovel, 1988). 
Diagnosis is the initial step in the technological process of transforming an individual 
with an ambiguous complaint into a patient or client with a diagnosed mental disorder. The 
D.S.M.-Ill was an attempt to make diagnoses appear to coincide more closely with technical 
rationality (Kirk and Kutchins, 1992:220), separating the designated patient from his or her 
social relations in the process. Using the manual as a viewing lens, the mental health 
professional acts as an impersonal and expert observer. lntersubjectivity or the dialogical 
relationship between the professional and the patient is superseded by this objectifying gaze 
(Foucault, 196311 975; Kovel, 1988). The individual is diagnosed according to specific 
behaviours which are not addressed in the context of the person's socially and historically 
grounded meaning system. Instead, the D.S.M.'s classificatory system of diagnosis consists 
of a list of criteria which the mental health professional can apply in a unilateral way 
regardless of differing contexts.' Psychiatric diagnosis constructs the object it purports to 
identify and is not the neutral, objective instrument that it claims to be. Instead, the authority 
of the D.S.M.-Ill lies in technocratic power whereby a specific professional body appropriates 
the right to ascribe names and categories and to legislate definitions. O 
Joel Kovel (1988) situates his critique of the D.S.M.-Ill in a conceptual framework 
consistent with the dialectical phenomenological view which informs my project. Kovel 
asserts that we are history-making beings. We form and comprehend our sense of self 
through our interactions with others. Self-recognition is thus a function of intersubjectivity. 
Mental illness may be characterized as a more or less significant moment of "frozen history', 
a reification of self-powers in which creative productivity is denied.'' This self-alienation, or 
internal splitting, involves the alienation of the person from other people and, as such, it may 
be comprehended by its effect on others. In conventional psychotherapy, this entails 
reflection by therapists on the nature of the interactions occurring in the clinical interview. 
As mental health professionals, therapists are expected to be aware of their own mental 
processes while being able to acknowledge the patient's unique individuality despite 
dissimilar experiences on the basis of race, class, gender, age, ethnicity and the like. 
An inexact procedure at best, this process has been thwarted by the dominant 
psychiatric perspective from the publication of the D.S.M.-Ill to the present day. The 
prevailing empiricism excises the role of dialogue necessary for this arrested capacity to be 
comprehended and surpassed. While claiming to be scientific, this approach actually serves 
an ideological function. First of all, it severs the intersubjective field, the dialogical 
relationship, by privileging the psychiatric point of view. l1 Secondly, its content imposes a 
particular definition of social normality and abnormality regulated by conventional clinical 
interests (Kovel, 1988). 
Kovel argues that engaging in a critique involves placing cultural phenomena in an 
historical context and deciphering the social interests which these processes, formations 
and products appear to serve. Employing a similar deconstructive approach, Atwood 
Gaines (1992:3) concludes that the D.S.M. system of classification l2 provides a standard 
of self mastery which implicitly reflects culturally dominant gender, ethnicity, religion and age 
conceptions of normality. This ideological project is cloaked in the guise of scientific 
authority, the D.S.M. routinely being touted as an atheoretical instrument for the identification 
of biologically based mental disorders (Gaines, 1992; Kirk and Kutchins, l992:7). Biology's 
presumed universality establishes the D.S.M. view as a totalizing discourse subsuming 
alternate perspectives with its all-encompassing explanatory power. 
Psychiatry considers mental disorders to be behaviour patterns which are 'clinically 
significant" (American Psychiatric Association, 1987:xxii). Medical professionals thereby 
arrogate sole responsibility for deciding which social phenomena fall into the category of 
psychiatric illness. The classification of these disorders constitutes the basis for diagnosis 
upon which medical intervention, research, language of communication and professional 
claim staking occurs. This takes place despite the fact that medical consensus 
acknowledges the indiscrete nature of the individual disorders and the absence of unique, 
disorder-specific symptoms. Gaines argues that these disorders or diseases are 
constructed rather than discovered, owing their conscious articulation to unconscious 
assumptions which coincide with the interests of specific cultural communities. I would add 
that these unconscious values and beliefs tend to map dominant assumptions which have 
receded from conscious awareness. Their commonplace acceptance as 'unarticulated 
common sense" (Gaines, 1992: 15) marks their transition from ideological to hegemonic 
knowledge (Williams, 1977; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991). I also would agree with Kovel 
(1 988) that the psychiatric establishment does not choose this path of action as a conscious 
conspiracy. It simply represents the relatively unreflective pursuit of its own interests which 
it takes to be synonymous with those of the common good. 
The conception of personhood embodied in the D.S.M. outlook appears to be 
derived from the dominant tendency in the Western cultural perspective - the northern 
European German Protestant tradition (Gaines, 198Ul984; 1992) - which depicts the 
person as constant yet malleable, physically bounded and autonomous, the locus of 
motivation and action. Not coincidentally in my view, this characterisation parallels the 
representation of the individual promoted by capitalist market forces which drove the 
comparatively rapid and extensive industrialization of northern Europe. Individuation and 
personal growth are central to this notion as is the alleged capacity to control and fashion 
oneself. The value placed on constancy is reflected in the D.S.M.'s category of personality 
disorder which is premised on the enduring psychological structure of the self. Rationality 
is held at a premium and informs a cultural standard of normality that presumes rational self 
mastery. 
This referential self differs from the sociocentric Mediterranean self which possesses 
capacities and a character set at birth with reference to significant related others, yet 
alterable according to interactional circumstances (Gaines, 198U1984; 1992). Significantly, 
this latter version of the self is not entirely subject to the individual's autonomous will but is 
seen to be a socially related, socially dependent construct. Emotionality tends to be valued 
in this conception and its sociocentric character diminishes the feasibility and value of self 
mastery. By contrast, the culturally dominant referential model tends to devalue the very 
qualities of emotionality emphasised in both the Mediterranean tradition and the 
conventional symbolic conceptions of ethnic minorities, women and children (Gaines, 1992). 
In a certain sense, the mature, rational, self controlled, culturally dominant self 
represented in the pages of the D.S.M. needs the example of its Other in order to construct 
itself (Gaines, 1992). Children and youths would seem to serve this function. The dramatic 
increase in the number of children's disorders documented in the D.S.M.-Ill (Kirk and 
Kutchins, 1992:101) appears to legitimize the notion of adolescence as a marker for 
abnormality much as Japan's 'school refusal syndrome' (Lock, 1988) can be seen to reflect 
similarly deeply held cultural assumptions and values (Gaines, 1992). Robert Hill and 
Dennis Fortenbeny (1 992) observe that the rise of the medicalization of social deviance over 
the past half century has witnessed a parallel tendency to characterize adolescence as a 
distinct period in which behaviours considered to be socially problematic are concentrated. 
They cite the work of G. Stanley Hall, Margaret Mead and Erik Erikson as but the most 
conspicuous benchmarks in this growing trend to view this interval as a time of emotional 
turbulence, norm transgression and potentially self-destructive behaviour within Western 
industrialized countries. The authors' partially ironic claim that adolescence has been cast 
as an age-bound condition which poses a risk to health raises the wholly serious concern 
that this increasingly popular representation may obscure the contributing role of oppressive 
structural inequalities along gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, class as well as age 
lines (Hill and Fortenbeny, 1992). 
What is evident is that this notion of 'adolescence as pathology" has taken on 
elements of a cultural stereotype, a cultural logic fostering a mutually constitutive dynamic. 
Greater interest has been directed to identifying and treating the ostensibly abnormal 
attitudes and actions perceived to be a function of this culturally specific life stage. The 
resulting attention legitimizes these behaviours as specific idioms of distress, culturally 
meaningful vehicles for conveying individual dis-ease, and their occurrence increases 
accordingly. 
Conduct Disorder 
'What's the use of their having names,' the Gnat said, 'if they won't answer to them?' 'No 
use to them,' said Alice, 'but it's useful to the people that name them, I suppose.' 
Lewis Carroll 
Through the Looking Glass 
A s the most frequently diagnosed psychiatric disorder of adolescence, the D.S.M.'s category of conduct disorder is a revealing illustration of this 
dialectic. The D.S.M.-Ill-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987), the version in effect 
during the time of my fieldwork, defines conduct disorder as being characterised as 'a 
persistent pattern of conduct in which the basic rights of others and major age-appropriate 
societal norms or rules are violated". Diagnostic criteria specify:'[a] disturbance of conduct 
lasting at least six months, during which at least three of the following have been present: 
has stolen without confrontation of a victim on more than one occasion 
(including forgery) 
has run away from home overnight at least twice while living in parental or 
parental surrogate home (or once without returning) 
often lies (other than to avoid physical or sexual abuse) 
has deliberately engaged in fire-setting 
is often truant from school (for older person, absent from work) 
has broken into someone else's house, building, or car 
has deliberately destroyed others' property (other than by fire-setting) 
has been physically cruel to animals 
has forced someone into sexual activity with him or her 
has used a weapon in more than one fight 
often initiates fights 
has stolen with confrontation of a victim (e.g., mugging, purse-snatching, 
extortion, armed robbery) 
has been physically cruel to people' (American Psychiatric Association, 
l987:55) 
Criteria for severity range from mild in which few conduct problems beyond the 
minimum required to meet the diagnosis are present through moderate to severe in which 
many conduct problems in excess of the minimum exist or 'conduct problems cause 
considerable harm to others, e.g., serious physical injury to victims, extensive vandalism or 
theft, prolonged absence from home' (American Psychiatric Association, 1987:55). The 
Facilitating Program states that:: 
[clonduct disorder as a diagnosis is not specific. [Its incidence of occurrence] 
can be adjusted by the adjustment of the cut-offs of [the] amountttype [of] 
behaviour present. r h e  identifying] behaviours are exceedingly common in 
... [the general] population. [The overlap of behaviours associated with 
conduct disorder with other diagnoses] is the rule (Crossroads, 1992:4).13 
Conduct disorder represents the encoding of specific adolescent behaviours whose 
degree of departure from the norm are considered to be clinically significant. It legitimizes 
these behaviours as a valid idiom of distress, simultaneously acknowledging the content of 
the behaviours as meaningful and reading it as evidence of a behaviour disorder which will 
be dealt with accordingly. The authority of this approach is largely based upon allusions to 
the medical model of diagnosis and the treatment of biologically based pathology which it 
applies to mental or psychological phenomena. The prominence and credibility of conduct 
disorder as a category is very much 'a function of the social power of the constituencies from 
which it emanatesn (Kenny, l995:2). This age-bound category illuminates what an influential 
body of social regulators deems to be evidence of the failure to navigate the passage to 
responsible selfhood. Situated within a framework of psychopathology, this category reveals 
the nature of the dominant 'social psychology"" (Horton, 1983:79) activated in response to 
these perceived difficulties. 
In fact, the behaviour that falls within the descriptive boundaries of conduct disorder 
speaks more of attitudes and actions defined by conventional standards to be socially 
deviant than of mental disorders or psychopathology. Intended to document symptoms of 
underlying psychological disabilities, this category inadvertently serves as a capsule 
commentary on prevailing cultural values. For it is within the cultural realm that each person 
fashions a conception of self which reflects the individual's unique negotiations with 
normative values, beliefs and expectations. Idioms of distress act as vehicles to express 
'instability in the content of selfhood" (Kenny, 1986:9). Of necessity, they employ elements 
considered to be meaningful and of value to their audience.'' In seeking social recognition, 
the person exhibiting behaviour considered to be conduct disordered effectively 
communicates a negative image of the conduct ordered, the dominant cultural Self. 
By all accounts, there is a good sized cohort currently clamouring for attention. The 
author of the most comprehensive study of adolescent mental health in Canada to date 
observes that conduct disorder comprises fully 59% of all the diagnoses made of teenagers 
in Ontario, the research project's catchment area. By Dan Offord's estimation, this includes 
5.5% of all youths between the age of 4 and 16, amounting to 100,000 cases of conduct 
disorder in Ontario alone (Offord, 1987). The Facilitating Program notes that many 
undiagnosed youths indicate that they engage in behaviours associated with conduct 
disorder, a group judged to comprise 60% of all adolescents (Crossroads, 1993:420). What 
emerges is a picture of a society vulnerable to bodily harm, destruction or loss of property 
and rule violation at the hands of the majority of an age-bound cohort. Youth defines the 
Other in this instance with fully 60% of those under 18 years of age judged to be 'at risk" of 
mental pathology. The expression of that pathology directly threatens the dominant cultural 
Self. For with person, property and norms under siege, what self respecbng person can lay 
claim to self-mastery? Presented in these terms, it becomes evident that mental health 
professionals gathered under the umbrella of the Ministry of Health are busying their minds 
and hands with matters of social control as well as health care. 
Conduct Disorder in Context 
A recent provincial conference on conduct disorders offered the opportunity to gain an understanding of how the concept of conduct disorder informs the 
actual practice of these mental health professionals. Jointly sponsored by the local medical 
school's psychiatric outreach and the national body of child psychiatrists, this second annual 
gathering was attended by approximately 1 10 people. The participants were roughly divided 
between psychiatrists and non medical mental health professionals, including psychologists, 
social workers, educators, and child care workers. The format consisted of presentations of 
one and a half hours in length followed by half an hour of discussion. 
The first of the two psychologist presenters outlined "A Developmental Model for 
Cross-Setting Prevention and Early Intervention with Children at Risk for Conduct Disorder 
and Delinquency". She spoke to the importance of communication between the different 
settings - family, school and community -when working with conduct disordered children. 
"Treatment Foster Care as an Alternative to Group Care for Adolescents with Severe 
Delinquency andlor Emotional Disturbance" was the topic chosen by the second 
psychologist. It emphasized the desirability of using short term foster placements to facilitate 
the teaching of skills to both the child and the biological parents. In neither instance was the 
legitimacy of conduct disorder questioned. 
The presentations by the medical professionals were more forthcoming in their 
criticisms. Conduct disorder as a category was considered to be deficient by all four 
psychiatrists. It was generally thought that the term was too broad in scope, acting as a kind 
of umbrella concept which grouped together individuals who share little in common other 
than the symptoms associated with this classification. On the one hand, it was recognized 
that each of us at some time displays behaviour which could be considered to be conduct 
disordered. On the other, there was consensus that children who are diagnosed to be 
conduct disordered can include individuals who exhibit serious psychological and 
behavioural difficulties. There was general agreement that this label described a 
behavioural disorder rather than a psychiatric illness. Its etiology was considered to be due 
to the interaction of multiple factors identifiable only through the compiling of a 
comprehensive phenomenological history sensitive to the interrelationship of biological, 
psychological and social considerations. There was also a willingness to work with this term 
despite its limitations. This frame provided the presenters with a working basis of unity 
within which each pursued specific areas of interest. 
In a talk on the "Etiology of Conduct Disorders", a research psychiatrist reviewed the 
contributions of biological theorists in the areas of "medical and neurological histories, 
developmental delays, immunological factors, prenatal trauma, neuropsychological factors, 
genetic theories and psychophysiological variables". The speaker called for interdisciplinary 
co-operation and ended with a lament that while improved housing, economic conditions and 
support for single parent families could only lessen the incidence of conduct disordered 
children, it was unlikely that the general public would accept the increase in taxes necessary 
to fund such preventative measures. 
Keith Johnson's presentation on the Facilitating Program argued for the centrality of 
attachment issues beyond early childhood. He claimed that the promotion of affiliation with 
others was critical for the caring of conduct disordered adolescents and that this required 
the active involvement of the immediate community. Audience discussion was generally 
favourable but critical comments were raised concerning the youth's rights regarding 
informed consent to the care plan procedures, the lack of necessary resources in specific 
communities to address the needs of the youth and the absence of a control group to 
confirm the program's promising results. 
In "Conduct Disorders from a Forensic Psychiatry Perspective", the head of the 
provincial forensic psychiatry unit for adolescents re-iterated the vagueness of the concept 
of conduct disorder, grouping as it does people who display occasional mild anti-social 
behaviour with others who may be chronic violent offenders. He expressed a concern that 
growing public intolerance of youth crime will result in stricter penalties despite the fact that 
nothing in the research literature supports the view that adolescents benefit from custody. 
Particularly disturbing from his point of view was the prospect of greater numbers of youths 
being imprisoned due to the absence of rigorous tests to differentiate the minority who are 
likely to become entrenched in violent acting out from the majority whose delinquency is 
transient and minor in character. As the leading forensic consultant to the provincial youth 
courts, his mandate includes developing screening techniques capable of making this 
distinction. He expressed skepticism about identifying conclusive procedures. However, 
he noted that the current political expediencies of his job find him advocating a move away 
from the general constellation of anti-social behaviours. Such "psychological constructs" as 
impulsiveness, manipulativeness, and lack of empathy, were now favoured as potentially 
more precise indicators of underlying psychopathology. 
The next speaker, arguably one of Canada's most prominent psychiatrists in the area 
of conduct disorder, echoed the cautions of the other presenters to avoid seeking simple 
causal relationships when exploring the etiology of conduct disorder. His talk entitled 
"Conduct Disordered Youth: Do We Serve Them Well?" directed attention to the actions of 
mental health professionals which tend to exacerbate the situation of conduct disordered 
youths. His research indicated that the major shortcomings of the social service system are 
its lack of continuity of care and its failure to provide suitable support structures. These 
failures are seen to be especially critical at a time when increases in the number of single 
parent families and double income families combined with high rates of youth unemployment 
bring new pressures to bear on the family unit. His emphasis was on a co-ordinated delivery 
of support designed to eliminate the wasteful duplication of services which accompanies the 
intervention of a succession of agencies over a period of time. 
The conference captured a number of themes which I would continue to encounter 
in the course of my fieldwork. The first consisted of the willingness of mental health 
professionals to situate their interventions within the frame provided by conduct disorder 
while maintaining a critical skepticism about the validity of the term, in particular, and the 
D.S.M. model of pathology, in general. The second was the degree to which attachment 
theory is turned to as a legitimate alternative to the atheoretical empiricism of the D.S.M. 
Keith Johnson's presentation on the Facilitating Program may well have been the only one 
which referred directly to attachment theory, yet the familiarity of the audience with this 
perspective and their receptivity to this point of view was evident. Neither is it insignificant 
that the founding meeting held the previous year devoted its entire proceedings to the topic 
of 'Attachment, Relationships and Aggression: Mental Health Challenge for the Nineties*. 
Conference documents indicate that the inaugural conference sought to provide 'an 
overview of the advances and understanding in the fields of infant, child and adolescent 
mental health, ... [with] the process of early bonding and attachment" (Lambrou, 1992) 
considered to be central to these recent developments. Clearly, attachment theory has 
emerged as an important cultural force requiring closer examination. 
CHAPTER SIX - AITACHMENT THEORY 
There was a child went forth every day, 
And the first object he looked upon and received with 
wonder or pity or love or dread, that object he became, 
And that object became part of him for the day or a certain 
part of the day .... or for many years or stretching 
cycles of years. 
Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass (1 855) 
C ontemporary attachment theory is most readily associated with the notion of bonding which lodged itself in conventional knowledge in the mid 1970's 
(Crouch and Manderson, 1995) with the publ i~at i~n of Matemal-Infant Bonding (Klaus and 
Kennell, 1976). This work highlights a sensitive period shortly after birth when the 
establishment of a strong attachment between the mother and the infant is thought to take 
place. This bond is considered to be crucial for the occurrence of attachment over the long 
term and its existence is judged to have important consequences for the emotional well- 
being of both mother and child. Arguing that this sensitive period owes its basis to biology, 
this ethological view is rooted in sociobiology and wedded to an evolutionary perspective 
(Crouch and Manderson, 1995). 
Maternal-Infant Bonding is an extension of John Bowlby's ground breaking work in 
the 1950's on maternal deprivation. Bowlby believes that mothers are genetically 
programmed to be responsive to the infant's signals for nurturing and attention. He 
considers this to be an adaptive interaction, designed to safeguard infants from predators. 
The consolidation of secure attachment between members of a kinship group is also judged 
to heighten the likelihood of long term suwival. Psychological disorder is considered to be 
influenced by human relationships with the breaking of attachment bonds thought to be the 
source of disturbances potentially capable of affecting subsequent relationships. Similarly, 
the internalisation of disturbed attachment patterns can render the person more susceptible 
to further distress and the internal working model of relationships more vulnerable to the 
impact of adverse conditions (Bretherton, 1992:766). 
This reading dovetailed with attitudes popular at the time which promoted ongoing 
nurturance by the mother in order to avoid potentially harmful life long consequences. The 
wide ranging controversy surrounding this perspective is responsible for much of Bowlby's 
continuing notoriety and for a certain simplistic reduction of his ideas in conventional 
thinking. Margaret Mead (1962) considers his position to elevate and reify what are 
essentially culturally specific conclusions (Holmes, 1993:46). Certain feminists maintain that 
Bowiby replaces Freudian drive theory with an evolutionay perspective of the mother-infant 
relationship in which biology supplants culture. The claim is made that implicit in Bowlby's 
concept of maternal deprivation is a belief in anatomy as destiny with the primacy of the 
mother-child relationship being construed as a biological universal rather than a culturally 
relative construct. ' As a result, a natural configuration has been fashioned out of the 
dominant arrangement of nuclear families in Western industrialized society: absent fathers 
within a patriarchal framework (Leupnitz, 1988). The counter argument emphasizes paternal 
deprivation 'due to weak, absent or abusive fathers, and [the] 'implosion' of the children onto 
unsupported mothersn (Holmes, 1993:47). 
Bowlby's influential study focuses on the plight of orphaned children in the aftermath 
of World War II. However, its conclusions resonate with an emergent ideology which 
promoted the replacement of women factory workers with men returning from active duty. 
This view portrayed women's main responsibilities to be the bearing and rearing of the next 
generation rather than participation in the labour market. The notion of the 'tvorking mother" 
has become somewhat more acceptable with the increased involvement of women in the 
work force in recent years, but this subject-position remains a site of political contestation 
to this day (Marshall, 1994; Gordon, 1988). 
Bowlby contends that mental health requires that 'the infant or young child should 
experience a warm, intimate, and continuous relationship with his [sic] mother (or permanent 
mother substitute) in which both find satisfaction and enjoyment' (Bowlby, 1951 :13). He 
considers society to play a critical part in this process for: 
[jlust as children are absolutely dependent on their parents for sustenance, 
so in all but the most primitive communities, are parents, especially their 
mothers, dependent on a greater society for economic provision. If a 
community values its children it must cherish their parents (Bowlby, 1951 34). 
Subsequent interpretations frequently neglect Bowlby's reference to the substitute 
mother and to the conditions of mutuality. They also overlook Bowlby's underlining of the 
significance of health factors, social networks and economic conditions to the attainment of 
beneficial mother-child relationships (Bretherton, 1992:761). These omissions are 
significant for contemporary attachment theory often promotes a perspective which is 
narrower in scope than the one proposed by Bowlby? 
These contradictory accounts demonstrate the malleability of the notion of bonding. 
Its content appears to shift in emphasis depending upon the specific interests of whoever 
employs the term. On the one hand, it seems to embody certain unquestioned beliefs about 
women and child rearing. On the other, its varying usage tends to reflect the changing 
economic and social circumstances which impinge upon the relationship between infant and 
mother. The legitimacy of the concept of bonding is not so much called into question by 
these comments as is its somewhat diffuse meaning which permits varying ideological 
positions to use the term to support divergent views.' 
1993 marked the third anniversary of John Bowlby's death. It also was the occasion 
of the first international conference held in his name. Spanning four days and attracting 
hundreds of participants, it consisted of presentations by dose to thirty academics, clinicians 
and researchers well known in the area of attachment theory.= In the words of the opening 
speaker, attachment theory has catalysed a paradigm shift which has had extensive impact 
across the mental health professions (Bretherton, 1992). Over the past 15 years, it has 
become consolidated as a primary reference point for theory and research in psychiatry, 
psychology and social work. Intense interest in this approach has sparked significant 
theoretical and methodological advances which have built upon Bowlby's premises while 
moving into areas unanticipated by and, in some cases, anathema to Bowlby himself. 
The Architects of Attachment Theory: John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth 
C ontemporary attachment theory is a product of the pioneering work of Bowlby further developed by Mary Ainsworth. Bowlby provided the theoretical 
framework with concepts derived from psychoanalysis, ethology, cybernetics, information 
theory and developmental psychology. Ainsworth supplied the notion of the attachment 
figure as a secure base from which the child moves to explore his or her surroundings. She 
also drew attention to the role played by maternal sensitivity to the child's behaviour in the 
I 
development of attachment patterns. In addition, Ainsworth provided the methodology 
required to test attachment related ideas empirically and introduced innovations which have 
had considerable impact on contemporary studies (Bretherton, 1992:759). ' 
The founding premises of Bowlby's theory were fashioned in the late 1930's in 
opposition to the Freudian principles advocated by his supervisor, Melanie Klein. Klein 
claimed that the emotional problems of children were due, for the most part, to intra psychic 
conflicts between aggressive and libidinal instincts. By contrast, Bowlby was convinced that 
the external world in the form of actual experiences played a more decisive part in a 
person's mental health. In particular, he argued that the mother's own childhood 
experiences were critical in determining the well being of her offspring. This interest in the 
intergenerational transmission of attachment patterns would guide his subsequent work. In 
the short term, it resulted in what is credited as being the first published article on family 
therapy, predating Gregory Bateson's family systems approach by a couple of decades 
(Holmes, 1993). The paper documented the clinical breakthroughs achieved by interviewing 
parents about their own recollections of childhood while accompanied by their troubled 
offspring. Bowlby would later extend this interest in family dynamics by incorporating 
systems theory and cybernetics into his perspective (Bretherton, 1992:760). 
Bowlby turned to Konrad Lorenz's studies of geese and Robert Hinde's work with 
rhesus monkeys to provide a theoretical explanation for his proposition that children require 
an intimate, continuous relationship with their care givers in order to thrive emotionally. By 
referring to nonhuman studies, Bowlby eliminated the need to wrestle with the issue of 
individual interpretation related to human behaviour. Bowlby's conception of the infant self 
tended to be passive and his main objective was to use ethology to provide object relations 
theory with a scientific foundation.' 
During the 1 9 4 0 ' ~ ~  Mary Ainsworth conducted independent research which led her 
to conclude that secure dependence on parents was critical to the development of a child's 
mental health. Her work on the notion of a 'secure base" (Salter, 1940:45) led to a 
collaborative project with Bowlby in which she contributed a classificatory system identifying 
positive, ambivalent and hostile as three noticeable relationship patterns among school-aged 
children reunited with their parents after prolonged hospitalisation (Bretherton, 1992:760). 
As Holmes (1 993:104) indicates, Ainsworth's naturalistic studies of mother-child interactions 
led her to devise an assessment instrument similar to the methods used by Harlow and 
Robert Hinde in their work with  monkey^.^ 
Attachment, Separation, Loss 
B y the time of the publication of Attachment (1969), the first volume of his trilogy, Bowlby has consolidated aspects of cybernetics, working models and 
intersubjectivity in an integrated approach. His conception of cybernetics replaces Freud's 
notions of drive and instinct. It refers to the organism's ability to modify behaviour in 
response to changes in the environment within limits set by the specific organism's 
evolutionary adaptability. Human individuals, according to Bowlby, have the capacity to 
predict and accommodate future eventualities if they have developed internal working 
models of their environment and of their own actions in that environment. Conscious 
reflection upon and revision of these models may be required in order to adapt to a 
drastically altered environment. Finally, the capacity for communication enables humans to 
share the content of these models on an intersubjective basis while this same ability to 
communicate permits the person to regulate behaviour on an intra psychic level (Bretherton, 
1992:766). 
In Separation (1 973), Bowlby incorporates concepts from contemporary cognitive 
theory to expand his discussion of how children use working models to predict the 
attachment figure's behaviour and to strategize their own responses. A child with an internal 
working model which portrays a valued and self-reliant self is one who is likely to have 
experienced an attachment figure responsive to his or her comfort and safety requirements 
while being simultaneously respectful of the need for independent exploration.' Bowlby 
extends this discussion to include the transmission of attachment patterns across 
generations. His belief is that individuals who grow to be relatively self-reliant and 
emotionally stable as adults are likely to be those people whose own parents encouraged 
autonomy while providing support. In Bowlby's opinion, such parents tend to have fostered 
quite open discussion of their own working models of self as well as those of their child and 
of other people and to have indicated that these models are subject to criticism and to 
revision. Bowlby emphasizes that this interpersonal culture within the family is as important 
if not more important than genetic inheritance where mental health is concerned (Bretherton, 
1992:767). 
Loss (1980) marks the completion of Bowlby's trilogy and outlines his use of 
information processing theory to explain the defensive distortions of working models as well 
as their relative stability over time. One source of stability is the tendency for habitual or 
automatic patterns of interaction to become less accessible to conscious awareness. 
Stability is also derived from dyadic relational patterns whose reciprocal expectations make 
them less likely to change than individual patterns. Some distortion can be expected when 
new information is defensively excluded from consciousness. While these defensive actions 
typically shield the child from unbearable conflict, confusion or pain, they also disrupt the 
ability of working models to accommodate the existing reality (Bretherton, 1992:768). 
Bowlby cites three situations in which he believes children are liable to engage in 
defensive exclusion. These are circumstances observed by children which their parents do 
not wish them to know about, incidents in which children witness parental behaviour too 
upsetting to think about and thoughts or actions on the part of children of which they are 
ashamed. These occurrences may lead to a division or split of the internal working model.I0 
Bowlby uses Tulving's concepts of episodic and semantic memory (Tulving, 1972) to explore 
the repressive and dissociative phenomena captured with this analysis. According to lnge 
Bretherton (1992:768), Tulving makes the proposition that episodic memory encodes 
autobiographical experience while semantic memory acts as the repository for explanations 
provided by other people. On those occasions when the two memory banks retain material 
which is highly contradictory, severe psychological conflict is the probable outcome. When 
this occurs, episodic memory which houses the person's recollection of actual experience 
may be subjected to defensive exclusion. It is Bowlby's contention that this self-protective 
mechanism is particularly likely to occur among bereaved children under 3 years of age 
(Bretherton, 1992:768). 
His analysis of the defence process led Bowlby to devote the last 10 years of his life 
to the examination of the application of attachment theory to psychotherapy (Bowlby, 1988). 
In Bowlby's view, a central objective of psychotherapy is the reappraisal of outdated or 
inadequate internal working models of self derived from relationships with attachment 
figures. The tendency is for the individual to re-impose these patterns on relations with the 
therapist so that their joint task becomes one of understanding the origins of these 
maladaptive models. The specific role of the therapist is to act as a secure base from which 
the person can begin to re-assess and revise working models (Bretherton, 1992:768-769). 
Contemporary Developments 
Adult Attachment Interview 
0 ne of the most decisive recent developments involves the application of Ainsworth's mother-child attachment patterns to the study of adults. Mary 
Main's adult attachment interview (George and Main, 1984) poses questions to parents 
concerning their own childhood attachment and the consequence of these early patterns 
upon their later development. The adults are judged to fall into one of three categories, 
replicating the infant classification patterns. Autonomous secure refers to those parents who 
give a coherent depiction of childhood attachment, regardless of whether or not these early 
experiences had been satisfying. Conflicted memories presented in a relatively disorganized 
and incoherent manner are considered to be typical of preoccupied parents, while 
dismissing parents fail to recall much information about these early experiences, the few 
memories recounted indicating instances of rejection. These findings are then applied to 
the current relational tendencies of the parents with their offspring, resulting in data strongly 
supportive of the premise that attachment patterns tend to be transmitted intergenerationally 
(Fonagy et at., 1991 ; Fonagy et al., 1993; Bretherton, l992:769). 
The conventional explanation for the high correlation is that insecurely attached 
parents demonstrate an inability to experience and resolve the distress associated with 
separation and loss. As a result, they are unable to accommodate the child's feelings of 
distress. This means that the child must resort to defensive measures such as the 
displacement of aggression onto siblings or toys, self-injury or over compliance in order to 
keep feelings within manageable limits. The care giver is understood to be accommodated 
by the child within a general coping style that takes one of three forms. In avoidant 
attachment, the child attempts to downplay attachment needs because of the likelihood of 
rejection. This results in a strategy of maintaining distant contact with the care giver while 
a defensive exclusion mechanism is invoked to remove both the child's unmet needs and 
the care giver's rejection from consciousness. An ambivalent strategy may be employed in 
which the child either clings to the care giver or actually acts as the adult's care giver while 
feelings of anger at the parent's rejection are excluded from conscious awareness. A third, 
less common pattern of insecure attachment is considered to be associated with a more 
severe psychopathology. 
Attachment needs are not considered to be confined to childhood. Instead, they form 
a lifelong part of a person's relations with parents, friends, and partners. For example, 
Bowlby considers the task of leaving home which typically occurs during adolescence to 
involve the distancing of parental attachment, mourning that loss and then moving through 
a transition period of peer group attachment to the pair bonding of adult life. As a parent, 
the nature of a person's present intimate relationships may be as important in shaping 
current parent-infant interactions as past events. Yet these same past influences may play 
an important function in the selection of a spouse or partner. Bowlby's awareness of these 
tendencies strengthened his resolve to cast attachment theory in terms of the feedback 
loops commm to systems theory, early negative self-assumptions fostering subsequent 
relations with others which reinforce these self-concepts in a vicious circle. Patterns of 
attachment and dependency also are seen to comprise critical components in therapy as the 
mental health professional becomes a pivotal focus for attachment needs that have been 
suppressed (Holmes, 1993:152). 
The Role of Narrative 
A rguably the most significant recent emphasis in the attachment perspective of human behaviour is its increased reliance on the concept of narrative. The 
meaning creating practice of story telling appears to have supplanted both scientific and 
ethical considerations in contemporary psychoanalysis (Rustin, 1991; Holmes, 1993). l1 
Through the process of shaping and naming the child's sensations, the parent may be 
understood to be the primary locus of meaning. 'The function of the parent, of the therapist 
and of cultural objects can all be understood in this framework of containment and 
structuring of inchoate experience' (Holmes, 1993:144). Significantly, John Bowlby is a 
notable exception to this interpretive trend. l2 
Jeremy Holmes (1993:214) makes the case that much of contemporary attachment 
theory shifts emphasis away from Bowlby's reliance on evolutionary science toward the 
hermeneutic tradition. The concept of narration supplies the catalyst for this re-orientation. 
The term narrative is derived from knowing and is considered to be central to 
psychotherapy's objective which is one of self knowing. Typically, psychotherapy sees its 
function to be one of assisting the person to become aware of information and experiences 
of which he or she has been unconscious. This process consists of attributing symbolic 
meaning to amorphous feelings. This provides the means to transform fragments of 
experience into a coherent story, a meaningful self-narrative through which the individual 
gains a sense of competence in managing the affairs of life. In shaping disjointed events 
of which the person is more or less aware into a self-authored account, the individual 
achieves a sense of mastery of self agency. l3 
Holmes points to the work by Fonagy (1 991) and Bretherton (1 991) in which the adult 
attachment interview is used to elicit a narrative account of the individual's childhood 
experiences. Secure attachment is related to the ability to tell a clear and coherent story 
while insecure attachment is indicated by the inability to give a consistent picture of past 
events. The actual content is less important than the emotional tone and the capacity to 
provide narrative unity, to ascribe meaning to what otherwise would be the disordered 
stream of events comprising a person's life (Holmes, 1993:146). The contents of this 
narrative may change over time. Events may come to hold more or less significance as the 
conceptual framework brought to bear on the information changes. However, what remains 
critical is the capacity to provide order, to fashion a coherent interpretation of one's 
experiences. In this conception, the secure base offered by the parent represents the 
foundation upon which subsequent meaning is based. The absence of such a stable point 
of reference undermines the capacity to shape a cohesive self-narrative. 
Here an hermeneutic conception of attachment theory converges with my critical 
interpretive perspective with its notion of identity as the central organizing principle, a locus 
about which it is possible to organize and order events to provide a uniform account. 
Lifelong insecure attachment is suggestive of ontological insecurity, one of whose 
characteristics is the lack of 'a consistent feeling of biographical continuity" (Giddens, 1991 : 
53). Although Bowlby's perspective is that of empirical science, his discussion of working 
models is compatible with Sartre's concept of fundamental deviation (Sartre, 196311968), 
Turner's root paradigm (Turner, 1974) and Bourdieu's habitus (Bourdieu, 198011990). 
These latter terms chart a middle ground between the essentialist notion of the self favoured 
by modernist humanism and the decentring of the subject by poststructuralism (Marshall, 
1994). They enable a conceptualization of attachment as reified social relations 14, critical 
encounters that continue to reverberate through an individual's current behaviour. As fixed 
patterns, these internal working models are resistant to change but are able to be surpassed 
in certain circumstances. They may constitute the dominant manner by which a person 
relates to the world. They also may be residual in nature, emerging to prominence only 
when the individual faces conflicting demands or similar destabilising challenges to selfhood. 
Social Considerations 
A s should now be evident, attachment theory accommodates a wide range of interpretations within its fold. Certain individuals regard the 
impact of childhood neglect or abuse as one of a number of factors which increase the 
potential for insecure attachment rather than as the single cause of future difficulties (Brown 
and Harris, 1978; Holmes, l993:124). Others elaborate this view by arguing that the 
combination of insecure childhood attachment, ineffectual parenting styles and social 
disadvantages such as economic hardships, single parenthood, and exposure to family 
violence produce conditions in which behaviour difficulties are likely to arise (Jaffe et al., 
1990; Rutter et al., 1970; Crossroads, 1994). l5 The internal working models formed under 
these circumstances will shape relationships later in life, whether as parents, wage earners, 
community members or citizens. These interactions, in turn, will have an impact on 
economic and cultural conditions which will influence the well being of subsequent 
generations (Holmes, 1993:204). 
A variation on this perspective shifts the emphasis onto the decisive role played by 
broader social factors - poor housing, unemployment, poverty, educational disadvantages, 
etc. These social indicators are judged to mark the boundary between the secure and the 
marginalised in society. This economic, political and cultural division represents a social 
construction of uncertainty (Marris, 1991) which has no less profound effects on feelings of 
attachment and stability than familial experiences which have been consolidated into an 
habitual attitude. In conditions of social inequality, security and stability become 
commodities, appropriated by those with adequate means and used as a lever to propel the 
less fortunate towards the periphery of the social mainstream (Marris, 1991; Holmes, 
1993:208). Ideologies serve to mask these inequities, further pushing the existence of 
social oppression and exploitation from conscious awareness. 
The latter account is some distance removed from the social analysis offered by 
Bowlby in which all instances of aggression can be attributed to the maladaptive response 
of the insecurely attached to loss or the possibility of loss (Holmes, 1993). Bowlby evidently 
imposed lessons from his exploration of interpersonal dynamics onto the broader social 
realm, reducing the latter to the former as a result. l6 The alternative need not be the 
favouring of the other pole of this dichotomy, exemplified by orthodox Marxism which 
dissolves all distinctions in the vat of class conflict. Marris' portrayal, for example, captures 
the tension between the individual and the social, the personal and the political, 
acknowledging the mutually constitutive relations between the realms of meaning but 
refusing to collapse the one into the other." Instead, it suggests replacing the quest for 
master meta-narratives with the articulation of 'a plurality of critical theories" (Marshall, 
1 994: 149). 
This critical modernist perspective proposes that we require distinct moments of 
analysis to do justice to the heterogeneous social constraints that confront each individual. 
For example, Marris' social construction of uncertainty is comprised of economic, political 
and social components, each one of which penetrates the others and is penetrated in turn. 
The autonomy of any one component is relative to its specific situated position in this 
ongoing dynamic. Consequently, each one must be understood within a socially and 
historically grounded dialectic. The issues raised by attachment theory are vital features of 
this complex but, by no means, capture social reality in its entirety. We turn now to an 
examination of how the Facilitating Program addresses this challenge. 
The Facilitating Program 
ttachment theory provides the Facilitating Program with its distinct perspective A on the predicament of youths identified to be conduct disordered. The 
internal documents produced by the Program offer a general overview of its approach: 
The [Facilitating] Program is primarily based on the notion that a bonding 
injury or attachment failure of some sort has occurred in disaffiliated youths, 
and that this problem is chronic in nature and likely to require long-term care. 
The program is not a treatment program and, in fact, avoids conveying the 
expectation that there is a short-term cure for these difficulties as empirical 
research indicates that it is more realistic to view these disorders as chronic 
conditions. Rather, the program is designed to intervene with a youth's 
entire ecology and to promote an understanding of the youth's needs from 
an attachment-based perspective. This goal is achieved through the 
development of a care plan, which details attachment issues involved in the 
current clinical situation for the youth and outlines a plan of care for youth 
throughout the period of adolescence. [Community support] and [hiatus] 
services are provided to assist the community in the implementation of the 
care plan. The extent to which this approach is expected to lead to 
behavioural change depends on both the nature and severity of attachment 
disruption in the youth and the flexibility and adaptability of the ecology in 
responding to his or her needs (Crossroads, 1992b:7). 
In a subsequent journal article, the Program includes a synopsis of Alan Kazdin's 
review of current literature from which it suggests "that therapeutic strategies that are geared 
toward the alteration of the youth's immediate and wider social environment are among the 
most effective in responding to the needs of troubled adolescentsw (Crossroads, 1993:420). 
The article goes on to state that: 
[tlhe fact that conduct disorder almost always occurs in conjunction with 
symptoms of other psychiatric conditions has important implications for 
understanding and responding to the needs of this population. An alternative 
perspective on conduct disorder is that it may be understood as one feature 
of a more general underlying problem related to the development and 
maintenance of attachment within interpersonal and social contexts, rather 
than as a distinct disorder per se (Crossroads, 1993:421). 
The article proceeds to describe the Program and to present an evaluation of its 
effectiveness in lessening the symptoms of conduct disorder as well as those of oppositional 
defiant disorder, depression, separation anxiety, attention deficit hyperactivity and 
overanxiousness. This discussion is preceded by a statement of the Program's guiding 
beliefs: 
Several principles which are drawn from attachment theory, object-relations 
theory and self-psychology underlie the operation of the program. First, we 
adopt the view that early experiences become solidified into representations 
of the self and other that then guide interpersonal functioning and give 
meaning to behaviour of the self and others. Two processes are central to 
the development of attachments: affiliation, the feeling of belonging and 
being connected with others; and mutuality, the understanding that actions 
and feelings of one person affect others and vice versa. These processes 
ensure bonding to early caregivers and subsequently to others. Second, we 
adopt the perspective that all behaviour has meaning. The labels that are 
typically used to describe behaviour (for example, normal versus abnormal, 
good versus bad, healthy versus sick) often distract attention away from 
understanding the psychological meaning and interpersonal intent of 
behaviour for the individual and the observer. Third, we see behaviour as 
reflecting a unifying set of intentions designed to maintain attachment and 
affiliation. Regardless of how behaviour may appear or how socially 
desirable it is, we tend to think of it as having a common goal of maintaining 
affiliation and ensuring security and survival. From this perspective, 
biological, familial, social and psychological factors contribute to the process 
of securing attachment, and all of these factors interact in determining 
success or failure in this regard. Fourth, we hypothesize that insults to 
attachment are expressed behaviourally and influence the capacity for 
affiliation and mutuality. Once an attachment representation develops, it can 
be added to, but it is impossible to subtract events once they have occurred. 
Change occurs through the assimilation of new self-other experiences and 
accommodation of attachment representations (Crossroads, 1993:423). 
Within a year, another article appeared which extends the period of the Program's 
post care plan evaluation from 6 months to 18 months. It also broadens and deepens its 
presentation of the possible impact of the social context on the formation of the insecure 
attachment. In particular, mention is made of research findings centred on the family 
histories of youths diagnosed with conduct disorder: 
First, numerous studies exist that consistendy show that family adversity, 
most notably low socioeconomic standing, single parenthood, parental 
psychopathology and exposure to family violence and aggression is related 
to the development of conduct disordered behaviour webster-Stratton, 
1990; S. B. Campbell, 1990; Jouriles et al., 1989; Rutter et al., 19701. 
Second, there is a well established relationship between punitive and 
inconsistent parenting practices and to the development of conduct disorder 
[Bates et al., 1991; S. B. Campbell et al., 1991; Patterson, 19861 .... It is the 
combination of insecure attachment styles with inadequate parenting styles 
(for example inconsistency, lack of warmth, poor limit setting) and family 
adversity that is most likely to increase the probability that behavioural and 
emotional problems will develop [Lyon-Ruth et al., 1989; Greenberg et al., 
19931. Exposure to adverse experiences during critical periods may have a 
profound impact on attachment styles. If children are exposed to high risk 
environments during critical periods they may be more likely to suffer from 
attachment related problems than if they are exposed to these environments 
at other times (Crossroads, 1994:360-361). 
The article concludes with the observation that additional research is required to 
determine the precise nature of the relationship between biological factors, high risk 
environments, management strategies of parents and the onset of behaviour problems 
(Crossroads, 1994368). How the Facilitating Program elects to address these concerns will 
offer insights into the probable political consequences of its interventions. To this end, 1 turn 
to a critique of the production of facts by its various departments and the attitudes and 
practices of its principal players. 
CHAPTER SEVEN - SOCIAL HISTORY 
C hris' referral to the Facilitating Program came about as the result of a longstanding history of difficult behaviout', Ken begins, reading 
from the typed document on the table in front of him. Of the four reports to be delivered this 
morning, Ken's social and family assessment is the longest. Over twenty pages of single 
spaced typing, it attempts to offer a comprehensive, systematic account of the events of 
significance in the life of Chris and his parents. Each of the departments represented at 
today's conference received a copy of this assessment during the first week of Chris' stay. 
Chris' mother and his social worker, on the other hand, are learning of its contents for the 
first time. After some introductory comments about Chris, the initial pages focus on the 
parents, his primary care givers: 
Chris has been diagnosed as having an Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
disorder and has had chronic problems managing his school environment as 
well as his peer relationships. He constantly gets into trouble due to 
aggressivity and angry, defiant, tempestuous behaviour. He is engaged in 
delinquent activity and there have been concerns about fire setting. In 
addition, he has been sexually abusive to his sister. Until being taken into 
the care of the Social Services Ministry, Chris was living with his mother, 
Karen, age 32, and stepfather, Bob, age 37, in Castle Rock, an 
unincorporated village near Jessop. Bob is employed as a backhoe 
operator while Karen is presently a full-time homemaker. The following 
information is based on a four and one-half hour interview with Karen and 
Bob on January 3 in their home. The purpose of the interview was explained 
to them as was the way in which the information would be used. In addition, 
I perused Social Service Ministry files. ' 
Karen was born on April 7,1959 in Sutton Flats where she was raised . She 
had two full sisters, two half brothers and three step-sisters. Her parents 
separated when she was about six years old and her mother remarried a 
man when Karen was 12 years old. He had three children from a prior 
relationship and then he and Karen's mother had two sons of their own. Of 
his prior three children, only one lived with the family. Karen described her 
mother as being quite strict and stubborn, providing clear limits and 
consequences. At the same time, Karen felt wanted and loved. Karen's 
father was an alcoholic and there was a lot of marital conflict due to his 
drinking. He was not a responsible provider. When he was not drinking, he 
was a laid back kind of person, but when he drank, he would be verbally 
provocative and abusive to his wife until she would fly at him and they would 
physically fight with each other. This was awful and traumatic for the 
children. In spite of this, Karen hated her mother for leaving her father after 
they had been together for 15 years .... 
As Ken reads the report, i om reminded of the diligence that went into its preparation. 
I had accompanied Ken when he interviewed Karen and Bob, the evening spent in the living 
room of their secluded home being one of uninterrupted, intense concentration. As I listen 
to his voice now, I hear many of Karen's words, for Ken had been as attentive in capturing 
her actual phrases on paper as he had been in prompting her to be as clear as possible in 
relating her account. My own verbatim notes made that evening sit on my lap, their words 
echoing much of what is being said: 
... moved a lot during the next few years, first to Lloyds after the initial 
separation and then returning to Sutton Flats before moving back to the 
foothills when Karen was nine years old. She was in different schools on a 
yearly basis, but found this reasonably easy to adjust to as she made friends 
readily. When Karen's mother married her second husband, the situation 
deteriorated for Karen. This man also drank and the children did not like 
him. Not too long after, Karen's two sisters left the home as a result of his 
rejection. Karen's mother sided with her new husband and closed her eyes 
to what he was doing to the children as she loved him. When Karen was 13 
years old, her stepfather attempted to sexually abuse her. He also inflicted 
corporal punishment on her a number of times. His attitude was that it was 
better if the girls were not around the home. One of his daughters had 
accompanied him when he became involved with Karen's mother, but his 
other two daughters only visited on occasion. He did not treat his three 
children well either. Karen's mother and her new partner had two boys 
together. This was viewed as a miracle as all the other children were girls. 
These boys were spoiled and given whatever they wanted. Karen's 
stepfather's whole life was drinking with his buddies and he neglected his 
sons as well. They are now 16 and 18 years old and do not want to have 
anything to do with him. His daughters don't want to have anything to do with 
him either .... 
Ken skips the section of the report referring to the current situation of Karen's mother 
and her second husband. The two hours allocated to the care plan meeting do not provide 
sufficient time for a complete reading of the social history so he edits his presentation by 
omitting certain passages and summarizing others. As he continues, I notice occasional 
paraphrasing where Ken has attempted to encapsulate some of Karen's comments in his 
own words: 
School went reasonably well for Karen and she involved herself in a lot of 
school activities. She found school easy and usually had average marks. 
She was able to obtain grade 11 at school. During her adolescence, she did 
some acting out. Her stepfather kicked her out of the home when she was 
13 years old and so Karen lived with her sister for awhile before returning 
home. This pattern continued. At age 15, she again was forced out of the 
home and lived with friends before moving home. When she was 16 years 
old, she was ejected from her home and went to the Ministry of Social 
Services who set her up in an apartment. Karen's mother would not 
advocate for her children, choosing her husband over her daughters. Karen 
became involved in drugs and alcohol on an experimental basis .... At age 16, 
Karen was living in her own apartment and going to school. During the 
summer, she went to Seton Rapids to see her father and he was supportive 
and caring of her .... 
At this point, the report shifts to Len, Chris' birth father, a section comprised of 
second and third party accounts. Karen evidently lost contact with Len some years ago so 
Ken must rely on Karen's recollection of comments made by Len and members of his family 
to piece together a summary of his upbringing: 
According to Karen, Len, currently aged 38, was one of seven children who 
were removed from their parents as a result of their severe alcoholism and 
abandonment of the children on various occasions. Home life was terrible 
according to Len's older sister. The children were taken away after the 
house caught on fire and they were unattended. Len's only memory prior to 
age five was of his foster father raping one of the foster children. When he 
was five years old, Len was adopted by a nice, French family who were strict 
Catholics. There were four adopted children in this home which was located 
on a farm. The other children apparently developed normally, but Len had 
emotional problems. He became involved in alcohol, used and sold drugs 
and stole a car once. While in his adoptive home, he was involved in 
positive activities such as hockey and church. 
The information on Chris' stepfather is equally brief. In comparison to Karen, Bob's 
childhood was relatively uneventful or he chose to present it as such: 
Bob was born on June 7, 1955 and raised in Acton, the oldest of four 
children in the family. His mother took care of him. She was a very quiet, 
resewed kind of person who would not say anything unless she felt she had 
something to say. Nonetheless, she was warm and able to demonstrate 
affection. Bob's father was an outgoing person who was conservative, strict, 
and had high standards. He was clear regarding his expectations and 
consequences were predictable The parental relationship was caring and 
loving and no conflict was evident. The family possessed cohesiveness and 
no abuse was indicated. Bob did not do too badly at school and finished 
grade 11. He also attended grade 12, but was unable to graduate. Bob left 
home at age 16, moving to Jessop where he obtained a job and an 
apartment. He stayed there for seven years, working for a door and window 
company before obtaining a truck driving job. He then moved to Montrose 
for a couple of years, returned to Jessop, then moved to Hartley before 
settling in Edison. He was a long distance trucker and enjoyed that 
emplcyment. 
Ken then moves on to the section relating to Chris' family history, a year by year 
account of Chris' development and of events of significance in his immediate surroundings. 
This comprehensive overview is the backbone of the social history and family assessment, 
comprising fully three quarters of its length. Ken opens with a short summary of the events 
leading up to Chris' birth: 
Karen met Len just prior to her 17th birthday. At first he was wonderful to 
her, but after several months she discovered that he was married and had 
two children. She was attracted to him as he was six years older than 
herself, was good looking, and treated her well. Karen had felt rejected by 
her mother and stepfather and so was vulnerable to the attention and praise 
Len lavished her with. She was very upset when she discovered that he had 
a relationship and gave him back the presents he had given her, slamming 
the door in his face. Nonetheless, he kept on calling her and coming around, 
giving "poor me" kind of stories regarding his wife. He indicated that he had 
no intention of staying with her and eventually did leave her. Karen and Len 
moved in together in the summer of 1976. For the first six months their 
relationship went reasonably well, but then Len began constantly drinking 
and doing drugs. He became physically abusive to Karen as well, being very 
controlling, jealous, and possessive. 
The couple moved to a small town north of Quinsom named Tanglewood 
where Karen felt very isolated as it was a Germanic community that she 
obviously was not a part of. Len had the phone disconnected so that she 
could not call anyone and this further constricted her ability to locate any 
supports. Even if Karen would go get groceries, Len might physically abuse 
her and accuse her of being unfaithful. He had an obsession with Karen 
becoming pregnant, although she did not wish to do so. If he found her birth 
control pills, he would destroy them. She did not want to become pregnant 
as she realized that he had problems. In addition, he had not yet divorced 
his previous partner. Karen had illusions that she could help him with his 
problems. 
One year before giving birth to Chris, Karen had a miscarriage during her first 
trimester due to Len's abuse of her. She was in hospital for one week as a 
result. Karen left Len repeatedly, but he continued to pursue her, express 
remorse, and promise her all sorts of things. Karen was in a vulnerable 
position as she had no supports, given that her father had moved back to 
Wynnona Lake. Len could also be kind and a lot of fun. After he abused 
Karen, he was apologetic and had presents and flowers. Karen become 
pregnant with Chris, although she had not wanted to become pregnant. She 
was happy about the pregnancy, but knew she would leave Len. During her 
pregnancy, the abuse she received from Len was somewhat less. By then, 
he realized that she had enough of it and she was fighting back. Every day 
she would think of how she could kill him. After becoming pregnant, Karen 
was in hospital for five days as she was threatening miscarriage. She 
became so big and the fetus was so active that the doctor thought it might 
be twins. The birth was natural, although it was a dry birth. Labour lasted 
about 12 hours and was very painful. The doctor wanted to use forceps, but 
Karen would not allow this. Chris was born seven pounds, seven ounces. 
Len was present at the birth and was very happy regarding it. Karen was 
also happy as she felt that Chris was her child. She had "made him" and Len 
had nothing to do with it. 
Chris was colicky during his first six months, but not having had children 
previously, Karen did not know the difference. She was a very over- 
protective mother who was constantly on the telephone to her doctor and 
rushed him to the hospital or the doctor all the time for normal kinds of 
things, as she did not know what was normal and what wasn't. She breast 
fed him for nine months and made a solid bond with him. She would put him 
in the Snuggli while she did her housework. Len was also good with Chris 
and helpful regarding his care. He was a little more respectful of Karen after 
Chris was born as he realized that she had decided to leave him .... 
When Chris was two months old, Karen got on a bus and returned to Lloyds. 
After about three weeks, Len came to Karen's mother place where she was 
staying and wooed her back. It was difficult for Karen to stay with her mother 
as her stepfather was not accepting of her. She returned to Tanglewood and 
stayed until Chris was seven months old. Then she went to Social Services 
and they put her up in a shelter. Leaving Len was a terrifying experience as 
he said that no one else would have her and that he would get his son back. 
A couple of days before Karen left, Len grabbed Chris and locked himself in 
the bathroom with him. This really scared Karen, as she did not know what 
he was planning to do. As far as she could tell, he didn't do anything to Chris 
at that point. After Karen lee Len, she let him have visiting rights but he 
constantly abused them. One night he called her saying that he would kill 
himself. Karen called the police who found Len by the river in an 
unconscious state, having taken an overdose of pills as well as alcohol. He 
was in hospital for quite awhile after this. The Ministry demanded that he pay 
child support, but he refused to do so unless he and Karen had a better 
relationship. At that point, Karen decided that she did not want Len to have 
anything to do with Chris anymore. This was when Chris was about two 
years old. During his first year, Chris exhibited normal development. He 
walked at age one and was a pleasant and happy child. He was extremely 
active, laughed a lot, and was very chubby .... 
The description of a happy, active child continues through Chris' early years. Toilet 
training was reported to be uneventful. Nevertheless, Karen observes that Chris continued 
to wet his bed three or four times a week until quite recently. By the time he was two, Chris 
was very active and Karen found it difficult to keep up with him. Meanwhile, she had 
become involved in a relationship with a bricklayer. He was frequently unemployed and had 
outstanding debts, so Karen worked to support herself and Chris and to help him out. His 
work was so sporadic that she basically was the main provider for the family. She also 
attended university as a mature student in the field of journalism. She had enrolled Chris 
in a daycare when he was three years old, so she would drop him off before attending her 
morning classes. Her job occupied her from early afternoon until 9 in the evening with her 
companion providing care for Chris during the late afternoon and early evening. Karen 
found this schedule too taxing and she realized that she wasn't spending enough time with 
Chris. 
About this time, Chris was sexually molested. His mother had placed him in 
a private day care which had been recommended to her. This woman had 
a 16 year old son and Chris told his mother that this boy had "chased his 
body". After he repeated this a few times, his mother asked him to show her 
with a Smurf what the boy had done and Chris indicated that the boy had oral 
sex with him and had threatened him that snakes would get him. Karen 
immediately removed Chris from the day care and confronted the day care 
mother on this, who denied the allegations. As Karen had no evidence or 
witnesses, she was unable to press charges. She talked to Chris a lot about 
sexual abuse after this. When Chris was five or six years old, his female 
cousin, who was one year older than himself, indicated that he had pushed 
her nightgown up and had her down on the bed. She was in distress about 
this. 
Karen ended her attempts to further her education as she found it too demanding to 
go to school and work at the same time. She had been able to control Chris up to this point 
in his life by speaking to him in a stem voice. She had never spanked Chris but her male 
partner did on a fairly regular basis. Karen disagreed with this approach and argued with 
him about his harsh punishment of Chris for inconsequential misbehaviour. Karen noted 
that Chris had become aggressive towards other children and she wondered whether this 
change in behaviour had to do with the spankings. Karen chose to leave her partner 
because of his harsh treatment of Chris, meeting Bob when Chris was still in kindergarten. 
They married in 1985. Karen reported that Chris accepted Bob readily and that Bob did not 
find it difficult to adopt a parental role with Chris. Chris was becoming very disruptive in 
kindergarten and would not stay still for any length of time. 
During grade one, the situation simply got worse as there was more sitting 
involved at school. Karen took him to the university clinic to see a child 
psychologist who recommended that he be put on Ritalin after seeing him for 
15 minutes. Karen was upset about this diagnosis and yelled at the 
psychologist, refusing to put Chris on drugs. She then saw a child 
psychiatrist, who put Chris through a number of tests and came to the same 
conclusion. Not satisfied with this, Karen saw a number of other 
professionals who had similar recommendations and she finally capitulated, 
although she felt that Ritalin was barbaric. Chris was not accomplishing 
anything in school and so she tried Ritalin for two weeks. His performance 
at school was totally different as it was much improved. He was not placed 
on Ritalin at home, where he continued to be very active. At school, his 
social relationships also improved as he was less aggressive .... 
During his elementary school years, Chris' behaviour swung between difficult and 
uncontrollable. The situation at home was little better as he became increasingly 
destructive, rolling a barrel into a parked car and chopping down trees outside their 
apartment complex. The family was evicted as a result. A school expulsion and another 
eviction prompted a move to a smaller community away from city pressures. 
Chris took grade four but had a terrible teacher who was physically abusive 
to him, doing such things as kicking Chris on his legs and hitting him on the 
head, in addition to giving him a fat lip. Karen confronted the teacher in 
regard to this, but he denied abusing Chris. Nonetheless, Chris kept coming 
home with bruises and saying that the teacher had hit him. He was 
eventually removed from that teacher's class. One day that teacher had 
another boy down on the ground and was kicking him and so the teacher 
was eventually removed from school. 
Chris also suffered a second episode of sexual assault about this time. 
Chris stated that he had been involved with a 65 year old man whom he 
named and that this man had fondled his penis several times. Karen had 
been leery about this man long before, as he was very friendly, lived by 
himself, and had boys going to his place for treats. He apparently had lived 
in a number of communities under aliases. Charges were laid against the 
man and Chris took the stand to testify against him. The judge yelled at 
Chris, declaring that Chris couldn't testify properly as he didn't know what 
God was. Chris was almost in tears and the experience was traumatic for 
him. 
After this, Chris' behaviour got worse. Karen was open with Chris about this episode 
and reassured him that it wasn't his fault, but Chris kept on becoming more violent. He had 
severe tantrums in which he would break things and hyperventilate: 
Karen wondered whether Chris' tantrums had anything to do with the 
epileptic-like fits that Chris' father had succumbed to periodically. Their 
onset usually coincided with alcohol use and seemed unrelated to being 
angry. On one occasion, he had been sent to jail due to his destructive 
behaviour while in this state, the court doctor having determined that he was 
in control of his actions. 
Chris' younger sister was born when Chris was 8 and he responded well to her 
arrival. Nevertheless, his aggressive, disruptive behaviour continued in school and an 
incident of fire setting was also noted. It was about this time that Karen took Chris for 
psychological counselling where she was advised that Chris' father was psychologically part 
of Chris' life: 
Since Karen could not cope with Chris, she called Len and he talked to 
Chris. The following summer, Chris spent three weeks with his father in 
Jordan Bluff. This was very hard for Karen to do as she was not sure that 
Len would send him back. Chris had always threatened to run away and live 
with his father and his mother felt that maybe he should live with Len. She 
did not get a lot of information about what happened while Chris was with his 
birth father, but after visiting his father, Chris no longer threatened to run 
away to him. Prior to that summer, a child care worker, Lonnie Varko, was 
employed to assist Chris. Lonnie felt that Chris' experience with his birth 
father was a stabilizing experience for him ..... 
The family was thrown into turmoil during the early summer of that year. Bob had 
taken on the job of backhoe operator outside of Jessop and was frequently home only one 
day each weekend. Karen was continuing to work and attempting to prepare the house for 
sale. She found herself to be short with Chris, feeling too stressed to employ her new 
parenting skills. Chris continued to display erratic behaviour, hitting either himself or his 
sister when he became frustrated. He physically attacked his mother as well and on several 
occasions stole from local stores and neighbouring homes. 
It was during this period that Chris and a boy two years older stole a car and drove 
to the next city three hours away. The theft showed a considerable amount of premeditation. 
Chris later stated that he was terrified throughout the episode but that he chose to follow 
through with their plan. He acted remorseful upon being caught. The incident was 
sufficiently serious for Karen to elect to continue Chris' use of Ritalin. It was shortly after this 
episode that the house was sold and the family relocated to Castle Rock, a small community 
a short distance from Jessop: 
When Karen moved to Castle Rock, she decided to give Chris a fresh start 
and try him in a regular country school, although Chris' former principal 
suggested another alternate school. Karen was concerned that Chris was 
being unduly exposed to bad influences within the alternate setting. Chris 
did well in Castle Rock school for the first couple of months and tried very 
hard. His parents bought him a motor cross bike and there were no major 
problems at home for awhile. Then Chris began to act up in school and 
become less controllable, so the principal recommended that he be 
transferred to an alternate program in Castle Rock. 
Chris was connected with incidents of fire setting and theft during this period, but the 
police concluded that there was insufficient evidence to press charges. Now thirteen years 
of age, Chris continued to be defiant in the face of expectations at home, his actions on one 
occasion so provoking his mother that she began hyper-ventilating. With this episode, 
Karen realized that she could no longer take the stress and called Social Services for 
assistance: 
In September, Chris was taken into care under a Short Term Care 
Agreement (S.T.C.A.) and placed with Brenda Quest, a foster mother who 
had 10 children in her home. While the situation at home had been leading 
up to the need for a placement, his removal from the home was precipitated 
by his sexual abuse of his sister. Karen heard Amy crying one day and 
looked out to see Chris doing up her pants. She heard him tell Amy to tell 
Karen that she had stepped on a prickle. When Karen asked what was 
going on, Chris stated that Amy needed to go to the bathroom. Karen sent 
Chris to his room and he yelled and screamed there. She was so angry that 
she felt like slapping him. Karen took Amy into a room and she revealed that 
Chris had pulled down her pants and spit on her. Amy also indicated that 
Chris had tried to penetrate her. Chris1 abuse of Amy had apparently 
occurred on a number of occasions. After this disclosure, Karen called 
Social Services and insisted that Chris would have to leave the home. 
Ken stops reading and turning to Karen says, "It seems that the R.C.M.P. were 
reluctant to press charges but, apparently, they eventually complied. We'll need an update 
on this because I don't have any more details." "It has gone before Crown," interjects Bill 
Steele, Chris' social worker. "He has a court hearing on March 18th." 
Ken nods and makes a note on a pad in front of him before resuming his 
presentation. He recounts that, subsequent to this incident, Chris was placed in a classroom 
with two teachers and six other children but was unable to maintain his behaviour. Ritalin 
appeared to cause Chris' defiant behaviour to escalate, so antidepressants were prescribed 
instead and improvement was noted. Ken observes that, according to Jim Hansen, Chris' 
new child care worker, Chris liked the foster home. This was despite the fact that it was 
chaotic due to the large number of teenagers present, two of whom were diagnosed as 
being attention deficit in addition to Chris. He continued to display his anger, punching walls 
and threatening suicide: 
In the foster home, he has had nightmares on a number of occasions and 
has yelled and screamed. His foster mother has seen him in bed with his 
rear in the air screaming that his bum hurts. This has led the foster mother 
and others to speculate that the sexual abuse he received was more severe 
than he disclosed. At home, he will also yell for his mother in his sleep. She 
will run in, but find him asleep. As far as Karen is aware, Chris is not 
sexually active. Last year one of his biggest problems at school was girls 
pursuing him. In regard to self-destructive activities, for a long period of time 
he threatened to kill himself. He told his foster mother that he had tried to cut 
his wrists, but was afraid it would hurt too much. He has told his mother that 
he hated himself, he was dumb and did not want to live anymore. He has 
engaged in some high risk behaviours such as walking down the middle of 
a bridge late at night. 
During one suicidal gesture, Chris was hospitalized temporarily but his breaking of 
a window and other abusive actions resulted in his discharge. Incidents of breaking and 
entering and the theft of fireworks have led to additional charges being laid. School 
outbursts continued to the point that he was permanently expelled from all schools in the 
district. Throughout this period, Jim Hansen continued to work with Chris, claiming that he 
has established a good relationship with him: 
Jim is slowly dealing with the issue of Chris' sexual abuse. Chris declared 
that he obtained his knowledge about sex from girlie magazines which he 
and his friend hid in the bush. Jim has taken a very supportive stance to 
Chris and has avoided engaging in a struggle for control. This has been very 
useful as Chris is trusting Jim. Jim feels that Chris is very observant and has 
excellent insights into people. He is very connected to the professionals who 
are working with him. In spite of his attention deficit, Chris is able to sit in a 
one-to-one situation for periods of time and concentrate on the matter at 
hand. Jim has Chris do a lot of written work with him and Chris can express 
his thoughts in this way. Chris likes drawing and apparently has some artistic 
ability. His foster mother also provided him with drum lessons, which he 
liked. 
Ken reports that Chris lived with his family for the ten days prior to coming to the 
Facilitating Program. His mother is willing to have him return home when he is discharged 
from the Program, but his social worker doesn't think that this is a good idea. The social 
worker is equally concerned about Chris' current placement due to the number of teenagers 
in the foster home and the possible negative effect they can have on Chris. 
'"That's about it for factual information," Ken says, looking up from his reading. "Now 
I'll make some of my own comments." He starts with a section dealing with family 
functioning. The commentary made here is relatively brief, the entire section filling two 
pages of his report. The discussion of problem solving begins with the assertion that the 
family has exhibited many strong skills in this area, beginning with Karen's protracted but 
ultimately successful efforts to escape from her relationship with Chris' father. Her qualities 
of vigilance, protectiveness and advocacy on the part of her children are cited. Karen's 
willingness to seek professional help, to consider seriously their counsel and to research 
Attention Deficit Disorder are given as examples of these capacities. Bob's contribution is 
portrayed in more modest terms. The family's perceived middle class life style is judged to 
be primarily due to his steady employment at a well paying job. Karen's work activity is 
mentioned as well, its rhythm dictated by and subordinate to her involvement with the 
children. 
Karen and her daughter are characterized as being the verbal members of the family 
with Karen's clear, focused and congruent style contrasted with Bob's slow flow of words and 
meagre descriptions of events. Karen considers that she and Chris communicate well with 
one another and that Chris understands what she says. Bob is less expressive towards 
Chris than is Karen but Chris looks up to Bob and attempts to hide his misbehaviour from 
him. Chris1 abilities to process and respond to information are considered to be hampered 
by his attention deficit. 
Roles are seen to be clear and to be divided along traditional lines with the family 
income virtually the exclusive responsibility of Bob while home and child care occupies 
Karen to a similar degree. Whereas Bob appears satisfied with this arrangement, Karen is 
under pressure and lacks time to pursue her own needs. Chris' helpfulness fluctuates 
according to whether he thinks he will benefit from his efforts. He demands immediate 
rewards. Cooking is one activity which he enjoys, showing a capacity to prepare food 
effectively with a demonstrated skill in presentation: 
The family has been affectively stressed for some time. While Karen was 
together with her first husband, the level of distress was very high due to the 
abusive nature of that relationship. Since marrying Bob, the level of affective 
satisfaction in the relationship has been fairly good. The dominant stressor 
has been coping with Chris' behaviour, and this has put a great deal of 
pressure on all family members, particularly Karen, although Amy also has 
paid a high price emotionally. The family has suffered a loss of community 
support due to Chris' disruptiveness and this has resulted in the family 
feeling somewhat emotionally isolated. However, there is some extended 
family not far away and this is a source of support for Karen. Chris has 
obviously suffered a high level of affective distress given the degree of 
censure he has experienced within the school and community setting. 
Ken turns to behavioural controls, opening with the statement that Chris' poor grasp 
of the link between action and consequences has made providing appropriate discipline a 
difficult undertaking. Chris' remorse appears to be genuine. However, his continued 
misbehaviour results in others being unhappy with him. Private talks prove to be of little 
avail. Positive reinforcement and praise can be effective but can lead to further difficulties 
if over done. Karen is the principal disciplinarian but Chris is more attentive to Bob's 
remarks. Despite Chris' efforts, his parents remain relatively united in the area of discipline 
and are supportive of one another. Bob is more easily given to impatience with Chris, 
requiring Karen to intervene on her son's behalf. A more equitable balance of disciplining 
was suggested as Karen is unduly pressured due to Bob's relative passivity in this area. 
Ken's report draws to a close with the final three pages devoted to an assessment of the 
family's structure and organization, parental relationships and parenffchild relationships. 
Throughout his 30 minute presentation, he has been uninterrupted, the participants in the 
meeting remaining silent and attentive throughout. 
The structure and organization of the family is fairly clear, but it has 
experienced some structural distress. While boundaries have been fairly 
intact, they have been violated on occasion, particularly between Chris and 
his sister. In terms of sub-systems, Bob and Karen comprise one distinct 
sub-system which is quite strong. However, it is unbalanced in that Karen 
is almost exclusively responsible for the child care. This detracts from the 
executive strength in the family. Chris and his sister comprise another sub- 
system which has had some cohesion, however trust has been violated and 
Chris must be very closely watched around his sister so that he doesn't 
further victimize her. 
Karen fell into the classic trap of being victimized by her spouse, thinking that 
she could change him in spite of his faults. Once she became entrapped in 
the abusive situation, Len made it very difficult for her to escape as he 
deprived her of sources of support. She ultimately realiued that the situation 
would not change and that she did not want to bring a child up within that 
context. However, her attempts to provide contraception were sabotaged 
and she did become pregnant. She had no illusions about raising a child 
within that environment and knew that she had to leave as soon as possible. 
She managed to gather the strength and fortitude to do this, although at 
considerable risk to herself. Although she cut off contact with Len due to his 
unreliability, she could not escape his presence as she continued to 
remember his threats to her when she left him. She continued to fear that 
Len would locate her and attempt to abscond with Chris, resulting in her 
being vigilant. When she finally contacted Len again, it was with a 
considerable degree of trepidation and, although she permitted Chris to visit 
him, she was not sure that Chris would be returned. 
Karen and Bob present themselves as having a solid, committed, and a 
caring relationship. Bob volunteered that he has grown to love Karen very 
much over the years. Both Bob and Karen expressed support for each other 
and made no critical remarks about the other. Their relationship appears to 
be mature and well established. Karen expressed surprise and appreciation 
that Bob has been as patient and tolerant'of Chris as he has, declaring that 
if she had been in his shoes, she would have walked away a long time ago. 
She sees Bob as having really tried in regard to Chris. Karen has been told 
that she needs an outlet for herself and should get away two or three times 
a week for her own mental health, but Bob doesn't seem to understand this. 
Given that he is away from home so much, he does not appreciate the 
degree of tension and stress involved in the ongoing care of Chris. Karen is 
open with him about what happens with Chris and he is understanding 
regarding this, but, nonetheless, his experience of Chris is very different than 
that of Karen. He does not have the time to go to the many meetings that 
Karen attends regarding Chris and he has been able to involve himself 
heavily in his work environment, something he apparently enjoys. 
Chris used to fantasize about his birth father, wanting to see him. His mother 
has been quite open with him about the situation in the home and about why 
they are no longer together. It appears to have been helpful to Chris to visit 
his birth father for several weeks one summer as this dispelled some 
fantasies for him. Since then, he has not been threatening to run away to 
see his birth father. The circumstances of his birth father are not well known 
at this time. 
Karen is obviously the central care giver in Chris' life and has been extremely 
committed to him throughout the years. Although he was born at a very 
difficult time in her life, she has been unwavering in her commitment to him. 
She obviously loves and cares about him and has done her utmost to 
provide for his needs. She still believes in him and did not negate him or 
refer to him as a bad person in spite of everything she has been through with 
him. She has avidly read material about Attention Deficit Disorder and has 
come to an understanding about what she can expect of him. She noted that 
her expectations of him are not high. Fortunately, Chris does have engaging 
and attractive traits which draw people to him. His social worker also feels 
warmly about him and this is certainly helpful. Karen realizes that she has 
made mistakes along the way in her care of Chris, but does not appear to 
negate herself for this. 
Bob is still amazingly supportive of Chris given all that he has been through. 
In many such situations, the step-parent forces the birth parent to make a 
decision between himself and the child, but Bob has not done so. While Bob 
noted that he has done a variety of things together with Chris, such as going 
to Cubs and having holidays together, Bob's involvement with Chris has 
been fairly low given that he has been away from home a great deal. More 
than one child care wwker felt that Bob's absence from the home was a 
crucial factor in Chris' distress. It has been noted on the three occasions 
where Chris has been provided with a male child care worker that his level 
of functioning has improved and he has greatly enjoyed their relationship. 
He is quite capable of attaching himself to people and responds well to a 
one-to-one relationship. It has been felt that if Bob was more active in 
providing this, the child care workers would not have needed to be involved. 
Certainly, Chris is open to involvement by Bob and this obviously would be 
beneficial for him. However, it is not likely to happen to any great degree. 
Bob states that, in his present employment, he does not have the luxury of 
booking off at a certain time as he is the only operator for the backhoe and 
has to stay with the job until it is done. Given that he is in the field of 
construction with other trades dependent on his work, he has no choice but 
to finish the job off, however long that takes. 
The couple deliberately chose their present environment in a rural setting in 
order to minimize Chris' ability to get into trouble. Doubtlessly this has been 
helpful, but it has not had the effect they had hoped for. However, it seems 
that the community the family is in is more supportive than previous 
communities they have lived in. Chris' relationship with his sister is of 
considerable concern at this point as he teases her, negates her, and is 
jealous of her. He derogatorily refers to her as her parents' "perfect angel". 
Karen emphasized that she loved both children the same and that Amy is by 
no means perfect. Nonetheless, she has been fairly well adjusted and has 
done well in kindergarten. She does show some signs of insecurity in that 
she continues to suck her thumb. Amy is a quiet child who is excellent at 
entertaining herself. She has definitely lost attention from her mother 
because of Chris, as he has been so demanding that he has required 
intense intervention. Karen engaged Chris in every activity and group she 
could think of in order to try and keep him constructively occupied. She has 
gone to countless meetings in regard to Chris and often has taken Amy 
along with her. Amy is closer to her mother than to her father, which is not 
surprising. Karen noted that she praises both children and does not do a 
good childbad child split. Amy is able to play well with other children, but 
gets very frustrated with Chris at times. 
Karen noted that Chris has a number of assets. He likes art, draws very well 
and likes to cook. When he cooks, he can do it artistically and will put effort 
into the presentation. He is also good on computers and is excellent at 
Nintendo. In spite of his enormous difficulties there, he has never skipped 
school and is presently scared that he may not be permitted to return. 
"Thanks, Ken. Are there any questions or comments people want to make at this 
point?'The psychiatrist slowly directs his gaze towards each of the participants in turn. 
"No? Well, let's go on to the report from psychology then ...." 
T he social history is, arguably, the single most important document in the formulation of the care plan. It provides the basis for each of the reports 
presented by the various departments at the care plan meeting and it is the only report which 
is routinely consulted by the psychiatrist prior to the meeting. The significance of the social 
history was made clear to me on one occasion when the psychiatrist appeared moments 
before the meeting was scheduled to begin. Keith asked the staff members present whether 
the document had been circulated. It was quickly determined that he was the only person 
who had not received a copy. Keith borrowed one and excused himself, explaining to the 
arriving community representatives that he had been called away on 'an emergency 
consultation'. The written social history apparently provides him with sufficient context to 
situate the verbal reports presented during the two hour meeting and to dictate the plan of 
action at the end of the meeting. 
A youth's social history is a document is 20 - 25 single spaced pages in length with 
much of its content derived from a single interview. The social worker spends, on average, 
five to eight hours in consultation with the parents or care givers of the youth. Efforts are 
made to put the individual's biography within its social context by inquiring about noteworthy 
occurrences that were taking place within the family and immediate community. This 
account is later supplemented by a variety of reports and files gathered from the referral 
agency, school, doctors, etc. The nature and quantity of these reports varies widely, 
depending to a considerable degree upon the length and degree of involvement of the 
consulting agencies. 
Chris' words do not appear on the pages of the social history. Instead, the 
participants in the care plan meeting are offered a composite picture of Chris as represented 
by various significant adults in his life. Chris' portrait is based on information compiled by 
the social worker from his conversation with Chris' mother and his step father and from his 
reading of the various files which document Chris's contact with professionals. From these 
contributions, the program social worker fashions a coherent narrative, a type of 'authorless" 
text. While its assembly and rendering remain the undeniable product of the social worker's 
labour, the constituent elements are gleaned from a variety of sources, the exact origins of 
which become blurred in the telling. The end result is a picture of the teenager cobbled 
together from evidence produced by a variety of theoretical frames, the precise nature of 
which remain hidden from view. The document produced and circulated by the social 
worker situates this information within a format compatible with attachment theory. And with 
this representation, '[rlational and real become one' (Gramsci, 1971 :447-448). 
Indeed. we have what appears to be a neutral, impersonal reciting of objective facts. 
Conventional wisdom would tend to support this type of construction, composed as it is by 
an employee of a state health agency who has consulted both the immediate authorities - 
parents or care givers - and the other state sanctioned personnel (teachers, family 
physicians, social workers, consulting psychologist, etc.) After all, these individuals are 
entrusted by the prevailing cultural logic to act with benevolence and with scientific rigour. 
The possibility that pronouncements by an established professional authority may 
not accurately represent the identity and interests of everyone concerned is seldom called 
into question. Those most knowledgeable of their practice - namely, the professionals 
themselves -- are disciplined by their training to become inured to the possibility that 
detrimental unintended consequences may result from their well intentioned, skilled actions 
(Waitzkin, 1991:23). In addition, the legitimacy of the professionals relies to a considerable 
degree on the continued appearance of being above criticism. Similarly, colleagues in allied 
fields who are well situated to pass judgment can ill afford to become too aware of or too 
vocal about the shortcomings of their counterparts across the hall or in other government 
departments across town. The symbiotic association of professional disciplines and the 
various departments of the state may be a relationship only consolidated since the early 
years of this century. However, it is a mutually supportive and protective arrangement based 
in no small measure on a shared stake in common economic and political fortunes. ' Their 
career well being depends to a large degree on the public's perception of a competent civil 
service. This is no less true of political activists - many of whom rely on jobs within state 
agencies for their economic livelihood - who are less vocal than usual when it comes to 
commenting on the possible negative consequences of extensive state involvement in the 
affairs of the general population (Wilson, 1977). 
The clients and their care givers are unlikely to marshal an organized protest. The 
former lack political power, experience and popular credibility. They are typically considered 
to be illequipped to speak for themselves, supposedly lacking the wherewithal of bona fide 
human agency. The latter are frequently desperate for immediate assistance and all too 
aware of their relative lack of power to challenge the opinions and conduct of the 
professionals to whom they have turned for benevolence and expertise. Certainly, they have 
little or no grounds to protest coercive actions on the part of their benefactors. The 
professional-client arrangement is sustained by mutual agreement, the enabling condition 
of hegemony. 
The similarities between a social history and an ethnographic case study are 
fortuitous. They invite further comparisons between the circumstances surrounding the care 
plan process and anthropological fieldwork. In fact, anthropology's recent experience 
enables us to cut through the common sense aura surrounding this everyday encounter to 
expose an entrenched power dynamic made all the more elusive by reason of the informed 
consent through which it is permitted - indeed, encouraged - to continue. 
The Construction of Authoritative Texts 
T he translation of discourse into text is a common practice amongst ethnographers and Program staff alike and it has important consequences in 
both instances. In the case of the ethnographer, the resulting text often ceases to be directly 
associated with a particular interaction involving specific individuals at a precise moment in 
time. Distinct persons and identities are replaced by a representative cultural voice, a 
generalized or generic spokesperson for the group or culture in question (Clifford, 1988:39- 
40). The actual informants drop by the wayside as the ethnographer steps in to provide a 
coherent, authoritative account of what, in all likelihood, was a highly ambiguous, 
inconsistent exchange. 
Stuart Hall indicates that social analysts must take pains to make it clear that their 
account is 'authored" (Hall, 1992:12), the product of a particular person or persons who 
bring specific traditions to bear on the material. As Hall notes, one of the measures by which 
the explanatory power of a text can be judged is the degree to which the author is 
forthcoming with a clear statement of the theoretical perspective and the value assumptions 
which guided the document's creation. This inventory enables the reader to engage more 
fully in an informed, critical evaluation. However, the criticism can still be raised that merely 
by 'imposing one meaning on events, narrative lends an account a certain unchallengeable 
authority or 'truth" (Hall, 1992:12). 
The social history embodies a similar decontextualizing dynamic. Comments on 
alleged incidents recorded in a youth's file by various professionals are routinely cited by the 
social worker as biographical fads. Their actual meaning for the youth remains unclear as 
do the circumstances which led to their inclusion in the youth's file. Second or third hand 
allegations of sexual abuse at the hands of an uncle, a day care worker or persons unknown 
are duly noted. Yet the actual author of the entry, the identity of the alleged perpetrator, the 
precise nature of the violation, the surrounding circumstances and the accuracy of the 
overall account remain in doubt. Nevertheless, these notations comprise significant aspects 
of what comes to be viewed as the 'Authorized Version' (Hall, 1992:12), the de facto 
'official" biography. It represents a form of free standing chronicle, an objective narrative in 
which truth is revealed rather than constructed. The interpreted nature of this account tends 
to recede into the background. The contributions of a multitude of authors 'become" the 
person sitting across the room in the care plan meeting. The various incidents and episodes 
outlined in the social history are successive overlays, supplying the actual youth with a 
professionally constructed lived experience. 
The Facilitating Program's head social worker is not unaware of the slippery nature 
of facts and of his own role in fashioning the final account. Here he speaks of the dynamics 
at play in a social history interview: 
Facts at best are open to interpretation - I guess that doesn't make them 
facts. People remember things which sound like facts and so we construct 
our speculation based on that. But, indeed, these might not be facts in terms 
of conditions that occurred. The interpretations can vary widely between the 
people themselves. This is what often happens when you interview a couple 
who have separated. Often the facts that they propose will be quite different. 
Certainly, the interpretations will be very different. There is a body of facts 
but exactly what they are is quite difficult to determine. So then we are more 
into the area of speculation. In terms of the actual part of the social history 
where people identify facts, I don't make a lot of comment. It's just 
descriptive. During the history taking itself, we get a lot of impressions. 
However, there simply isn't time to go through in detail all the areas that 
we're going to cover, so I end up keeping my comments couched and 
qualified. Also, what someone relates to me I may record but very much 
disagree with. I may think what they tell me is probably not true and yet I'm 
in no position to say so. But it does mean something in terms of the 
interpretation. 
While the social worker displays a sensitivity to the constructed nature of the social 
history, what remains troublesome in the completed document is precisely the absence of 
an account of these relations of production. Instead, we are presented with a reification of 
reality. The ironic twist is that this authorised version is effectively a de-authorised account. 
We are denied a sense of the social relationships which led to the designation of certain 
occurrences as facts. Entries in community social workers' files, teachers' reports, or youth 
workers' notes tend to be disassociated from their origins. Remarks, allegations, 
impressions emerge as "brute data" (Taylor, 197111987:SO). The people responsible for the 
various entries ~eferred to in the social history become irrelevant. They are the mere 
chroniclers or scribes for what has been disclosed as real, rather than the actual creators 
or unwitting corroborators of a particular interpretation of reality. At this point, the youth 
being described is effectively transformed into an administered entity, the meaning of whose 
behaviour has been determined by decree. 
Texts as Commodified Culture 
A n initial step towards 'less false stories' (Harding, l99O:lOO) is the recognition of the actual sequence of events which results in the transformation of 
discourse into text. On the one hand, this interactive process necessarily involves a triple 
hermeneutic with the information being altered to some extent at each step in the interpretive 
encounter (Richer, 1988:409). On the other, contemporary social arrangements dictate that 
this process frequently entails the commodification of lived culture. In the terminology used 
to describe commodity production, the practical consciousness of everyday life corresponds 
to use value produced by humans through productive activities. Practical consciousness 
is socially produced, a product of the intersubjectivity of a particular community. The 
ethnography that results from the triple hermeneutic is considered to represent the 
anthropologist's individual appropriation of this social product. Through this appropriation, 
use value is transformed into exchange value (Richer, 1988) as the ethnographic text is 
published and distributed in the literary market place to gamer financial profit and status, 
employment or tenure, what Bourdieu (1 984) refers to as cultural capital. 
In the case of the youths seen by the Facilitating Program, behaviour informed by 
practical consciousness has a use value specific to the circumstances in which they find 
themselves. With the designation of specific behaviours as markers of conduct disorder, 
psychiatrists have created an exchange value from these meaning creating practices. Now 
viewed as symptoms, the person's actions are dislodged from the context of purposeful 
activity, divested of personal meaning and reified as constituent elements or components 
of an identifiable, clinically significant disorder. What originated as meaningful, situation 
specific behaviour is transformed into decontextualized evidence of abnormal behaviour 
which the psychiatrists are funded to identify and to treat. The Facilitating Program differs 
from this approach insofar as the application of attachment theory as a meta-narrative 
supplants the empiricism of the D.S.M. Yet the implicit designation of certain incidents as 
insults to attachment legitimizes the involvement of the staff as experts employed to identify 
and to attend to these particular facts. As the social worker makes clear, the social history 
is consciously designed to capture this information: 
We essentially tried to come up with a number of instruments to measure 
things in the family. But we really werenlt successful in finding anything that 
seemed to be really, truly workable. We looked at the McMaster model and 
that was helpful in terms of some of the criteria or some of the categories we 
look at in the social history now. It came from the McMaster model - the 
problem solving, family functioning area, communication, roles, affective 
response and behavioural controls. Those were the categories they used 
and they had mechanisms whereby you could measure that stuff. However, 
that seemed to be really much too limiting to be very meaningful for us. So 
we never did follow through on using the instruments but the categories have 
remained. So the meaning was established over time by practice. That 
helped with the analysis and in terms of the assessment. 
I've had some training in family systems theory and it seemed to be a useful 
way. So I adapted structural family therapy analysis into my report. I picked 
that because they have some very simple concepts which are quite easy to 
apply and help a lot in terms of organizing one's thinking about the family 
functioning. The thinking behind family systems is useful in the analysis. 
Looking at one kid in the context of school, for example, we're trying to 
analyse the interplay of the children between children, rather than simply 
trying to analyse the child. 
As I've become more cognizant, I've done more and more analysis of the 
family. I guess perhaps at the beginning I wasn't sure that was my role as 
the psychologists do an analysis but it's a different kind of analysis. The early 
reports had a lot more history and a lot less analysis. Now, they have a lot 
more history and a lot more analysis. What happened is that it simply has 
become a lot more detailed, more pages. I'm up to 15 to 30 pages. The 
latest is 30 pages which is a record - 9 hours worth [of interviewing]. 
Conduct disorder is a generic category. It is an unhelpful category. Acting 
out looks like acting out. But it is the reason behind the acting out that is very 
important. You really have to understand the child individually to understand 
where the behaviour originates. Othewise, you can't construct what's 
behind the behaviour. That's why the extensive history. It involves 
constantly sorting through and making hypotheses to come up with what 
appear to be the salient issues. That's the purpose of the social history. It 
consists of not just arbitrary information, but specifics that have a bearing on 
the child and the child's behaviour - bonding, emotional climate, discipline 
(how clear, consistent vs. chaotic, laissez faire), anything traumatic, e.g. 
death of a sibling. A parent's exposure to similar trauma has a major effect 
on how the parent is raised which will have an impact on the child. There is 
the assumption that if the parent had a caring upbringing, he or she could 
provide at least some aspects to the child even if in an abusive relationship 
occurred. What degree of nurturing are these parents capable of? 
My thinking is heavily influenced by attachment theory. I'm also heavily 
influenced by family systems. The whole family is impacted by other family 
members' behaviour. I'm looking to describe the context including family, 
school, community. All behaviour is meaningful, so I'm constantly looking to 
interpret what the behaviour is. Multiple causation means that my work 
involves a considerable amount of detective work. 
Characteristics of Conduct Disordered Youths 
A s the head social worker, Ken Lancaster plays a decisive role in the designation of the facts which appear in the social histories. Ken indicated 
a number of scenarios which apparently lead to the admission of an individual into the 
Program. He qualified his remarks with the observation that the Program rarely sees 'a pure 
instance of any of these categories, that usually there are a number of things which impact 
on the child." 
1. Mentally handicapped.' This behaviour is equally disastrous [as 
conduct disorder] but its genesis is different. These kids require unique 
interventions due to their learning disabilities. How many we get I really don't 
know, but there do seem to be a number. Their behaviour appears to be 
linked to other problems. Kids who do well in their first years of schooling find 
that coping becomes more taxing to the point that they can't keep up. By 
early adolescence - junior high, for example - school becomes more 
demanding. These kids have compensated for so long and when those 
mechanisms fail them, you can see acting out behaviour. It is frequently 
hard to explain because no trauma is evident. Instead, it is a trauma of the 
coping mechanisms. 
2. Attention Deficit with or without Hyperactivity. There is almost a 
standard sequence of behaviour which becomes evident in kindergarten. Up 
to then, behaviour is not out of the ordinary. The constellation of the 
behaviour is a lack of attention which results in a poor ability to learn. The 
kid can cope reasonably well for the first year or two but then her behaviour 
becomes disruptive and she becomes labelled as a bad kid. The source of 
the behaviour is not immediately evident. She feels bad about herself. Her 
parents become punitive, seeing the kid as willful, and the problem escalates 
from there. By early adolescence, she can't fit into her peer group, so 
gravitates to an anti-social group. Sometimes, behaviour improves when 
programs are put in place, but often the damage is so severe that effective 
intervention is difficult. 
3. Sexual abuse. This is probably not a pure category. It is so common 
that it encompasses a high proportion of the kids we see, possibly 75 per 
cent. The nature of the abuse ranges from mild to profound and results in 
things like Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Most of these kick appear to be 
stressed already with this event pushing them over the edge. This abuse 
results in selfdestructive behaviour. Drug abuse and suicide are the major 
set of negative sequelae that result. 
4. Abuselneglect This is a general category reflecting the fact that many 
of the families we see are quite chaotic. The child tends to be poorly 
socialized due to being parented by people from chaotic, neglectful 
upbringing. The parents have no positive models to apply to their own child. 
They tend to choose partners who are similar to their own parents. Often this 
pattern is quite entrenched and multi generational. Parents have no 
awareness of more positive models so are not aware of how far off the 
standard they are. These parents may abuse their children but they are 
proud because they abuse less than their own parents. They are frequently 
marginally employed, often with a history of substance abuse. They tend to 
move a lot and are often unable to provide basic needs such as food, shelter, 
and clothing. Their coping defences tend to be very primitive. The kids 
don't fit into the school or social arena and act chaotically. Their personal 
boundaries are poor. They frequently are involved in drug abuse at an early 
age. They leave home early and experience early pregnancies. They tend 
to choose partners who perpetuate abuse. They become victimisers or the 
victimised. 
These comprise what the social worker considers to be the main categories of youths 
who come through the program. On the basis of these criteria, Ken agreed that Chris was 
not atypical of kids referred for a care plan. ' He then went on to speak of additional general 
characteristics common to a number of these individuals: 
In many cases, we see kids who could cope reasonably well in the midst of 
a considerable amount of distress but they have experienced a number of 
extraordinary events which have pushed them over the edge. For example, 
you may have a child with an Attention Deficit who finds herself faced with 
a major accident, parents' loss of employment, or frequent family moving 
such that she simply can't cope any longer. The same could be true of a 
child with a learning disorder or mental handicap; she may be managing but 
experiences a sexual abuse event that overtaxes her so there is a major loss 
of function. In these instances, the kid may have such a major constellation 
of things they are up against that it is practically impossible to sustain normal 
development. 
For example, I saw one yesterday who had lost one parent and whose 
mother had been multiply abused by a number of partners. There was 
evidence of ongoing abandonment by mom alternating with periods of caring. 
As a result, attachment was extremely disjointed. Mother has a bipolar 
disorder and a drug problem. The kid has experienced multiple placements 
as well as a care giver who abused her. In the meantime, mom gets a new 
partner. So, many factors are in play. The kid acts out and abuses other 
people. This situation is not gratifying for her new caregiver as there is little 
mutuality or reciprocity. The child is in a sense doomed. These 
circumstances are not unusual. 
I didn't include fetal alcohol syndrome as a separate category as this problem 
often expresses itself as an Attention Deficit or as learning disabilities. This 
syndrome may have its genesis in the intrauterine environment. It affects a 
number of kids that we see. Another factor is prenatal distress of one sort 
or another. This is not defined as a specific cause but my clinical experience 
says traumatic pregnancy seems to precede certain problems. Mother is 
stressed due to abuse in pregnancy which means that baby-mother 
bounding is insulted from the start. Frequently, this leads to a not very 
gratifying bonding experience for mother, so a negative sequence results. 
Once again, it is difficult to separate things out because so many factors are 
at play. 
The step parent situation is another fairly major issue. Not infrequently, 
mother or fathers have a number of partners over time. The new partner 
may not accept the stepchild at the outset or, if she does, the stepchild is 
then rejected on the birth of new child. This leads to a situation of either 
child leaving home or the birth parent of the child leaving the home. It has 
been called the failure of the blending process in which one kid gets picked 
on or scapegoated and victimised. This may well be a child who has specific 
problems to start with such as attention difficulties so is at best difficult to 
parent. When the new parent comes along, he or she doesn't have the 
tolerance or patience to parent or becomes abusive towards the child. 
Yet another stressor is adoption. We see a number in this situation in which 
the adoption process has not been successful. Some of those are probably 
the fault of agencies who put kids into homes that were grossly unsuitable 
or who didn't pick up on a history of abuse in the family prior to adoption. 
Others are the failure of the adopted child and the parents - or with one 
parent and not another - to form a good attachment. Marital problems may 
exist or the parents get a child of whom they have little information. When 
they get the child, they feel angry and hard done by so get angry because the 
kid does not match their expectations. Scapegoating and adoption 
breakdown ensues. 
Occasionally, you will have a child who seems to be performing well. These 
are the children of high functioning families such as those of doctors or other 
professionals. The parents are very intelligent, highly motivated, and very 
successful. One child acts out but it is not easily identifiable. The family is 
sophisticated and can present well and the issues are subtle so it is hard to 
diagnose. One scenario seems to be where you have a child with models 
of competence all around in terms of parents and siblings. For some reason, 
the child is not able to compete at the same level, perhaps because she is 
not as bright or due to other variables. The kid tries but finally can't cover up 
her inadequacy. The parents may have expectations the child is incapable 
of meeting. Although the kid is doing quite well, she doesn't meet their 
expectations. At some point, she falls apart as she can no longer cope. 
She gets a negative message from the family because she is not upholding 
the family ideals. We saw one case like that when the girl ultimately 
committed suicide. We can't be certain that these were the contributing 
factors, but it appears that was the case. 
The kids we see are ones in which their community was unable to cope with 
them. In some cases, the community is more proactive so that a fair number 
of kids are still in their families. It used to be the case that the community 
had to exhaust all other resources before the child was referred to 
Crossroads in its capacity as the province's long term treatment resource. 
Now we emphasize that the earlier we receive the referral the better. People 
are coming to see us now as a resource to help them manage kids so 
placement breakdown doesn't result in permanent wardship. ' 
T he social worker has shown himself to be appreciative that his informants may offer distorted conceptions of reality. However, he appears to be less aware 
that his own involvement might affect the production of facts. There is a tendency to 
overlook the impact that his presence may make on the nature of the information gathered 
as well as a certain lack of self-reflexivity in acknowledging the possible limitations of his 
analytical framework. In the first instance, the social worker's reference to detective work 
infers that rather than taking an active part in the shaping of particular facts through a 
process of interpretation, he was actually uncovering or disclosing the facts (Handelman, 
1987:364-365). Information gathered in this manner may not acknowledge the mutuality 
inherent in the production of knowledge. Instead, the perception of the "client [or informant] 
-as-object" (Handelman, 1987:372) may so dominate that the social worker may 
underestimate his own role in compiling the social history report. 
In addition, the impact of the social worker upon the behaviour of the informant may 
be underestimated. This dialogue cannot be understood to be free from distortive 
influences. It is enough to recall that the social worker is both an individual and a 
representative of the administrative body of the state. Significantly, another Crossroads' 
social worker remarked on the relative ease with which he now was able to gather 
information for social histories. He contrasted this to the reticence he encountered in his 
former position with the Ministry of Social Services. He attributed this difference to the 
perception that the Health Ministry was mandated to provide care while the Social Services 
Ministry embodied functions of control, empowered as it is to apprehend children in the 
course of securing their care. While information may be more readily available, it cannot 
be presumed that the informants take an impartial attitude towards thei: interviewer. 
The social worker is explicit about his use of attachment theory and family systems 
theory in determining which information will be included as facts. In particular, he makes 
reference to the necessity to attempt to isolate potential insults to attachment, decisive 
attitudes, events or general conditions which are likely to have had long term consequences. 
The practice of identifying factors in a person's history to account for current behaviour is 
a well established one in psychiatry and psychotherapy. However, this procedure is neither 
unique to the mental health professions nor is it a recent innovation. @ The designation of 
certain incidents as having a decisive impact on a person's interpretation of the world is now 
something of a cultural commonplace in Western societies. Despite its widespread 
acceptance, this procedure is far from unproblematic. 
The assigning of significance to particular occurrences is a question which is relative 
to the viewer. Critical social science, for example, endeavours to convince people to 'adopt 
a particular narrative account of their lives" (Fay, 1987:71). Yet critical social science can 
no more guarantee an accurate reading than can the social worker's attachment based 
account. lo The critical interpretive approach recognizes that unintended consequences may 
result from its particular application of rationality and that it is no less limited by the presence 
of unconscious motivations and irrational blind spots than any other style of reasoning. 
These limitations are testimony to the fact that certain of our beliefs and attitudes are rooted 
in relatively unreflected experience. Our resistance to alter our views - and, in turn, the 
reluctance of others to alter theirs in the face of our arguments - is partly accounted for in 
Turner's root paradigms or Sartre's fundamental deviations, the legacy of early experiences 
having taken the form of unreflected premises anchoring our social construction of reality. 
In addition, the use of a contingent rather than a timeless Archimedian standpoint may 
enable active engagement on the basis of identifiable ethical and political premises, but it 
does so with a healthy suspicion of all claims to truth, its own included (Rabinow, 1986:258). 
Critical Interpretation and Cultural Logics 
T he focus of the social history is on the journey of the youth through cultural rites of passage - birthing, initial steps, toilet training, prsschool, etc. -with 
an accompanying commentary on important events for the family unit. The purpose of this 
account is to document occurrences or conditions which might be decisive to the formation 
and maintenance of affiliation between the individual and significant community members. 
While the social history does not focus on social structural issues of class, ethnicity, etc., 
there is considerable material which relates to the social processes, formations and 
institutions associated with these phenomena. A close reading of the social history can offer 
a picture of the realm of possibilities that confronted the person at various points in time. '' 
The consequences of decisions made in the face of these social constraints can be seen 
to reverberate both in the immediate social environment and within the individual herself. 
Read in this way, the document throws into relief the ebb and flow of specific cultural logics 
- meaning creating practices - which influence the beliefs and actions of the individual as 
well as being affected by her conduct in turn.'* 
With the vantage point offered by a critical interpretive perspective, it becomes 
evident that the facts that comprise an individual's identity are no different from other social 
facts which form the basis for claims to objectivity. All are products of specific historical and 
cultural processes, constructions fashioned in fields of power. Using this reflexive approach, 
the Facilitating Program's practices of knowledge production become the objects of inquiry. 
These technologies seek to disclose the social relations constitutive of the problematic 
behaviour of an individual. In so doing, they produce specific facts intended to substantiate 
their truth claims. These facts, in turn, become the proposed constituents of an alternate 
conception of the socially related individual and the immediate community. This meaning 
construction involves a public inventory of details typically considered to be the most intimate 
and private. It represents a striking demonstration of Foucault's notion of state administered 
subjection. 
The attachment theory employed by the Facilitating Program is, at once, an 
expression of a cultural logic, an analytic frame which attempts to identify cultural logics and 
the manufacturer of cultural logics. Combining elements from both positivist and interpretive 
styles of reasoning, this outlook seeks to produce evidence supporting the view that 
significant correlations exist between specific events or conditions (insults to attachment) 
and subsequent occurrences (acting out behaviour associated with conduct disorder). The 
Facilitating Program uses a variety of technologies to compile these facts, procedures which 
act both as vehicles for fashioning relevant data and as practices which mediate the self and 
social understanding of the youth and her community. The social history offers one window 
into these processes. 
Chris Sargent: The Case Study' as Cultural Logic 
A comparison of Ken Lancaster's list of representative categories and Chris' 
Sargent's social history reveals a remarkable overlap of shared characteristics. 'Attention 
Deficit with or without Hyperactivity", 'sexual abuse", 'abuse/negled", 'extraordinary events", 
"step parent situationn, and, of course, Ken's comment that the Program seldom encounters 
"a pure instance of any of these categories, that usually there are a number of things which 
impact on the childn - the details included in Chris' social history bear evidence of each of 
these features. This raises the question as to which facts are disclosed, which are 
constructed. It also suggests the possibility that a functional circularity in logic can be 
established, the typification of a particular population predisposing the selection of 
subsequent candidates for this cohort. 
Critical social science indicates the impossibility of understanding any phenomenon 
free from the influence of our relationship with the object under study (Fay, 1975, 1987; 
Marsh, 1988). The nature of relational knowledge (Rosaldo, 1989/1993:206-207) 
challenges the validity claims of diagnostic technologies in psychiatry which assert that 
specific psychiatric classifications possess an inherent unity or integrity which is 'neither a 
random phenomenon nor an artifact of the techniques through which it is detected, treated, 
experienced, and studied (Robins and Guze 1970; Spitzer and Williams, 1980)" (Young, 
1995: 104). The suspicion remains that professionals may approach a particular population 
with the expectation that their findings will support the typification. l3 As a result of this bias, 
a totalizing narrative becomes established and entrenched, reducing the likelihood that the 
researcher will entertain any interpretation as legitimate other than the pre-existing one. 
My discussions with the Facilitating Program staff did not reveal a simple answer to 
this question. Certain professionals appeared to be quite sensitive to the constructed nature 
of the so-called facts that appeared on the youth's file. Some were open to the suggestion 
that their own formulations should be approached with the same critically reflexive eye. 
Others, while suspicious of certain allegations documented in the files, were more inclined 
to approach test scores and interview observations less as relationally mediated products 
than as scientifically validated evidence to be considered as objective reality. With the latter 
individuals, authoritative claims borne of standardized procedures and clinical experience 
carried greater legitimacy than first hand testimony by their clients and their care givers. 
Nevertheless, these differences in outlook did not translate to their individual reports nor to 
remarks made in care plan meetings. In these public exchanges, the commitment to 
professional discourse was such that, with rare exception, the relationally mediated nature 
of facts was overshadowed by the aura of scientific technologies, leaving the distinct 
impression that the findings had been disclosed rather than constructed. This resulted in 
a uniform point of view, an authoritative discourse in which inconsistencies, contradictions 
and uncertainties were few or non-existent. 
Reality shows itself to be more unruly. Don Handelman (1987:359), for example, 
notes that evidence supporting the existence of child abuse and neglect is undeniable. Yet 
he believes that it is the suspicion of maltreatment rather than the unequivocal 
documentation of abusive or neglectful conduct which produces the larger number of cases. 
In terms of the documents examined by the Facilitating Program, certain details culled from 
social services, education and health files clearly indicate that they are opinion or 
speculation rather than corroborated fact. A significant amount of the material provided in 
the social history is drawn from unconfirmed reports which are noted as such but which 
remain live issues, subject to debate as to whether they actually occurred. Designating 
unconfirmed occurrences in individual files as likely or unlikely was a matter of some 
discussion in the Monday program evaluation meetings. The lack of clarity and the absence 
of consensus on what comprises maltreatment simply adds to the ambiguity of purported 
evidence. The impression given was that a certain amount of common sense interpretation 
based on informed speculation without the benefit of guidelines to establish probability had 
been undertaken by all departments over the four years of the Program's existence. 
Certainly, Chris' social history offers ample material on which to speculate. Working 
from Ken's criteria, the list of possible insults to attachment begins with the potentially 
traumatic childhood experiences encountered both by Chris' mother and father. In Karen's 
case, these include the loss of a parent through separation, witnessing of physical and 
verbal abuse between parents, separation from siblings as well as being the victim of 
attempted sexual abuse, physical abuse, neglect and rejection by her mother and stepfather. 
For Len, the list could include neglect, apprehension from his parents, the witnessing of rape 
of a sibling, multiple placements. Any or all of these could be considered to contribute to 
less than favourable bonding conditions with their own child, a situation which was 
conceivably aggravated further by the distressed relations between Karen and Len prior to 
Chris' birth. In addition, Chris' history contains innumerable possible losses and other 
potential insults to attachment. A! a minimum, these range from evidence of neglect, loss 
of his father, exposure to his father's abuse of his mother, physical abuse by his mother's 
partner, loss of his surrogate father, possible sexual abuse, diagnosis of Attention Deficit 
Disorder with Hyperactivity (A.D.H.D.) and Ritalin treatment, expulsion from school, multiple 
evictions of the family from their home, physical abuse by a teacher, exposure to sexual 
assault, verbal abuse by a judge, multiple school placements and suspensions, multiple 
child care workers, criminal prosecution, inconsistent parenting, an absent stepfather, to 
Chris' removal from his home after his suspected sexual assault of his sister. 
Nevertheless, the actual practice of the Program staff in identifying insults to 
attachment remains somewhat elusive. Discussions at the Monday program evaluation 
meeting made it apparent that there is no clear procedure for designating which behaviour 
should be considered to be detrimental to supportive relationships. The categories outlined 
by the social worker at my request cannot be assumed to be common knowledge throughout 
the treatment complex. For instance, the other social worker for the Program produced a 
list of characteristics which overlapped to some extent but were by no means phrased in the 
same terms as Ken's categories." Certainly, the social histories do not clearly specify which 
events must be understood to be "clinically significant". As will become evident, nominated 
events or diagnostic statements do occur in the summaries of the psychology and education 
reports, but these are the result of interpretations arrived at independent of Program-wide 
protocol or consensus. A participant in the care plan meeting could reasonably presume 
that the summary conclusions presented in the various reports are the basis for the more 
general statements made in the care plan. Yet this is not necessarily the case. As we shall 
see, the actual nominated events on which the psychiatrist bases his assessment of insults 
to attachment tend not to be identified in the report. Instead, they typically are left to be 
inferred by the reader. 
Cultural Logics: Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity 
N either can it be presumed that there is agreement amongst the staff about the nature of these various disorders. This certainly proved to be the case 
concerning Attention Deficit with Hyperactivity Disorder. In outlining characteristics common 
to a number of admissions to the Program, Ken Lancaster emphasized a socially 
constructed interpersonal dynamic lying at the heart of this particular pattern. One of the 
education consultants, on the other hand, was adamant that Attention Deficit behaviours 
were due to cognitive deficits. In his view, the negative impact of these deficiencies could 
be reduced by social interventions but their origins were undeniably biologically based.'' 
What Chris' social history offers is the opportunity to witness the sequence of events which 
led to the inauguration of a specific cultural logic - A.D.H.D. - as it was applied to his 
circumstances. 
During grade one, Chris was taken to a succession of psychologists and psychiatrists 
due to his inability to attend to his school work. Each professional in turn prescribed Ritalin. 
Despite her initial strong opposition, Karen finally agreed to this course of action and Chris' 
school performance improved noticeably. Chris continued to take Ritalin while at school. 
Some years later, Karen was given written material on Attention Deficit Disorder, the 
diagnosis commonly associated with the use of Ritalin. She found this information very 
useful for her care of Chris. 
In this scenario, professional interpretation of Chris' restless behaviour and failure 
to concentrate on school work led to a proposed treatment plan consisting of the prescription 
of Ritalin. The use of this drug was followed by a perceived reduction in the troublesome 
symptoms. The association of Ritalin, used as a conventional intervention for the treatment 
of the symptoms of A.D.H.D., with the lessened frequency and severity of the problematic 
behaviour tends to confirm the existence of A.D.H.D. as a physiologically based disorder. 
Chris' change in behaviour tends to confirm the diagnosis that he 'has" A.D.H.D. As a 
result, his so-called acting out behaviours become reified as symptomatic of the presence 
of an actual biologically based disorder. 
Chris' behaviour is subsequently perceived to be mediated by the presence of this 
abnormal condition. Yet the existence of an ongoing physical dysfunction is contradicted 
by the fact that Chris demonstrates considerable competence in a number of areas, 
activities which would be hindered or prevented by the short attention span associated with 
A.D.H.D. Chris evidently "likes art, draws very well and likes to wok. When he cooks, he 
can do it artistically and will put effort into the presentation. He is also good on computers 
and is excellent at Nintendo." All are activities, incidentally, that can be pursued alone, 
without the presence or intervention of others. 
The precise nature of Chris' socially troubling behaviour is not at issue here. What 
is relevant are the cultural logics which are brought to bear on Chris circumstances such that 
he comes to %e viewed as being afflicted with A.D.H.D. The social history enables us to 
follow the progression of events which leads to this conclusion. As a moment in the 
relational process of knowledge production, the social worker's report appears as a 
component of the professional discourse leading to the formulation of the care plan. Within 
the framing logic of mental health care, the reciting of particular information elevates it 
beyond the realm of anecdotal hearsay and accords it the status of scientific evidence. AS 
a potential participant in this exchange of information, Chris cannot be presumed to be 
immune to its possible impact. 
Cultural Logics: Gender 
A shift in focus from Chris' circumstances to Karen's realm of possibilities illustrates the importance of broader cultural logics. Specifically, the presence 
of oppressive social relations associated with patriarchy are documented in the social 
history, yet are not labelled as such. Instead, it would appear that descriptions of Karen's 
social relations are included primarily to contextualize her son's behaviour. They are not 
referred to as issues to be addressed beyond their potential impact on Chris, the designated 
client in the care plan proceedings. 
On more than one occasion, Karen's economic and emotional circumstances are 
shown to be precarious due to her status as female and mother. Shortly after Chris' birth, 
Karen found herself faced with a double bind: improve her relationship with an abusive male 
partner l6 who othetwise would refuse to contribute to child support or request assistance 
from state agencies, thereby placing Chris at risk of apprehension due to Karen's inability 
to provide financially. Both horns of the dilemma are expressions of the cultural convention 
which places the principal responsibility for child care on the shoulders of women.'' 
Karen is confronted with two representations of the 'bad" mother yet finds herself 
with neither the emotional support nor the financial resources to avoid being cast in one 
role or the other. The social history documents her efforts to acquire schooling sufficient to 
to secure a job providing an income adequate to the needs of herself and her son. This 
takes place in a cultural context in which women typically find themselves bringing home a 
substantially smaller wage than that of men (Conway, 1990: 108-1 09). A significant factor 
contributing to this situation is the difficulty women encounter in pursuing a career while 
being the principal economic provider for a family (McDaniel, l993:li'O). This situation is 
further complicated as women who are single parents frequently cannot rely on child suoport 
from their former partners to ease the financial burden.'' As the single reliable source of 
child care and the sole breadwinner, it is little wonder that these women find themselves 
vulnerable to charges of over protectiveness, on the one hand, or neglect, on the other. 
Whipsawed between two contending cultural expectations, the margin for error is very small, 
a predicament which itself imposes additional pressure and increases the likelihood of 
failure in the eyes of the dominant culture." As an independent unit, the family is confronted 
with expectations it is often ill-equipped to meet (Gordon, 1988/1989:166). Perceived 
difficulties grant the state license to intervene, ongoing surveillance producing more 
pressure to comply with conventional definitions of normalcy. 
This issue loomed large in a care plan review held six months after Chris' discharge 
from the complex. The psychiatrist returned to the topic of the ongoing absence of a male 
role model in Chris' life as Bob persisted in putting his work responsibilities ahead of the 
parenting his step son. The psychiatrist also stated that Karen was too involved in the 
affairs of her son, their relationship being characterised as "enmeshed", a term with 
overtones of mental pathology. Nonetheless, Karen is, arguably, the only person upon 
whom Chris can rely. Her commitment, vigilance, and perseverance was evidenced in her 
successful efforts to have Chris removed from a psychiatric ward for adults, a setting which 
she did not consider to be suitable for someone of his age. Yet her ongoing willingness to 
place his own interests ahead of her own, occasionally at considerable risk to her own 
physical and emotional well being, carries the threat of being construed as fostering an 
overly dependent relationship. Once again, Karen finds herself faced with 
expectations which place her in a position of double jeopardy. She was the sole emotional 
support for her son during her relationship with his father and remains the primary support 
in her current relationship. However, she is constantly faced with the recognition that the 
flip side of the charge of excessive caring is one of emotional neglect. Accusations of 
neglect are not directed at either male partner. Instead, her husband is "encouraged" to 
spend more time with Chris, the terms of this relationship seemingly voluntary. Karen's 
relationship with her son, on the other hand, appears to be obligatory. Lapses in proper 
conduct on her part are liable to result in rebukes that she is guilty of either pathological over 
protectiveness or criminal negligence. 
The incidence of male violence - physical, verbal and sexual - directed towards 
women and children is another aspect of patriarchy thrown into relief on the pages of Chris' 
social history. Exposure to violence has been identified as potentially contributing to the 
incidence of behaviour associated with conduct disorder (Jaffe et al., 1990:38). It figures 
prominently in many of the files that I consulted. Violence against women has been shown 
to be related to social inequalities in terms of class (Conway, 1990:150) and race ([Province] 
Task Force on Family Violence, 1992: 189, 192; Hughes, 1987), correlations which were 
strongly suggested in the majority of the files of Native youths. 
Cultural Logics: Class and Race 
T he difficulties I encountered in systematically documenting these impressions were largely due to established practices which had the effect of marginalizing 
issues of gender, class and race (Waitzkin, 1991 :39). Simply put, this information frequently 
was not available. This proved to be the case both in the documents from various external 
agencies which were consulted by the social worker in drafting the social history and in the 
files compiled by the Program over the course of the individual's stay. References to these 
categories on the face sheets of individual files were typically left blank. 
The consideration of class as a general category also tended to be overlooked as 
a matter of consequence. The head social worker considered all but a handful of the youths 
to be of the 'middle classa, those exceptions being comprised of members of families whose 
reliance on welfare spanned a generation or more and the occasional individual whose 
parents were affluent and/or highly paid professionals. Class also did not figure in the 
Facilitating Program's research project to evaluate the effects of the care plan process. The 
research assistant explained to me that one of the reasons for its exclusion was the difficulty 
in aniving at a satisfactory definition of class. Within the social histories, details about the 
employment situation of care givers was often missing. While the outline for social histories 
used by the social worker includes a section related to extreme economic hardship, I failed 
to encounter one example of its use in my reading of over eighty files. By contrast, the 
actual content of a number of social histories made it apparent that the family unit was 
frequently faced with conditions of extreme poverty. 
The consideration of race also played no part in the Facilitating Program's research 
project. However, a case can be made that race is an issue of particular importance. 
Conversations with the Facilitating Program's two principal social workers and my own 
investigation of the files confirmed that Native youths comprised the largest visible minority 
to make use of the Program's services, in numbers highly disproportionate to the provincial 
total. 21 One of the social workers made a 'guess-timate' that First Nations' people 
accounted for 40% of the admissions since the inception of the program. The absence of 
clear documentation makes it difficult to corroborate this impression. While this figure 
appears to be excessive, Native youths do represent a significant minority of admissions to 
the Facilitating Program. The actual number can be expected to drop as the administration 
of treatment programs passes into the hands of First Nations agencies. 
This situation underscores the importance of fashioning an explanatory model 
capable of extending the field of vision beyond the confines and the particulars of the 
specific family unit. It also calls attention to the various forms of tutelage imposed by 
prevailing systems of cultural logic. The demand for Native people to comply with an 
unrealistic cultural representation " parallels similar expectations made of women, the ideal 
of motherhood being virtually unrealizable under the best of conditions. Not unlike the plight 
of women (McDaniel, 1993: 173), Native people have been confronted with systematic state 
measures that have undermined their social and economic livelihood (Tobias, l976ll983; 
Dyck, 1991). They then have been the target of social policies intended to address their 
disadvantaged position. One effect of this tutelary relationship (Tobias, 197611983; Paine, 
1977:78; Dyck, 1991; Dyck and Waldram, 1993) can be measured, in part, by the alarming 
number of teenage suicides and the high rate of apprehensions from homes crippled with 
chronic unemployment or underemployment. Historic relations imposed by the state also 
inform the practices, only recently curbed, of placing Native children and youths in non- 
Native foster homes. 
Not the least significant aspect of this entrenched dynamic is the legacy of 
government sanctioned residential schools. The systematic exclusion of Native youths from 
culturally appropriate models of parenting continues to have repercussions generations later. 
Although less sensationally publicized than the recent revelations of school administered 
sexual and physical abuse, the long term effects of this practice are no less widespread and, 
arguably, no less devastating. These are perhaps the more blatant examples of a prevailing 
attitude best described as racist (Culhane, 1994), the twin prongs of state benevolence and 
surveillance contributing substantially to a predicament they are intended to alleviate (Dyck, 
1991 ; Marcus, 1992; Swartz and Levitt, 1989). 
CHAPTER EIGHT - PSYCHOLOGY REPORT 
J an moves quickly through the information relating to Chris' reasons for referral, skipping the synopsis of Chris' social history that comprises the first two pages 
of her 8 page report. Her 15 minute account primarily focuses on the outcome of the 
psychological interview and the findings of a series of tests measuring a variety of attributes 
including those of intelligence, susceptibility to depression, self perception and perception 
of family: 
A quiet handsome youth, Chris presented as having a restricted range of 
affect. At the beginning of the interview, he was cooperative and revealed 
a rather dry sense of humour. Nevertheless, Chris appeared to have little 
insight into his problems. He became less cooperative as questions were 
raised about his having been abused. He slid down into the chair, hid behind 
the collar of his ski jacket and the brim of his baseball cap and would not 
respond to further questions. 
Jan notes that Chris' explanation for being at Crossroads was because he punched 
a wall at his foster home and did not listen to expectations and because he swears. He said 
that since returning home, he has gotten along well with his family and that he would like to 
live with them upon leaving Crossroads. He reported that he was mostly happy staying at 
Crossroads, except when staff failed to follow through on their promises. He mentioned that 
he was expelled from school for fighting and that when he gets angry or feels scared, he will 
either yell or break something if he doesn't avoid losing it by going to his room. He denied 
any thoughts of self-harm or of feeling worried about anybody or anything: 
With regards to conduct disorder, Chris had difficulties sequencing events, 
giving a somewhat confused order. He denies that he steals but that he had 
done a B. & E. which he didn't want to talk about because he wanted to turn 
things around ... Chris indicated that apart from making homemade bombs 
and setting fires with some friends, he usually does most of his anti-social 
behaviours by himself .... 
The report indicates that Chris acknowledged that he had been abused sexually but 
did not want to talk about it. He denied having forced anybody to take part in any sexual 
activity. After being questioned about his history of abuse, Chris became increasingly 
reluctant to answer any questions. With reference to hyperactivity, he stated that he 
daydreams, that he doesn't listen in school and that the problems he encounters with school 
work are due to being lazy. He was slow to respond when asked what he liked about 
himself, finally volunteering that he plays drums and guitar, has very good hearing and 
enjoys art, particularly working with clay. The report observes that neither peers nor adults 
are viewed by Chris as being important resources. Chris' future plans are to return to school 
and, eventually, to "go into forestry because he would like to plant trees to help the 
environment." 
Chris took the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Ill (Revised) (W.I.S.C.) 
under the supervision of psychology staff members. Despite seeking reassurances about 
his progress and exhibiting occasional frustration with tasks requiring verbal expression, he 
was considered to be cooperative and appeared to be motivated to do well. Overall, Chris' 
results indicated that his cognitive abilities were average with below average percentiles 
achieved in areas of verbal ability, freedom from distractibility, short term auditory memory 
and clerical speed and accuracy. His highest scores were attained in arithmetic 
computation, perceptual organization and cognitive flexibility. 
According to the assessment of the psychology staff, Chris does not appear to be 
acknowledging symptoms of depression. However, his responses to the test instrument, 
the Beck Depression Inventory, may be invalid as Chris indicated that he did not understand 
all the vocabulary used by this assessment device. He did complain of having lost 10 to 15 
pounds recently and of experiencing physical aches and pains and constipation, symptoms 
which are sometimes indicative of somatization of depression. 
The results from the Jesness Personality Inventory were judged to be similar to those 
provided by most adolescents Chris' age. However, Chris failed to complete the Chedoke 
Youth Self Report (Y.S.R.), complaining of its length and difficulty. His mothets responses 
to the Y.S.R. reveal that she considers Chris to have significant difficulties in the areas of 
appropriate conduct, sustained attention and emotional distress. She provided the picture 
of a boy who is cruel to animals and people, destructive of property, prone to lying, stealing 
and fire setting as well as being unhappy, impulsive, hyperactive, inattentive, compulsive, 
self-destructive, and suicidal. She also indicated that providing care for Chris has been very 
stressful for her. 
In response to the questions on the Family Environment Scale, Chris' mother 
describes their family to have an emotional cohesion similar to most families, but to be more 
expressive than most families and more conflictual than distressed families. Chris, on the 
other hand, describes his family to be more emotionally cohesive than most families and to 
be similarly expressive and conflictual as most distressed families. The report notes that 
Chris' results may be of questionable validity as the test was given verbally with Chris 
seeming to give impulsive responses. 
Jan moves to the closing section of her report, stating that the assessment's 
summary and recommendations are based on the psychology department's observations 
of Chris and on an interpretation of his test results. The comments are meant to reflect the 
department's understanding of developmental issues of significance in Chris' life and the 
accompanying recommendations consist of courses of action that the psychology staff think 
may help to remedy the identified concerns: 
Chris is a 13 year old adolescent with average cognitive abilities who 
presents as guarded in his responses and emotionally constricted. He has 
a long standing history of difficulties that stem primarily from an Attentional 
Deficit Disorder and from having been sexually abused. He also meets the 
criteria for Conduct Disorder. He appears to be a sensitive youth who does 
not want to cause problems for others. However, he has very poor impulse 
control and acts out without any remorse for his actions afterwards. Chris 
has a very poor self-image, likely resulting from having caused extensive 
problems for himself due to his acting out behaviours, combined with being 
violated sexually several times by older males. It is possible that Chris has 
been more severely abused than he has disclosed, given the sexualized 
content of his nightmares, as reported by his foster mother. Chris is reported 
to have sexually abused younger children including his sister, and unless 
Chris learns alternative behaviour, he is likely to do so again. Although he 
has not carried out his threats of self-harm, it is possible that Chris could 
injure himself or others, given his impulsive tendencies, without consideration 
of long term consequences. 
Given Chris' highly sexualized behaviour with younger children, it is important 
that he learn to cope with his sexual impulses before he becomes an adult 
with a well-formed sexual identity. A juvenile treatment program for sex 
offenders is strongly recommended. Such a treatment program should not 
be viewed as a punishment; rather, it should be viewed as a way of 
protecting Chris and others from victimization and as a means of protecting 
him from social stigmatization, given society's lack of tolerance for sex 
offenders. If this is not available, he would likely benefit from seeing a highly 
skilled mental health professional who is well acquainted with the 
complicated facets of Attention Deficit Disorder as well as with sexual 
victimization. 
Jan underlines the caution required in securing suitable living arrangements for 
Chris. She indicates his desire to return home and acknowledges the persistence and 
dedication which his mother has shown to his care over the years and her continued 
willingness to provide a home for him. Concern is expressed about Chris living in a 
residence with younger children and the likelihood of Chris' offending against his sister is 
raised. Whatever the eventual placement, ongoing contact with his family is to be 
encouraged. In addition, one-on-one attention by a male child care worker should be 
provided and relief provisions for his care givers will probably be required. Family 
counselling is suggested for Chris' family members to improve their coping skills, both in 
terms of their own interactions and in regard to Chris' attention difficulties and his possible 
re-integration into the family. Whether at home or at school, Chris will require clear 
expectations, considerable structure and immediate reinforcement of appropriate behaviour. 
Jan's presentation ends with the recommendation that activities such as guitar or drum 
playing and organized outdoor pursuits which promise a high probability of success be 
pursued in order to bolster Chris' low self-esteem. 
"Comments or questions anyone?" Once again, Keith waits for a response before 
moving to the presentation by the education consultant .... 
t the suggestion of the head psychologist, I met with Lucie Berringer, a A psychology assistant and practicum student, to gain an understanding of the 
interview and testing procedures used as the basis for the psychology report.' 
First of all, what we do is not so much testing as a global assessment of the 
kid. What that means is that we'll try and get the big picture and testing is 
one tool that we use to get a part of it. Testing typically includes standards 
and norms and specific criteria and strict procedures. It's basically giving a 
kid a test and coming up with a number. Where the real process comes in 
is in the interpretation of all the different tests that we give. Typically, there 
is a standard test sequence. There are certain tests that we give to every kid 
here. 
Depending upon the situation, it might call for a different type of test, so that 
it's flexible in that sense. Given that we're doing this global assessment, 
psychology on its own isn't enough. We really rely on the social history. 
Working with social workers is really important because if we were to submit 
our interview results and our tests results, it wouldn't mean a heck of a lot. 
In fact, it doesn't always make any sense until we read the social history and 
we speak to education and we piece it all together. Sometimes we might 
have a specific question in mind that didn't come up when they were 
interviewing the parents so that the social worker might actually contact the 
parents again or else look at their notes and provide us with that information. 
So when Roslyn, the research assistant, sort of smiled when I made a 
comment about Yacts", I guess she was smiling because there's no basic 
raw "fact". It's subject to interpretation. 
That's right or also it's just so much and then it becomes selective. The 
interpretation that we make tends to be based on something. There's 
obviously a lot of our own intuition in there but we try hard to tease away 
what is true from what's not true. It does get tempting to just go with the flow, 
go with how you feel and that's why the tests are really important for us 
because they give us structure. It's important to stick to that structure. They 
provide you with a number. And you can say, 'Oh, my god, I would have 
predicted that he would have done this way' and then the kid will do 
something totally different. Your procedures are meant to be standard and 
we administer them in that way so that if any glitch or any funny thing 
happens, you can be confident it's the kid and not necessarily you. 
The W. I. S. C.2, for example, is supposedly measuring intelligence. Are you, 
in fact, measuring a kid's intelligence or are you using a tool which has come 
to be seen as a means for measuring intelligence and seeing how well the 
child performs that particular test and then ascribing intelligence based on 
the results? 
It's more the latter. Partly, because almost everyone agrees that we can't 
agree on what intelligence is. That's been a big academic debate. In fact, 
it becomes the focus of our training in first year [psychology] because 
assessment relies on intelligence tests. It's usually the basic test you give. 
That's the starting point. We're not necessarily even interested in getting the 
kid's intelligence. We like to think of it as their functioning and mostly we're 
getting intellectual functioning but you get other kinds of functioning that 
comes out. We really are involved with assessment versus testing and 
testing is a part of the overall assessment. 
With each kid that comes through here, we go over the care plan process 
with them. Typically, what we say to them is that people from different 
disciplines are bringing information about you to the care plan meeting. The 
social worker is going to talk to your parents and get their scoop on what's 
been going on. Education is going to do some testing with you and find out 
about your schooling and what we're here to do is to get your point of view. 
We're your representative basically. And that's sort of what we are. So the 
whole process isn't meant to be scary for them. It's meant to be welcoming 
and co-operative. There are some standard things that we say, one of which 
is that we don't keep secrets and so anything that they tell us is open to 
being used. So if there is anything that they are not comfortable with telling 
us, then they should state that. We might still question it but it's better to tell 
us the truth than to lie because we end up basing our recommendations on 
what they say. It doesn't always work but we do that anyway. 
Lucie then referred to her outline of the psychology interview and read a list of subtitles: 
Psychotic symptoms, mood disturbance, anxiety disorder, conduct disorder, 
oppositional disorder, Attention Deficit hyperactivity disorder, receptive or 
expressive language disorder .... Mood disturbance, that's an important one. 
Have they been depressed before? Do they tend to be depressed? Again, 
they don't often recognise it but they sometimes can very well describe 
symptoms of depression. Anxiety, conduct disorder, oppositional disorder 
- these are the different behaviours, you know. Do they engage in any of 
these particular types of things? Attention Deficit, language disorder .... 
Obviously, you don't ask about language disorder necessarily. It's more 
something that you observe in what's going on and then you may actually ask 
the kid if you're wondering about it. And then there's history of abuse .... 
In terms of conduct disonler and Attention Deficit, how are those categories 
understood within the psychology department? Are they seen to be 
disorders that are internal to the child or are they seen to be particular 
behaviours - I'm thinking of conduct disorder, specifically - particular 
behaviours which have been categorised within the D.S. Ad.-Ill-R? 
That's more like it. We don't even look to make a label. We just simply ask 
about different symptoms. That can be helpful to us and it might concur with 
a diagnosis that has been established before or else relate to something that 
the psychiatrist is curious about or has decided. We don't make that 
diagnosis ourselves. 
What about Attention Deficit? Is it seen to be organic or is it seen to be 
something that will always remain a puzzle? 
Hmm, the puzzle definitely. It's definitely a puzzle as to what it is but that's 
the same thing for any of the psychological disorders. It's the same for 
psychotic disorder - you can't really say schizophrenia at this age. You can 
debate that about alcoholism. That's where each of our views is different. 
I don't think of them as medical disorders but other people do and certainly 
psychiatrists do. 
Do the other psychologists think of them as medical disorders? 
That's interesting because it's one of those kind of philosophical questions 
which after awhile you don't necessarily ask unless during lunch time over 
your sandwich. It's just basically a process of going in and evaluating does 
a kid act like this, do they look like this. 
More pragmatic.. . . 
Exactly. We're not out to label a kid as having this or having that. We try to 
stay away from that. It becomes very important in our reports not to label. 
Certainly, sometimes the use of a label is good so you always aim for the 
better one rather than the worse one. You don't ever want to be derogatory 
in any way. That's very important, especially with representing the kid. What 
we're trying to present in the care plan is our understanding of them. We're 
presenting our assessment - that's the overall point - but we want to be as 
true to the kid as we can. So when we're presenting our interview, we're 
basically saying they said this in very much a reporter like style. There isn't 
a lot of interpretation at that point. We basically state what they said and 
then the interpretations come at the very end of our report. 
I've noticed the psych reports are very camfully written. There are sentences 
which say 'this suggests to us based on our expwience" or #based on similar 
tests given to other kids". It's always well qualified. 
Exactly. We look for this whole constellation of problems that this kid might 
have. That's interesting in a way because some of our testing gets us that 
[information]. Here we're giving them a chance to say it and will they be 
consistent. And they may and they may not be. I find that if they tend to 
deny everything in the interview, they tend to deny everything in their self- 
report but not necessarily. They might present to us very cheerful, very 
happy, they don't really know why they're here, or it's not really that bad at 
home and yet when they're in their rooms filling out their Chedoke [Chedoke 
Child and Family Centre Intake Questionnaire Youth Self-report] 3, the results 
will indicate that they are very depressed or the same with B.D.I. [Beck 
Depression Inventory ] ' or else very angry, or that type of thing. So, 
although it's from the same source, it's important to get the information in a 
different way. 
I'm really intrigued by the whole interpretive process. If you have a kid that 
presents to you as being cheerful and yet back on the unit writes a report 
which says exactly the opposite, what is the reality? 
Well, that's exactly it and that's why the context is so important. That's where 
the social history comes in. How has he been on the unit because there 
tends to be consistency somewhere. It's a matter of piecing it together. Is 
it that they have problems with women, in particular, or maybe not problems. 
Do they try to please women more than men? So far all that we've had in the 
department doing the interviews are women. Or does this kid have a history 
of lying or denying or whatever. Did the education [department] find the 
same thing that here is a high anxiety kid who is trylng to cover it up? Again, 
that's where we always have to qualify but sometimes you feel quite 
confident that we're on the right track. Sometimes that is what we'll point out 
if we're finding that they can present one way and yet feel another way from 
what they report. And that's something important for the parent to realize. 
The parent may score them in a totally different way and we can say 'mom 
and dad agreed with kid that the kid had this and this problem. However, 
they did not see depression as being a problem for this kid and this tends to 
suggest ....' It suggests that the parent doesn't see the same level of distress 
and that can be important for the parent to realize. Sometimes the easiest 
reports to write up are the ones where everything fits nicely. But the ones 
that are most informative are the ones that do have some inconsistency and 
they make you think a little bit harder about what's really there as opposed 
to what appears to be obvious. 
So, there are also questions about the self, the person, their psychological 
mindedness. These are all things that we try to fill in for ourselves. These 
core questions about their psychological functioning tend to cover a lot of 
different things because if they're anxious then they tend to be anxious in 
one domain like school or at home and then that fills in parts about school 
functioning. All these questions tend to be specific in some way because we 
do try to present certain areas - the different problems that may arise in 
family functioning, school functioning, peers, aspirations for the future. 
That's the standard format and then we make recommendations. But it's 
definitely not a rigid interview. 
We're not necessarily interested in finding out what happened (in the past]. 
That's more what the social workers do. They really do try to write up the 
social history. We're interested in presenting the kid's perceptions. So it 
doesn't matter that this is completely untrue. In fact, if they lie to us 
throughout the whole thing and we know that, that's informative in itself. It's 
more knowledge that we're after and we're not necessarily trying to seek 
facts. You have two sessions with the kid specifically and the first one tends 
to be like this [format]. It's structured somewhat but it's going to be different 
with every single kid depending on who is in the room, how we feel, how they 
feel, although it's the same room. An interview sometimes is done over two 
or three sessions because it's just not working or else they can't pay attention 
for that long. Sometimes you give a complete interview within 35 minutes - 
that would be very rare. Typically, it's a little bit over an hour. With some 
kids it can go much longer because they have a lot to say and they're willing 
to say it. That's what I find really interesting is that you really do have to work 
at your interviewing - or you get a chance to work at it with these kids - 
because you can never necessarily be the same. You always have to try to 
come up with new tactics and be flexible. That's your job. You want to 
present the information. You're not so interested in presenting the same 
person all the time which is different from what we do with the actual testing. 
Based on this interview, right away you can find out some things. 
Some tests might not even be valid to use at all. If you have a low 
functioning kid with big language difficulties then that indicates to me that a 
lot of our tests shouldn't even be done. Typically, when that happens here 
they tend to get done anyway and then there is just lots of qualifiers. I think 
that this is definitely a problem. There are a lot of kids that are filling out self- 
report measures but you might only find out a few days later that this kid is 
not very bright and probably won't be able to understand them. The unit 
workers are more than willing to help but they don't necessarily know. We 
don't necessarily know and typically these kids fill out these things the first 
couple of days that they are here because they're not allowed to leave and 
so this is at least something to occupy them and they might do it in their room 
at night [on their own]. 
Here today I'm just presenting you one standard test battery but there are a 
lot of other standard tests that you learn to use and that you have to 
administer. You've got all these nice norms and you can see how useful that 
is. Then you are presented with this Rorschach ink blot where the kid just 
gives any old response. Exter came up with a certain system for it but a lot 
of it is interpretive, interpretation coming out of your ears. You tend to wonder 
what the value of that is, how useful it can be. But working with these kids 
I've come to understand that it's useful to have them work in a very stnrctured 
environment - which is what the W.I.S.C. is - and then give them an 
absolutely unstructured test where you can't even tell them what you're 
expecting because you don't know what you're expecting. All you say is 
'what do you see? It's a very ambiguous stimulus. You get some responses 
out of them and it can be really helpful to see how poorly they work in an 
unstructured setting. This isn't the test we give to everybody. This would be 
a test that we would give to a kid we think might be having some sort of 
thought disorder. We're more reluctant to give this test because it is not as 
well respected in court room settings. So, there is that to consider. You 
have to have a good reason to give this test, obviously, but it can be really 
useful to see how well they do. 
You might want to use it with a very complex kid who has got a lot of affect 
and a lot of emotion, who might have been trying to conform with you the 
whole time. You might get a kid who really tries well on this other test [a 
structured test]. They don't do that great but they're quite appropriate and 
very co-operative and they respond to your structure. You're providing them 
with clear expectations of what they are meant to do and they do very well. 
Then all of a sudden on another day, you give the Rorschach - in the same 
setting, you're in the same room, you're the same person, you're just as nice 
as you were the last time. But this time you're not telling them what [the 
expectations are] and you get really, really bizarre answers. One or two 
bizarre answers isn't necessarily important but you can get a whole profile 
from that test and it can be useful. It gives you more of a sense of how they 
cope, whereas this [other structured test] is meant to tell you how they are 
functioning intellectually - as we said, we know it gives you more than that - 
but that one tells you more on how they cope and it does provide you with a 
little bit on how they are functioning intellectually. The literature shows that 
there are certain standards that you should expect to get. They should be 
giving you 'x' number of responses of this type and of that type. So there is 
a little bit of normative data to work with. 
The conventional way of seeing the Rorschach is that it's the content that is 
really revealing and there are all kinds of elaborate Freudian or Jungian 
interpretations that am used. But what you're saying is that there is at least 
as much information to be gained by looking at how they respond to a non- 
structured versus a structured situation. 
I don't know as it's the conventional way, but that was a pretty old way of 
looking at the Rorschach. Ever since Exter's system - I think he came out 
with it in the late 60's - and with the whole behavioural movement, we've 
moved away from that. People are now coming back to it a little bit with 
interpretations of content and Exter allows for that in his system. Is it all 
morbid? Do they see blood and guts everywhere? Obviously, that's 
important, but nowadays that's not really how it's used. It is more used for 
coping. You do all the quantitative stuff. It's a very complicated score. It's 
something that might take you half an hour to administer and it might take 
you that long to score. That has been a very practical reason for not 
administering it in the past. You just don't have that kind of time. But now 
you've got a computer system to help. The psych assistants certainly are 
keen on it because it provides information. I think psychologists are more 
wary of it because of the possibility of being subpoenaed. 
We tend to stay away from the neuropsych testing. The kid may have had 
that type of testing in the past or else they may later on. That might be 
something that we can recommend so we're not necessarily interested in 
giving them a whole neuropsychological battery. The Woodcock Johnson 
does a lot more testing as well. Actually, one thing that I'm going to be doing 
towards the end of the summer is looking into the similarities and differences 
between the W.I.S.C. and the W.J.R. woodcock Johnson - Revised] 
because that's been a problem here. 
Because they come up with different..  ? 
They don't always come up with the same thing and they're not parallel. 
They talk about a processing speed affect and we talk about one but we're 
using different tests to come up with it. There is this whole academic notion 
too that we feel that our test is good and education feels that their test is 
better. We try and avoid all that kind of stuff but it does come up every once 
in awhile. I think they're both good. It's just a matter of understanding how 
to interpret them together. 
J an Newcombe, the head psychologist, was interviewed to gain an understanding of why these particular tests and interview questions were 
chosen as the basis of the psychological assessment. She was also asked her perceptions 
of the strengths and weaknesses of these instruments. 
Well, there are two factors that led to the tests being used. One was that 
they were in use when we got here. [laughter] So that's one. There were 
a lot of other tests that were used as well but then in trying to settle on these 
ones, what we decided was the Chedoke measure would be used so that we 
would be able to take a look at our kids compared to other adolescents. It's 
quite a solid measure. The other reason is that it has been revised so that 
we get those diagnostic scales [related to] the DSM Ill. Given that there is 
no structured diagnostic interview here, it was helpful in that way. They also 
have a lot of questions about drug use, school function, social function, etc. 
So it's a pretty good broad measure. 
The Beck Depression Inventory is a solid, simple, well researched measure 
of depression with diagnostic work done in terms of score levels and some 
work done on the relation of high scores to suicide attempts to get more 
specifically at depression and suicide and vegetative features. There was 
a factor structure which was useful. Even if the kids don't say they attempt 
suicide, many of them have some of the vegetative features of depression. 
So that's a more specific measure. 
The Jesness [Jesness Inventory] is widely used by Youth Court Services 
and here in the treatment complex. The thing we try to get out of the 
Jesness is whether or not the kid has values which are anti-social from the 
point of view of most people. I don't think it does a particularly great job. 
We're doing our own factor analysis of the scale to see if we can get it any 
better. 
The Family Environment Scale ' we started to include part way through 
basically to get a number reading on family relationships. The cohesion and 
conflict subscales are not bad in terms of the psychometric [profiles]. But all 
the family environment scales, the family functioning scales, have various 
strengths and weaknesses. We wanted to document this over the course of 
follow up. Otherwise, if we didn't want to document in a number form, we 
wouldn't have used it because we know it from the interview. But it gives a 
number rating and it gives us a number rating from the parents as well. The 
Family Environment Scale and the Chedoke measures allow us to compare 
perspectives of parent and child and given that we rely on social work to do 
the family assessment, we don't do an assessment of the family from 
psychology. That's probably unusual for this kind of a program. So this 
allows us at least some information from which to compare the perspectives 
and then fill in the social history. 
The only other thing, I think, is the W.I.S.C. It's obvious why we have the 
W.I.S.C. because it allows us to identify cognitive functioning and whether 
or not there are particular general issues at the level of functioning or specific 
problems which have repercussions with how they deal with social 
relationships. There are, of course, better and worse psychological tests but 
all of them have limitations. 
The interview is something that I put together after working here for a fairly 
short period of time. Its purpose is to give us a kind of structure for going 
over major areas of functioning in kids. It's very much in need of revision at 
this point. It goes through where has the kid been, why do you think they're 
here, interviewing around the whole diagnostic areas - thought disorder, 
depression, conduct disorder - and getting at various things within each of 
those categories so that we have a better understanding. It then goes into 
the family functioning, their perception of their relationship with their mother, 
their siblings, their friends. It tries to get at coping resources - how do they 
cope, how they do in school, what are they going to do in the future. SO 
those are the specific questions and within that we watch how the kid copes 
with the interview which is not written anywhere but we watch how consistent 
their descriptions of relationships with the family are, how contradictory. For 
example, the kid will say "I'm here because I want to hold my family together 
and they all care about me and I care about them" and then 5 minutes later 
say "I hate my fucking family; I wish they were all dead.' Things like that are 
fairly obvious. They don't fit together too well. It gives us a guideline. It was 
so we made sure in the interview that we got information in all of those 
categories. It probably would be seen more as an unstructured interview 
than a structured interview in that the order of the questions can vary 
depending on how the kid wants to negotiate the various topics. 
What strategies do you employ when gathering, organising and analysing 
the data - the social history, test results, interview accounts, behavioural 
observation of the child? For example, do the more quantitative measures 
serve as indicators which you interpret in light of the social history and your 
understanding of attachment theory? If so, do your comments and 
conclusions primarily rely on empirically replicable results or informed 
speculation? Do you use a strategy of nominated events identifying critical 
incidents whose repercussions are revealed in current behaviour to decide 
which significant events will be selected for inclusion in the background 
synopsis? 
. . . I  informed speculation' ... hmm, clinical judgment. [laughter] Well, these are 
tough questions. How do we put it together? Is that what you're asking? 
I'm interested in your cognitive strategy. How do you approach this mass of 
information, some of which are numbered, some of which are observed 
impressions, some of which are interpretations of direct vehal responses? 
So it's really how you construct the sense of the child. When Lucie and I 
were talking, she talked about the numbers being a help in providing a global 
picture of the child and there was a fair amount of clinical judgment brought 
to bear. I'm interested in how that all fits together. 
I think that different psychologists probably do it in slightly different ways. I 
think all of us have an assumption about attachment or relationships in the 
family which is a guiding principle. We all try to think of what's happening 
now with the child in a developmental context. So we think of a 
developmental formulation which is different often from a clinical unit or a 
psychology unit where you will get a diagnostic formulation. Starting with the 
interview and then the social history information often I will then consider 
what I would predict would be the results on the test. What appears to be 
happening to this kid? How are they now? What are the test results likely 
to be like? I then try to work through how these things fit and sometimes 
don't fit because it doesn't necessarily all fit together. We are not doing 
documentation of symptoms and signs or documentation of cognitive 
functioning level. We do some of that and we do it very formally. We're quite 
formal. But the meaning that we have for that really comes out of a process 
of understanding what's happened in the history of the child and how do they 
function in the interview. We then put that together with the test results. 
That's probably pretty vague. You wanted to know if I use a strategy of 
'nominated events'? 
Yeah. For example, hem at the end of Chris' psychological report' there is 
a statement that: 'He has a longstanding history of dflculties that stem 
primarily from an Attention Deficit disorder and from having been sexually 
abused. " 
Yeah. There are some events that we would see as being more critical. 
Sexual abuse would be a critical event. We know that sexual abuse predicts 
certain things from the literature. The clinical judgment doesn't fall out of the 
sky. It's basically clinical judgment on the basis of what we know about 
research in this area. Attention Deficit disorder - we know something about 
the course of that in terms of development and what problems it might cause 
in terms of social functioning. We know about parents who are physically 
abusive or neglect. We know about the possible repercussions of that and 
of observing violence in the home. We know that's one of the important 
things. Things like level of cognitive functioning when you have a 
compromised child - a fetal alcohol syndrome child - born into a family 
where their parenting is precompromised as well. We know something about 
what to predict would happen. Critical incidence of conduct disorder at the 
age of onset - we know that if you have an early age of onset with a wide 
variety of conduct disorder symptoms, we know what's going to [happen]. So 
there are certain things that stand out that are strong predictors. But for all 
of these things, there really is no 1:1 correspondence between a particular 
event and an outcome. So we're confronted with the task of taking a whole 
bunch of predictors some of which you know more about than others and 
then putting that together and trying to project what's going to happen to this 
child given that the situation remains relatively unchanged. 
Keith speaks of manying the dichotomous thinking represented by the 
scientific method with an approach that can capture what he calls the 
"aesthetic: lived experience which constitutes the person's sense of being- 
in-the-world. Is this what you am attempting to do in the psychological 
assessment? 
... the "aesthetic". Is this what we're attempting to do? What does Keith 
mean by that and I'll tell you if I'm attempting to do it? (laughter) 
I had quite a long conversation with Keith about the "aesthetic". I had 
thought it was general knowledge but it seems to be an item that he's 
working up on his own right now. 
Yeah. He's starting to use this term more. And "lived experience" .... ? 
That was my synonym. Keith was talking about part of his formative 
experience which was around existentialism and I latched onto the idea of 
being-in-the-world which is very central to existentialism. I think it tries to 
capture the idea of how the world feels to you ... 
Hmmhm ... [agreement or encouragement] 
... and it seems to me that what you are doing in a psych assessment is 
attempting to get a sense of how the child is in the world. .. 
Hmmhm ... 
... not just breaking it down into particular attributes but trying to get a holistic 
sense.. . 
Hmmhm ... 
... and to me that seems to parallel what Keith was talking about. So I 
thought I'd run it by you.. . 
Yeah, I think you've basically answered that question. (laughter) The only 
other thing is that it brings back that whole issue about whether or not you 
believe that there are real facts versus some kind of created meaning. I'm 
kind of halfway in the middle of these things. Kids come in here and they 
have created a certain way of viewing the world. There have been some real 
experiences but they have interpreted these experiences in a particular way. 
Then we have these test results which are our way of picking out things but 
there is a million different things that you could pick out and nominate. It's 
a way of capturing something. If it is capturing it or if by virtue of doing that 
it's putting it into a context. 
I'd like to talk about the Jesness for a few minutes. The Jesness assessment 
scale was expressed in terms of social negativism - social maladjustment, 
alienation, asocialdy. I thought the ringer in the bunch was value orientation 
which was basically working class values. Later on, they talk about the 
samples they use and they said the reason why they chose from a basically 
working class population for the non-delinquent sample was because they 
wanted to control for class. Given that the delinquent sample was made up 
of kids in the detention centre, they are saying that, by definition, kids in the 
detention centre are working class. To me, that does not necessarily follow. 
Yeah, they used the word anti-social in particular ways, but you are right. It's 
pretty derogatory the way they are using it. But, you know, one of the 
realities is that a lot of our kids have come from families that are 
economically barely surviving. What you say is true, but that is the case. I 
would say that it's well documented in the literature that putting a child into 
poverty is a risk factor and there is no question about that. It is probably one 
of the worst risk factors for kids. I know what you are saying is that they are 
just working class people and they have all the problems. 
Another way of looking at it from another value perspective is that these 
people are living in poverty. When they are living in poverty they cannot 
provide their children with the same thing that other families who aren't living 
in poverty can. The parents don't have the luxury even to be able to parent 
their children with the same attention and energy as parents who have 
resources. So I see what you are getting at in the way that it is written here. 
But it is the reality. For example, the Offord study in Ontario looked at kids 
in [housing] projects. These are poor kids and it's a real big risk factor. Poor 
kids with single moms, poor housing. They don't have any access to 
recreational facilities. They don't have access to adequate clothing. They 
end up being humiliated in school. They respond to that. The teachers have 
a bias like the bias in here and it's a real problem. 
The reason why 1 &used on it is because in a number of my conversations 
with people here there has been a tendency to minimize those factors that 
you just outlined. 'Oh, it cuts across all classes.. . ' Well, it does but where do 
the majority come from? 'The middle class'. That's what I'm told by people 
who are in a position to have some sense of who is coming into the pagram, 
by people who are situated in very key positions. I've read Offord's findings 
and I attended the Children and Youth at Risk Conference where Offord 
spoke. I would agree with you. Yet it's interesting to see that there is quite 
a variation among staff members as to how they see these kids. 
I think when people say that these kids could be your kids and they could be 
my kids what they mean is - what I take them to mean is - that these are 
kids. These are people. They could be your child or they could be my child. 
They're in particular circumstances and I think that poverty is one of those 
circumstances. From what I see, a lot of the kids come out of homes where 
there is a lot of stress on the family. The family may be able to break out of 
the poverty range but the way that they are doing that is often by the parents 
having to not do other things with their kids. The Jesness is not a good test. 
Who it's normed on is not the best group that we could have it normed on. 
I found some of the questions on some of the other tests to be very 
ambiguous. For example, the Beck Depression Inventory with its references 
to time. I can imagine a kid who has been chroniCally depressed coming up 
with quite a different response to these questions - "as well as ever could: 
"than usualn - than a kid who is more acutely depressed.. . 
Ahuh 
... and yet both are depressed. 
Yeah, that's a good point. 
I also had a reaction to the phrase "severe violation of social norms - 
disobedience, skipping school, running away from home ". . . 
This is taken from the DSM and that's why its classified that way. Yeah, I 
know ... (laughter) ... "skipping school" is a "severe violation of social 
norms" ... yeah, I know. 
The true or false statements in the Family Environment Scale includes: 
'Family members often keep their feelings to themselves". Well, that can be 
good or bad. You have no self control of your feelings, so you're going to 
spew it all out. If you are repressing things, that's quite a different question 
as well. That can be a sign of a well controlled quote unquote functional 
family or a dysfunctional family. "We say anything we want around home". 
The same thing: we're open and up front or we don't have to think about 
other people's feelings; we just spew it out and not take responsibility for it. 
Here's another one: 'Family members rarely become openly angry: Anger 
can be a good or bad thing. Depending on your family background, you 
either write true or false. It doesn't give a clear picture. 
l agree. 
'Family members often criticise each othef. Again, that can be constructive 
or destructive. Criticism may be something that is secreted away or it may 
be inappmpriately discussed in a way that raises a lot of stress among kids 
that don't have any control over the outcome. There is a real difference in 
outcome depending on the family circumstances. In my reading, it is highly 
ambiguous. 
It is, but what's quite remarkable here is I think that you've pick out almost all 
the items on the expressive domain. There are two problems with the test. 
Like most tests, they have to select particular wording that sometimes isn't 
all that clear. You've sat through what we've done in the [Monday evaluation 
meetings] trying to make up scales. You know how difficult it is to actually 
get a wording for an item that most people are going to understand. The 
other problem with these tests is that the items are not items that reflect what 
necessarily goes on in the families of the kids that we see. These are pretty 
light items. They don't have any items to express feelings about hitting each 
other, for example. 
B oth Lucie and Jan exhibit a certain amount of skepticism about the validity of the different instruments they use to collect information for the psychology 
report. Neither subscribes to a wholly positivist view of reality nor do they dismiss the 
significance of their role in the interpretative process. In fact, Jan's orientation draws heavily 
on object relations represented by the work of Heinz Kohut (1971;1977), an interpretive 
approach which pays close attention to the interactive dynamics between primary care givers 
and the child in constituting a social template.' Yet the interviewing techniques and the 
various tests used by the Facilitating Program represent the actual forces of production 
which generate the findings conveyed at the care plan meeting. These procedures do not 
uncover facts; they produce them (Young, 1980:144). The nature of their production 
implicates the textualization process in which discourse is decontextualized and accounts 
are authored. Typically, the effects of production remain unacknowledged in the recording 
of the information, yet their potential impact upon the findings may be considerable. The 
interview, for instance, is an encounter infused with power (Weber et al., 1994 :45), the 
outcome of which may be influenced in a number of ways. 
The psychological tests employed by the Program - particularly those such as the 
Chedoke, Beck or Jesness which involve the use of questionnaires - typically use a format 
which attempts to attribute an objective meaning to a standardized test (Young, 1980:140). 
Yet the triple hermeneutic draws attention to at least three moments when the meaning 
intended by the test may be incongruent with the personal culture of the test respondent. 
The question may not coincide with the lived experience - 'practical consciousness" - of 
the person. The reflected knowledge prompted by the question may be other than what is 
intended by the questionnaire. Finally, the significance attributed to the response may have 
little or no relevance to the everyday attitudes and practice of the individual. Many of the 
shortcomings of the various instruments, readily identified by various staff members in 
private conversations, are not mentioned during the care plan. To do so would call into 
question the Program's capacity to produce authoritative knowledge. For it is the language 
and practices of these procedures which comprise the professional discourse in which the 
Facilitating Program is engaged. 
Situated as it is under the auspices of forensic psychiatry within the Ministry of 
Health, the Facilitating Program requires the presence of the psychiatrist to qualify for 
funding. Operating within the psychiatric medical model requires a similar acknowledgement 
of the authority of the D.S.M. in defining its terms of reference. Conduct disorder may be a 
category viewed with skepticism or outright disdain, yet it legitimizes the existence of the 
Facilitating Program as a mental health agency. Professional authority requires that the 
Facilitating Program be seen to produce credible facts, facts that are produced through 
professionally sanctioned procedures and expressed in language consistent with these 
expert technologies. 
The significance of this fact was made apparent during a discussion with the head 
psychologist about the limitations of conduct disorder as a concept. She indicated the 
D.S.M.'s significance in the mental health field, explaining that a pragmatic approach 
required the use of its terminology "to establish credibility and to ensure funding". Her 
remark echoed the position of advocates of developmental psychopathology which had 
appeared in an article favourably viewed by the Program staff: 
In spite of the numerous scientific and philosophical issues that continue to 
plague the DSM system, it remains the common language used by mental 
health professionals and public health agencies to communicate about the 
problems and conditions for which the mental health community has 
professional responsibility (Wakefield, 1992; Wilson, 1993). Thus, linking 
our research to the common language of the DSM maximizes the likelihood 
that resulting knowledge will benefd the children who are the ultimate source 
of our concern. It is no small consideration that this in turn helps to ensure 
that our research will be valued and perceived as relevant to the public 
health and mental health communities, which have an increasingly powerful 
influence on research funding priorities" (Richters and Cicchetti, 1993:3). 
This is not merely a question of promoting harmonious border relations between 
neighbouring disciplines in order to ensure peaceful co-existence in the field of mental 
health. Its implications reverberate throughout the state's social problem apparatus with its 
mandate of managing the more problematic aspects of capitalist social relations: mental 
health, deviance, violence and crime (Morgan, 1981 : 19). A closer look at the procedures 
and concepts which provide the common currency - and legitimacy -for the sections of the 
state responsible for these social issues can provide a glimpse of how the state serves to 
reproduce capitalist social relations in everyday life (Ng, l988:12).' 
Characteristically, state agencies are tied in with professional forms of 
organization, and both are interpenetrated by relations of discourse of more 
than one order .... Integral to the co-ordinating process are ideologies 
systematically developed to provide categories and concepts expressing the 
reactions of local courses of action to the institutional function ... and 
providing a currency or currencies enabling interchange between different 
specialized parts of the complex" (Smith, 1986:8, quoted in Walker, 1990: 12) 
The Jesness Inventory can be seen to provide this sort of currency, a technology 
which does the bidding of the state's social problem apparatus and a variety of professional 
disciplines alike. It has the distinction of addressing issues central to state management and 
professional expertise in each of the areas of adolescent mental health, deviance, violence 
and crime. It is used by the Facilitating Program, despite its flaws, due to its widespread 
acceptance on the treatment complex and within adolescent forensic psychiatry, generally, 
and because of its perceived ability to determine whether a youth has anti-social attitudes. 
Endorsement through its use by the Facilitating Program simply adds to its credibility, 
increasing the likelihood that it will be used without the qualifying skepticism expressed by 
Jan Newcombe. 
T he Jesness lnventory warrants a full length study in itself. The account that follows can only provide brief suggestions of some of its more serious 
implications. The introduction to the Jesness lnventory opens with the statement that: 
[tlhis manual presents data currently available on the Jesness Inventory, a 
measure designed for use in the classification and treatment of disturbed 
children and adolescents. Although the lnventory was designed for use with 
 delinquent^,'^ there are reasons to believe that the scales will prove useful 
with children and adolescents in a variety of settings .... The Jesness 
lnventory consists of 155 true-false items,'' designed to measure the 
reactions of young people to a wide range of content. A first objective was 
to include items that would distinguish disturbed or delinquent children from 
others; a second objective was to include items covering a variety of attitudes 
and sentiments about self and others in order to provide the basis for a 
personality typology for use with children or adolescents (Jesness, 19661 
l972:3) 
The introduction goes on to identify 11 personality characteristics and to outline how 
it proposes to measure the presence of each characteristic. It would appear that these 
categories are intended to represent deviations from the norm for they are couched in 
socially negative or anti-social terms. An apparent exception is that of "Value Orientation" 
which is expressed in neutral terms. Yet its description reveals a judgment which is anything 
but neutral. "Value Orientation refers to a tendency to share attitudes and opinions 
characteristic of persons in the lower socioeconomic classes" (Jesness, 196611 972:3). One 
reading of this leads to the conclusion that holding attitudes in common with those of the 
lower socioeconomic classes, i.e. working class, puts a person "at risk" of mental 
disturbance leading to delinquency.I2 
The perceived connection between working class background and disturbed or 
delinquent behaviour is substantiated in the discussion of normative samples. Jesness 
observes that: 
The majority of delinquent subjects in the normative group, both male and 
female, came from the two reception centers serving the California Youth 
Authority .... In this study a delinquent is defined as an individual who has 
been removed from his home by law enforcement authorities and referred to 
the California Youth Authority. The nondelinquent sample was obtained 
during 1961 and 1962 in ten public schools in Northern California. The 
majority of these subjects live in urban areas, with two of the schools located 
in small towns. Most of the schools were situated in what were described by 
school officials as "lower-class" socioeconomic areas. The reason for 
selecting schools in the lower-middle- and lower-class area was to develop 
a measure which would distinguish delinquents from nondelinquents 
regardless of social-class status (Jesness, 196911 972:20; italics added). 
Jesness argues that, in order to control for social class background, the 
nondelinquent sample was drawn from a lower-middle and lower class population. Why? 
The operating assumption seems to be that all youths referred to youth "reception centers" 
[sic] are, by definition, lower-middle or lower class. Here the Jesness lnventory appears to 
confirm Jan's assessment that adverse economic circumstances contribute to the likelihood 
of behaviour which corresponds to the symptoms of conduct disorder. Jan objects to the 
attitude of the Jesness which, she believes - incidental to its primary objective of identifying 
kids with anti-social values - casts working class people in a 'derogatory" light. What is 
overlooked in her remarks is what she shares with the Jesness: a perspective which, on one 
level, acknowledges the shared structural location which evidently contributes to putting 
working class males as a group 'at risk" but which, on another level, pushes those common 
conditions into the background in order to isolate supposed anti-social characteristics which 
can then be used to identify those most 'at risk' as individuals. The issue of social class 
recedes into the distance as the psychological profile of a conduct disordered youth is 
constructed. 
Identified on the basis of their admission to a youth detention centre, the sample 
cohort of conduct disordered youths is duly decontextualized. Troublesome characteristics 
are isolated and defined. Tests to identify those characteristics are devised then applied to 
other youths who are similarly decontextualized. The end result is the reconstitution of 
youths varying in class, gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity and age as conduct 
disordered youths who exhibit measurable 'tendencies predictive of social and personality 
problems' (Jesness, l 9 6 Z l  972:3).13 The underlying causes of the objectionable behaviour 
are not addressed neither is agreement on the origins of the behaviour required in order to 
use the lnventory effectively. 
This overall process is not unlike the one used by the D.S.M. which focuses on 
behaviour to the neglect of meaning and on reliability in diagnosis at the expense of 
identifying possible underlying causes. The Jesness lnventory manual offers clear 
documentation of the construction of this cultural logic: 
What can we use as an estimate of the probability of a boy's becoming 
delinquent at some time during his preadolescent and adolescent years? 
Besides the regional variation in any hypothetical "true" rate, his chances of 
being adjudged delinquent will vary with the local definition of delinquency 
and with the standards of treatment customary to the locale. In a study by 
Briggs, Wirt, and Johnson (1961), 32 per cent of 2000 boys, tested in the 
ninth grade (mostly at age 13) were shown in a follow-up study ten years 
later to have had contacts with the police involving 'more than minor 
infractions." It is probable, however, that the group reported upon which 
consisted of the Hathaway and Monachesi sample (1953), were involved in 
less serious offenses than those of our current criterion group. Therefore, 
for present purposes, the assumption is that at some time between the ages 
of 8 and 18 approximately 20 per cent of the boys in California will be 
involved in delinquent acts serious enough to be of p;blic concern (Jesness, 
1962/1972:23). 
Delinquency is used here as synonymous with mental disturbance. The 
incorporation of this test as a part of its assessment procedures indicates that the Facilitating 
Program accepts the use of delinquent as being equivalent to conduct disordered. A nod 
in the direction of local norms indicates an appreciation of the socially constructed nature 
of delinquency. The figure of 20% of the entire population of Californian boys appears to 
refer to those likely to have involvement with the police, suggesting that the actual number 
of undetected offenders will be a greater number - hence, of some concern. 
The lnventory has been used by several investigators. Their findings 
indicate that the California sample used in the present study appears to be 
representative of delinquents and nondelinquents in other geographical 
locations, including England (Fisher, 1967, Davies, 1969, and Mott, 1969). 
Mott found the 'scores obtained by the English approved school and 
comprehensive school boys on the Jesness lnventory subscales are 
remarkably similar to those reported for the California delinquent and 
nondelinquent samples respectively." There do appear to be consistent 
differences on the Immaturity scale, however, with English boys scoring 
higher. Reasons for this are not clear. With a sample of Scottish 
delinquents and nondelinquents, Vallance and Forrest (1971) found that, 
while most scale scores were similar to those of American youths, Scottish 
delinquents and nondelinquents scored higher than the American sample on 
the Alienation scale. This study also showed that the Asocial Index 
discriminated about as well between delinquents and nondelinquents as was 
true for the California sample. Chularton (1 976) explored the usefulness of 
the lnventory with Australian Delinquents. He concluded that the measure 
successfully differentiated between delinquents and nondelinquents, with 
even greater differences shown between delinquent and nondelinquent 
females than was true for the California sample. The lnventory has been 
translated into several foreign languages but none of these studies have to 
our knowledge been published (Jesness, 1962/1972:25). 
These encouraging comments open the door to an interpretation supportive of 
launching a normalizing project of neo-Kantian dimensions. On the one hand, the Inventory 
demonstrates a capacity to isolate universal human characteristics. On the other, it appears 
to embody a sensitivity to secondary attributes which differ due to variations in local 
conditions. Its potential global significance is attested to by the fact that it has been 
translated into a number of languages. The proof of its applicability internationally awaits 
the publication of test results. l4 
The manual increases its credibility by acknowledging the numerous possible 
contributing factors including those of class and gender, their complex nature and the fact 
that the lnventory may be of little use in predicting delinquency among some youths. It 
acknowledges that the lnventory was based on male norms then goes on to support its use 
with a female population with qualifications and to display an appreciation of diversity within 
a broader unity and of a multi-causal approach to delinquency. It then concludes with a 
reaffirmation of its truth claims as an assessment tool. 
I n Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs, Paul Willis (197711981) focuses on twelve youths who would fit the profile of the 
delinquents targeted in the English application of the Jesness Inventory. However, Willis' 
landmark study of the rebellion of English working class boys against school authority amves 
at conclusions significantly different from those summarized in the manual. Contrary to the 
intentions of the Jesness Inventory, the focus of Willis' study was on 'cultural form" rather 
than on individuals. '' 
Willis adopted this perspective to try to explain the existence of a counter-school 
culture among working class males promoting behaviour which sabotaged their schooling, 
thereby undermining their chances of attaining anything other than working class jobs. He 
initiated his research at a time when the post war expansion of the economy had collapsed, 
throwing into relief the failure of education to provide everyone with equal access to jobs. 
With a zeal worthy of William Ryan's Blaming the Victim (1971), reformers turned their 
sights, not on the economy or on the education system itself, but, rather on the recipients 
of education: 
In the hands of the policy makers the sociology of education dug deeper and 
deeper, tunnelling ever further back into family, childhood, individual 
psychology, and isolated cultural effects to identify the source of 'failure." 
Class (and the analysis of class) really only made its entry to designate a 
huge tautology: working class people suffer educational and cultural 
disadvantages; people who suffer educational and cultural disadvantages 
are working class. There was no explanation of these things, nor any 
suggestion of how unequal class relations and capitalist production might be 
centrally implicated in them (Willis, 1977/1981:2M; original italics). 
Willis' investigation led him to conclude that counter-school culture is an expression 
of working class males' assessment of their chances for advancement in a class society. 
In effect, it represents their refusal to be duped by the liberal rhetoric which declares that 
education will eliminate the effects of class inequities, allowing each person to compete as 
an equal without fear of discrimination. Rather than 'being 'ignorant,' 'anachronistic,' 
'pathological,' and in need of eradication, such cultural responses may in certain important 
respects be in advance of the understanding of the liberal agencies" (Willis, 1977/1981:2O~; 
original italics). Liberal rhetoric, in Willis' view, effectively obscures the fact that, in a class 
society, social integration requires that education prepare most working class individuals for 
their future within those conditions of inequality (Willis, 1977/1981:2O4). 
In his afterword to the book's second edition, Willis emphasizes that while his focus 
was on one variant of working class culture - the male counter-school culture - he did not 
discount the importance of canying out similar investigations in terms of gender and ethnicity 
(Willis, 1977/1981:217). Neither did he ignore the fact that the book would receive a less 
favourable reception in North America than was the case in the United Kingdom (Willis, 
1977/1981:2l4): 
mhere seems to have been a much greater emphasis on the individualizing 
and a certain kind of the psychologising of "social problems" in North 
America, which must act to break, hide, or fragment some of the processes 
described in this book .... And if individual and certain kinds of psychological 
categories reign supreme (so that one day, perhaps, every disaffected child 
will be given an individual counsellor), then general social processes can 
soon be turned into personal "failings." None of this suggests the irrelevance 
of 'cultural forms," but rather the greater urgency of recognizing their variety 
and connection - before whole sections of the school population are 
'psychologisedn (Willis, 1977/198l:216). 
Willis' concerns appear to be borne out in the Jesness Inventory, one of the 
tendencies of which is the psychologising of social problems. Class appears as a founding 
tautology - working class people (primarily males) exhibit disturbed and delinquent 
behaviour; people who exhibit disturbed and delinquent behaviour are working class 
(primarily males). The class implications of Jesness' argument are increasingly marginalized 
in the course of outlining a technology which centres on the identifying, defining and 
measuring of anti-social characteristics of individuals. Nevertheless, Jesness' text supports 
a reading that working class individuals occupy a social position structurally opposed ("anti') 
to the interests, attitudes and norms of the status quo ('social"). A logical application of his 
position would lead to the working class, collectively, being monitored and treated, 
individually, due to the high potential for disturbed or delinquent behaviour. 
Another way of arriving at this conclusion is by sketching a representative profile 
based on the characteristics associated with delinquent or disturbed youths. According to 
Jesness, these individuals do not act in a socially acceptable manner and they adhere to 
values of the working class. Their perceptions are immature and self-centred and display 
a distrust of authority. They are conscious of angry feelings which they act out while tending 
to be uncomfortable in the face of these feelings. They are inclined to be self-isolating and 
socially uncomfortable. Normal emotions are repressed and life's unpleasant incidents and 
circumstances are denied. Finally, problems are usually solved in a fashion which is 
dismissive of social conventions and norms. 
Jesness' intention to present these attributes as being socially negative seems 
undeniable. What is equally apparent is that what is socially dominant is seen to be socially 
desirable. Anti-social behaviour is an undesirable reaction on the part of individuals - most 
of whom are from the working class - due to their psychological makeup. That this 
oppositional behaviour is, in fact, negative or undesirable is self-evident only when viewed 
from the position of the status quo. In fact, this logic leads to the converse conclusion that 
middle and upper class youths tend, by definition, to be pro-social, healthy in mind and in 
conduct. For the Jesness Inventory, it is enough to identify and define the psychological 
characteristics of delinquents and to measure their occurrence. Explanations of causes will 
be multiple and are best left to others. 
By contrast, Willis' study supports the view that existing social norms may be the very 
conditions which cause one to be angry and frustrated. If these norms are judged to be 
unfair or discriminatory, distrust of authority may be not only understandable but also 
reasonable. Acting out against these norms may be a socially responsible action advocating 
social justice. Discomfort in the face of this action is an understandable response given the 
possibility for reprisals at the hands of the dominant order. Conceivably, these norms may 
reflect the ideological, economic andlor political expression of structural inequalites due to 
exploitative and oppressive class relations - hence, the appearance of sympathy with lower 
class values and attitudes in this list of 'anti-social" tendencies. 
This is not to argue that Paul Willis has provided the definitive reading of the 
circumstances of these 'lads'. 'The 'same' text can produce equally competent but widely 
divergent readings or receptions from exactly the same 'data" (Theron Britt quoted in 
Waitzkin, 1991 :289). Certainly, Willis acknowledges the limitations of his account and that 
multiple readings are required (Willis, 197711 981 :207).16 To do otherwise is to open the door 
to the danger of normalization, whereby one perspective dominates all others in its pursuit 
of ultimate conclusions which will always elude its grasp. To his credit, Jesness includes 
social theories in his list of possible explanatory models. However, the prevailing 
momentum favours psychological, biological and social analyses which neglect or 
marginalize the issue of social structural inequalities." 
It is important to recognize that the perspectives and technologies employed to 
construct data tend to predetermine the nature of the treatment or care proposed to resolve 
the difficulties. This view finds support in Howard Waitzkin's assessment of the practice of 
doctors, an evaluation which could be extended to include health professionals, in general, 
and mental health professionals, in particular. As Waitzkin indicates, the proposed 
resolutions tend to be pragmatic. They rarely identify the need to transform systemic 
inequalities, concentrating instead on "seeking limited modifications in social roles" 
(Waitzkin, 1991:23) intended to assist the individual to cope with the immediate 
circumstances while leaving broader contextual issues unaddressed. 
This critique appears to be applicable to the Facilitating Program. The Program 
utilizes the Jesness to document anti-social characteristics, the presence of which are 
attributed to a history of insults to attachment. Emphasis is placed on identifying anti-social 
attributes within the individual as part of a care plan process which takes as its basic unit of 
analysis the individual-within-the-family-and-immediate-. Explanations of the 
origins of psychological distress remain couched in intra and inter personal dynamics with 
the consideration of social structural inequalities being marginalized in the Facilitating 
Program's perspective and practice. What is portrayed as being a scientific attempt to 
facilitate the benevolent treatment of disturbed and delinquent youths takes on disturbing 
ideological features of the social control of a particular class. Certainly, it can be argued that 
this is an unintended consequence. Yet it is a consequence nonetheless and one which 
supports state measures which ensure the reproduction of capitalist relations (Hall et al., 
1978; Morgan, 1981 ; Ng, 1988; Smith, 1986; Walker, 1990). 
CHAPTER NINE - EDUCATION REPORT 
N arinder Bohal from the education department of the Facilitating Program begins his report by filling in the details of Chris's school successes and 
difficulties mentioned in Ken's initial presentation. Report card comments support Karen's 
statements about Chris' turbulent school history. An evaluation from the psychiatrist 
consulted when Chris was in grade four concludes with the observation that, in Narinder's 
words, "many of Chris' problems have an organic basis." In a manner similar to that of the 
social history and family assessment, the educational assessment incorporates information 
from sources beyond the purview of the Facilitating Program's staff. As such, it is presented 
with the disclaimer that the accuracy of that information cannot be guaranteed and may, in 
fact, simply represent the opinions of others. It also limits the applicability of its 
recommendations to current circumstances, urging that considerable caution and care be 
exercised in the use of the report in future years "due to the changing and developing nature 
of children." 
The testing component of Chris' current educational evaluation consisted of an 
interview and three assessment exercises. The Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational 
Battery - Revised is described as a set of individually administered tests which offer a wide 
range and comprehensive means for measuring cognitive abilities and actual academic 
performance. In general, Chris' capacities were judged to be average with low average 
noted in the area of mathematics. His actual achievement was a reversal of these results, 
generally low average with the exception of average performance in reading skills. The 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - 111 - Revised is a test of general intelligence 
intended to assess particular verbal and visual-spatial capabilities. Chris' verbal rating was 
low average while both his performance and overall score were average. Finally, Chris was 
given the Piers - Hams Children's Self Concept Scale, "The Way I Feel About Myself." His 
score of 26 when compared to average scores between 40 and 60 was considered to be 
indicative of very low self esteem. Chris' testing sessions took place for short periods 
spread out over three days due to his inability to concentrate. He yawned frequently, 
appeared to be tired and required regular reassurances in order to stay on task. 
Unlike the other presentations this morning, the educational assessment has the 
distinction of being the only report whose summary and recommendations typically find 
themselves reproduced in full in the completed care plan. Narinder spends the majority of 
his 15 minutes focusing on these sections [Care Plan - School 1ssues:pp. 190-1941. 
Narinder closes his presentation with a request for information from Karen and Chris' social 
worker: 
"I need some clarification about Chris' involvement in the school intervention 
program. It's not clear to me whether he is still enrolled or whether he has 
been suspended." 
"He's suspended," Bill Steele says, "due to physical acting out." 
"He would benefit from close supervision, " Narinder replies. "He has very 
limited attention span. He also needs assistance with how he holds his 
pencil. He writes and draws with his hand in a hooked position which 
obviously makes it very stressful for him." 
"I've worked with him on that," Karen says. 
"I'll talk to his teachers," Narinder adds. 
'When you make your recommendations to the school," Keith says, 'you 
might want to suggest that he be given one-on-one direction away from the 
aisles, possibly on a computer." 
'Was he kept on anti-depressants?" Karen asks, directing her question at 
Keith. 
'We take them off everything they're on while they're here. Othetwise, we 
don't know what we're dealing with." 
"I was just wondering about the yawning.". 
"His foster mom commented on his bad sleeps," Bill interjects. 
"He may be experiencing flash backs," Keith says. He pauses. "Any further 
comments?" He then turns to the next person for her report. 
s my presence in the Facilitating Program classroom might be too disruptive, A it was suggested that I meet with Eric Matson of the education department to 
discuss the background to the education report. Eric explained to me that the educational 
assessment involves a review of the student's entire school history. This includes consulting 
all the available documents such as progress records, attendance records, special program 
reports, etc. Teachers' comments are of particular importance to determine whether their 
observations correlate with the results of the current testing. Typically, the education 
specialist talks to teachers from the previous year or two in order to compare impressions 
of the student and to outline significant themes. This information is checked against the 
youth's behaviour in the Facilitating Program school and discussion with the primary child 
care worker takes place in order to arrive at a description of the underlying dynamics. 
Eric placed particular emphasis on how the education component of the care plan 
process has evolved from its initial function of summarizing the youth's school history, 
documenting academic deficiencies and making recommendations for remedial studies. At 
the heart of its present activities is a focus on identifying existing cognitive liabilities in order 
to assess the possible impact of these deficiencies on school and social learning, in general. 
This information is then used to make management suggestions which clearly place the 
onus on educators to modify their practices and expectations to meet the needs of the youth, 
rather than attempting to alter the individual to fit into the prevailing school system. Under 
Eric's direction, I was given the Woodcock Johnson test for cognitive abilities. Afterwards, 
we discussed its implications: 
We attempt to see the kid's cognitive ability and determine what we can do 
to facilitate it. We try to do this within a consideration of affiliation, ecology 
and mutuality. This is probably the most difficult aspect. Rather than change 
the kid, we need to change the ecology. This represents a subtle shift in 
which the focus is changed from 'Johnny should ..." to 'one should." 
Psychology has tended to look at the emotional side - for example, 
depression - whereas we tend to look on the cognitive side. Then we 
attempt to blend our understanding. For example, psychological behaviour 
may be due to anxiety; anxiety may be due to cognitive deficiencies. 
The Woodcock Johnson helps us to get at how the kid processes the 
information. Here I'm talking about information being all the input that is sent 
out. How much of what is sent out is actually received? Auditory, visual - 
how much can be retained for how long? Can the kid hook it up to what she 
already knows? Can the kid apply any reason to it? From that, we get a 7 
point scale that represents the kid's competency in these areas. We can 
then translate this to what the kid can be expected to receive from both a 
structured classroom and an unstructured classroom and school yard 
situation. For example, if she has problems with auditory processing, we can 
extrapolate she will have troubles in the classroom and problems in the play 
ground and at home as well. The test helps us to get at communication skills 
-- writing, reading, listening. Or get at different languages - demand 
language where kid has to supply some reasoning as well as more 
spontaneous language in which the kid tells you what she did yesterday. 
We try to find the cognitive levels in the different areas so that we can 
recommend to the teacher to drop off on lectures and give visuals, for 
example. [The Woodcock Johnson] will give us age and grade equivalencies. 
I do it on the basis of age because the kids are all over the place in terms of 
their grade level. This gives me a percentile readout where the kid stands 
in terms of the general population. 
[As we administer the test], we will watch for irritation, frustration, signs of 
giving up. Anxiety is frequently a factor. We're not able to say the deficiency 
is due to anxiety or [the anxiety] is due to the deficiency in processing 
auditory messages. But if the kid gives a physical indication, we may be able 
to make some assumptions. With some students, anxiety is a part of every 
test situation. I would then try to help them to relax, to see this as more of a 
project than a test. We haven't been able to come up with another 
descriptive word other than test. Psychologists can use interview but, when 
you come down to it, this is a test. And the word test sets up a negative 
atmosphere to begin with. 
The individual exercises are designed to measure a particular capacity. If 
the student doesn't recognize the word, is she able to employ other 
strategies to try to figure out what it is? We're attempting to describe how the 
student processes information, not how intelligent she is. Where her 
strengths and weaknesses are. General background information [is one 
resource we measure]. The ability to analyze and synthesize is another - 
the ability to take things apart and put them together, the ability to reason. 
Often we will look for a match. A deficiency here robs you of a whole 
resource base that you can use. If you're weak in terms of general 
background information, you probably have trouble reading or writing 
because you don't have a great base of knowledge. If your reasoning ability 
is strong and your general background of knowledge is weak, chances are 
that you [process information] at a simple and naive level. Flags pop up 
when I test the kids, so I'll know what else to look for. 
Processing of visual information [involves] not just visual in terms of eye 
receiving the message, but how your mind puts the visual cues together. 
Some kids have problems because so many options come to them - for 
example, hyperactive, Attention Deficit kids - there are so many possibilities 
that they get tired sorting it through. Short term memory [is another we look 
at]. Many kids have a difficult time because they forget that the test key at 
the top of the page is available to help them sort it through .... Somehow they 
feel that they should know the answer without the key. I watch for that 
because that may be a classroom behaviour. They don't believe that you 
can learn. These kids are what I would call 'unempowered" because they 
see things happening outside their own ability to influence things. They don't 
see things such as effort, study, homework, practice, review as benefitting 
them. If they succeed, they think that is lucky and everything else is affected 
by the outside. If I pick up on these cues, I'll watch for it when I read the 
report cards or talk to the teachers and see if that is the case. 
With Auditory [deficiencies, kids can] compensate by questioning. 
Processing [involves] how fast you can deal with the information. This 
[deficiency] can be due to wanting to be certain or a need to make sense. 
How quickly is the student able to assimilate information? Some people 
need time to put it into context. [They learn to] avoid [situations requiring this 
abil'Q] or they compensate. Long term retrieval [relates to] the ability to store 
and retrieve information. Visual and auditory is stored then retrieved. Storing 
may be a problem. Or hearing a symbol and matching it with a name may 
be an auditory problem. [Many kids] compensate by writing. Kids that score 
low here often have a difficult time at school. School tends to be very 
memory dependent in the sense that you've got to remember kings, rivers, 
provinces and [other] facts. So it's very memory intensive. You've got to 
constantly match what the teacher is saying to a picture or something. The 
kids that have a problem here have a real problem if they don't find some 
strategy. They often are underachievers or drop outs. [The final area is] 
another sort of long term memory retrieval but with a contextual component 
in which things can be hooked together or related in some way. 
How you feel [when you take the test] is going to be a factor. It is an 
important factor for the students here who can be very volatile. They come 
in here angry or depressed. It's an important consideration because you're 
not dealing with a kid who has had a positive experience in the classroom 
who is walking in for some testing. It taints the results. At that point, 
secondary observation comes into play. If the kid seems angry or too 
frustrated or too depressed, we'll call it a day. Or I'll talk them into feeling 
somewhat more positive. There are any number of issues, but that's part of 
the package. And you don't know. The exactness of the figures, I wouldn't 
swear in court by. Difficult to fake high scores, easier to explain low scores. 
Students without a capacity to process information can do better than 
students without a capacity to retain specifics in school, given the culture of 
the school system. Differences in ethnic and gender cultures will have an 
impact on how well a student will do in the school culture. If we could break 
through the gender bias, make it more neutral, we might get some insight 
into how structural we are in determining how people think and perceive and 
conceptualize. Gender bias in terms of stereotyping is extreme. Ethnic 
cultures add a furthering complicating dimension to education. 
The early model of education was an inflexible system that was compulsory. 
To a certain extent this still exists. When you begin to introduce a whole 
bunch of variables, you introduce a kind of panic. This is what's happening 
now. Basically, what I see is teachers dropping like flies in the next few 
years. You introduce kids with varying cognitive abilities. In a sense that has 
always been there, but now the spread is greater. You're getting everything 
from the mentally educatable to under-achievers, bright students, gifted 
children within the same class. So you're having to cater to a whole range 
of cognitive abilities. Within that you're getting kids with learning difficulties. 
You're getting kids with physical difficulties of some sort, physically 
challenged. Kids with language difficulties, English as a second language. 
Kids with all sorts of social problems. Behaviour disorder, that sort of thing. 
At one time, the model allowed teachers to focus on the academic. If you 
don't do this math, you're going to fail. You'll need to spend another year in 
this class. You're not going to be able to go to university. Now you're getting 
a kid who may not ever be able to learn that. She will not reach that level. 
Or the kid that doesn't care. So the academic is not the main thrust. We still 
hold on to it because it's the reason for being but you've got a kid who 
doesn't give a damn and who isn't cooperating. Or you're given a kid who 
has got low cognitive ability so that is going to take a lot of time to internalize 
information or someone who is educatably handicapped, who is not going to 
be able to do long division, regardless. You might as well hand him a 
calculator now and go to it. Just a tremendous mix. And you have the 
administrator at whatever level saying we have to protect the integrity, we 
can't spread too thin. And I know they are right. We can't spread ourselves 
too thin. But we are being asked to do it. 
What factors have brought about this change? 
Certainly, economics. If you use the train analogy, it doesn't matter where 
you came from when you board that train or whether you're a new immigrant 
or whether you're a third generation Canadian. You came and sat and 
stayed as long as you .... Certainly, when I was in school which was the '40's 
and the '50's kids would drop out after grade 8 as I did. In the '40's' after 
grade 6 was not unreasonable. And you would stay even if you had to stay 
until you were 15 in grade 6. Fine. It was just part of the whole thing. Part 
of it was that you were part of the whole community. While you were a grade 
below, you were still part of the total thing. There wasn't a concern. There 
wasn't the identification. When I think back to kids I knew at school, they 
didn't have labels - slow learner, English as a second language or whatever. 
I remember a kid coming in and there was a big 'do' in the school just to 
make sure that we all understood that he was coming to the school and that 
he couldn't speak English and that we'd have to be tolerant and try and help 
him. That was a big deal. That was one kid in a population of 5,000 in the 
town and maybe 800 or so in the school. 
As time went on, I think our general understanding increased. You can never 
ignore the intuitive understanding of the natural teacher. You hit them every 
once in awhile. You know in the movie 'The Natural", the guy gets up and 
he can just do it? I think there are people in teaching who are just naturals. 
They instinctively know or they would be observant enough to know that this 
is Johnny and his brother was like this. But our general knowledge and 
understanding of learning - the way it happens and some of the problems 
with it - became more known. And I think that once we begin to identify that, 
once you get a diagnosis, then a prognosis sort of demands itself. As a 
matter of fact, part of the problem we had here is that we were saying we've 
got a lot of kids with learning disabilities. It's not that we can just run a 
regular classroom. Once you've identified them, the question becomes what 
are you going to do with them. The requirement is that you provide an 
education that is appropriate to the student. Now you have to bring in people 
who know a little bit about it to deal with it. And so it spreads .... I don't know 
whether our economy and our administrators really are prepared to 
compensate. I think the economy is a strong factor. It would be similar to 
saying - to use a clinical model - we think we have a whole bunch of 
diseases here, let's get the specialists in and let's put them all in one room 
and have one person deal with it. And that becomes an impossibility. 
As a mechanic, for example, if you were at your stall and in the day twenty 
cars were driven in, all of them different makes, you're required to work on 
them. You're required to attend to all of them during the day and to try and 
diagnose what is wrong with them and try and fix it. The requirement is that 
while you want to get them to a certain level of operation, you have to make 
sure that you address them all. It becomes clear that becomes rather 
confusing. Because just when you have an insight on one, you have to move 
to another. Not only that but, from time to time, the [garage] owner is going 
to rap on your stall and ask you for information or whether you can take 
another car. And from time to time, the owners are going to walk in and want 
to know when their car will be ready and why you've taken so long. l think 
that gives you an idea of what has happened in the classroom. 
For the most part, the perspective and techniques employed by the educational 
consultant either originate in or are adapted from the field of psychology. The principal intent 
is to isolate individual characteristics independent of the productive effects of the 
assessment procedures1 and then modify the social setting to meet the needs of the 
individual student. Many of the professionals working in the Facilitating Program appear to 
be aware of the inconclusive nature of their results, mediated as they are by relational 
effects past, present and anticipated which influence the outcome of their respective 
inquiries. Yet they carry out their investigations, using assessment instruments which they 
recognize to be flawed, in the pursuit of evidence of personal attributes which exist 
independent of their analytical procedures. 
To a considerable extent, their persistence is due to the fact that psychology's 
credibility as a science rests on the premise that the individual is comprehensible. One of 
its fundamental tenets is that the various characteristics which comprise the person are 
measurable. The implications of the quantitative procedures outlined in the discussion of 
the psychology report - the Jesness Inventory, in particular - cany over to the procedures 
used by the education consultants. In both instances, the assumption is made that it is 
possible to isolate features internal to the person - aspects of 'the essential individual, 
separate from the social domain" (Hallway, 1984:55).* 
Individualism appears to be pivotal for both ensuring the basis for a reasonable 
degree of coordination between the various professions (Venn, 1984:121) and for promoting 
a receptivity to the normalising discourse concerning the person under scrutiny. The stated 
objective of the Facilitating Program is to foster supportive relations between the youth and 
the immediate community. However, the bulk of the findings which provide the substantive 
frame for the care plan are derived from interviews, tests and observations which focus on 
the individual youth. Family dynamics, for example, may be of concern to social worker, 
psychologist, education consultant, child care worker and psychiatrist alike. However, the 
vast majority of the facts that make up the various care plan reports refer to the individual 
"who is singled out as target, by reference to norms of conduct that establish degrees of 
deviation and the boundaries of acceptable behaviour" (Venn, 1984:121). 
The concept of individualism is an elusive one. It comes cloaked in the mystifying 
clarity of common sense and is further obscured by the immediacy of quantified facts (Venn, 
l984:13O). The normative premises which anchor the mental health professions tend to 
coincide with the dominant view of sociality in which the individual is the basic unit of 
analysis. As our examination of the D.S.M. and the Jesness Inventory make evident, the 
preoccupation with the so-called individual to the neglect of the social tends to coincide with 
the ready acceptance of the middle class, male, Eurocentric model of normality (Gaines, 
1992; Venn, 1984:130). The operating presumption is that dominant expressions of sociality 
- prevailing relations of intersubjectivity and power - are unproblematic (Venn, 1984:130). 
This mindset suggests the continuing legacy of positivism, one in which decontextualization 
will face little opposition. 
[P]sychology ignores the historically specific character of what it takes to be 
its pre-given object; the subject of psychology is the 'rational man' [sic] with 
no past, or rather whose past has receded to a mysterious point of origin. It 
appears on the scene in the guise of the naturally normal 'man', behaving 
according to norms that in the end are undehtten by biology (Venn, 1984: 
140). 
This would appear to be an overstatement in the case of the Facilitating Program 
considering the efforts made to trace the life experiences of youths as they encountered 
and engaged in specific social relations of family, school and neighbourhood over time. 
Certainly, the social history is acknowledged by each of the contributing disciplines as being 
critical to its individual contribution to the care plan process. Yet the questionnaires and 
tests which supply the psychology and education departments with much of the data 
supporting their conclusions rest on assumptions of normalcy which pay little more than lip 
service to questions of social context. Instead, the findings indicate the degree of 
correspondance with or deviance from standardized tables, themselves the product of 
decontextualized enquiries. All too often, the meaningful experience of individuals is 
reduced to a binary response with statements of true or false considered to capture human 
existence in all its complexity. What lies at the heart of this approach is the very basis of 
psychology's claims to scientific credibility: its object of study as a pre-given entity. 
Significantly, '[iln so far as [psychology] creates a regime of truth premised upon a 
psychological individual then it prohibits other formulations which do not repeat the 
individual-society dualism" (Walkerdine, 1984:197). 
The radical historicist perspective allows us to throw into relief positivist notions of 
individual and society as predetermined entities, alerting us to the fact that the individual is 
an ensemble of social relations. Rather than being a fixed entity, a person is a dynamic, 
self-constitutive process within specific social conditions which, in turn, act as regulative 
forms shaping an individual's sense of self. With this shift in perception, conventional duality 
(Henriques et al., 1984b:24) can be replaced by the realization that both objects of study - 
the individual and society - are socially constituted under specific historical circumstances. 
The procedures employed to identify and assess are now understood to be productive of the 
very objects they intend to study (Venn, 1984: 133). 
What is crucial to our understanding is that psychology, much like all the other social 
sciences, is basically a productive enterprise (Henriques et al., 1984:l). It constructs rather 
than discloses its objects of study (Venn, 1984:133), simultaneously classifying, 
administering and regulating these objects by means of technologies shared by 
professionals in areas as diverse as education, social services, and health? The effects of 
these activities can scarcely be considered to be benign. The regulative tools used by 
psychology and related professions involve normative procedures of evaluation and 
prediction, features integral to its assertions of legitimacy as a science (Henriques et al., 
1984d:3-6). These practices enable psychology to play a decisive role in the constitution 
of what it means to be an individual. Not only is psychology central to the conventional 
representation of individuals but also its language and practices (in)form our subjectivity, 
providing us with the means by which we shape our senses of individuality and self- 
awareness. 
The critical interpretive perspective argues that objects of study are not 
comprehensible independent of our actual relationships with those objects. No longer 
pregiven objects of study, conceptions of the individual and society are recast as particular 
consequences of specific discourses. They are social products requiring deconstruction 
within relations of knowledge which are destined to impose their own unique set of insights 
and limitations upon the outcome. Our technologies of knowledge have effects on the 
objects of those procedures. 
For the social sciences, these consequences are not unrelated to the administrative 
and regulative practices associated with these disciplines. (Henriques et al., l984:92) The 
emergence of disciplining practices which gave rise to the production of the normal subject - 
typically, the individual of psychology - coincides with the rise of capitalism, particularly the 
apparatuses of the welfare state. Yet they should not be understood to be produced and 
wielded by a monolithic force bent on oppressing those unfortunate souls who find 
themselves slotted in other than the dominant categories of class, gender, sexual orientation 
and the like. As often as not, these normalizing processes are authored and advanced by 
progressive individuals captivated by the prospects of science to bring about human 
emancipation (Walkerdine, 1984: l65).' Neither can individual disciplines be understood 
separate from their interactions with their counterparts nor from the overarching constraints 
of existing social policy administered by the state. These influences are mutually constitutive 
with the dominant trend being one which tends to individualise, psychologise and 
decontextualize social phenomena. 
CHAPTER TEN - RESIDENT ASSESSMENT PROFILE 
D onna, Chris' primary child care worker, gives a 10 minute overview of Chris1 behaviour while living in the residential unit. Her report is divided into 
sections relating to recreational involvement, lifestyle topics which address vocational and 
social issues as well as self-care in terms of personal hygiene, and sexuality. The 
presentation, virtually a verbatim reading of her three page report, closes with comments on 
Chris' health and on his attitude towards his life at home. 
Her observations on Chris' behaviour while at Crossroads echo many of the remarks 
contained in the social history and family assessment. She recounts how Chris participated 
fully in many of the recreational opportunities such as swimming, bowling, art and guitar 
playing. He required close supervision to complete many of the chores. His interactions 
with others were problematic. 
Throughout his stay, Chris appeared very scared, very apprehensive, hyper 
and defiant. Chris often hid so that staff and peers had to look for him. He 
was unable to take responsibility for his behaviours and set himself up to be 
a victim. Items were often destroyed in his room and he would blame others, 
but it was obvious that it could only have been Chris that did it. Chris had 
trouble interacting with his peers as he would continually set himself up or 
bother his peers to the extent that they wanted nothing to do with him or they 
would try to hurt him. When Chris got himself in trouble, he would try to get 
his mom to bail him out. Chris did not seem to bond or affiliate with peers or 
staff. 
Chris had many problems settling at bedtime. He seemed unable to control 
himself and would do such things as hide inside his mattress, other kids' 
rooms, the girls' wing or flood the hallway with water from the showers. Chris 
was involved in a lot of random property damage ranging from broken cups, 
destroying a mattress, and vandalizing a staff member's car. 
Chris was also involved in a shoplifing incident, for which the R.C.M.P. will 
be laying charges. Chris was quite upset about the shoplifting charges and 
upset that his mother knows what happened. He is also blaming the incident 
on his peers saying they forced him to do it. Chris was assessed restitution 
for his damage. Chris also set off the unit's fire alarm by lighting birthday 
sparklers on fire. 
Chris could be very verbally abusive and physically abusive. He would push 
staff into walls, punch out at them, and spit. He had one incident of 
squeezing a staffs hand and refusing to let go so that she had to yank her 
hand out. He then went yelling to his peer to squeeze hard as it hurt the staff 
member. He also grabbed a Christmas tree ornament from the tree, 
smashed it and threatened staff with it. Chris never showed any remorse for 
his behaviour nor did he ever apologize. 
Chris was unable to express his feelings or thoughts, except to say that he 
was scared when his peers wanted to get at him. Chris always acted out his 
feelings rather than talked about them. Chris was unable to hear 'no' or 
'waitw or negotiate for privilegedgoodies. During the first two weeks of his 
stay, Chris would throw himself on the floor and cry or run and hide. During 
the last two weeks, he would express his anger through destruction of 
property, throwing chairs and running if 'no' was heard. 
Chris could take care of himself [in terms of personal hygiene]. Daily, he had 
a shower and dressed. He did his own laundry. He would dean his room for 
his allowance as well as change his linen. Chris usually needed support to 
do this as everything caught his attention. 
Chris had an incident of being bitten by a female peer because he had been 
grabbing at her breast. This was done in the context that 'everybody was 
trying itw. Chris told myself that he had never been sexually active but 
wonders about it a lot. In the last week of his stay, Chris had been doing a 
lot of inappropriate sexual acting out both verbally and physically. For 
instance, Chris has told both female and males to 'suck my dick" and 
pretends to masturbate in public. 
For the first seven days, Chris refused to eat at the same time as the rest of 
the peerslstaff. Chris told me that he had lost his appetite and lost ten 
pounds within the last month and as well had problems sleeping. 
Approximately ten days ago, Chris had one incident of sniffing glue. 
Basically, Chris talked about no one except his mother whom he missed and 
is homesick for. He said his mom buys him things for no reason at all. Chris 
said he didn't attend his care plan meeting because he did not want to hear 
about the sexual assaults or about the shoplifting incident. Chris did wish to 
let everyone know that he wanted to go back to his mother. 
"He has really been acting out, eh?" Karen says, "I was crying when I was 
talking to him and hearing about what he has been doing." 
'Yes, he has become more defiant during the past couple of weeks. Spitting 
on pictures of the sta ff...." 
'That's the down side of having kids in this program," Keith observes. 'They 
get a fair amount of tutoring and we can't do anything about it." 
The Resident Assessment Profile is based on information compiled by the primary 
child care worker or psychiatric nurse from a variety of sources. The youth's activities are 
charted in daily notes. In addition, the shift head, primary worker and secondary workers fill 
out standardized forms which comprise the bulk of the material assembled by the primary 
worker for the final report. 
During Chris' stay on the unit, I spent time talking to him and observing his behaviour 
with the other residents. I also attended shift changes and recorded the comments of the 
staff members related to Chris and to the general dynamics on the unit. This provided me 
with a certain understanding of the context which informed the remarks made by Chris' 
primary worker at the care plan meeting. Chris' arrival on the unit coincided with an 
especially turbulent period at Crossroads. Sirhan Singh, a large, aggressive fifteen year old, 
entered the care plan process and quickly established a reputation for intimidation 
unequalled in the Facilitating Program's brief history. Resident and staff alike were routinely 
threatened; property was damaged and, at one point, the police had to be called to disperse 
a group of residents under Sirhan's leadership who appeared to be on the verge of starting 
a riot. On a number of occasions during the initial part of Sirhan's stay, I had the sense that 
the staff members' apprehension was being communicated to the residents with a 
corresponding rise in the general level of unease. At times, the tension on the unit was 
palpable with the atmosphere during shift change being especially charged. The staff 
members going off shift used this moment to debrief upsetting incidents while the oncoming 
staff anxiously sought reassurances that they were not walking into a state of siege. By the 
end of the first week of Sirhan's stay, the shift heads were able to re-establish a sense of 
equilibrium. However, the threat of impending crisis remained during the entire length of 
Sirhan's time on the unit. 
Chris appeared on the unit shortly after Sirhan's admission. Sirhan's impact on Chris 
was dramatic. The daily entries in Chris' chart provide a brief glimpse of what was 
unquestionably an extremely upsetting period for Chris. Sirhan evidently sensed Chris' 
vulnerability and lost little time in exploiting it to the fullest extent possible. Chris, on the 
other hand, quickly determined that the safest place was the "time ouf room, a locked room 
where youths spent time 'in seclusion* ostensibly in order to regain their composure. Chris 
provided the only instances I observed where access to the room was voluntarily requested 
by a resident and the only occasions where I witnessed the staff use the 'time our room to 
protect one of the youths from another resident. Chris' chart included the following 
comments: 
Day 3 feeling safer when the door is locked at night 
Day 4 fearful of peers; youth is terrified of this place and is the 
scapegoat for all others; remains fearful of threatening peers, 
but also seeks opportunities to be 'naughty' himself 
Day 7 hooking into hyperactivity on unit; attention seeking through 
negativity; states himself that he was much more 'negative' in 
Crossroads environment 
Day 9 seclusion; a female resident told the writer that he [Chris] is 
wanting to be in seclusion and looking for any reason to be in 
seclusion; he feels 'scared1; he feels unsafe around [an unspecified] 
male resident; when Chris found out his threatening male peer was 
not on the unit, he immediately relaxed, became smiley, and chose 
not to be in seclusion 
My notes from shift changes during this interval include a running commentary on 
Sirhan's terrorizing exploits. It also details the various tactics used to defuse his impact on 
the residents throughout the complex, including the co-ordination of a standardized course 
of action to be followed by all the Crossroads staff members when faced with Sirhan's 
escalating belligerence. Additional staffing was provided and a protocol was set in place so 
that staff members would know when it was appropriate to call for the police. Interspersed 
throughout my notes are verbatim comments about Sirhan's threatening behaviour and its 
impact on Chris: "Sirhan grabbed Chris by the throat and held him up off his feer; 'I gave 
him [Sirhan] eleven 'time-outs' yesterday; he was able to tell me that it was eleven when I 
asked him"; 'Chris is the worse victim I've ever seen". 
These developments take on particular significance when it is recognized that they 
provide the context for the reports given during the care plan meeting. For example, Chris' 
psychological testing and interview took place during this intenral and the psychological 
report included the following observations: 
With regards to mood, Chris reported that he was mostly happy at 
Crossroads, except when the unit staff did not follow through on a bargain 
that they had struck with Chris .... He stated that his appetite was less than 
normal because he did not like the food, but that he did not have any 
problems sleeping, except for having had a nightmare the night before the 
interview. He denied having any thoughts of self-harm. Chris denied feeling 
worried about anything or anyone in his life .... Chris' responses on the Beck 
Depression Inventory suggests that he is not acknowledging significant 
symptoms of depression. He endorsed an item indicating that he has 
thoughts about self-harm but that he would not carry them out. He also 
indicated that his appetite is much worse than it used to be and that he has 
recently lost 10-15 pounds. He also indicated that he is somewhat 
concerned regarding physical aches and pains and constipation, symptoms 
which are sometimes indicative of somatization .... 
The formal testing referred to in the education report also took place during this 
tumultuous period. The following observations were made of Chris' behaviour. 
Chris approached the testing situation with apprehension but began to relax 
as the testing progressed. He exhibited very limited attention span. 
Consequently, the testing was carried over a number of short sessions 
spread over three days. Chris appeared to have very low frustration 
tolerance level. As soon as he was faced with a slightly difficult question or 
task, Chris had a tendency to give up. On a number of occasions, he had to 
be coaxed and encouraged to complete a task. He seemed to be quite 
anxious and insecure and often asked the examiner if he had given the right 
response. Sometimes his responses were slow in coming .... Chris had 
difficulty sustaining attention for more than a few minutes at a time. He 
would often yawn and appeared tired. Consequently, the testing had to be 
completed through several short sessions. Chris' low self-esteem and 
anxiety was evident from his need for frequent feedback, 'Is that right?" was 
his frequent query of the examiner. At times, Chris also appeared to be 
easily distracted and had to be reminded to get back on task. He would * 
often make excuses. Chris had a tendency to give up easily, especially 
when a task became rather complex or difficult. 
At the completion of the education report, his mother had inquired about his yawning, 
wondering if he was on medication. The community social worker reminded Karen that 
Chris had been sleeping poorly prior to being admitted to Crossroads. Keith Johnson then 
assured her that no medication was given during Chris' stay and suggested that his 
apparent drowsiness may be due to sleep disruption caused by flash backs. 
Chris' responses in his interview, his behaviour throughout the assessments 
procedures, the test results obtained in these sessions and his observed conduct while living 
at Crossroads informed the evaluations provided by the departments of psychology and 
education and the residential unit. Considerable speculation was made about the possible 
reasons motivating his actions. Yet what was conspicuously absent from each of these 
accounts was any attempt to situate Chris within his actual circumstances for the three 
weeks prior to the care plan meeting. The immediate context in which Chris found himself 
appeared to be of peripheral significance in arriving at an interpretation of the meaning 
behind his behaviour. 
The potential seriousness of the distortions which can occur when transforming 
contextualized discourse into portable texts was further revealed to me while I was 
monitoring another teenager's passage through the care plan process. Yvonne is a fourteen 
year old adolescent who, according to the summary contained in the psychology report: 
is currently functioning in the Borderline range of cognitive abilities overall, 
but with poorly developed skills in the area of common sense judgement in 
practical social situations. Despite an early history of chaotic caretaking in 
the care of her natural mother, Yvonne appears to have settled well into her 
adoptive family and formed strong bonds with family members - in particular, 
with her mother and sister. Furthermore, despite some difficulties with 
attention, math, and spelling, Yvonne appears to have coped well in her early 
school years and was not considered a behavioural problem either in school 
or at home. However, from the time she and her family moved to Ash Grove 
in 1989, she has been subjected to a great deal of psychological abuse at 
the hands of her peers relating to her Native heritage and her difficulties 
making effective judgments in social situations. Not surprisingly, Yvonne's 
experiences have eroded her previously strong sense of self and contributed 
to her current lack of positive identification with her Native heritage. It is also 
not surprising that Yvonne eventually gravitated toward more antisocial peers 
and behaviours in her attempts to gain acceptance within a peer group. 
More recently, Yvonne's acting out behaviour has escalated and appears to 
be temporarily related to the return home of her married sister and the 
subsequent birth of her niece. Despite the fact that Yvonne clearly is 
strongly attached to both her mother and her sister, it is a fragile attachment 
in that it is difficult for Yvonne to perceive that she is not being displaced as 
the baby of the family and that affection for the baby does not necessarily 
mean less affection for her. Her response to the perceived rejection has 
been to seek a new family attachment - her street family - whom she 
believes cares about her and protects her while she is on the street. 
Diagnostically, Yvonne appears to have experienced depressed mood for a 
considerable period of time. Furthermore, Yvonne's current sense of 
hopelessness regarding her future, her reports of suicidal ideation, and her 
engagement in street life activities including I.V. drug use, put her at 
considerable risk for self-harm either inadvertently or intentionally. Yvonne 
has also been sexually assaulted on two occasions and reports symptoms 
of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder including frequent dreams and daytime 
reliving of the assaults, impairment of relationships with significant others, a 
sense of foreshortened future, and sleep disturbance. Although Yvonne's 
reports regarding her eating habits are inconsistent with those of her 
caretakers, she did report both anorectic and bulimic symptoms, including 
self-induced vomiting, and shows evidence of some distortion of body image. 
She also indicated that she may consider the use of laxatives as a purgative 
in the future. She must, therefore, be considered at some risk for the 
development of an eating disorder. Finally, as previously diagnosed, 
Yvonne's prenatal history and current presentation support the likelihood of 
Fetal Alcohol Effects. 
Yvonne's situation presents an abundance of behaviours of interest to the Facilitating 
Program with its orientation towards attachment issues. The child carelnursing notes alone 
include a number of entries which support the evaluation arrived at by the psychology 
department: 
'I have a problem. I am anorexic. I have been for the past five years. I know 
I need help but I don't know how to ask for it. Could you please help me?" 
'I'm an anorexic. I have a goal to reach seventy nine pounds because that 
will put me in the hospital. I throw up after each meal.' 
Yvonne left class early because they were showing an Inuit film. Apparently, 
Yvonne was feeling anxious that the residents would tease her .... Yvonne 
reported that she hated school because the kids at school were very mean 
to her, teasing her in a racist way. She said she had no selfesteem because 
of this mean teasing. 
Yet the succession of reports given at the care plan meeting by no means provide 
a comprehensive account of Yvonne's stay at Crossroads. Neither can they be said to 
capture what Yvonne considers to be one of the most pressing predicaments confronting 
her at the present time. Certainly, Yvonne's concerns about her eating habits and her poor 
self-esteem were reflected in the actual reports made to the care plan participants. What 
was not mentioned was Yvonne's upset related to her sexual orientation. This is despite the 
fact that her referral information file includes a note under the heading of Sexuality which 
reads: 'patient thinks she might be gay" and that the charting notes from Yvonne's 
residential unit states that: "Yvonne talked about her concerns about telling her mom she's 
gay.' 
This is not to imply that this single preoccupation was the missing link which could 
explain Yvonne's behaviour in its entirety. What it does indicate is the imperfect process by 
which potentially meaningful issues are identified in day to day discourse and documented 
in texts which are transferred from one professional to the next. The absence of this 
information from Yvonne's care plan reports reveal their incomprehensive nature. In fact, 
the failure to include Yvonne's preoccupation with her sexual orientation draws attention to 
the information which is presented. To what extent are behaviours considered to be of 
significance by the Facilitating Program staff influenced by unresolved issues related to her 
perceived sexual orientation? Conversely, is Yvonne's stated apprehension about her 
mother's possible reaction reflective of other womsome preoccupations? Once again, the 
problem of contextualisation comes to the fore, raising questions about the credibility of the 
representations presented by the different professionals. What continues to be elusive is 
the exact nature of the meaning creating practice of Chris and Yvonne. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN - CARE PLAN 
K eith pauses and asks if any one has any further questions or comments. As no one responds, he reaches for the portable tape recorder on the table and 
begins his dictation of the care plan. The initial section of the care plan addresses the 
lifestyle categories introduced in the resident's assessment profile but now reflecting the 
psychiatrist's point of view. Each sub-section begins with a paragraph outlining family and 
personal dynamics followed by a longer section detailing management strategies, a format 
maintained throughout the document. Home life issues comprise the second major category 
with subsections relating to setting, relationship with caregivers, relationship with significant 
others and home responsibilities. The care plan concludes with the third category, the 
education assessment's summary and recommendations with sub-sections relating to 
school placement, cognitive-academic functioning and social relationships. 
Generally, the completion of the psychiatrist's dictation marks the end of the care 
plan meeting. Typically, a week elapses before the discharge meeting, sufficient time for 
the tape transcript to be edited by the community support worker assigned to the youth. The 
discharge meeting is neither attended by the psychiatrist nor by any of the presenters at the 
care plan meeting. Instead, the community support worker chairs the hour long meeting in 
which copies of the care plan are circulated to the participants and read aloud by the 
community support worker. A short discussion follows in which co-ordination of 
responsibilities between the community professionals and of communication with the 
community support worker are finalized. Chris' care plan process was unusual in this regard 
as the care plan and discharge meetings were combined to allow Chris to return to his 
community in time for the Christmas break. This morning, Chris' social worker chooses to 
introduce the fact that Chris' parents have been referred to an Attention Deficit parenting 
group that begins the following month. 
'We have an issue here of an absent parent," Keith remarks. 
"I've put it to Karen and Bob that they both have to be involved." 
"Chris needs a father or a substitute father," Keith replies. 
"One of the local ambulance drivers has expressed an interest in being a big 
brother." 
Keith nods, "Just because he has a father, doesn't mean that he doesn't 
need male mentoring. He is a very lonely child." 
"Jim Hansen is very good and we'll keep him involved with Chris as long as 
possible." 
"If Chris is placed outside the home," Keith continues, "the care giver must 
be made aware of what to expect." 
Bill nods in agreement. 'We're prepared to give this family long term help. 
We've identified a number of Attention Deficit kids in the area. In fact, I have 
a youngster with problems similar to Chris. I'm lucky because I have a good 
partner. We'll be working with Chris long term." 
'We need more people like this," Narinder says, turning to Keith. "I had a 
social worker from Lakewood in a care plan meeting last week who was very 
supportive as well. Very optimistic." 
"When I hear the school say that they don't want him," Keith replies, " I want 
to ask them who they think they are ...." 
The meeting ends on schedule, exactly two hours after it began. 
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Obviously at 13 years of age, Chris is too young yet to join the labour force. 
However, he is at just the right age to start to learn some connection 
between efforts he makes and rewards he gets. His Attention Deficit 
Disorder is going to be problematical in this regard. He tends to begin tasks, 
but then gets distracted in the middle of them and not complete them. He 
tends to deal with this by trying to hide from the task or from others the fact 
that the task hasn't been completed. Obviously, for an employer, this 
behaviour would be totally unacceptable. 
Manaaement Strateaieg 
It is extremely important that Chris has a routine way of earning his money 
at this point in time. He should have something that he does literally every 
day that allows him immediate reward, but that is a task that requires working 
to completion before the reward is given. Chris is in dire need of male 
mentoring and, in many occasions in the past, this kind of mentoring by child 
care workers has proven beneficial to him. It is very important that we 
attempt to achieve this kind of situation for him and, again, I would advise the 
child care worker be employed and be focused in this area with Chris. 
B. SOCIAL 
~ i l v l P e r s ~  Dvnamicg 
Clearly Chris is having major difficulties in the social arena. This is primarily 
due to his Attention Deficit Disorder. He has little general information. He 
doesn't know how to get along with other people. He doesn't understand 
interpersonal relationships. He tends to project blame onto others and, all 
in all, is quite dysfunctional in this area. 
This is further complicated by some of his sexualized behaviours. He was 
sexually abused himself and he has now been accused of being involved 
sexually with others who are younger than he is. This further compromises 
his social functioning. 
Manaaement Strateaieg 
Mother has attempted to have Chris join all sorts of groups and activities and 
learn skills. Generally speaking, she has been unsuccessful in this regard. 
This is probably due to her attempts to have the situation tailored to fit Chris' 
needs rather than to have Chris learn how to cope with the situation on his 
own. It is very important that he be given this opportunity regardless of how 
many time he fails. 
I would most likely begin with something to do with recreation since that 
tends to have its own built in reward. His child care worker may attempt to 
teach him a skill like tennis, sailing, sports, etc. and keep at it in an organized 
way until Chris develops some sense that he can actually perform the task. 
His low self-esteem, lack of attention and poor social skills are all going to 
mitigate against him in this regard. However, this is a task that can be 
worked to completion given a plan and an intention to carry out the plan. It 
must not be taken for granted that Chris could engage in the activity if only 
he wanted to. This is far from the truth. 
C. SELF CARE (PERSONAL HYGIENE) 
FamilvlPersonal Dvnamicg 
Chris can, when given a tight structure, look after himself. He can keep 
himself clean. Finally, his enuresis has cleared up. He can do his own 
laundry. He is given to be a good cook who can present food attractively. 
ement St- 
This is an area in which we can set up a set of routines that will allow Chris 
to have some control over his environment, feel some sense of success and 
build some self-esteem. His routine should be invariable, concrete, begin 
early in the morning and be focused as anchor points during the entire day. 
This doesn't mean that I expect Chris to be nagged or otheMlise coerced into 
doing the activity, but simply that a set of expectations be set out and then 
followed in a very stringent way so that Chris tends to gain some control over 
his world. He is anxious and frightened most of the time in that he can't 
really figure out what is going on and expects only the worst. If we can 
create a world for him that is more predictable and he has more control over, 
then he will feel much safer and be less stressed. Again, this has to be done 
with due respect for his individualism and self-esteem. 
D. HEALTH 
~amilvlPersonal Dvnamicg 
Chris has an established Attention Deficit Disorder that has been 
problematical for him since early childhood. He is otherwise, as far as we 
know, in fairly good health. However, Chris has developed an extremely low 
self-esteem in response to his difficulties and combined with this has 
developed a number of behaviours in order to cope that are less than 
successful. He can't get along with others at all well at this point in time, 
neither children nor adults, and this leaves him as a very undefended, 
abandoned young 13 year old who has little resources in the world and little 
help with his difficulties. 
Manaaement Strateaieg 
Again, I would advise that Chris have available to him male mentoring. 
Whether this is done by child care or somebody in the Mental Health Centre 
is probably irrelevant. What is required is somebody to take an ongoing, 
active interest in this boy, spend time with him, perhaps first on a daily basis, 
engage him in tasks that he can be successful at and, in all ways, parent him 
from a male perspective. 
Unfortunately, his stepfather's work doesn't allow this kind intensive 
interaction to occur and, apparently, his stepfather can only be an adjunct to 
parenting. We are going to have to try to remedy this through society's 
response to Chris' needs. Obviously, if a male mentor in the community can 
be found that Chris can visit with, work with and spend time with, this also 
would be helpful. 
E. SEXUALITY 
There are charges before the courts concerning Chris' sexual behaviours. 
This is probably all to the good. There are a number of programs for sex 
offenders that can help children like Chris understand his own sexuality and 
the sexuality of others and this is really in his best interest. 
ment St- 
I would advise to go ahead with the charges since even court diversion may 
give us access to a sexual offenders program through Youth Forensic 
Sewices. This, as I mentioned, is certainly in Chris' best interest and should 
be pursued. 
He has shown fairly intense sexual curiosity over the past while and he does 
need a complete sexual education in order to figure out ways to meet his 
own sexual needs and his own sexual desires that are socially acceptable 
and socially appropriate. This is going to be difficult for Chris for the rest of 
his adolescence. 
FamilvlPersonal Dvnamicg 
Chris and his mother are enmeshed. It appears that, even when separated, 
they have a good deal of interest in exactly what is going on psychologically 
and emotionally for each other and they are very dependent on each other's 
good will. This, on the one hand, gives Chris some sense that he is an 
acceptable child and that he is loved. However, at the same time, his 
behaviour is such that even Chris can't convince himself that it is acceptable 
so this threatens the relationship he has with his mother and, indeed, makes 
it a very anxious and ambivalent one in spite of mother's acceptance of Chris 
as he is. This kind of interaction permeates his home life to the extent that 
he continually finds himself able to excuse some of his behaviours because 
the family really wants to have him functioning better than perhaps he is able 
to and so are willing to accept some of his more outlandish projections. 
Management Strate- 
I think that we must leave this to Chris and his mother in that trying to impose 
a solution on them simply will see them close ranks against us and nothing 
will be accomplished. I think we have to wait until mom does ask for help, 
then ask mom what kind of help she is willing to accept and, at that time, find 
an appropriate placement as a support family for Chris. 
B. RELATIONSHIP WlTH CARE GIVERS 
The relationship with the care givers are going to be quite complicated. First 
of all, the care giver needs to have boundless energy.and, as well, needs to 
have a male in the environment that is interested in a teenage boy and is 
willing to spend time with him. No care giver will survive without having these 
attributes. 
The care giver also needs to understand the dynamics that we have 
discussed to this point in time and also have a good appreciation of exactly 
what Attention Deficit Disorder is and what kind of picture it deals with in 
terms of information processing, long term memory, short term memory, etc. 
The community support worker is Alan Thiessen. Again, the care giver 
needs to be given an opportunity to go over this information and solidify it 
before attempting to care for Chris. 
As well, this care giving will be only acceptable to mother if it is a concerted 
effort with her active involvement and her support. Thus, even the choice of 
the care giver has to be related to mom in a way that she can feel she has 
some sense of control that what we are doing is appropriate. 
We need to involve other family members as much as we possibly can as 
well. It is relevant to note that Chris has done well when he has been 
provided some male mentoring. 
C. RELATIONSHIPS WlTH SIGNIFICANT OTHERS 
It is very difficult indeed for Chris' mother to tolerate exactly what is going on 
with her son at this point in his life. However, this does lead to some 
difficulties in that they tend to be the centre of each other's existence and 
consequently projections tend to be shared. There has been a good deal of 
effort made to try and identify some kind of source of difficulty that might be 
curable with some kind of magic pill for Chris. This tends to get in the way 
of the kind of interventions on a parenting basis that need to be made. Chris 
has not heard "no" in a way that he understands to be helpful to this point in 
time. 
Manaaement Strateaieg 
We need to have mom complete parenting courses again. This is simply an 
attempt to extricate her from the situation she finds herself in and to work 
with other people who find themselves in similar situations so that she has 
some support. Maybe these courses could be found through the agency of 
the Mental Health Centre or, perhaps, child care workers in the Jessop area. 
It is very important that we begin this process while Chris is not at home so 
that mom gets to understand some of the dynamics of her interaction with 
her son so that we can alter them in a way that would be in everybody's best 
interests. 
Bob, the stepfather, really needs to understand that if he is going to have a 
hand in parenting Chris, he simply has to make more of an effort. Mom 
needs help, she can't do this on her own and it is impossible for her to bring 
Chris into male adulthood. 
D. HOME RESPONSIBILITIES 
FamilvlPersonal Dvnamicg 
Obviously, Chris has little concept of what home responsibilities are as they 
have simply been met for him in the face of his intransigence sense and his 
Attention Deficit Disorder. He tends to not complete tasks unless he is 
closely supervised one-to-one. He is ashamed of not meeting the task or 
embarrassed and then tends to hide the fact that he didn't complete the task 
by hiding himself or lying or otheMilse covering up. This further complicates 
his social interactions. 
Wanaaement Strateaieg 
It is important that, as already mentioned, Chris have some kind of routine. 
This can involve some responsibilities around the home. This must be 
concrete, stable and needs to be followed up initially on a one-to-one basis. 
This may have to go on for literally months before Chris slips into following 
the routine on his own in a way that allows him to have some sense of 
control and ease in the home situation. Chris is really in need of this and a 
persistent effort must be made regardless of where he is living. 
In terms of Chris requiring medication while he is in the home situation, I see 
no indication that he is going to benefit in this regard. Small dosage anti- 
depressants have had an effect previously when Ritalin has failed in the care 
of Attention Deficit Disordered children. He has had, apparently, a trial of this 
and perhaps this trial could continue in the hope he might achieve some 
benefit from it. I don't see medication otherwise indicated. 
Ill. SCHOOL ISSUES 
SCHOOL PLACEMENT 
Underlvina Pyrramics 
Chris presents as an anxious, insecure, angry and impulsive 13 year old boy. 
He is reported to be very active since early childhood. As a result of a variety 
of inappropriate behaviours in early childhood, Chris' parents sought 
professional help and, after some hesitation, he was placed on Ritalin. Chris 
has been on and off Ritalin since then. It has been reported that Chris' 
behaviour and performance improved when he was on Ritalin. Chris 
attended kindergarten at a Catholic school. He is reported to have a great 
deal of difficulty in sitting still and concentrating. Chris' behaviours gradually 
worsened as he went through the primary grades. Teachers considered 
Chris to be a capable student. However, his defiant, aggressive and 
disruptive behaviour overshadowed Chris' academic potential. He was seen 
by Dr. James Galway at Children's Hospital on January 17, 1989 and 
diagnosed to have Attention Deficit Disorder. Dr. Gahvay attributed Chris' 
educational problem to "an underlying cognitive deficit". 
Chris' school problems escalated as he went through intermediate grades. 
Additional support from time to time was helpful to some extent. Efforts at 
providing him with alternate educational settings such as S.T.R.I.D.E. and 
Elementary Intervention have met with limited success. Chris has found it 
extremely difficult to function without constant adult supervision. His 
inappropriate behaviours including defiance, aggression and disruption have 
resulted in a number of suspensions from school. Unable to cope with Chris, 
the school suspended him indefinitely on November 19,1992. 
An analysis of Chris' performance in school and outside appears to indicate 
that Chris' Attention Deficit Disorder and inadequate social skills may be 
some of the main reasons for this lack of success. Unable to experience 
success, Chris reacts in an extremely negative manner. Some of these 
behaviours may be an attempt to divert attention away from his academic 
and social inadequacies. Consequently, he becomes defiant, aggressive 
and belligerent. Reported incidents of sexual abuse and some instability at 
home may also have contributed to Chris' difficulties. 
Despite all of these adverse factors, Chris has been reported to be a capable 
student. He has been found to be a thoughtful student who can produce 
good work when he decides to apply himself. Creating a structured, 
predictable and consistent learning environment with appropriate support 
may help Chris get back on track. To ensure success, Chris must become 
a willing participant in any educational program or placement deemed 
appropriate for him. 
fl anaaement S t r a t e m  
In view of Chris' ongoing difficulties at school, there are very limited options 
available to him at this time. An alternate school placement like the one at 
Jessop Alternate School Program (J.A.S.P.) may be one possibility to be 
considered in this regard. Whatever his placement, Chris would need a lot 
of additional support. The possibility of a suitable child care worker to work 
mainly with Chris would be greatly beneficial to him. He will require a very 
structured and non-threatening learning environment where expectations are 
clearly defined. Individualize his program as much as possible. Avoid power 
struggles with Chris. Help avoid situations where Chris may feel inadequate 
and embarrassed. Give him tasks and learning activities where success is 
easily attainable. Provide Chris with opportunities to be successful. 
Encourage him to help with small tasks in and outside classroom activities. 
This might be helpful in Chris' acceptance by his peers. Give frequent praise 
and encouragement to improve his sense of self-worth. 
This person should be in a much better position to establish 
bondinglaffiliation with Chris and gain his trust. Once this is in place, Chris' 
mentor can facilitate his integration into the school environment as well as 
the community. 
Initially, keep the focus on Chris' behaviour, social skills and peer interaction. 
Once he shows improvement in these areas the emphasis can be shifted to 
his academic progress. Be kind, fair, consistent and non-judgmental while 
working with Chris. 
B. COGNITIVE - ACADEMIC FUNCTIONING 
Underlvina Dvnamics 
Chris' cognitive abilities as per his performance on the Woodcock-Johnson 
Psycho-Educational Battery - Revised were as follows: 
Lona-Term Retrieval: (the ability to retrieve information through association, 
after time): Average 
Short-Term Memory: (apprehension and use of information within a short 
period of time) : Average 
Processina SD~&: (ability to perform clerical-speed type of tasks under 
time): Low Average 
Processing: (discrimination, analysis and synthesis of auditory 
patterns): Average 
ual Processing: (perceiving, thinking with and integrating visual patterns 
and spatial configurations): Average 
Comprehension-Knowledae: (depth and breadth of a person's knowledge, 
experience and sophistication): Average 
Fluid Reasoning: (capability to reason in novel situations): Low Average 
This is consistent with Chris' earlier assessment of overall average cognitive 
abilities. 
An analysis of Chris' intra-cognitive abilities indicates that his major strengths 
lie in Short-Term Memory, Long-Term Retrieval and Auditory Processing. 
His high scores in Visual-Auditory Learning and Sound Blending appear to 
indicate that Chris can function well both in the visual and auditory 
modalities. This, combined with his fairly well developed Short-Term 
Memory, Long-Term Retrieval and Auditory Processing provide Chris with a 
sound base. Processing Speed, at 9th percentile, appears to be one of his 
weakest areas. 
He did very well on memory related tasks that are contextual or conceptual 
but not so good on purely memory dependent tasks. This may be one of the 
reasons for Chris' low scores on Math and Dictation (Punctuation, Usage and 
Spelling) as he is unable to store and retrieve the information without context, 
association or anchor. He needs a lot of help in this regard. 
Academically, Chris is a good reader. His Broad Reading, at grade 9 level, 
appears to be better than his agelgrade level. Chris' other skills - Broad 
Math at grade 5.3, Broad Written Language at grade 5.1 and Broad 
Knowledge at grade 4.7 - appear to be considerably below his age. He 
needs a lot of assistance in improving his math computational skills, 
punctuation, spelling and usage. Chris' knowledge base in Science, Socials 
and Humanities is also very limited. His aptitudelachievement discrepancies 
indicate that Chris is not performing according to his potential. It is likely that 
his social, emotional and behavioral difficulties as well as the problems with 
purely memory dependent tasks are adversely affecting Chris' performance 
at school. Unable to perform according to his potential, Chris gets frustrated 
and embarrassed and reacts in a negative manner as a defensive 
mechanism. Once these issues are addressed, Chris should be able to 
experience success. His teachers and care givers need to carefully manage 
Chris' behaviour and environment on an ongoing basis. It may be a long, 
drawn out process before encouraging results are achieved. 
In view of Chris' difficulty with sustained attention and concentration, there 
is a need to individualize his program as much as possible. A concerted 
effort needs to be made to get Chris involved in the learning process. In 
addition, a suitable curriculum should be in place right from the beginning. 
Initially, Chris may have to start with more concrete concepts and materials. 
As he makes progress, he can move on to more abstract concepts. Most of 
Chris' learning may have to be student paced, contextual in nature and 
concrete. 
Chris' distractibility, disruptive and attention seeking behaviours can be best 
addressed by reducing any distracting stimuli. If possible, eliminate his 
audience. Seating Chris in front of the class and away from doors, windows 
and aisles may help him to concentrate more on his work. Give him mixed, 
short and varied tasks in which success is easily attainable. Keep directions 
short, clear, consistent and specific - one at a time. Catch him being good. 
Create a positive and supportive learning environment. Break down 
academic tasks and learning activities into small segments and gradually 
increase the level of difficulty as Chris makes progress. 
As Chris appears to experience considerable difficulty with his written work, 
keep his written assignments to the minimum. Encourage him to use 
alternate ways such as oral reports, tape recorder and word processor. 
Avoid timed tasks. Give him more time to complete assignments. 
Encourage Chris to use a computer and appropriate software for skill 
development and assignments. For Math, let Chris use a calculator and 
other aids till he internalizes the skills/processes. He would benefit from well 
focused and hands on strategies. 
C. SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
_ ina Dynamics Underlv 
Chris appears to resist direction and authority. His understanding of social 
relationships and skills is rather limited. Chris1 impulsivity, defiance, 
belligerence and difficulty to adjust have adversely affected his interaction 
with others. His craving for attention and disruptive behaviour appear to 
alienate Chris from his peers and adults. Without realizing the 
consequences, Chris seems to engage in a variety of inappropriate activities 
and behaviours that get him into trouble. Frequently, Chris tends to project 
blame onto others. His difficulty in displaying appropriate social behaviour 
is probably more a consequence of his lack of knowing how to act than a 
desire to dominate the interaction. Chris1 attempt to dominate may be more 
of an attempt at empowerment than an assertion of self. Fear of failure, 
anxiety and very low self-esteem may complicate this process even more. 
He may be using coping mechanisms that are socially unacceptable, but 
allow him to deal with his needs. Intensive counselling as well as a suitable 
social skills development program would greatly benefit Chris in overcoming 
these difficulties. 
Chris has been reported to respond well to structure, consistency and 
positive reinforcement. He can get along well with adults whom he trusts. 
Persons working with Chris must keep the focus on his positive attributes. 
Catch him being good. Offer praise and reward whenever Chris deserves 
them. Immediate feedback and gratification may improve Chris1 low 
frustration tolerance and self-esteem. Chris is reported to enjoy vigorous 
physical outings, art, music (drums), etc. These interests can serve as good 
motivators to get him involved in a variety of productive social situations. His 
teachers and care givers will have to be both proactive and reactive in 
helping him along. 
A suitable child care workerlmentor who can establish a trusting relationship 
with Chris would be a great asset in this regard. Also the possibility of peer 
tutoringlcounselling should be considered. Chris would benefit from his 
participation in socially structured and socially appropriate activities of 
interest to him. 
Encourage him to take part in non-competitive paired or small group activities 
with an emphasis on recreation, sports and the outdoors. He needs a fairly 
high degree of external structure. 
Accept Chris' feelings and attitudes as legitimate without passing judgment. 
Use these as starting points for appropriate behaviour alternatives. Give 
Chris tasks and activities that will bring a feeling of success and satisfaction. 
This would go a long way in improving Chris' self-esteem. Once he feels 
accepted and successful, Chris should be well on his way to a successful 
experience at school and the community. 
Psychiatrist 
Facilitating Unit 1 
Crossroads Youth Mental Health Centre 
This care plan was developed through a multidisciplinary process involving 
social work, psychology, psychiatry, education and child carelnursing. The 
care plan is a public document in the sense that copies of the care plan are 
provided to the parent@) or legal guardian of the adolescent, to the 
adolescent, to the community case manager and to others involved in 
providing service to the adolescent. All service providers are encouraged to 
be familiar with and implement the care plan. 
The documents which were used in developing the care plan include a Social 
History and Family Assessment, a Psychological Assessment, a psychiatric 
interview, an Educational Assessment and a Child CareMursing 
Assessment. Due to the technical, complex, or sensitive nature of these 
documents they are confidential and will only be released to appropriate 
parties based on the professional regulations and judgment of the respective 
discipline. If you believe you have to have access to these documents, 
please contact Crossroads Youth Mental Health Centre. 
Your request must include: 
a) the full name, address (if known) and date of birth of the adolescent, 
b) identification of which report is being requested (ag. social work, 
psychology, etc.) 
c) the purpose for which the information is requested, 
d) a dated consent for release of confidential information, with the 
original signature of both the legal guardian and a witness (including 
their names, printed or typed), if the adolescent is under 16 years old, 
or 
e) a dated consent for release of confidential information with the 
original signature of both the adolescent and a witness (including 
their names, printed or typed), if the adolescent is 16 years or older. 
T he care plan draws on the information presented by the various departments in the care plan meeting. Typically, the social history is the only text viewed 
in advance of the meeting. The other reports are given verbatim, with the psychiatrist 
dictating the care plan without further consultation. The result is a brief document which lays 
out specific issues and management strategies within the various spheres of the individual's 
life. 
This exercise takes place within a framework provided by attachment theory, 
although the theory is not referred to directly in the various reports. The operating 
assumption is that the individual is responding to insults to attachment, primarily those of 
abuse or neglect. Troublesome behaviour reflects her response to these alleged insults. 
The objective is one of re-attaching the individual in supportive relationships, an eventuality 
which will lead to the minimizing or elimination of the problematic attitudes and behaviours. 
This perspective guides the individual tests, interviews and anecdotal accounts that supply 
the data for the various reports and the care plan is informed by these inquiries. It is 
precisely in its production of the care plan that the Facilitating Program can be seen to differ 
from most other applications of attachment based therapy. 
In conventional psychotherapy, attachment theory promotes the cultivation of the 
therapist as an attachment figure. The therapist functions as a representation of an 
historically significant figure or figures, catalysing the emotions associated with past 
interactions. Psychoanalysis commonly makes a distinction between remembering and 
acting out. Acting out here refers to unconscious fantasies and wishes originating in the 
past being expressed in the present with the individual unable or unwilling to recognize that 
their appearance is other than in response to immediate circumstances. In effect, the 
capacity to remember the actual origins of these behaviours has been superseded by a 
compulsion to duplicate or repeat the behaviours. 
The notion of mutuality underscores the fact that the client's responses were 
reciprocally constituted by and served to constitute the responses of her historical 
attachment figure@). In most instances, the attachment figure was an adult who functioned 
as the determining component of this exchange. This is not to deny the uniqueness of the 
child's meaning producing agency. Nevertheless, an adult usually occupies the position of 
relative power with the capacity to accommodate an infant or child whose behaviours 
aggravate. The infant or child, on the other hand, is less able to defuse, neutralize and 
thereby accommodate a similarly aggravating or distress inducing adult. 
The therapist, serving as a secure base, is seen to be resistant to re-inscribing 
conflict inducing responses which formed the content of the childhood encounter. This 
permits the client to move beyond compulsion to recall the formative event or events 
resulting in the acting out behaviour. Present conduct is now explainable in terms of past 
events which have been brought to conscious awareness. Psychoanalysis typically relies 
on dialogue to precipitate this transitional state of transference and to clarify options for 
future behaviour. It is through this process that the individual comes to construct a coherent 
life story, a meaningful narrative account characterized by integration rather than 
discontinuity (Connerton, 1989:25-26). 
In the procedures employed by the Facilitating Program, the client is not expected 
to enter into a dialogue with the therapist to fashion a revised self-narrative. Unlike 
conventional psychotherapy, the Facilitating Program does not employ a "talking cure'. 
Instead, the Program endeavors to facilitate a revised practice. The care plan outlines 
decisive factors impinging upon the youth and details the perceived resources available to 
the youth. It then proposes management styles which favour the supportive response of 
members of the immediate community to the youth's behaviour. Nevertheless, the 
objectives sought by the Facilitating Program are identical to those of discourse based 
interventions: the consolidation of an internal working model based on positive or secure 
attachment experiences. 
Participants in the care plan are collaborators in its production. The youth herself is 
asked to give her evaluation of her situation and the response is duly recorded with excerpts 
appearing in the report from the psychology department. Input is solicited from her care 
givers and from social workers, physicians, psychologists, and teachers who have been 
professionally involved with the individual. This information forms a significant portion of the 
material drawn upon by the psychiatrist in outlining the care plan. The plan is dictated in 
front of the interested parties and provides the basis for the hour long meeting the following 
week chaired by the community support worker which marks the transition between the 
residential portion of the care plan process and the return to the home community. 
What comes clear with this processual overview is that each exchange involving the 
compiling of facts is professionally mediated. The social worker consults the care givers and 
the youth's files to compose the social history. Other professionals - psychiatrists, 
psychologists, psychiatric nurses, child care counsellors, education consultants - conduct 
interviews, write observations in nursing charts, administer tests and write the reports which 
constitute the authorized version of the facts. These accounts achieve their authority to a 
considerable measure through the use of professional discourse, the vehicle by which 
findings are constructed and conveyed. This technology involves the use of language and 
styles of presentation which attest to their origins within a professional body. Beyond the 
specialised jargon, fact generating procedures and interpretive speculation, the detached 
tone and relative invisibility of the author provide an additional cachet of expertise. If a 
report or care plan embodies a certain amount of authority simply by its coherent rendering, 
then one compiled from the observations of numerous unnamed professionals or punctuated 
with numerical data derived from standardized tests is likely to attain even greater credibility. 
The social history and the psychology report which inform the care plan routinely 
contain extensive documentation of conditions and incidents which hold the potential to 
hinder or disrupt relationships of attachment. On occasion, certain incidents or 
circumstances regarded to be at the root of an individual's misconduct are referred to 
directly, particularly in the psychology report. However, few if any of these allegedly decisive 
factors appear within the text of the care plan. In fad, it would appear that explicit 
designation of possible insults to attachment is a practice to be avoided. 
This aversion reflects a conceptual contradiction which lies at the heart of the 
Facilitating Program's perspective. On the one hand, there is a quest to isolate specific 
historical factors likely contributing to the current misbehaviour. This is perhaps best 
represented by an investigation supervised by the head psychologist which seeks to identify 
and define behaviours considered to be disruptive to attachment. The social histories of 
recent admissions to the Program are then analysed with the objective of relating the 
occurrence and severity of these probable relational insults to subsequent misconduct. This 
research project was undertaken with the support of the psychiatrist. On the other hand, he 
was cautious about its probable outcome, observing that "we'll probably never know 
because everybody is different.' 
Keith's comments draw attention to his efforts to combine the best features of the 
scientific method with an appreciation of what he terms aesthetics, the notion that the 
attitudes and actions of each person are expressions of her unique experience of the world. 
His apparent reluctance to specify causal relationships in the care plan document appears 
to reflect the uncertainties that remain in his attempt to amalgamate these differing points 
of view. Not the least of the difficulties confronting him concern the as yet underdeveloped 
field of developmental psychopathology and the imprecision of the philosophical traditions 
of hermeneutics and phenomenology. The productive nature of knowledge - arguably 
inherent to the human condition - further complicates this situation. 
Explicit reference to specific insults to attachment are not the only notable omissions 
from the care plan. The use of psychiatric categories tends to be downplayed as well. 
Individuals admitted to the Program with the D.S.M. sanctioned diagnosis of conduct 
disorder regularly find their predicament described in the innocuous terms of parent-child 
conflict upon their return to the community. The practice of using the least offensive 
classification possible is a fairly common one in psychiatric circles (Kirk and Kutchins, 
1992:232) and no more so than in the Facilitating Program where every effort is made to 
minimize, if not eliminate, psychiatric labelling due to its stigmatizing and marginalizing 
effects. 
Attention Deficit Disorder and Sexual Abuse as Critical Insults to Attachment 
E xceptions to both these patterns can be seen in Chris' care plan. Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity (A.D.H.D.) and sexual abuse figure 
prominently as probable identified causes of Chris' difficulties. This is despite the fact that 
Chris' social history includes other events which would be of interest to an attachment based 
approach. These include multiple losses of significant relationships including ones with his 
father, surrogate father, child care workers and various schools and neighbourhood 
communities. Chris also experienced scapegoating and isolation. He was physically 
abused by a school teacher and verbally abused by a judge. His mother's precarious 
economic circumstances meant that Chris faced instability at home. In addition, he 
witnessed a number of violent episodes involving his mother. All of these incidents would 
qualify as potential affronts to attachment, yet the conventions of the Facilitating Program 
routinely would exclude their explicit mention in the final document. Nevertheless, a 
psychiatric disorder (A.D.H.D.) and a specific insult to attachment (sexual abuse) are 
highlighted as significant features of Chris' social history which need to be taken into 
account when choosing management strategies. 
In both instances, there is the danger that the mentioning of the specific category has 
activated a totalizing discourse in which behavioural difficulties are construed as direct 
effects of a cognitive dysfunction, on the one hand, or of a traumatic event, on the other. 
Certainly, the care plan itself offers no qualifying remarks to forestall this interpretation from 
taking place. First of all, conduct coinciding with identified symptoms of Attention Deficit 
Disorder with Hyperactivity is acknowledged as evidence of the presence of this disorder. 
In addition, reference to the disorder itself conveys the impression that A.D.H.D. constitutes 
an empirically discrete cognitive dysfunction. While there are members of the Facilitating 
Program's staff who subscribe to this interpretation, others view the question of Attention 
Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity with more ambivalence. They point to social relational 
factors which appear to contribute to the appearance of these troublesome behaviours.' 
Nevertheless, the ambiguity associated with this category is not reflected in the care plan 
itself. 
Mention of sexual abuse in an individual's social history is no less problematic. From 
a marginalized phenomenon whose long term consequences were little recognized, child 
sexual abuse recently emerged as a perceived social problem of seemingly epidemic 
proportions (Rogers and Rogers, 1 992:l79). In some quarters, its speculated occurrence 
provided a totalizing explanation to account for a wide variety of troubling beha~iours.~ This 
view was countered by others who, while acknowledging the potential trauma of sexual 
abuse, provided evidence which indicated that long term effects could be alleviated or 
eliminated with supportive interventions and relationships (Rogers and Rogers, 1992:22). 
Additional studies of childhood trauma caution that precipitative intervention by state 
professionals in the aftermath of an abusive incident actually may have harmful results due 
to the undermining of the individual's sense of empowerment and the disruption of 
immediate social relations (Swartz and Levett, 1989:743). 
The day to day practices of the Facilitating Program demonstrate an unwillingness 
to impose definitive cause and effect interpretations on the details gathered in the social 
histories of its clients. In addition, some effort is made in the psychology report to present 
the findings as opinions based on clinical experience rather than as objective facts. 
However, the actual relations and processes which provide the contexts for the interpretation 
of the perceived misconduct are not documented in the final plan. Instead, sexual abuse 
and Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity as professionally constituted categories of 
social problems take the fore, the reader's understanding of Chris' predicament being 
mediated by the ideology of the mental health expert (Smith, 1986:8; Walker, 1990:14). 
Although the words and phrases may be part of everyday language, their appearance in this 
document provides them with a decisive ring, testimony to the authority of the professionals 
whose conclusions are summarized in the document's brief pages. The danger exists that 
these professionally mediated representations may eclipse those authored by the child or 
youth. 
The Representation of Self 
T o a certain extent, the Facilitating Program has sought to avoid unilaterally constructed representations of the youths in its care. Each of the disciplines 
makes an effort to consult with the teenagers, with the psychology department assuming a 
particular responsibility to act as an advocate for her point of view. Nevertheless, the 
surrounding circumstances embody a number of features which render the usefulness of the 
interview problematic (Weber et at., 199443). Typically, the youth is not particularly 
forthcoming in the psychology interview, a reticence which may be due to her relative 
inexperience, inability to articulate her point of view, and/or reluctance to divulge information 
to professionals, in general, or to the staff person, in particular. At the very least, the 
information gathered is shaped by the professional discourse, raising questions as to what 
is actually represented by the findings. 
The production of facts about another person, representations intended to capture 
the truth of a person's reality, is an inexact exercise at best (Crick, 1992:187). The power 
laden nature of this encounter adds another level of complication to an already perplexing 
situation. Here considerations of the coercive or persuasive impact of professional 
explanations become critical. The power balance at play will play a crucial role in the 
precise nature of the fads that emerge, suggesting the potential to transform self 
understanding at the very moment that the interviewer endeavours to represent the 
individual's point of view (Taussig, 1980:4). 
Yet the quest for less false stories should not persuade us that simply bypassing 
professionally mediated conversations would enable us to gain an accurate or authentic 
account of the youth's point of view. The self that is presented for public viewing is a 
construction, influenced by time, space and probable audience but, ultimately, fashioned 
through personal intention. With each narrative that is constructed, some aspects are 
suppressed, a part of the story is left out (Spivak, 1990:18). Neither is it only our 
recollections that are partial. Our contemporary constructions of self identity are filtered 
through cultural screens which are equally selective. A person's ongoing creation contains 
many residues, reifications of past experiences having a staying power which gives a certain 
consistency to one's perceptions. Yet the self is not a constant in the sense that it 
comprises an essential, immutable core to individual consciousness. Just as memory is a 
social practice mediated by social conditions past, present and anticipated, so too is identity 
socially situated and socially constituted, its revealed contents changing over time. 
What is chosen to be examined by the audience of the self is no less socially 
embedded than what is chosen to be communicated to a public audience. Each 
formulation, each presentation of self has its own validity and one is not a more authentic 
expression of the person than the other. They are simply different expressions whose 
appearance is mediated by and responsive to social conditions. No social scientist or 
historian - or perceptive teenager, for that matter - can lay claim to having executed a 
definitive reading of these expressions. The best one can do is to strive to achieve an 
appreciation of some of the elements and the forces of circumstance which appear to be at 
play with the hope that this may move us to a closer approximation of what transpired at 
each juncture. In this regard, the extent to which the Facilitating Program staff have taken 
into account the impact their presence and their professional ideology have made on the 
facts of Chris' situation remains ~nc lea r .~  
The Legacy of Sexual Abuse: An Example of Acting Out 
P ersonal conduct is no less problematic than self-reporting in providing a definitive account of self identity and of knowledge production. For instance, 
youthful acting out has been shown to be crucial to the constitution of the D.S.M. category 
of conduct disorder. It also provides an intriguing point of convergence for elements of 
attachment theory and Marxist conceptions of alienation, reification, and cultural logic. Yet 
the explanations provided by these theoretical approaches lead in distinctly different 
directions with decidedly dissimilar political consequences. 
Conventional attachment theory regards acting out to be an unconscious re- 
enactment of past insults to attachment. Its conception of the unconscious is not 
inconsistent with that of contemporary Marxist theory. Both perspectives consider the 
unconscious to be rooted in social relationships of which we are currently relatively unaware. 
The origins of essentialist self-judgments frequently comprise an important aspect of this 
uncharted tenitory. By our own construction, we render aspects of ourselves to be thing-like. 
Rather than dynamic, fluid self creations, we come to be marbled with the static residue of 
past events that serve as limits to our realm of possibilities for future projects. 
These reifications result when recollection of the social conditions of knowledge 
production are suppressed (Jameson, 1991:314). This occurs when a self-conception is 
interiorised and consolidated as a fixed notion of a person's self-knowledge while the social 
relationships associated with this evaluation are forgotten. The individual plays an active 
role in this process, interpreting the response of others and then electing to inscribe this 
evaluation - whether clearly articulated or an ill defined structure of feeling (Williams, 
1977:132) -- as a defining aspect of the self. The attribute itself may cany painful or 
distressing connotations which encourage the individual to suppress and possibly repress 
this information while canying it forward as a component of self-identity. Its disparaging 
effects can be hegemonic, saturating the person's sense of being yet remaining elusive due 
to its taken for granted or common sensical authority. Its influence also may be more 
transitory, the self-judgment called into play only during moments of perceived 
disempowerment. 
One example of reification is the sense of shame or self blame commonly referred 
to in accounts of survivors of childhood sexual abuse (Bass and Davis, 1988:35; Women's 
Research Centre, 1989:208). A typical explanation given to this sensation of shame is that 
children have concluded that there must be something inherently wrong with them to have 
invited such painful abuse. The distressful nature of the recollection is such that individuals 
choose to avoid examining its contents. This perpetuates an underlying belief that they are 
fundamentally flawed or inadequate, a self judgment which informs ongoing practice. The 
incident did not force the person to come to this selfdemeaning assessment nor did its 
painful memory cause him or her to carry forward this self-evaluation. Instead, the 
convergence of different determinations - emotional dependence, physical powerlessness, 
intellectual immaturity - increased the likelihood that poor selfesteem based on a repressed 
memory of abuse would be the outcome. Yet the presence of another determining influence 
- e.g. the recollection of an empowering incident - could be sufficiently forceful to offer an 
antidote, an alternate interpretation capable of neutralizing the potentially self-destructive 
message prompted by the abusive encounter. The ultimate choice of representation - 
minuscule though the range of options might appear - rests with the child. 
The sensation of upset which has come to be associated with sexual abuse is an 
example of an idiom of distress, a culturally specific demonstration of dis-ease. This term 
implies that specific learned forms are invoked to convey personal upset in culturally 
meaningful terms. It is probable that many of these idioms are fashioned and incorporated 
at an early age, the circumstances surrounding their formation subsequently becoming 
peripheral to a person's awareness. Their retreat from consciousness may be explained, 
in part, by the experience of discomfort which marked their inception, disconcerting feelings 
which tended to be suppressed along with the precipitating circumstances. This intentional 
minimizing and marginalizing may, in turn, lead to actual repression in which a person elects 
to 'forgetn activating this defence mechanism in the first place. 
Subsequent conflicts or contradictions which induce the sensation of distress may 
invoke the idiom in toto. Form and content fuse as a culturally constituted vehicle which 
simultaneously constructs and expresses a person's dis-ease. Both content and form may 
include historical residue. This helps to explain the tendency for psychoanalysis to focus on 
nominated events (Young, 1992:lg) from a person's reconstructed past in order to establish 
a causal connection with current symptoms of di~tress.~ Nevertheless, past precedents, if 
they in fact did take place, do not cause present distress to be expressed. Instead, they 
provide the template for the construction of distress, a vehicle which continues to perform 
a specific function in response to current contexts but does so with a decidedly historical 
reference. 
With this explanation comes the possibility that expressions of distress - behavioural 
evidence of a person's alienation from self-creative powers - may be primarily a response 
to contemporary circumstances. The person may invoke the learned idiom when her sense 
of individual agency is thwarted by present social relations, the nature of her behaviour 
directing attention to past precedents rather than to existing conditions. This reinforces a 
prevailing cultural logic which seeks explanations by probing the individual's psychological 
history rather than by examining current relationships, including social structural 
contradictions. 
The conventional logic that victims of sexual abuse are liable to become sexual 
victimizers likely informed the assessment presented in Chris' care plan as well. It appears 
that little or no consideration was given to the possibility that Chris' encounter with his sister 
was motivated by an immature sexual curiosity rather than being a consequence of his past 
abuse. In this instance, the victim-victimiser paradigm favoured by mental health 
professionals coupled with the prevailing attitude of moral outrage triggered by evidence of 
possible sexually abusive behaviour involving a child likely was sufficient to rule out any 
other interpretations. 
Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity: An Example of Ontological Insecurity 
C hris' care plan also draws attention to the fad that the convergence of care and control occurs from birth through our relations with significant care 
givers. I have noted that Bowlby stresses the psychological dynamic of attachment which 
he considers to be a universal imperative. He discounts hermeneutics in favour of biology. 
In so doing, he emphasizes the scientific basis on which to examine this relational principle. 
Holmes (1993), on the other hand, points to the current emergence of interpretation and 
narrative as central to attachment-based psychology. He considers the transmission of 
meaning to be at the core of attachment relationships. In this view, the interactions of the 
infant with the primary care giver provide the seminal template through which meaning- 
producing practice is mutually constituted by care giver and child. Cultural content can be 
seen to play an integral part in this process, but the primary focus with attachment theory is 
on its imputed form. 
Keith Johnson considers ambivalent insecure attachment as being perhaps the most 
devastating as the child comes to experience a fundamental instability in her sense of being- 
in-the-world. This formulation resonates with the issue of ontological insecurity, a 
preoccupation of a number of social theorists not commonly associated with attachment 
theory. For an individual who experiences ontological insecurity, distress is an ongoing 
occurrence, characterized by a chronic sensation of disease. This seems to be due to the 
fact that the individual's signifying capacities are compromised, resulting in an inability to 
consistently integrate experiences into a relatively stable, unified self-representation at any 
point in time. This conception of a flawed central organizing principle with its accompanying 
sensation of insecurity demonstrates Freud's dictum that 'the pathological illuminates the 
ordinary" (Kenny, 1986:22). It also allows us to move away from Bowlby's conception of 
attachment as a function of universal psycho-biological forces or imperatives. 
Instead, formative relationships may be understood as interactions which due, to 
historical circumstances, prove to be critical to the constitution of the individual's internal 
working model of self and other. In part, their lingering effects are evidence of the 
transmission of culture, both in content and in fonn, between generations. They are 
significant contributors to the individual's meaning creating practices - the cultural logic of 
the personal -which continue to reverberate in the individual's attitudes and actions. The 
'poor fit" referred to by attachment theory takes the form of ontological insecurity in this 
account, thereby providing an alternate conceptual framework in which to view behaviours 
associated with the A.D.D/A.D.D. with Hyperactivity designations. A benefit of this 
conceptual approach is that it enables us to situate this discussion within broader social 
considerations. 
Robert Connell(1987) and Henrietta Moore (1994) point out that a person's cultural 
logic on questions of identity or identification should be understood to be multiple rather than 
singular. Connell extends Sartre's discussion of the formation of a class identification in 
childhood to include the consideration of gender and sexual orientation. Moore furthers this 
analysis by speaking of the multiple subject positions which exist in any culture with respect 
to gender, for example. Neither are these gender options fashioned in isolation: one 
person's sense of gender at any given time is mediated by particular constraints of class, 
ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, etc. Moore argues that the selection of a particular 
position takes place in the context of an anticipation of the power that can be expected to 
accrue to that identification. While a particular identification holds the promise of a certain 
amount of empowerment, its failure to deliver on this promise brings an accompanying 
sense of frustration, distress and disease. 
A significant number of feminists (Mascia-Lees et al., 1989; Abu-Lughod, 1991; 
Moore, 1988; 1994) acknowledge what some contemporary Marxists have been slow to 
recognize: uniform, coherent, consistent identities be they of class, gender, sexual 
orientation typically exist as essentialist illusions rather than as lived actualities. They are 
simplistic conceptions which do violence to everyday reality. Similarly, sensations of 
disempowerrnent can not be associated definitively with one distinct subject position or 
another. As idioms of distress, they may be reasonably accounted for within a number of 
discourses. This is true as well of representations of the abuse of power. Objectification 
and the denial of mutuality are characterizations which may be accommodated within a 
variety of explanatory discourses. The presence of particular facts does not itself legitimize 
a specific theory (Ingleby, 198598). 
Chris' care plan offers numerous examples of how the Facilitating Program routinely 
favours certain discourses while alternate readings are marginalized or ignored. The care 
plan clearly emphasizes the presence of Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity and 
evidence of sexual abuse as being decisive factors contributing to Chris' current behaviour. 
This analysis can be understood to be informed by prevailing discourses within the mental 
health field and to constitute those discourses in turn. In addition, conventional practices 
within the Facilitating Program tend to highlight the possible impact of these phenomena in 
terms of individual psychology rather than examine structural conditions which may promote 
their occurrence. Yet elements exist in the various reports consulted by the psychiatrist 
which could have led to quite different interpretations. 
For example, Chris' witnessing of the physical abuse of his mother meets attachment 
theory's criteria as an insult to attachment. Depending upon the discourse of choice, this 
incident may be interpreted as reflecting a variety of structural inequalities. Chris' 
vulnerability may be understood in terms of his relative powerlessness due to his lack of both 
experience and physical strength which left him exposed to the potentially harmful 
repercussions of male violence. This potentially traumatic encounter was repeated on a 
number of occasions as Chris' father was permitted to remain in the home due to the 
family's reliance on him for its economic livelihood. In this way, imbalances of age, gender, 
and class can be seen to be decisive factors in the scenario, a list that is by no means 
exhaustive. This brief illustration merely gives some indication of the variety of subsequent 
interpretations which can be brought to bear on the facts, each one providing a credible 
explanation. It also suggests the value of applying a number of perspectives to Chris' 
c i ~ ~ ~ m s t a n c e ~ ,  each const~dion deconstmcted and reconstructed in succession. This call 
for multiple interpretations takes on added urgency with the realization that the favouring of 
one discourse over another has definite consequences, both practical and political. 
The self-constitution of the individual resonates with the available discourses. 
Prevailing discourses - dominant, emergent, residual - inform the meaning that we attribute 
to indications of distress, for example. What in one scheme is symptomatic of insults to 
attachment as the legacy of nominated events may be re-conceptualized as a learned, 
culturally specific idiom of distress, incorporated in the past with content that draws attention 
to these origins but expressing disease with current oppressive arrangements. Moreover, 
they may direct the person to a variety of explanations, i.e. psychological trauma, patriarchal 
oppression, age related rebellion, etc. 
The state is not a passive observer of this process. The various ideological 
apparatuses that enable it to cany out its mandate contribute to the pool of discourses which 
influence and inform an individual's choice of representations. Totalitarian regimes have 
been shown to employ the mechanisms of the state to constrain the options for self 
representation. "A particularly extreme case of such interaction occurs when a state 
apparatus is used in a systematic way to deprive its citizens of their memory" (Connerton, 
1989:28). A less severe but no less effective way is to induce people to adopt a particular 
identity by persuading them of the legitimacy of a particular representation of the events of 
their lives (Ingleby, 1985; Foucault, 198211983b). In this manner, a person becomes a 
willing participant in the construction of an authorized version of her self-narrative. 
The Facilitating Program as an Emergent Discourse 
I ntentionally or otherwise, the Facilitating Program plays an active role in the deconstruction and reconstruction of an individual's identity. The Program team 
conceptualizes the difficulties faced by the youths referred to its care as being a product of 
their social relations, rather than something that is inherent to them as autonomous 
individuals. Instead of employing a dichotomous formulation - usithem, individuaVsociety - 
the program re-frames the perceived social problem of troubling behaviour as being 
precisely that - a social problem whose origins are due to the absence or the elimination of 
a pro-social template upon which the individual can fashion subsequent relationships and 
whose resolution is a social - rather than an individual - responsibility. A series of 
investigations, interviews, observations and tests are initiated to gather information to serve 
as the basis for a plan of action to guide the youth and her immediate community. The staff 
sees itself performing a benign function by bringing the respective parties together, defining 
the terms of the relationship and facilitating the care plan's implementation through 
community support workers. 
The care plan is intended to be an accessible document, brief and to the point while 
capturing issues anticipated to be of critical significance throughout the youth's adolescence. 
Conciseness requires that the assessment of the youth's situation be summarized without 
the benefit of including supporting evidence and detailed analysis. Similarly, the Facilitating 
Program staff realize that the individual's circumstances may change in the years leading 
up to his or her nineteenth birthday. Care givers may come and go. The teenager may 
change schools or jobs or move from one community to another. For these reasons, the 
management strategies are presented in general terms rather than dwelling on the 
particulars of current circumstances. 
Certainly, there are moments in the care plan process where effort is made to 
capture the details of specific encounters and to indicate how these relate to the wider social 
context. The social history is perhaps the most notable example of this. Yet even in this 
document, we fail to be presented with a clear account of how the teenager regarded the 
events of his or her life. Biographical information is passed through the filter of professional 
discourse with a consequent blurring of the nature of its actual meaning to the youth 
involved. Similarly, the connection of immediate conditions to broader structural forces 
tends to remain illdefined. A more fully contextualized view can only be gained by reading 
between the lines of an individual's social history and by connecting what is suggested with 
the details that form the backdrop of other social histories. 
I n the care plan document, we encounter personal behaviour patterns which are conveyed as being more or less implicit consequences of insults to attachment 
on decontextualized individuals. The unique social relations which comprise a person's 
sense of identity at any point in time are omitted as are the social conflicts and contradictions 
which inform those social ensembles. This is only partly due to the nature of the care plan 
as an abbreviated summary. Attachment theory as the prevailing discourse of the 
Facilitating Program is largely responsible for both the care plan's form and content. Its 
ideological content can be seen to reinforce existing structural inequalities, regardless of the 
intent. 
For example, A.D.H.D. and the consequences of sexual abuse figure prominently 
in Chris' care plan. These phenomena are represented as discrete psychological 
complexes with the impression given that they can be expected to unfold in a relatively 
predictable manner regardless of differing personal characteristics or varying social 
circumstances. This account appears to reflect the rational individualist conception of the 
individual associated with conventional psychology rather than the notion of the person as 
an ensemble of social relations.' As a result, the identified source of Chris' difficulties bears 
a striking resemblance to the various psychiatric afflictions which are conventionally 
ministered through the application of the medical model by means of the D.S.M. 
Karen is viewed as being 'enmeshedw in her relationship with Chris with the 
possibility that the two of them would 'close ranksw if a decision to separate them was 
imposed. As it stands, this evaluation comes perilously close to "blaming [one of] the 
victim[s)" (Ryan, 1971). Karen has endured innumerable hardships in her de facto role as 
principal care giver to her children. The nurturing and concern that she exhibits towards her 
son demonstrate a diligence and steadfastness which stands in mark contrast to any of her 
male partners, both present and past. She would appear to be caught in the double bind 
of patriarchy which requires a woman to shoulder a disproportionate amount of the child 
rearing responsibilities while, at the same time, ensuring that she does not become the sole 
emotional support even in the all too frequent absence of a male counterpart. 
This tendency to essentialize gender roles is also apparent in the statement that it 
is 'impossible for [Karen] to bring Chris into male adulthoodw. The call for a 'male mentor" 
is a common one in a number of the care plans for teenage males that I consulted. It 
reveals an assumption that sex distinctions (differing male and female reproductive 
capacities) are synonymous with gender differences (conventional social conduct of men 
and women). This belief in the essential duality of social functions argues that gender roles 
are discretely defined and can only be modelled by a person of the appropriate sex. This 
position counters the view of gender as a variable social construction with the contention 
that it is a matter of biological destiny. This stance reinforces patriarchal notions of 
fundamental, universal differences which provide ideological underpinnings for the structural 
persistence of gender inequality. By contrast, gender may be regarded as changing and 
changeable, a continuum of social relations in which alterations to the prevailing content of 
one category modifies the content of the other (Moore, 1988:7). An implication of this 
perspective is that it is conceivable for Chris to be guided into responsible adulthood by 
either male or female mentors. 
While patriarchal relations are effectively supported, the issue of class inequalities 
is no where to be seen. This is despite the fact that Karen's economic plight played a 
contributing role in exposing Chris to a variety of abusive encounters and continues to be 
a factor in the family's child care arrangements. While the significance of the working class 
background of its sample figured prominently in the operating rationale of the Jesness 
Inventory used in the psychology report, no mention of this topic occurs in any of the more 
than 80 care plans that I consulted. 
This is not the case for race or ethnic considerations. While this issue is not a 
feature of Chris' care plan, it does appear in a number of care plans, particularly those 
produced for Native youths. In most cases, it consists of reference to the importance that 
the knowledge and practice of cultural heritage play in the well being of Native youngsters. 
This approach may demonstrate a sensitivity to issues of self-determination and 
multiculturalism, yet it pulls up short of addressing concrete instances of racism. Mention 
of racist slurs directed at a female Native teenager may be made in the social history, but 
the nature of the care plan is such that any specific 'insults" to attachment remain 
unidentified. The decontextualized nature of the care plan thus serves to suppress the 
documentation of racism as well as other instances of systemic oppression. Further 
limitations of this approach are revealed in the following notation which appears on a care 
plan prepared for a Native youth: 
It should be noted at the outset that [this individual] is of Native heritage. His 
growing up years have taken place in Native culture. A good deal of the 
issues that are appropriate to his cultural heritage are not known to us and 
we are not experts in them. Everything, thus, that we say in the Care Plan 
has to be taken with this handicap in mind. 
On the one hand, these comments acknowledge that the cultural traditions of Native 
people are distinct from those of the dominant society, undefined though it may be. On the 
other, these same traditions are set aside due to the expediency of producing a care plan 
based on attachment theory. Shortcomings that may accompany this approach are readily 
admitted to be due to a 'handicap" of cultural ignorance. Yet the culturally uninformed or 
under informed nature of this perspective is not judged to be so severe as to disqualify the 
Facilitating Program from carrying out its mandate. While the intentions of this qualifying 
statement to demonstrate the Facilitating Program's sensitivity to cultural considerations 
seem valid, the possible consequences of this strategy are cause for concern. 
This manoeuvre recalls the traditional contradiction at the heart of the relationship 
between colonizing interests and Native people, the party in a position of dominance 
defining the cultural group as other while simultaneously attempting to incorporate or 
assimilate this group according to its own conventions (Sider, 1987:22). In this instance, the 
Facilitating Program recognizes that differences in meaning-producing practices exist which 
it is ill-equipped to appreciate. Staff members then proceed with their investigation and 
present their subsequent recommendations based on the presumably pan-human principles 
of attachment theory. 
I would argue that this constitutes an instance of tutelage, the Native youth being 
placed in a position of liminality. Initially, recognition is made of the existence of cultural 
differences due to his membership in a significant minority group. With this 
acknowledgment, he stands on the threshold of being related to as a self determining 
individual capable of defining himself and his conduct according to his own legitimate and 
meaningful standards with the attendant right to be understood in his own terms. 
Concurrently, the Facilitating Program staff act on the premise that its own point of view 
represents the "best interests" (Dyck, 1991:162) of the individual by default. Through this 
practice, the Facilitating Program reveals its belief that attachment theory offers the means 
to understand another person, regardless of his or her lived experience. As a self-defined 
totalizing discourse, its claims to truth supersede any (other) cultural considerations. 
Unintentional though it may be, this attitude effectively terminates dialogue. The youth is 
relegated to the status of an administered object, a generic unit of analysis stripped of the 
very culture producing qualities that define him as a unique human being (Kessler, 1987).7 
There is some reason to believe that steps may be taken to rectify this situation. For 
example, 'Reaching Out", a Facilitating Program report based on province wide consultation 
with community professionals, recommends that: '[i]ssues of staff selection will ... need 
consideration, especially related to issues of 'cultural sensitivity'. Wherever possible, multi- 
cultural staffing or close linkages with multi-cultural communities needs to be establishedw 
(Crossroads, 1993b: 19). Nevertheless, increased community collaboration and diversity of 
personnel are not guarantees that an appreciation of cultural matters will be reflected in the 
Facilitating Program's perspective and practice. 
The Care Plan as Social Contract 
T he net effect of the care plan process reinforces the belief that the state of the art in contemporary social science has been brought to bear on the situation 
of the individual youth. These authoritative discourses tend to be accepted due to the 
perceived benevolence of the experts who produce them and because they are cloaked in 
scientific legitimacy. Knowledgeable specialists in the areas of social work, psychology, 
education, child care and nursing have joined forces to provide the psychiatrist with the 
elements necessary to fashion an inclusive care plan addressing the major realms of the 
youth's life at present and anticipating the years of adolescence to come. As the product 
of these labours, the care plan is intended to represent a non-blaming paradigm in which to 
structure future interpersonal relations based on mutual respect and understanding. 
The document itself represents a critical moment in the negotiation of a partnership 
between the professionals, the teenager and the family or care giving unit. This joint 
enterprise intends for the client to gain sufficient mastery so as to achieve autonomy from 
direct professional intervention and for care givers and the immediate community to provide 
supportive conditions for this process to take place. Implicit in this framework are certain 
skills which must be mastered to successfully navigate this social field. The care plan 
indicates these desired behaviours and attitudes and proposes further specialized help 
where required. In this way, professional mental health professionals administer a program 
designed to encourage a particular form of subjection among the youth, care givers and the 
local community. The professional's authority is maintained not by withholding knowledge 
as was traditionally the case, but by making this knowledge readily accessible (Ingleby, 
1985:103). In this way, it is hoped that lay people will adopt the point of view of the 
professional. 
Vital to the success of this objective is the actual composition of the youth's 
community. In practice, few people other than members of the immediate family, the 
occasional close relative and community professionals attend the care plan meetings and 
access to information contained in the care plan document and its supporting reports is 
closely monitored. As a community support worker explained to me, a community based 
professional - teacher, social worker, psychologist, etc. - would be given a care plan 
whereas a next door neighbour would not. Throughout the life of the care plan, the ranks 
of the 'immediate community" will tend to expand only to include those who have an interest 
as a professional in the youth's circumstances. 
Certainly, professionals play a central role in the day to day application of the care 
plan. Significantly, discharge from the residential portion of this process does not mean 
discharge from the program itself. The youth remains 'on the books" of the Facilitating 
Program until the age of nineteen. In practice, this means that legal responsibility for 
ensuring the teenager's well being legally reverts to the community case manager. 
However, the care plan itself serves as the practical 'case manager". Care givers and local 
professionals implement its recommendations and monitor its effectiveness. When 
difficulties in administration arise, a community support worker from the Facilitating Program 
can be involved directly at the request of the youth, care givers or local professionals. 
CHAPTER TWELVE - CONVERGENCE OF CULTURAL LOGICS 
Things derive their being and nature by mutual dependence and are nothing 
by themselves. 
Naga rjuna (second century Buddhist philosopher) 
An elementary particle is not an independently existing, unanalyzable entity. 
It is, in essence, a set of relationships that reach outward to other things. 
H. P. Stapp (twentieth century physicist) 
T he Facilitating Program goes some distance towards recognizing that all knowledge is relational. This is demonstrated by the emphasis placed by the 
staff on affiliation and mutuality, critical components 'drawn from attachment theory, object- 
relations theory and self-psychology" (Crossroads, 1992b:423). The program also exhibits 
a sensitivity to the existence of multiple determinations, stressing that 'biological, familial, 
social and psychological factors contribute to the process of securing attachment, and all 
of these factors interact in determining success or failure in this regard" (Crossroads, 1993: 
423). 
While the Facilitating Program distances itself from the medical model, it is careful 
to situate its own activities on the terrain mapped out by conventional mental health 
practices. For example, the Facilitating Program claims to reject the medical model of 
physical illness in which the location and cause of affliction are located in the individual with 
treatment initiated to bring about a cure. By contrast, attachment theory situates the origins 
of the current difficulties in relationships rather than within the person. Nevertheless, the 
Program subscribes to the terminology contained in the D.S.M. In the case of conduct 
disorder, the D.S.M. provides a classification which focuses on observable behaviour - 
much like the symptoms approach taken by the medical model - yet stops short of providing 
an explanation for the actual origins of these behaviours. In this sense, the medical model 
is invoked but not fully applied. 
The Facilitating Program is critical of the approach taken by the D.S.M., pointing to 
the overlap between categories and speculating on the presence of an underlying 
predicament which accounts for these behaviours. The Program then proceeds to retain the 
concept of conduct disorder, ostensibly to comply with the conventions of the mental health 
professions in order to aid communication, establish credibility and enhance funding 
possibilities. This also allows the facility to continue to cloak itself in the mystique of the 
D.S.M., thereby retaining the aura of medical authority while incorporating a positivist 
formulation - conduct disorder - into its discourse. 
The journal articles produced by the Facilitating Program (Crossroads, 1993; 1994) 
attest to this approach. These presentations point to the overlap of symptoms shared by 
conduct disorder with other categories but do not challenge directly the legitimacy of the 
concept itself. Neither does the Program shed light on the particular social forces which 
promote the continued use of the concept of conduct disorder. Instead, the focus is on the 
existence of an underlying disruption of attachment which appears to be the basis for a 
number of different D.S.M. classifications. One plausible explanation for this is that the 
Facilitating Program is reluctant to question the prevailing structures which enable it to cany 
out its activities. 
The Facilitating Program takes advantage of the authority and benevolence (Ingleby, 
1985) associated with medical interventions while attempting to carve out its own unique 
identity. In particular, it piggy backs on the legitimacy ascribed to positivism, effectively 
hitching 'rides with a fact-full discourse" (Young, 19925). Meanwhile, it endeavours to graft 
certain features associated with interpretive social science onto its practice. This reliance 
on the legitimizing aura of empirical science tends to suppress a reflexive critique of the 
Program's theoretical perspective and practice. 
The Program argues that an individual's behaviour must be understood to be 
meaningful and to be rooted in social relationships. Significantly, the most recent journal 
article demonstrates an awareness of the impact of broad structural inequalities on their 
clientele (Crossroads, 1994:360-361). The paper continues with a description of the 
application of attachment theory in its community-oriented care plan program and a 
generally positive assessment of the results of its program evaluation. It concludes with the 
observation that: 
[tlhere is little question that insecure attachment is related to the 
development of behavioural problems [Greenberg et al., 19931, however, 
considerable research is necessary to determine how attachment interacts 
with other factors such as parental management strategies, exposure to high 
risk environments and child biological factors in determining adjustment 
during adolescence (Crossroads, 1994368). 
Yet the research procedures employed by the Program effectively decontextualizes 
the individual in order to explain behaviour. The various modes of inquiry used by the 
department of psychology, for example, focus on the person's responses to questions which 
either have little relation to their typical surroundings or are highly ambiguous in their 
content. This tends to draw attention away from the actual social context, focusing instead 
on the response of the individual qua individual. Similarly, the residential assessment profile 
compiled by child care and nursing provides a decontextualized evaluation of the individual, 
disregarding the unique and frequently highly charged setting which provides the basis for 
their obsetvations. Both accounts embody a circumscribed notion of the self that borders 
on the unified, rational subject of positivist psychology. These methodologies result in 
authoritative accounts which, combined with the time constraints associated with the care 
plan meeting, minimize the possibilities for an open dialogue. As a result, the potential for 
reflexive appreciation is hampered and protocols persist without the benefit of rigorous self- 
scrutiny or collaborative critique. 
Consistent with positivist science, the Facilitating Program seeks to explain 
behaviour independent of its own relationship with the person or person under study. The 
Jesness Inventory is but one instance of a procedure used by the Facilitating Program 
whose premises and beliefs are suppressed under the rubric of 'science". The 
questionnaire's inclusion of working class values as a marker of behavioural dysfunction 
attests to the presence of ideological assumptions in this supposedly value-free research 
instrument. Culturally relative beliefs and values are innate to any investigation, no matter 
what its claim to scientific neutrality. However, the values guiding the theory and practice 
of the program need to be identified clearly so that they might be examined and evaluated. 
For the most part, the perspective and procedures of the Facilitating Program do not foster 
this type of critical examination. 
The Facilitating Program's research focus is also problematic. The emphasis is on 
refining the procedures for identifying and categorizing possible insults to attachment, 
determining the importance of age in evaluating the potential impact of these insults and 
correlating these earlier occurrences and conditions with subsequent behaviour problems. 
This perspective tends to overlook the productive nature of such an inquiry; the individual 
with her complaints is seen to exist independent of the procedures used to comprehend her 
plight. This relatively nonreflexive search for facts carries the risk of becoming a process 
of normalization whereby the intricacies of an individual's history are sifted relentlessly to 
detect possible causal relationships with later behaviour. With conclusive findings destined 
to remain just beyond reach, the research procedures support a particular conception of 
human behaviour based on individual psychology, a view favoured by the dominant ideology 
which its own activities reinforce in turn. 
In its failure to take these considerations into account, the Program may be seen to 
be a victim of its own success. The journal article documents the generally favourable 
response of both the teenagers and their care givers to the care plan process.' 
Nevertheless, the reliability of these findings compiled from telephone interviews conducted 
by community support workers is left relatively unquestioned. Mention is made that the 
respondents may have modified their comments due to their ongoing association with these 
workers. This possibility is 'not felt to be the case, however, because even prior to the 
evaluation the community was consistently encouraged to provide direct, open and often 
critical feedback to the program regarding their experiences" (Crossroads, 1993:426). This 
observation underestimates the potential impact of the staff administered survey on the 
responses of the participants. Instead, the stated willingness on the part of the Facilitating 
Program employees to engage in open communication is judged to be sufficient to dispel 
any possible distortive effects due to existing power imbalances. This tendency to discount 
the potential repercussions of its interventions is further evidence of the positivism which 
infiltrates the program's theory and practice. 
The uncritical optimism reflected in these findings is tempered by the conclusions 
contained in the 'Reaching Out" report authorized by the Facilitating Program but compiled 
independently of the telephone survey. The results of this study are generally favourable 
but the report indicates a certain amount of dissatisfaction with various aspects of the 
program. Significantly, the former community support supervisor who now works in another 
region speaks of the need for the education of participants in the principles and dynamics 
of the care plan model (Crossroads, 199353). These comments echo the report's 
recommendation which calls for greater collaboration with the participants in order to 
develop the existing program and to overcome any shortcomings. 
Despite the presence of reflexive blind spots, the Facilitating Program's staff does 
not appear to be intent on muzzling opposing points of view. Certainly, Keith Johnson is 
receptive to my fieldwork project while being aware of its potentially critical nature. Neither 
is Jan Newcombe's reaction to my criticism of the class bias inherent in the Jesness 
Inventory one of defensive retreat. Rather, she freely acknowledges the limitations of this 
particular instrument in much the same manner as she is open about her reservations with 
all the research procedures. Similarly, she is candid about the shortcomings of both the 
positivist and interpretive approaches, characterising her own position as one of straddling 
these two perspectives. Her prime intent appears to be that of revealing the origins of the 
youth's distress not one of dismissing any countering evidence that might put her current 
point of view in jeopardy. As is the case with the psychiatrist, she appears to be genuinely 
open to consider any possibility which would result in the improved welfare of the teenagers 
under her care. 
This inquiring attitude is typical of Facilitating Program staff members. Their lack of 
a strict allegiance to one version of attachment theory contributes to an openness and 
flexibility which are attractive features of the program. In fact, the staff consists of a group 
of individuals who subscribe to a variety of different personal cultural logics while remaining 
within the overarching meta-narrative of attachment theory. These varying outlooks 
comprise points of view which appear to be at odds and which may promote quite dissimilar 
political consequences. Yet their accommodation within the Facilitating Program helps to 
explain its elusive nature and the difficulty in providing an inclusive critique of the program's 
operations. 
Psychiatrist Keith Johnson and former community support supervisor Bart Turner 
illustrate the diversity of these opinions. They also offer revealing examples of the 
contradictory views which can be encompassed within a meta-narrative comprised of 
attachment theory. Both embrace outlooks which appear to stretch well beyond the 
boundaries of a positivist reading of attachment theory. However, there are elements in both 
their positions which resist reflexive analysis. As a result, the chances are reduced for 
alternate conceptions to come to the fore. As the main architects of the Facilitating 
Program, their continuing impact on the direction of the Program is considerable. Their 
perspectives and the implications for the Facilitating Program require a closer look. 
Keith and Bart speak of the importance of being 'well integrated' in order to be 
effective in the type of work they do. This refers to their belief that they have reflected on 
the possibly decisive impact of certain people, conditions and events on their lives and have 
incorporated these reflections into a coherent working model of self and other. In Keith's 
case, early childhood experiences in which he was separated from his mother and father 
due to wartime contingencies fostered a sense of ontological insecurity. Keith recounts how 
he was in his mid thirties before he came to the realization that other people felt much as he 
did. Nevertheless, feelings of instability and uncertainty continued throughout his years in 
medical school. Keith considers his early experiences and the resultant insecurities to be 
formative of his interest in the plight of so-called conduct disordered children. These factors 
were also decisive to his growing conviction that attachment theory provides the most 
compelling explanation of their predicament. 
Bart, on the other hand, speaks of supportive childhood conditions which he believes 
contributed to his sense of ontological security. He provides examples to illustrate what he 
characterizes as a nurturing upbringing in which he and his siblings were encouraged to 
explore their environment and their own capacities without fear of censure or rebuke. Bart's 
relatively late decision to pursue a career caring for children and youths was motivated not 
by a sense of purpose forged by traumatic incidents in his own childhood but, rather, from 
a recognition of the pleasure he derived from this type of work and the apparent skills which 
he brought to this activity. 
The Psychiatrist's Paradigm 
I n attachment theory, Keith and Bart found an outlook which resonates with their own lived experiences. Whereas Keith and Bart are on opposite sides of the 
equation in terms of their assessment of the security of their own attachment, both are 
convinced of the legitimacy of the conception of nondichotomous thinking promoted by the 
attachment model. The intersection of their personal logics with the explanatory model 
results in distinctive world views which reinforce one another and lead to particular political 
consequences. Keith's conception of this perspective are spelled out in the following 
remarks: 
You need to get your paradigm wide enough to be able to see [what's going 
on]. We are often presented with quite dramatic examples of [what I'm 
talking about]. "A war on drugs" - people don't understand what a "war" 
means. All wars have victims and I don't care what the language you use. 
We're very good at using the language to make it appear as if we were 
somehow on the side of right. You know, dichotomous thinking again. We 
have the right to do this because it represents a moral right. You get 
arguments on the morality of things from people who say it's moral to be 
outraged by pornography; it's moral to be outraged by feminist issues. You 
get this kind of dichotomous thinking that breaks behaviours up into good 
and bad and people decide based on their own experience which part of the 
dichotomy they're going to hold to. Regardless of who you talk to - even 
Hell's Angels have got good and bad. 
In fact, the more prone to violence people are, the more likely they are to 
dichotomize. Violence creates the necessity for counter violence. The 
structure is violence versus violence. Your paradigm has got to include 
looking at that structure of violence versus violence. When I'm looking at 
these kids, I'm looking at the violence done to them. It seems so simple and 
so obvious now because if you do a history of affiliation all you see is the 
violence done to them. It seems so simple and so clear to me that I have 
difficulty now understanding why I didn't understand that for so long. I even 
use language like wounds, attachment wounds, without realizing that I'm 
talking the language of war. People get wounded in a war. 
The centre of attachment becomes the defence of the cub. At the centre of 
society is the defence of the cub. That's the paradigm. If you get inside the 
paradigm, you get safety. But the price of the safety is the willingness to be 
violent. Now, you can get in touch with that really easy on a personal level 
if you just think about if somebody you love was being threatened. What 
would you do? There's very little violence you wouldn't resort to almost 
immediately. You certainly wouldn't stand around having a discussion about 
affiliation with a person who is threatening the person you're attached to. 
Attachment leads to violence. Then the concept of a violent attachment 
becomes quite evident. Suddenly, all of the abusive stuff that goes on 
between couples, you can start thinking about in rational terms. It's the 
attachment that's causing the violence. Take the example of the stalker. 
The person goes after them because they have the experience of being 
violated, the experience of this person taking their attachment issues and 
then throwing them in their face and saying, 'Get away from me". Obviously, 
it's kind of an aberration at one level but on another it's only part of a process 
and if your paradigm is wide enough you see it in terms of a process that's 
going on. That's where my thinking is going now. 
But now we're out on the edge because I don't have any solutions for the war 
in Bosnia. I don't have any solutions for what the Americans are doing in 
Africa. Well, the UN presumably. You can't blame the Americans for 
everything. You ask them to be Daddy and then if they strike somebody you 
tell them they're bad. They're bombing Somali people that they went there 
to help. How is that helping? Yet if they don't, what are they supposed to 
do? I can't think outside of violence. How are you willing to protect 
somebody? That's what brings me back to the paradigm of the cub and the 
parent. These people are starving. There aren't enough resources to go 
around. The only way that you can make sure that your tribe has enough is 
to take enough for your tribe. That means there would be even less to go 
around if you share it equally. What else are you supposed to do? If there 
was enough, then you could probably say that there was enough. But, in 
Canada, we don't think there's enough. You take the kids we work with. 
How are they ever supposed to get a car without stealing? I mean, literally, 
we will not share our resources in such a way that they can have what a lot 
of us will have. How does somebody buy a house for $300,000? The first 
house I bought was $8,500. It was a nice house too. But wages were 60 
bucks a week. You see, we've got this really violent structure created out of 
attachment and then they're complaining that violence is increasing in our 
society. 
I see a kind of thread, if you like. Quite clearly it appears to me that I have 
watched this phenomenon since the time that I was in London with bombs 
dropping on my head as a 3 month old baby. My mother was in London 
where she had no obligation to be but ostensibly she was staying in case my 
dad came home. Yet there's a kind of an acceptance that people could drop 
bombs on your head. How far back does that go in Ireland? One country 
has taken over part of another country and they're still in the middle of Belfast 
willing to bomb things? They don't know what else to do. Every so often 
they form peace groups which go around saying we're going to have to stop 
doing this. That's a kind of a violence because you're trying to convince the 
other side to stop doing it. How are you going to do that? Well, you can get 
violent with them. You can put them in jail. So how we take it further from 
here is really, really difficult. 
The [Facilitating Program] takes the meat out of the sandwich to a large part 
but the problem with that is that we're left with what's at the bottom of the 
barrel. Most people you can look after by reducing the violence towards 
them. If you're not violent towards them, they reduce their violence 
somewhat towards you. They don't eliminate it, but it gets down there. You 
start taking some of the violence out of the situation. Care plans really are 
suggestions that we take violence out of the situation. We look for where the 
violence is being fed and then we try and detract from it. You try to make the 
aggressive solution less prominent in terms of problem solving and that 
seems to make it easier for everybody to get along. In fad, I think it does 
make it easier for everybody to get along. That's why attachment is, on the 
one hand, what I use and, on the other, what I'm trying to overcome. The 
paradigm has to be wide enough to do that. When you take everybody out 
that you can take out, what do you do with what's left? We're getting good 
at taking people out because all you need to look after them is to follow a 
reasonable care plan. But it's really hard to get people to do that because 
it's counter to their attachment. It's counter to how they think and feel about 
attachment. It's counter to how they do attachment. The more visible - 
probably the more violent, if you like - our client is, the less likely it is that 
people are going to do without violence to take care of them. 
We have this business of charging kids. No one sees it as at all incongruous 
to have a grown up adult with a gun in their hand walk into an area and say 
"I'm going to interview you" to a 12, 13, 14 year old child. It is incongruous 
but it's institutionalized so you can't see that there's something wrong with 
this picture. This is just the normal picture. Somebody behaves in this way 
then we have to charge them. The fact that the violence the child resorted 
to was most likely provoked by the adults in the environment is not 
considered relevant. On the one hand, we depend on generalization. That 
is, you treat people more or less the same. We depend on that for 
socialization. But, on the other hand, if you've always experienced abuse 
from adults, then why wouldn't you generalize that? The logic of one side of 
the paradigm is the same as the logic on the other side of the paradigm. I 
can take our thinking that far but who is going to take it the next step? Who 
is going to open a new frontier for it? For me, that is the question. 
None of us have found a way of going beyond the paradigm. Within the 
paradigm, we can continue to look after kids fairly successfully because, at 
least for now, we can accept that we can't get rid of all the violence. But if we 
can get rid of most of it, things will be better. How this is going to play out 
politically in the next couple of years is important as well. We have a whole 
world at the moment which is intent on each tribe defining its territory, 
creating some sense of safety and we have large tribes attacking each other. 
And we have the whole problem of violence within tribes to deal with as the 
world reasserts itself. Clearly, we can't think of any other way to do it accept 
through violence. 
Keith embarked on a medical career relatively late in life after acquiring experience 
as a child care worker followed by a baccalaureate in psychology and a Master's degree in 
social work. Medical school brought Keith in close contact with the analytical approach 
associated with the medical model. By contrast, he favoured a relational view that stressed 
mutuality, the reciprocity of social relations, a processual view of knowledge production and 
an interdisciplinary stance. Keith's preoccupation with personal aesthetics is a logical 
extension of these perspectives, highlighting the unique sense of being-in-the-world that 
characterizes the reality of each individual: 
I tend to try to see things from - the latest buzzword - an aesthetic view of 
the entire experience of something rather than a dichotomous view of 
something. Now where did that come from and how did it develop? I think 
there's a good argument to say that you can't get to this position without it 
being somehow an affective process, a process that has to do with 
attachment and caring about things. But it's also a cognitive process. Again, 
it's another aesthetic, isn't it? It's another nondichotomous sort of position. 
Basically, what I'm talking about is trying to develop a way of marrying 
cognition and affect and to many experiences so that we have a whole rather 
than parts of a whole. You see, I really think the scientific method in terms 
of behaviour lets one down. The scientific method depends on a kind of 
analysis of a thesis and any time you analyse a thesis it's a bit like taking a 
jigsaw puzzle apart and looking at the pieces and then somehow construing 
the examination of the pieces as giving you information about the whole 
when, in fact, it will never give you information about the whole whatsoever. 
This occurred to me working with people in medicine who venerated this way 
of thinking and who wanted to discuss, for instance, brain metabolism and 
to try and discuss the components of the cells that make up the neural 
network that really is the brain. It very much reminded me of someone who 
had gone down to the Bell Telephone switching station and pulverized 
everything, discovered that there was a whole bunch of concrete there and 
decided that explained how the telephone worked. You still have a whole 
bunch of people who take that view. Given enough time to sort the concrete, 
to sort the copper and the plastic, you could reconstruct the switching station. 
But you still only have a switching station. You still wouldn't know how the 
telephone worked. This is not a new thought for me. This is not a thought 
that happened in the present. But it was a thought that I didn't know what to 
do with. You know how you can be aware of something and at the same 
time not be aware that you are aware or not understand your awareness of 
it? .... 
[Take, for example], life on the unit, day to day life on the unit. I'd walk into 
the unit and I'd see people working with the kids and I'd see predictable 
outcomes all the time. I'd say, 'If you do that with a kid, the outcome you're 
going to get is not the outcome that we want.' I'd try and point that out to the 
staff. Take something really simple. For instance, just last Friday, David 
from the cottage was talking to me. They sat there having tremendous 
difficulty with something that on the surface was very simple. They don't 
know whether the kids can wear hats to the table or not. An interesting 
question if you think about it for more than 10 seconds because why do 
people get involved in the minutiae of existence? Who cares? Yet some 
people are deeply offended by some kid coming to the table wearing a hat 
and other people feel very liberal about it. 
The problem is they're both missing the point. The aesthetic of having a 
meal includes the experience of attachment. It is not the fact that the kid is 
wearing a hat that's the issue. The kid wearing a hat to the table is making 
a kind of statement which is contrary to the aestheticism of eating in our 
society. It's like a bad painting. For some of the staff going to the table and 
seeing a kid with a hat on - %ell, wait a minute. This is not my aesthetic.' 
Others come in there - "this picture doesn't look too bad. This kid wants to 
be a member of a gang; gang members wear their hats a certain way and 
he's making a statement about himself. O.K., I can understand that.' They 
look at it from that perspective. But when people start talking about this, they 
really get in trouble quickly because they really don't understand what they're 
talking about. They really haven't got to the point of what are we discussing 
here .... 
Keith's seemingly paradoxical belief in the value of both quantitative research and 
personal aesthetics attests to his recognition of the general patterns which can be seen to 
cut across the unique particularities of individuals. This composite view is consistent with 
the Facilitating Program's perspective which attempts to straddle the positivism of John 
Bowlby and the hermeneutics common among many contemporary practitioners of 
attachment theory: 
What's really helpful in this regard is an understanding of psychodynamics. 
Unfortunately, psychotherapy has fallen into disrepute. When I talk about 
control issues and violence issues, that's a fairly new formulation for me. 
The other fairly new formulation for me is aestheticism, the sense that there 
is more to interaction than cause and effect. There is a dimension that is 
entirely aesthetic. There are very few words for it. If you go back to the white 
haired gentleman [Fritz Perls] who was moving from stool to stool, you can 
see the gestaltist sense of figure-ground. You can see that's another 
expression of the idea I'm trying to get across. They demonstrated in the 
physiological realm how we do that from a perceptual point of view and then 
they applied that to psychology. 
[For example,] I find physicists incredibly amusing because in one sense in 
their paradigm they can understand matter and they can put a man on the 
moon and they can make space craft but in another sense they don't have 
the faintest idea what they're talking about. When you get down to trying to 
find some first principles, they haven't got there. All their science is resting 
on a lack of comprehension at some point. And that's an aestheticism. It 
doesn't mean that they can't build space craft. They can. But they can't tell 
you why. And they can't tell you why they work. They just know if they put 
all these pieces together in this particular way then the outcome will be this, 
not why the outcome is this. 
Not that they haven't gone a million miles. If you read [physicist Stephen] 
Hawking you can see how far they've gone. But in spite of the fact that they 
can manipulate the physical world, they don't know more about their field 
than we know about behaviour. There is an unwillingness to accept this 
point of view, especially in medicine. Doctors have gone to the esoteric, 
have gone to the "we can explain it by just simply taking it apart; if I can 
understand how the membrane of a cell works, then I might have increased 
my understanding of human physiology." But so what? Understanding that 
is extremely important. I'm not devaluing it. I'm saying that at some point 
somebody is going to have to come along and say, "Well, why? Why is there 
a cell wall there in the first place? What does it matter how it works? What 
is the purpose of it working in concert with all the other cell walls? What is 
the sum of the matter; not what is its functional structure?" 
The bigger questions for me are the ones that are brought up all the time. 
Those are the ones that I'm listening to when people are talking because 
without an aesthetic we don't have anything. Taking things apart to see how 
they work - in other words, dichotomous thinking - eventually gets you to the 
stage where you are examining the puule piece that you've taken from the 
jigsaw puule for its compositions of cardboard and its shades of colour as 
a way of trying to look at the picture. Its patently absurd to try and figure out 
what the picture is from one of the pieces of the puzzle - one of the 
components - because the look of the picture itself is an aesthetic 
experience. It doesn't lend itself to the scientific method. 
I'm not advocating further dichotomous thinking by moving away from 
scientific thinking and replacing it with aesthetic thinking. I'm suggesting that 
if you add them together, you're going to have a wider paradigm to think in 
and we don't think very often in that paradigm. Stephen Hawking thinks in 
that paradigm. [Ontario psychiatrist] Dan Offord thinks in that paradigm. 
That's the ideal: to move toward a paradigm that includes both aesthetics 
and scientific thinking. When I go to a meeting and people are talking to me, 
that's what I try and answer them in. I can tell that sometimes I sound like I'm 
speaking gibberish because I don't have an aesthetic language or an 
aesthetic training. But I see its significance .... 
The "Untraining" of Community Support Workers 
There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. 
Shakespeare 
B art seeks the benefits of a change in consciousness as well. He credits his adherence to a non-dichotomous approach to formative childhood 
experiences, an upbringing characterized by profound acceptance and tolerance of his need 
to experiment. An incident in university further consolidated his belief in the desirability of 
an inclusive outlook: 
There was a movement to get the Reserve Officers Training Corps 
(R.O.T.C.) off campus because all of us - we didn't use the term then - 
'politically correct" types couldn't tolerate the thought of associating with 
these blood thirsty warmongers. Any association whatsoever implied 
endorsement of the war effort. In fact, there were people in the movement 
who would go to even greater extremes and use violence in that regard. The 
chair of the humanities department challenged me one afternoon and we got 
into a discussion. "What do you expect to accomplish by getting these 
people off of campus?" said the correct line. 'Well, it sounds like they need 
the benefit of associating with what you consider to be civilized thought. 
What benefit is there of having an army which is segregated from a concern 
for humanity, especially in a republic and a social democracy?" He made a 
very sound case for a paradigmatic shift that I wasn't ready to accept at the 
time. It was troubling then but it was years later that I really had to confess 
to myself that he was right. 
Bart draws upon his training in theatre and his knowledge of literature to exemplify 
this nondichotomous attitude in his training sessions for community support workers. The 
poetry of T.S. Eliot, W.B. Yeats and Allen Ginsburg and videos of Saint-Exupery's The Little 
Prince, William Burroughs' Naked Lunch and Joseph Campbell's The Power of Myth are 
combined with haiku writing and drumming to underline the duality of thought and action that 
typify conventional ways of thinking and acting. The net effect is to precipitate what he terms 
'a paradigm shift in consciousness", 'untraining" which would enable workers to refrain from 
imputing blame when encountering obstacles to the development of supportive relationships 
in local communities. These resources are used in conjunction with Alice Miller's The 
Drama of the Gifted Child (Miller, 1981), Robert Bly's Iron John (Bly, 1990) and Dorothy and 
Raphael Becvar's Family Systems (Becvar and Becvar, 1988): 
Narcissistic attachment is one of Alice Miller's paradigms. [She speaks ofl 
the price paid when narcissistic needs aren't met, when children are not 
loved or admired, when the family doesn't celebrate their existence. The 
need to be complete is so strong because that is the natural law, a deep 
psychological imperative. [People] will spend their lives trying to achieve that 
sense but they will have a big hole inside from preverbal times. [They will try] 
to build a shell of external accoutrement to say that they are whole. Some 
take a creative approach expressed in their art; another choice is to be 
destructive, to replicate that onto others ..... 
The Drama of the GiRed Child is important because it shows the price of 
raising the child to meet the needs of the parent. It is a powerful emotional 
experience for any one who reads it because we generally are raised that 
way to some degree or another. It causes people to re-examine their 
understanding of how they were raised. They can see what great cost has 
been exacted from them and they can also empathize with that kind of 
experience in others and not judge it. They become more accepting through 
their own experiences that its painful or plausible for others to be in the kind 
of pain that they're dealing with. They realize the kind of approach that says, 
"well, just snap out of it or grow out of it" (which is one that we often take) 
wasn't realistic for them, so why would it be realistic for others. You have to 
be accepting of others' experiences. 
Bart and Keith share a passion for the works of Robert Bly (1990) and Joseph 
Campbell (1988) both of whom rely on myths to articulate certain timeless truths which 
purportedly lie at the heart of the human condition. Bly focuses on what he considers to be 
the contemporary necessity for men to acknowledge the mixed psychological, emotional and 
spiritual legacy bequeathed them by contemporary industrial society in which child raising 
is typically the exclusive domain of mothers while fathers tend to be conspicuous by their 
absence. Appearing to avoid reductionist and essentialist conceptions of gender identity 
(Bly, 1990:34) and sexual orientation (Bly:1990:x), Bly initially affirms an androgynous view 
of humankind. He later qualifies his argument by stressing that 'for this century and this 
moment it is important to emphasize the three percent difference that makes a person 
masculine, while not losing sight of the ninety-seven percent that men and women have in 
commonn (Bly, 1990:234). Bly employs an extensive knowledge of myths, religious texts, 
history, philosophy, literature and folk tales from a broad spectrum of cultural traditions to 
argue that: '[a] boy cannot change into a man without the active intervention of the older 
menn (Bly, 1990:86-87). Bart observes that:: 
[Alice Miller shows] how a child has bits of himself sort of squashed, cut off 
and broken away, killed, buried in his development and how that experience 
develops pathology. Robert Bly's Iron John takes the same principle but 
says this is how you can develop completeness or wholeness. For some 
reason or another you feel incomplete. There's something missing. You go 
into a quest and you seek something. What happens is that you get into 
some of your repressed, painful, dark side of your life - your ashes - and 
you come out of it by marshalling your resources. Often you are given 
something in your life - a key, a golden apple - and you use it to 
acknowledge completely the shadow part of your life. Bly uses that 
metaphor, the dark side, the ugly side and the image of eating it, integrating 
it. He says this is a way that a man would do it. This is helpful as a model 
for development and growing as we often focus on the needs of females and 
haven't focused until recently on how men are raised. The official victim is 
easy to see and it was assumed that men were complete, that they had the 
power ..... 
What is significant for my purposes is that Bly's analysis, for all its sophistication and 
subtlety, tends to reduce complex, multi-causal social situations to a univocal psychological 
theme. This is perhaps best illustrated in his commentary on youth gangs -'[w]hen you are 
looking at a gang, you are looking ... at young men who have no older men around them at 
all" (Bly, 1990:32) - and student rebellion - '[tlhe son's fear that the absent father is evil 
contributed to student takeovers in the sixtiesn (Bly, 1990:21). Finally, Bly's statement that 
the genetic difference of 'just over three percent ... isn't much[, hlowever, the difference exists 
in every cell of the body" (Bly, 1990: 234) leaves the reader with the impression that 
entrenched dissimilarities will always distinguish men from women, a distinction which Keith 
describes as being 'self-evident". 
What tends to be downplayed in Bly's account are the historical contexts in which 
these narratives first appeared. Seeking to make sense of the human condition in a 
reassuringly universal and timeless manner, these stories are, nonetheless, products of a 
specific time and place. The commonalities shared across history and space may be more 
misleading than revealing, obscuring divergent circumstances, diverse influences and 
dissimilar meanings which have been rendered homogeneous and coherent by 
interpretations favoured by dominant cultural traditions. 
Joseph Campbell (1988) complements Bly's analysis, highlighting the rites of 
passage to adult gender roles typically encountered by men and women across the sweep 
of history. Campbell looks beyond the historical dimension of individual agency and social 
structures in his quest for explanations for the difficulties which befall humankind. In his 
view, an understanding of human affairs is best sought through mythology for 'mythology 
is the penultimate truth - penultimate because the ultimate cannot be put into words" 
(Campbell, 1988:163). It is through the examination of myths that we will catch glimpses of 
an overarching force whose purpose is revealed through the actions of humans. This 
idealist conception of history clearly minimizes the tenet that 'men (sic) create their own 
history" and renders the likelihood that human actions can eradicate conditions of inequality 
to be dubious at best. 
Like Bly, Campbell (199050-55) seeks to transcend the dichotomies which permeate 
our cultural traditions. Campbell's investigation of myths has produced an abundance of 
materials filled with images of the nurturing, omnipresent mother and the emotionally distant, 
absent father in which "the finding of the father has to do with finding your own character and 
destiny" (Campbell, 1988:166). In his opinion, a major function of myths is to provide a 
guide for this quest. While both males and females embody elements of the other, the 
solitary pursuit of the father by the male and the path into motherhood of the female are 
gender specific. Neither quest is more or less heroic; both represent destiny dictated by 
biology (Campbell, 1988:124-125). In Campbell's estimation, the basis for these mythic 
themes lies in our universal human psyche (Campbell, 1988:51), the vehicle which offers 
each of us the potential to experience the transcendent, the ultimate meaning producing 
practice (Campbell, 1988:58). 
Campbell's shunning of materialism includes an attraction to Jungian archetypes 
(Campbell, 1988:51), an influence which is also evident in the work of Robert Bly and Alice 
Miller. Carl Jung's advocacy of timeless essences has enjoyed a resurgence of popularity 
recently with perhaps the most influential contribution being Jung's 'pioneering study of the 
inner child" (Abrams, 1990:24). The concept of the 'inner child" not only finds favour with 
both Campbell (1990:260) and Miller (1 990:189) but also occupies a place of privilege in the 
discourse of many professionals and lay people involved in the identification and support of 
survivors of childhood abuse (Bass and Davis, l988:58; Davis, 1991 :33; Bradshaw, 1990: 
224-225). The inner child is but one in a number of archetypes believed by Jung to be 
inherited features of a universal collective unconscious (Jung, 1990:25-30; Ellenberger, 
1 970:705). Fundamental distinctions in terms of age and gender (Ellenberger, l970:7lO) 
as well as race (Dalal, 1988) are enshrined in his inventory with myths considered to be 
enactments of these archetypes (Abrams, 1990:25). In Jung's estimation, '[tlhe most we 
can do is to dream the myth onwards and give it a modem dress" (Jung, 1990:25; original 
italics). Campbell and Bly, it seems, are only too willing to comply. 
Jung's influence contributes an under current to the work of Campbell, Bly and Miller, 
guiding their analysis away from examining immediate social conditions as contributing 
factors to problematic behaviour and from recommending structural transformations to 
prevent their recurrence. In Jung's view, an archetype corresponds to a type of neo-Platonic 
idea (Ellenberger, 1970:706; Abrams, 1990:25) which owes its form not to the social 
practices of the moment but, rather, to its location within a collective unconscious. Unlike 
a hermeneutic or critical interpretive conception of the unconscious which is located in the 
lived experience of the individual, "the Jungian archetypes of the unconscious are biological" 
(Campbell, 198851). Never to be grasped in their entirety (Jung, 1990:25), archetypes are 
metaphors promising glimpses of universal truths. The power of myths serves to connect 
individuals to a supposedly common psychic heritage, deflecting attention from social 
experiences which informed their creation and which continue to be implicated in their re- 
telling. Jung, with his emphasis on archetypes, fashions a meta-narrative of elusive 
essences, timeless in form and relentless in its capacity to divert our gaze to the past and 
beyond. 
This legacy is evident in Alice Millets mono-causal interpretation of troubling 
behaviour as signifying an unconscious re-enactment of a childhood predicament (Miller, 
1984/1986:15). The possibility that this perceived acting out is a learned idiom of distress 
whose (re) appearance is triggered by current oppressive conditions is downplayed in her 
presentation. Instead, the examination of immediate relationships including broadly based 
social patterns takes a backseat to efforts to reconstruct a past whose precise features are 
destined to remain as as elusive as Jung's archetypes. This pursuit also serves to reinforce 
the conception of the person as a unified individual rather than the dynamic locus of often 
contradictory and conflicting social relations. In Millets view, the individual's 'social ecology" 
is confined to relations with immediate care givers, typically the mother.' 
David lngleby (1 985: 105) argues that the professional discourse of mental health 
professionals seeks a legitimacy not unlike that sought by folk tales, fables and myths. The 
difference is that professional discourse tends to portray itself as objective as well as 
benevolent, lending itself immunity from critical examination of its underlying beliefs, values 
and biases. While it is true that fables and myths typically do not rely on an appeal to 
objective authority to substantiate their claims, this does not diminish their power of 
persuasion. Much of their credibility is generated by their resonance with life occurrences 
that cut a wide swath across the everyday reality experienced by a substantial portion of 
human society. The documentation of typical rites of passage, identity predicaments, 
conflicts between individual initiative and solidarity with the community, personal quests and 
losses imbues these cultural artefacts with a timeless aura. They comprise a popular social 
psychology, interpretations of contradictions and transitions in an individual's life span which 
tend to coincide with the dominant cultural norms. Their reassuring compatibility with 
recurring cultural patterns tends to elevate myths and fables to the level of eternal truths, 
evocative of a rhythm, purpose and design that appears to supersede human intervention 
rather than simply mirroring the power imbued regularities of social life. 
Jung's appeal to universal archetypes and Campbell's cosmic psychology bear 
traces of this idealist rhetoric, mystifying the historically located forces of production which 
brought them into being. Their origins are attributed to a superhuman hand rather than 
acknowledging their location within the persistent social psychologies which are retold with 
each generation. The values and biases embedded in these cultural narratives are as 
grounded and specific as those found in the presumptions of social workers and 
psychiatrists who produce their own fables, their own stories of childhood (Rogers and 
Rogers, 1992). Whether the objects under analysis are myths or professional discourse, the 
challenge is one of unpacking the contents to disclose the social interests contained therein. 
Beyond the Psychiatrist's Paradigm 
Attachment is the great fabricator of illusions; reality can be attained only by someone who 
is detached. 
Simone Weil 
T he challenge to illuminate concealed contradictions can be daunting. In Keith Johnson's world view, the explanatory power of attachment theory as a meta- 
narrative is simultaneously intensified and rendered more complex. This extended passage 
captures the flavour and the sweep of his outlook: 
Take the figures of Jesus or Buddha, their mythical existence. Whether they 
existed or not, nobody knows but somehow or other the ideas existed so they 
probably existed in a person. When they subjected their ideas to the raw light 
of day, when they put their ideas into the culture they were living in, the ideas 
were politically bastardized. It really makes me laugh sometimes because 
you'll see people looking at a crucifixion as an ideal. They don't really seem 
to get it. People will fill up a church - a Catholic church or any other church 
- and there will be a cross there. What are they looking at? They're looking 
at essentially the figure of an idea. Jesus. Let's suppose for one minute that 
he had magical powers. His choice was to avoid that death and he chose 
not to be part of it. When you make a non-violent choice, what happens to 
you? When people go and look at a cross, are they then supposed to 
remember that he made a non-violent choice and violence was done to him? 
Does that give them the message to be non-violent? No, it doesn't. 
Take the Jewish message: no more holocausts. For some obscure reason, 
they think it's a violent message. You watch the Jewish people struggle at the 
moment with violence versus violence. Jesus came from them too - they're 
very gifted people - but it seems like every 2,000 years, they've got to learn 
all over again that violence doesn't work. It gets you killed. Jesus refused 
to be violent and he got killed any how. You've got two kinds of Moslems, 
the Sunnite and the Shiite, and they argue that lines of descent are 
important. The blood lines are considered to be the important factor. If 
Mohammed's ideas are valuable, then what do the bloodlines matter? 
They're ideas that have value. Our biology seems to reject them .... 
I don't know if somebody is going to find a place to stand outside the 
[Facilitating Program] and the ideas of the [Facilitating Program] and say, 
"hey, you're inside a paradigm. Here's a bigger paradigm in which you can 
be more effective in terms of what you're doing.' It might be the geneticist 
who stands outside and says, 'Well, you know, from where I stand, I can fool 
around with other pieces of genes here and I can make everybody come out 
almost exactly the same. Therefore, the genetics of the situation will be 
equal. We'll have equal people." .... 
In the strangest way, we're trying to invent ourselves. We're trying to invent 
thinking machines. We've already been invented. And we object to the fact 
that we have this limited life span. If you look at it like that, the machine 
would only work, this process would only work, if it covers all the possibilities 
of the D.N.A.. It has to express all its capacities. That means it has to have 
all its botched genetic experiments. That's the grandiosity of the experiment. 
I'm pretty narcissistic sometimes and pretty grandiose but the idea is a little 
bit bigger than me and its expression is a little bigger than I am. Yet I have 
the pleasure of being born at a time when knowledge has exploded in such 
a way that I can see the shape of the thing. If I have respect for the shape 
of the thing and if I have respect for the other people who are born in the 
same time I am, I don't have to go around fixing anybody. It will all fix itself. 
I've just got to take it as far foward as I'm able to take it .... 
We do unimaginable things. We do things that our ancestors couldn't 
envision anybody doing, but they could envision them. The Greeks thought 
about who is up on those planets. It has taken us 2000 years to find out but 
we're patient and persistent. During all that time, part of the people who 
were living and dying were being marginalized. Christ said it just as clear as 
anybody could: the poor will always be with us. And what he was really 
saying is respect people. He was saying they're as valuable as you are. You 
don't have any special value. You're just there and they're there. Be 
respectful .... 
We're involved in this aesthetic. There are parts of the involvement that we 
are not aware of or not in control of and can't be functionally directed. Even 
our structures get involved because they are just like us. You can have a 
Ministry [of Education] that has forgotten what it was supposed to do 
because the aesthetic of the Ministry is not understood. That to me is the 
90% unknown that we live with everyday but in a kind of a weird way we 
know all the time. [Let's recall the analogy of) people who live with elephants. 
They learn to walk around them and after awhile they forget that there is an 
elephant there. I have no doubt that we are living with an elephant of some 
sort. And we walk around the elephant every day of our lives and if we could 
only open our eyes and see the elephant we could probably ask the elephant 
to move or put the elephant somewhere less inconvenient. 
The problem with parenting now is the aesthetics of parenting. Its almost like 
we've forgotten that all parents have a care plan for their kids. There's 
nothing visionary about a care plan. Everybody has one. That's part of 
having a kid. Except in our society, some people don't have a care plan for 
their kids because their kids are not kids. They're something else. What I 
see more often is ambivalent kids. What I see is that some people have kids 
without knowing that they are going to be separate from them. There's a 
whole sort of basic feminist literature that blames mom. They say don't be 
mother bashing, but they write book after book after book about how their 
mother has influenced their life and continues to influence their life in a way 
that they find themselves suffering from and that they have to recover from. 
And that's total garbage. They haven't got the concept yet that they're 
separate. This appears so simple and so self-evident when you think of it. 
The idea of separateness, for instance. We are separate. But we're not. 
Because if you think in attachment terms, we're never separate. To talk 
about your idea again of having these two poles pulling us, the idea that 
we're an individual and the idea we're part of a social group, is the same idea 
that we are separate but we are attached. One's in sociological terms and 
one's in psychological terms, but it's the same idea .... 
The danger is that we continue to do what we're doing. The danger of doing 
what we're doing is that it's not going to be long before somebody drops the 
atomic bomb on somebody else. That's going to happen because if a human 
being can think of it, a human being will do it. You see, we haven't come 
very forward in the aesthetic area. Religion was almost useful - it's not 
useful any more - because it appreciated aesthetics. In a weird way, it 
venerated what we didn't know. It tried to express what we didn't know in 
cathedrals and paintings. That went into corporate thinking where buildings 
were built to express what we didn't know. 
I don't know what to call the field we're talking about. That's why I think we 
need to have people to continue to be doctors before they become 
psychologists, before they become what we call psychiatrists. I think we 
need to have a grasp of the totality of the aestheticism. And I think that 
group requires a very broad based education. You need to go to university. 
You need to know a bit about philosophy. This is a 'need to know" situation 
because if you get settled in then you will get the person who knows nothing 
but what's in the cell wall and they'll dismiss the aesthetic world, dismiss 
Jungian thinking or Alice Miller or Stephen Hawking. If you're having a 
paradigm, those guys have got to be in the paradigm too. [Otherwise], it 
means that your aestheticism is reduced to Andy Warhol. 
I hate to even think about this because it all has to fit together. We all live in 
the same world. The idea that there is conflict between nature and nurture 
to me seems so simplistic and so silly. The last 10 years or so has been 
spent trying to clear that kind of dichotomous thinking out of my mind. If I 
think of Jungian stuff and I think about Alice Miller type victim outcome stuff 
and I think about the D.N.A., it should come as no surprise that, in order for 
us to have continuity, we have to have reliable, predictable outcome. 
Transgenerational changes are more marked by their lack of change than 
they are by change. 
I'm not sure that we've extended the aesthetic side of knowledge very far. 
On the dichotomous side - on the scientific side, if you like - we've 
managed to take a lot of things apart and consequently understand the 
pieces to some extent and understand how to put them back together again 
and understand how they function together. You can understand function 
quite simply without understanding purpose. You can put a rocket together, 
but so what? What are you going to do with it? So far we shoot it up in the 
air and let it come down again 
because we know how to do it. We've had a probe go out into the galaxy. 
But why? The only thing we can think of is in case there is somebody out 
there who might see it. The guy that does that is tying a flag to the highest 
tree hoping that if somebody goes by it will attract their attention. 
On the aesthetic side, the one that makes most sense to me is [playwright 
Samuel] Beckett. I think that possibly the greatest aesthetic work of art for 
me is Waiting for Godot. Existentialism. The existentialists looked at the life 
of one person and inside that one life they found room for cynicism and, to 
some extent - Rimbaud said it long before me - they found despair. The 
aesthetic side of the answer to those guys' thinking, obviously, would be 
religion. We need to talk about both the meaningfulness and the 
meaninglessness of the individual life. That they have two limits .... 
There are very few models. Where do you look for models? You could look 
to Christianity. According to The Bible, Jesus was never violent. Look what 
other people have made of what he said. They have taken it and reworded 
it into incredible violence. The same thing is true of Muslims. The problem 
is for them people don't include kids or women, just men. Buddhists take it 
to mean that you're not violent to any creature. But are they doing O.K.? 
What's happening to them? Then you look at the people without a sense of 
this as an issue. You look at the Chinese who are quite willing to kill their 
kids to maintain order, to maintain privilege. Russia was the failure of the 
idea of socialism. There it was the grandest experiment ever but they tried 
to bring about sharing through coercion. Of course, it didn't work. 
Where do we look for models? The creativity of people in the academic 
profession I find scary. The only way that people seem to be able to think is 
to replicate what the person in front of them is advocating and then find 
another way of writing it down. Or find another way of proving the same fact 
or what they call facts. That's the paradigm but inside the paradigm there 
are a million things to think about. Someone needs to spell out what kinds of 
assaults there are to bonding. Is too much attachment the same as too little? 
Is there white attachment? Is there gay attachment? Is there black 
attachment? Is there Chinese attachment? Are there periods of 
attachment? Are there periods when you are more likely to be attached than 
others? What changes over time? What happens to different kinds of 
attachment? How do you study attachment in a 14 year old? The work, I 
think, is hardly even started. It's just an ideal. 
The whole process of psychotherapy, for instance, is a process of 
integration. By taking the themes of my life and being able to have them all 
with me today, I will at least be able to reflect on them. But if I have to take 
some of the things that happened to me and place them in a certain category 
that keeps them separate from the rest of my experience, then not only am 
I not complete, I can't reflect. Almost by definition, in order to do this kind of 
thinking, you have to come to terms with your life. You have to be able to be 
inclusionary in your own life. And psychotherapy is going out of fashion. 
There is a kind of a pill mentality that people call organic as if they were 
saying sensible. I'm sure some day we'll be able to tell you everything that 
the individual cell does and even how it does it. But that will tell us nothing 
at all about how they 'cell". So I use the word intention when I talk. 
Obviously, it's another word for purpose. In that sense, I'm suggesting that 
life is purposeful. If you don't have a paradigm that includes the purpose, 
you have nothing at all. It would be like sending a probe to the outer reaches 
of the universe with a message on board to whoever it meets only to have 
whoever finds it take it apart to see how it works .... 
If you spend enough time and if you get old enough, then you can think about 
Robert Bly a little bit and then you can think that if you have enough 
information then you can add it together in some way, in some kind of 
abstract form, you might find the beginning of wisdom. And so we come full 
circle to the word I've been using a lot. You go to the elders for wisdom. You 
don't question their wisdom because it's wisdom. And that, of course, is an 
aesthetic experience. The idea of aestheticism, the idea that there is a way 
of healing the splits between things and seeing them as related, seeing them 
as a whole and then finding some language to talk about them as a whole, 
that's what Jung was talking about. He was celebrating our individuality by 
asserting it as part of a whole. We're individual within the human experience 
but the human experience is a whole and we are part of the human 
experience. So the idea of there being traces of race memory becomes 
perfectly presentable in that kind of thinking mode. 
The focus of all these thoughts presently has been violence. I've got an 
aesthetic. I can talk about that, but I can't get a big enough paradigm to help 
me deal with it in a concrete fashion. On the one hand, there's the bad 
violence vs. the good violence argument. It's the "I've got a bigger one than 
you" mentality. So if the kid is small you can pick the kid up. If the kid is an 
adolescent, you can call the cops or you can get 4 or 5 strong males to throw 
him in and lock the door. In other words, you say the paradigm is that 
violence exists and we have to deal with it. Therefore, we have to have good 
violence in order to cope with it and here is the definition of good violence. 
It's in the paradigm. That sounds sensible. Except if you take that in 
relationship to affiliation or you take that in relationship to attachment, you've 
got a problem. You have to deal with the idea that the person who 
experiences the violence from you doesn't experience it as good violence. 
That's not their aesthetic that it's good violence. So they then are given 
essentially bad violence by you which then amounts to the same thing that 
they did to you. So do you see where the paradigm can only take you so far? 
The other place the paradigm breaks down inside the paradigm is even more 
frustrating. I watched it happen in [a treatment centre] last summer. There 
were two guys who were working in a house with 5 kids. And they decided 
that they were not going to be aggressive towards the kids no matter what 
the circumstances were. Well, guess what happened? The kids got more 
and more violent, both with each other and with the staff. It was a really 
scary place to be. One of the boys was probably a paedophile. Add that to 
the mix and what have you got? The house just disintegrated right before 
our very eyes in three weeks. The other set of violence, the set of violence 
that people talk about that Gandhi and perhaps Jesus Christ [believed] in, 
that also incites violence. Gandhi and Jesus Christ both died in violence. 
Inside the paradigm, you're screwed wherever you go because the paradigm 
itself won't hold enough understanding to guide you. 
When I say that these kids are no different than anybody else, I mean that 
as a direct statement of fact. They do what everybody does with the 
information that comes their way plus whatever they bring as individuals to 
the information. So when it's added together, they add it up the same way 
we do. They use it the same way we do. They plan their life with it the same 
way we do. So they are exactly the same as us, except they're different. 
Because we have made a bunch of rules that identify them as being 
different, not because they actually are different. We don't know how to deal 
with violence and we don't know how to deal without it. 
rhese kids ended up in that situation because of their history and because 
of how they responded to their history]. And because of their parent's 
history. That's where your transgenerational, that's where your Jungian stuff 
comes in again. They didn't end up because of their own personal history. 
They ended up because of the transgenerationalised history of their parents 
bringing whatever their parents brought to the situation .... How much does 
D.N.A. bring to the situation? Well, that's naturelnurture. The D.N.A. brings 
as much as it brings. You've got to understand that D.N.A. replicates very, 
very responsibly within the paradigm of D.N.A. .... Are we going to start 
[messing] with the D.N.A. in a way that D.N.A. is not going to be replicable 
anymore? If you leave anything out, then it's not part of it anymore. If it's not 
part of it anymore, then you've altered in some very significant way the final 
expression or the final purpose of the D.N.A ..... 
You go a long way thinking inside a paradigm. Again going back to how far 
we've gone with the paradigm of Newtonian physics or nuclear power. That's 
how we move forward and scientists would argue that I'm an iconoclast, that 
I'm in some way disempowering [by] saying that you can't get there from here 
[which] is basically what I'm saying. They say, 'Look at how far this thinking 
has taken us. It can take us further. You can eventually read all the books 
in the library and know what the heck's going on. We don't need your 
pathetic attempts at the formulation of aesthetics. We'll just carry on the way 
we're going." 
Fine. That's an argument anybody can make. It's not one I find credible 
because when I ask them, 'Well, what are you going to do about Bosnia?", 
they just look at me as if that doesn't exist. 'How come we marginalise 5.5% 
of the kids, marginalise with each generation and its getting worse as 
generations go by?" They've no answer to that. Talking the way you were 
just talking: "Canlt we find a paradigm inside the paradigm that will allow us 
to understand'. I haven't been able to. I've been at this for 33 years. I can't 
see a paradigm inside that will help us. Even though I'm stuck with using 
them, I'm aware that they're not getting us anywhere. Now, if you can think 
your way by that, let me know. 
The social conflicts that are common features of humanity are central preoccupations 
of Keith Johnson. In his attempts to think beyond the attachment paradigm, Keith's 
speculation turns to genetics as a decisive factor condemning us to the contradictory forces 
inherent in the human condition. The principles of attachment behaviour as they are 
inscribed in our biology define our capacities and limitations as a species. Relief will be 
forthcoming only at such time as our current genetic configuration has run its course or 
human intervention through genetic engineering has moved us beyond the current impasse, 
the latter an admittedly hazardous option. This totalizing narrative shifts attention away from 
structural change as a possible means to reduce the violence in human relations. Instead, 
we are reduced to spectators awaiting a sea change in human affairs triggered by the 
anticipated progressive consequences of biological evolution. 
Despite the complexity, subtlety and breadth of his vision, Keith's perspective shares 
a feature in common with other discourses. Each endeavours to articulate a coherent 
narrative and each is destined to remain partial, positioned and partisan. Anthropology, for 
example, has been subjected to intense criticism for its tendency to fashion a monologue 
with its objects of inquiry, a perspective which has until relatively recently assured the 
discipline a certain prestige and authority in its representation of the cultural other. It is 
evident that the same sort of critical scrutiny is required wherever claims to truth are made, 
be they those of common sense or benevolent objectivity. This forum can expect no closure 
as the investigation is endless. The single expectation is that it attempts to be inclusive in 
its scrutiny, exempting no narrative from its examination. 
In the case of both cultural myth and professional discourse, an initial hurdle is simply 
the recognition that a critique is required. In each instance, the aura of truth which 
envelopes the idiom acts as a protective cocoon, deflecting attempts to skewer the contents 
with a penetrating gaze. Instead, common sense familiarity renders the ideological 
component non-existent. One consequence of this dynamic can be seen in the influence 
of mental health professionals on cultural norms. The net effect of their discourse forges 
a cultural logic whereby socially related problems are transformed into mental health 
problems innate in the individual. The Facilitating Program challenges this tendency to 
some extent, yet its unintended consequences are consistent with the interests of the status 
quo. It was with my introduction to Dorothy and Raphael Becvats Family Therapy: * 
Systemic Integmtion (Becvar and Becvar, 1988) that I was able to understand this dynamic 
more clearly. However, it would be some time before my own complicity in this process 
would be revealed to me. 
The Perils of Reflexivity 
T he Becvar's manual represents the linchpin connecting the assessment phase of the care plan process with the community follow-up. This text is not only 
the central reference used by the community support workers, but also the document which 
melds the various components of the program into a conceptual whole, an integrated 
system. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Bart was introduced to this book by 
Keith Johnson who recommended its inclusion in the training of community support workers. 
Bart explains the role played by Family Therapy in the training sessions: 
Becvar and Becvar was the first thing I wanted people to read because it 
took a cognitive approach and offered a restructuring of the way things could 
be viewed. The cognitive approach is probably the least threatening to 
people. It gave them a very thorough examination of how we participate in 
life. It provided the language - the metaphors, the words - that we could 
use. It provided a common metaphor. It probably confronted the value 
based - [i.e.]positive and negative - understanding that most people in the 
helping professions come with. It took almost a scientific approach to the 
view that when you finally understand that you don't know it, you now do. 
Which is really what [Zen Buddhist philosopher] Alan Watts was saying: 
letting go of the assumption that you understand it all, that you've got the 
truth or that your perspective is some measurable indication of true reality. 
I think that is the first second order change experience that people have. 
In fact, [the book] explains that in a very incremental and logical manner. It 
almost seems a contradiction in terms, but it is done that way. I think that it's 
a safe way for people to open their minds to the process of new ideas or new 
perceptions or of being comfortable with a lack of understanding, of not 
having it sorted out. It also makes a good, sound philosophical and 
theoretical framework for understanding the way systems operate and that 
life is a system. We're all part of a greater system which is the point that the 
Facilitating Program is acknowledging. [Community support] workers have 
to be very sensitive to that fact because they have to function not as an 
observer of a black box but as part of a system. They have to participate in 
as benign a way as possible. If you participate with an understanding of the 
rules of the systems, the way they operate, then you can be benign because 
you're not trying to make a square peg fit in a round hole. That basic 
discipline, that understanding was important. [Becvar and Becvar] was really 
the foundation for the other experiences. 
The Becvars acknowledge that the logical positivist-empirical tradition continues to 
set the standard for scientific investigation in popular consciousness (Becvar and Becvar, 
1988:292). This position of dominance is considered to be due, in large part, to the 
perceived success of its efforts to transcend the uncertainties and relativity of the human 
predicament by 'defining a specific protocol to make our subjectivity objective' (Becvar and 
Becvar, 1988:299). According to these authors, systems theory and the new physics 
challenge the assumptions of logical positivist-empirical science as they are played out in 
conventional psychology. The observer's perceptions are now judged to be decisive to the 
constitution of what is perceived: 
This position seems to reflect the essence of Einstein's statement that the 
theory decides what we can observe. In other words, what we can see and 
what is 'out there" is decided by the paradigm we have in our heads. Thus, 
what is in our heads becomes real 'out there" and takes on characteristics 
of the paradigm and apparatus we used in our observation. We are looking 
in a mirror and what we see is our own reflection looking at us looking in a 
mirror (Becvar and Becvar, 1988:296).5 
While the Becvars call on professionals to be cognizant of the formative influences 
on their point of view in order to free themselves from unconscious constraints (Becvar and 
Becvar, 1988:xvii), they skirt discussion of the systemic inequalities that permeate the social 
realm, constraining attitudes and actions alike.= Instead, they present a somewhat 
generalized account of the interdependence of the observer and the observed. In this 
conception, a dialectical process of mutuality dictates that patterns of behaviour are 
reciprocally determined rather than due to the actions and attitudes of one party or the other. 
They recognize that an historical account of existing patterns may lead to a better 
understanding of the current context. However, they argue that their primary concern is not 
one of locating the cause of ineffective communication and conduct in order to attribute 
blame. Instead, they seek alternate ways of conceptualizing troublesome patterns so that 
innovative communication and behaviour can be introduced (Becvar and Becvar, l988:69). 
This process is referred to as second order change, modification of the rules of a system 
resulting in the transformation of the system itself (Becvar and Becvar, 1988:86). Neither 
does their systems theory approach prejudge which order of relationships should command 
our attention. The Becvars observe that as the family tends to be a focal point for living and 
for meaning creating, therapists commonly have directed their attention to this social 
complex. However, they claim it is equally appropriate to intervene at the individual, couple, 
extended family, neighbourhood or societal levels (Becvar and Becvar, 1988: 13). 
What remains problematic in the Becvats formulation is the interrelationship of 
knowledge and power. They touch upon this issue with a discussion of the nature of the 
prevailing culture which values certainty and which finds reassurance in the correlational 
research methods and quantitative findings favoured by the logical positivist-empirical 
approach. While affirming this tradition as a credible way of knowing, the authors question 
its claims to objectivity. In particular, they take exception to the 'disciplinary politicss (Becvar 
and Becvar, 1988:301) through which the frame of reference of fledgling students is 
systematically constricted to correspond with the dominant conventions. In this manner, the 
search for solutions to broadly sketched problems intended to address the interests of 
humankind are supplanted by more modest exercises which effectively re-assert the 
interests of the profession or discipline (Becvar and Becvar, 1988:301-302) 
By contrast, the cybernetics of cybernetics proposed by the Becvars is not 
complacent with accepted truths. It calls for continual reformulation of so-called problems. 
This requires that the existing frame is constantly questioned in the name of addressing 
issues through different conceptual lenses. It is at this point that they introduce their 
conception of aesthetic which they propose would offset the current practice of mental health 
professionals - family therapists, specifically - intervening with a confidence that may not 
be warranted. It would also call into question the clamouring for truth which has seen the 
social sciences "become 'secular religions' to which people turn for the certainty previous 
generations sought in 'traditional religions'" (Becvar and Becvar, 1988:294). This initiative 
seeks to surpass the disciplinary boundaries currently in place by challenging conceptions 
through consultation with existing authorities and clients alike. Aesthetic therapy replaces 
the imposition of the expert's agenda with a collaborative enterprise. It represents a 
reciprocal partnership in which the parties work together to formulate a higher order solution 
(Becvar and Becvar, l988:303). 
Here the Becvars hint at the possibilities - and the risks. They mention that family 
therapists impose values which frequently coincide with those of the prevailing culture. In 
fact, '[wlhat is experienced by our society as normal or abnormal and the relative range of 
each is suggested by the theories we professionals invent for consumption by the members 
of the society"(Becvar and Becvar, 1988:322).' Pragmatism may demand conciliation with 
the dominant point of view and the prevailing structures in order to provide the questing 
professional with the security of an economic livelihood and credibility with her peers (Becvar 
and Becvar, 1988:319). Nevertheless, the Becvars indicate that higher order solutions, by 
definition, take us beyond what is the norm at any particular moment. They advocate close 
collaboration with clients, yet they sidestep the possibility that the self interest of the 
professional may part company from those of the person he or she is endeavouring to 
assist. The therapist may benefit from prevailing formations, processes and institutions 
which perpetuate imbalances of power and privilege. In fact, the status of expert is a 
consequence of successful training within the state's ideological apparatus of education, a 
disciplining formation which grants the credentials enabling professionals to take up a 
particular position in relation to their clients. The Becvars refrain from calling attention to this 
relationship, an historical arrangement whose familiarity contributes to the invisibility of its 
constraining effects on collaborative efforts to reframe perceived problems and difficulties. 
The Becvars' conciliatory attitude towards logical-positivist-empiricism coupled with 
their commitment to a systems approach mirror the outlook taken by the Facilitating 
Program. On the one hand, the assessment period of the care plan process is dominated 
by a focus on the individual despite efforts to contextualize made in the course of the social 
history. The net effect of the various tools of assessment is to underscore personal 
characteristics and attributes couched within a frame in which possible insults to attachment 
serve as causal origins of current conduct. On the other hand, the care plan and the 
community support phase look at present dynamics in order to identify patterns of 
communication that are ineffective. This is regarded as a mutually constitutive configuration 
with no intent to level blame. Yet its formulation occurs within a circumscribed context which 
ignores broader power relationships including those embodied by the various professionals 
as employees of the state. Consistent with the Becvar's example, the Facilitating Program 
appears to encourage reflexivity only to the point where it begins to jeopardize the existing 
relationship between the mental health worker and her client. Culturally sanctioned as 
agents of truth and compassion, mental health workers typically spend little time second 
guessing the legitimacy of their mission as state employed professionals. This oversight 
ensures that the cultural presumptions and political configurations which sustain their 
careers and their economic livelihood remain relatively immune to critical scrutiny. 
The Becvar's book provided me with the distance necessary to become aware of the 
relative lack of reflexivity demonstrated by the Facilitating Program staff. Its perspective 
dovetailed with my own radical historicist outlook, compelling me to situate the concepts and 
procedures of the Facilitating Program within an historical context. In particular, the 
pr~gram's conception of community caught my attention. The family is considered to be the 
nexus with teachers, social workers, child care workers typically playing supportive satellite 
roles in a constellation that the program manager characterizes as a form of extended 
family. Yet broader social dynamics remain conspicuously absent or minimized in this 
portrayal. Oppressive structural relations are given short shrift in the understanding of 
factors contributing to possible traumatic encounters in the child's past which may inform 
present behaviours as well as in the appreciation of current conflicts which may precipitate 
the problem behaviours. Instead, the care team typically speaks of an individual's 
psychological upset within a particular family rather than pointing to wider social 
contradictions, an approach which serves a depoliticizing function (Gusfield, 1989:433; 
Morgan, 1980; Waitzkin, 1991). Ultimately, the Program considers the resources necessary 
for caring relationships within the home community to exist at present. Some creativity and 
initiative on the part of local care givers may be needed to gain access to these resources, 
but no structural transformation is deemed necessary. 
Intentionally or otherwise, the program guarantees itself a steady supply of clients 
without fear of the source drying up. Significantly, the Facilitating Program's definition of 
community is so circumscribed that the social contradictions which may be decisive to the 
appearance of the problematic behaviours remain undetected and undisturbed. Where 
local communities perceive themselves to be ill-equipped to implement the care plan, the 
Facilitating Program calls for increased intervention by the community support workers to 
expedite the discovery of innovative ways to apply existing resources. However, the 
examination of systemic violence - underlying social structural contradictions - remains 
beyond the purview of this approach, effectively guaranteeing the maintenance of the status 
quo. 
Inadvertently or not, this intervention serves to legitimize the activities of the state. 
The Facilitating Program, in particular, and the state, in general, are effectively absolved of 
further responsibility if difficulties persist. What is promised is further intensive scrutiny of 
the lives of individuals and continued monitoring of the supportive measures provided by the 
immediate community. However, an evaluation of the program's suitability or the need for 
preventative measures such as structural transformation are overlooked. Instead, the state 
may be seen to have fulfilled its mandate with responsibility for ongoing care now reverting 
to a local level. 
Initially, the team defines itself as part of this community for the purposes of 
identifying the socially related nature of the problematic behaviour and of outlining supportive 
actions which could be taken. If the difficulties persist, however, the program reframes its 
relationship within the community. This is indicated by its observation that "the extent to 
which this approach is expected to lead to behavioural change depends on both the nature 
and severity of attachment disruption in the youth and the flexibility and adaptability of the 
ecology in responding to his or her needs' (Crossroads, 1992b7). With this statement, the 
impact of the staff members interventions - as professionals, as employees of this state 
agency, as individuals. - is bracketed and their accountability is sidestepped. They cast 
themselves as facilitators whose allegedly neutral actions are beyond reproach and above 
criticism. In this way, they privilege their position as professionals, detaching themselves 
from the very social body of which they initially claimed to be a part. As a consequence, 
their location within existing relations of power is obscured and their position of relative 
privilege remains undisturbed. In addition, the broader social mechanism by which they are 
mandated to carry out their specialized practice remains opaque. The state thus persists 
as that nebulous entity that we take for granted, a common sense given universally 
necessary for the preservation of social order. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN - CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
T he program's narrow definition of community and its self-exclusion from evaluation was brought home to me as I struggled to determine my own role 
in the fieldwork site. As a former youth worker in a residential treatment centre, I could 
identify with some of the expectations and limitations that faced the workers in this program. 
As a psychiatric nurse trained in social constructionism rather than the medical model, I had 
some awareness of how the gaze of each professional discipline takes place through distinct 
lenses. My initial objective had been to document how possible perceptual distortions on 
the part of the professionals may do violence to the actual circumstances of the teenagers. 
I wanted to understand and represent the teenagers' point of view, acting as an advocate 
for them. 
City of Vancouver's Children and Youth advocate Penny Parry explains how she got 
the clearest instructions on how to act as an advocate from the Youth in Care Network, an 
organization made up of teenagers in institutional or foster care. On her first day on the job, 
she met with the Network and immediately was asked what it was exactly that an advocate 
did. A little taken aback, she asked them what they thought she should be doing. First, they 
told her that as the children's advocate, she should not presume to know what is in their best 
interest. Instead, she should help them to understand whatever situation they are in: why 
they've been turfed out of class or into foster care or how come no one seems to listen to 
them. And she should help them to understand in a way that doesn't make them feel bad 
or stupid for asking for assistance. Second, they told her that once they understand the 
situation, she should help them express what they need to say, not say it for them. And, 
finally, if they've invested time and energy to get informed and taken the risk of expressing 
themselves, her job is to make sure that they don't waste time with officials who won't listen 
or who can't do anything for them. Penny has used these three points as the model for all 
her advocacy work for youths and families ever since (Wilson, 1994:lO) 
This approach has a number of supporters within anthropology. It is consistent with 
the principles outlined in a recent practical guide to applied anthropology which argues that 
people 'have the right to be actively involved in the management of their destinies, and 
consequently to avoid becoming the victims of others' good intentions" (Chambers, l985:23; 
original italics, quoted in Singer, 1994:340-341). The role of the anthropologist is to help 
them 'bring about their own visions, in their own ways, and [at] their own speeds" (Egan- 
McKenna, 1990:13, quoted in Singer, 1994341). In short, it is to provide critical support in 
their pursuit of self-determination (Escobar, l993:17). 
As I had not been given permission to conduct formal interviews with the teenagers 
who agreed to be part of my study, I decided to examine the reports and activities of the 
program staff to see the extent to which their discourse and practice served to further the 
self-determination of the youths in their care. I assumed that this limited form of advocacy 
would dovetail with my role as anthropologist. However, it occurred to me during the early 
stages of my fieldwork that these two roles might not make for a comfortable fit. As I had 
not ruled out working in applied medical anthropology, I began to wonder what possible 
repercussions my advocacy approach might have on future job prospects. 
The team's stated policy of being responsible and accountable to the community 
pointed the way out of this impasse. But where they defined community in circumscribed 
terms and distanced themselves from the evaluation process, I decided to participate as a 
member of community writ large - as part of humankind. I would try to use my specialised 
knowledge to further the interests of the greater community and not, primarily, to advance 
my professional career. All very clear. All very simple. All very noble. Well, this decision 
may have set my mind at ease for awhile, but I soon discovered that it carried with it many 
liabilities. 
My circumstances were complicated by the fact that I had been schooled in the 
therapeutic discourse and practices that I now was trying to document. The concepts and 
notions that were commonplace among the staff were the same ones that provided the glue 
that held my own interpretations together. They had become too familiar to me. How then 
to become conscious of my own consciousness? Ultimately, I concluded that I should be 
looking at the processes and structures which allowed me to carry out my fieldwork and the 
staff to carry out their therapeutic interventions. The answers to my questions were not 
going to come from imposing an "usfthem" distinction. They would emerge from an 
examination of the social conditions of knowledge production that we shared in common. 
A s academics or activists, those of us who pursue a livelihood within the fields of education, criminal justice, health or social services are implicated in the 
very structures which we often find reason to criticise. We derive financial benefits and 
professional status from the ideological apparatuses of the state, mechanisms which have 
shown themselves to be instruments of both care and social control. Typically, we have 
sought to shore up and to extend those forces which appear to be the most progressive. 
Yet our defining frames seldom, if ever, come into question. Arturo Escobar notes: 
[tlhey are, indeed, those parts most invisible to us, because they give us the 
right to speak and the right to know ourselves and others. These practices 
cannot be dispelled arbitrarily, but they have to be historicized, as part of 
dominant modem modes of knowing; at the same time, anthropology has 
failed to construct a politics that problematizes this dependence and the 
relationship between knowledge that makes it possible and the social 
positioning from which it operates and which it tends to reinforce (Escobar, 
1992:418-419). 
To help me grasp this relationship, I first turned to the structural positioning of the 
treatment program and the university as components of the ideological apparatus of the 
state under capitalism. The existence of the various disciplines gathered under the umbrella 
of the treatment program is an outcome of this arrangement. The multi-disciplinary 
composition of the team mirrors divisions of academic expertise evident on university 
campuses. Here a conception of the person is first formulated, dis-assembled then re- 
assembled on the basis of disciplinary frameworks forged in the crucible of European 
Enlightenment and further moulded by the shifting demands of the state. 
We need to give heed to our position within this arrangement. The structures and 
language that fuel accepted notions of social problems tend to be driven by state funded and 
sanctioned processes of social ordering. As Escobar (1 993) remarks, it is experts - within 
the university and outside - that provide the currency used by the dominant classes and the 
state to define specific groups of people as clients with particular needs. It is experts - and 
experts, of course, know best - that render individuals administered objects whose needs 
are "unproblematic' (since they are defined by expert knowledge)" (Escobar, 1993:386). 
Narratives compiled by the mental health professions regularly depict individuals 
hobbled by social contradictions to be undergoing emotional or psychological difficulties 
innate to their person or exclusive to their particular history within their immediate social field. 
As the social context is alternately sloughed off or tightly constrained, any possibility to 
situate the interpretation within a political frame is hindered. Predicaments evocative of 
broader social problems are reconfigured as personal difficulties. Problems of a political 
nature become individualized with the path of intervention charted in medical or 
psychological terms. Issues of concern to broadly based groups in civil society are re-cast 
as matters of individual distress. In short, the status quo negotiates the application of its 
authorized social psychology to yet another potential political flashpoint. 
In the case of the Facilitating Program, a tutelary blueprint - the care plan - is drawn 
up by state professionals at the highest level with responsibility for its implementation 
decentralized to local authorities. Consistent with medical practice (Waitzkin, 1991 :4-5), in 
general, and psychotherapy (Lichtman, 1982:268), in particular, the chosen course of 
treatment focuses on adjustments of attitude and conduct individuals can make in their 
immediate situation rather than on the restructuring of the larger society. A closely 
monitored and tightly circumscribed local community is mobilized to put this plan into effect. 
Responsibility for the care plan's implementation is thereby returned to local authorities, 
professional and individual. Through this intervention, the state is seen to have fulfilled its 
mandate of individual care and social control. As a consequence, conditions for the 
continued accumulation of capital are secured and the legitimacy of both the state and the 
status quo are ensured. 
By definition, tutelage is neither positive nor negative; instead, it must be evaluated 
in context. The Facilitating Program operates within the social space traditionally filled by 
care giving adults entrusted to aid youths' transition to responsible adult status. The state's 
present occupation of this social space has been authorized and legitimized by social norms 
at least partially of its own making. State guardianship of supposed conduct disorder youths 
has come to be viewed as a necessary and desirable fact of life. Through the education, 
counselling and monitoring of the conduct of both the youths and their adult care givers, the 
state's agencies establish a relationship of benign persuasion which, in turn, frames care 
givers' relations with the youths in their care. The outcome is the shaping and moulding of 
behaviour in the midst of a caring, supportive association. It is within the dynamics of these 
relationships with significant adults that the youths fashion a sense of self and other. It is 
here that the fundamental aspects of identity and identification are forged. It is here that 
significant events - including those evocative of distress - are identified and interpreted. 
And it is here that the notion of the person as an individual and the conception of the 
relationship of that individual to the broader social realm takes on distinct attributes of 
individuation. 
These encounters are formative of the individual's cultural logics, styles of reasoning 
tending to be so much a part of the unrefleded processes of how the individual interprets 
reality as to be presumed to be reality itself. This provides the template upon which the 
person articulates the meaning of subsequent social relations. This process helps to explain 
how oppressive social relations may come to be characterised as emotional or psychological 
problems inherent to the individual, thereby depoliticising a cultural logic transmitted from 
one generation to the next. 
A s an apprentice anthropologist, I am part of an academic discipline which has tended to be slow to see its complicity in the state's construction of problems, 
clients and needs. More than ten years ago, Sherry Ortner (1984) stressed the growing 
significance of the concept of practice within anthropology. This shift in attention from rules, 
norms, structures and systems to human action in everyday life was judged to be critical to 
an understanding of how social systems are sustained and transformed. However, the 
balance of the 1980's was marked by a preoccupation with the literary and dialogic practices 
that inform representation and textuality to the neglect of what Marilyn Strathern (1 989) has 
termed "the ethnography of Western Knowledge practicesn (Escobar, 1992:418) which 
contain and constrain the outlook of the ethnographers themselves. 
Anthropologists working in the health field have proven to be no exception to this 
oversight. As Merrill Singer points out: 
[Ilacking a reflexive orientation, medical anthropology has tended to follow 
the path of least resistan =....shaped by the dictates of 'social usefulness' as 
that is conventionally defined by the dominant ideology of Western society. 
Despite lip service paid to social criticism, the critical edge of medical 
anthropology has long been blunted in the service of gaining social 
acceptability and access to the health arena from powerful players in the 
biomedical health system (Singer, l990:295). 
What is required is that we examine the conditions in which we generate 'facts," 
determine the interests that this information serves, and adopt a more critical attitude 
towards our role in the production of conventional knowledge (Escobar, 1993; Scheper- 
Hughes, 1992). From the early Greeks to Gramsci, a consistent call has been to 'know 
thyself' and this is part of our task. Michel Foucault (1 991) helps sharpen our perception of 
this question by indicating how the fields of belief and action are structured by power through 
a form of govemmentality. "Culture itself, it can be argued, is the result of discourses and 
practices of governmentality (concerning health, the body, planning, the population, 
etc.)"(Escobar, 1992:411). As researchers, this demands that we must undertake an 
itinerary of how we have come to be constituted on the basis of certain practices and 
discourses. This self-critique can be understood as a form of 'historical ontology of 
ourselves" (Escobar, l992:4ll). 
The university is an important site in an inventory of our knowledge practices. 
Academic disciplines do just that - discipline, setting distinct constraints on what is 
produced and how (Escobar, 1992:41&-419). The net result of these normalizing effects has 
prompted a number of people' to comment on the difficulties of maintaining a critical stance 
within this setting. Comel West (1993) argues that cultural critics located in universities and 
colleges find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they align themselves with 
those who campaign for the fundamental transformation of social structures, including 
institutions of learning. On the other, they are economically dependent on these same 
structures. West believes it is only with simultaneous involvement in social movements 
independent of these structures that critical voices can keep from being co-opted. This 
parallels lessons drawn from Jurgen Haberrnas' analysis in which he promotes the fortunes 
of what he calls civil society, that social space whose cultural logics stand in opposition to 
those of capital and the state (Escobar, 1992; Everton, 1996). 
For the staff members of the Facilitating Program, solidarity with these sentiments 
does not necessitate abandoning employment as mental health professionals. However, 
it does demand a constant sorting through of the various issues encountered in the course 
of their work to determine the solutions which best serve the interests of those who are most 
oppressed and exploited. Despite the benevolence of their intentions, their structural 
location poses ongoing questions of complicity which many not always prove possible to 
resolve without putting their own professional careers at risk. 
The same dilemmas confront cultural critics employed within an academic setting. 
bell hooks speaks from this vantage point, urging the devising of alternate ways of knowing 
and writing to sustain political commitment. Specifically, she calls for a redefinition of 
interactions between so-called experts and the people who have been their traditional 
informants. She claims that unless these encounters are based on mutually reciprocal 
engagement and critique, the inevitable outcome will be all too familiar relationships of 
oppression. 'When this happens, cultural studies reinscribes patterns of colonial 
domination, where the 'Other' is always made the object, appropriated, interpreted, taken 
over by those in power, by those who dominate" (hooks, 1990:125). In this arrangement, 
the academic 'expert" adopts the role of 'privileged interpreter-cultural overseer" (hooks, 
1990:9, quoted in Escobar, 1992:418). 
Dell Hymes (1991) suggests a different tactic yet one which complements hooks' 
proposal. He calls for a decentralized ethnography with many practitioners and many 
fieldwork sites. He envisions ethnography not to be the exclusive domain of professionals, 
university and college trained and based. Instead, it should be the practice of people of 
diverse experience and differing skills in locales with which they are familiar, i.e. in their 
workplaces, their neighbourhoods, theirassociations. He contends that institutionally based 
ethnography is but one resource among many to be employed in this joint enterprise. Memll 
Singer (1 993;1994) continues in a similar vein, urging the participation of anthropologists in 
what he terms a community-centred praxis, 'a collaboration with the other in the struggle for 
self-determinationn (Singer, l993:15). By this he means long term engagement with local 
development initiatives, campaigns and projects which define common needs and problems 
and seek their resolution through collective actions. Ethnographers and mental health 
professionals alike share the challenge of widening the space for democratic decision 
making, an essential requisite for the transformation of structural inequalities (Greenberg, 
1981). Raymond Williams considers this involvement to be critical to the education of 
ordinary people in the skills and responsibilities of government (Williams, 1979). In the 
instance of so-called conduct disordered youths, collaboration with Youth in Care Network 
and the community members seeking to define the plight of their children in other than 
medical or criminal terms would appear to be promising places to start. 
Collaboration means to work together, yet it is possible to collaborate in a monologue 
in which the discourse is initiated and dominated by views of one party. A critical 
collaboration requires a dialogue in which all participants take part, the cultural logics of 
each individual - what Paulo Freire terms 'generative themesn or 'meaningful thematicsn 
(Freire, 197011990:86) - being informed and transformed in the process2 This 'problem- 
posingn (Freire, l970/1990:66) exchange is such that the theoretical knowledge of the 
professional and the 'empirical knowledgen (Freire, 1 970/1990:129) of the client and the 
immediate community become entwined. As members of a partnership of 'co-investigatorsn 
(Freire, 197011 990:97), professionals join their nonprofessional counterparts "to know with 
them the reality that challenges themn (Freire, 197011 99O:lO2). In dialectical terms, it 
involves the movement to a new synthesis not the informed acquiescence of one person to 
the initial thesis of the other. Only within a mutually constitutive critical dialogue can one 
hope to arrive at second order change and a new point of departure referred to by the 
Becvars. 
Y et this is an exercise fraught with risks for power imbalances are still in play. For the professional, it raises the possibility that the client may reject her 
analysis on the basis of her own lived experience (Freire, 1992/1994:26-27), thereby 
undermining the professional's credibility as an expert. For the client, it means providing 
the professional with insights into her point of view which may be used, inadvertently or 
otherwise, to advance the hegemonic interests of the dominant order, perpetuating 
conditions of inequality which may have contributed to the present experience of distress3 
Critical practice conducted in the midst of state sanctioned programs finds itself on 
especially contradictory terrain. However, no social movement can be said to be free 
standing, immune to the influence of state policy. Community initiatives face constant 
threats not the least of which is the strengthening of hegemonic designs which can occur 
when reformist activities are mistaken for transformative ones (Singer, 1995:88-90). The 
former involves system correcting measures which pull up short of altering the basic social 
structure; the latter endeavours to bring about decisive changes in the alignment of power. 
Singer shares Howard Waitzkin's concern that collective movements originating as agents 
of social change are often co-opted: 
... the history of reform in capitalist countries has shown that reforms most 
often follow social protest, make incremental improvements that do not 
change overall patterns of oppression, and face cutbacks when protest 
recedes (Waitzkin, 1981 :359, quoted in Singer, l995:88). 
Assimilation by the state's ideological apparatus is one way in which transformative 
impulses are undermined. This frequently takes the form of a shift away from community 
education, democratic decision making and social activism: 
... involvement with the state and the receipt of regular funding contribute to 
the formalization and bureaucratization of community organizations. The 
initial goals of many community groups are displaced by concerns with 
organizational maintenance and by the career interests of their workers. 
Once established, 'inertial forces" within the groups can impede their ability 
to respond to changes in their environments, and they can be prone to 
internal fragmentation. The ability of indigenous workers to bring about 
social change can be limited by the organizations in which they work, and 
they can experience pressure to become more professional and earn 
academic credentials (Cain, 1993:666, quoted in Singer, 1995:88). 
The incorporation of autonomous social movements into the realm of state control 
is parallelled by the further incursion of state initiatives into civil society. One manifestation 
takes the form of a type of quasi-professionalization in which a client or patient is included 
as an equal partner in a joint project. Relations of mutuality and respect provide the 
conditions in which the lay person is encouraged to take an independent point of view while 
simultaneously being educated in the professional mind set (Ingleby, 1985:102). 
These perils hamper efforts to formulate effective collaborative models. Yet the 
necessity to transform the potentially destructive dichotomy between roles of expert and 
cultural other remains. Johannes Fabian and Edward Said have addressed this issue in 
the context of the current crisis of anthropology, but I would argue that their remarks have 
a much wider currency. The campaign to transform oppressive relations between expert 
and concerned citizen (and what citizen is not concerned) is on the agenda across the social 
sciences and the humanities as well as in the health professions. Anthropology simply finds 
itself to be the most vulnerable to criticism due to its traditional project. This perilous position 
- ironically and perhaps not surprisingly - makes anthropologists uniquely qualified to draw 
lessons from past complicity in relations of domination and to contribute to the emerging 
movement to transform the political basis of knowledge production. 
Both Fabian and Said (1989) call for anthropology to abandon the analysis of the 
other in an us-them dichotomy and for the frame to be reconceived. They argue that the 
political processes which constitute the other are identical to those which create the self. 
Fabian believes that: 
[w]e will always be liable to be seen (correctly) as old colonizers in a new 
guise as long as we understand critical, emancipatory anthropology as doing 
our critique to help them - by they the Third World, the working classes, the 
disinherited, women .... Who are we to 'help' them? We need critique 
(exposure of imperialist lies, of the workings of capitalism, of the misguided 
ideas of scientism, and all the rest) to help ourselves. The catch is, of 
course, that 'ourselves' ought to be them as well as us (Fabian, 1991:24; 
original italics). 
Ultimately, the material conditions capable of sustaining such a view will only be 
realized with the transformation of oppressive social relations which mediate our interactions 
with each other and which obscure our common plight and interests (Fabian, 1990;1991). 
A critical anthropology - and an equally critical mental health profession - which directs a 
probing gaze with equanimity towards the self as well as the other and which seeks to 
overcome the relations of domination in which it is implicated is well worth the struggle to 
realize. Clearly, the objective of such a broadly based project is not the traditional one of 
positivist social science from Comte to the present day which seeks to predict and control 
human behaviour. Instead, it strives to eliminate oppressive social dimensions, both those 
which unfold before us in social practices and those which are inscribed within us as 
habituated attitudes. It is in this way that we can move towards helping ourselves and 
towards the moment when we truly can say (with apologies to Pogo) that we have 
discovered the 'other' ... and them's us. 
It seems to me that this is the challenge that faces all cultural critics, whether mental 
health professionals, social scientists or concerned citizens. We must strive to document 
the world and ourselves in it in such a way that the circumstances in which we find ourselves 
become enabling conditions for the transformation of the world and of ourselves. Certainly, 
forces capable of bringing about these changes are greater than any one of us. Yet each 
of us has the responsibility to sort through the privileges, to be mindful of the perils and to 
have the courage of our convictions to articulate and to support forces of progress. Those 
are the rights and obligations exacted by the practice of cultural critique. And, I might add, 
they are no different than those imposed by the burden of being human. 
NOTES 
CHAPTER ONE: CROSSROADS 
1. For my purposes, identity is defined as the selfs 'central organising principle' (Paranjpe, 197536). 
Community refers to a symbolic construdion encompassing norms and values through which a sense of identity 
within a bounded social grouping is provided to its members (Hamitton, 19859). A person's understanding and 
experience of community is judged to reside in his or her relationship to the symbol not to meaning inherent 
in that symbol (Cohen, 1985; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991; Bentley, 1987; McDonald, 1987). On the one 
hand, this means that it is possible for a sense of commonality to exist while one's individuality remains 
preserved. On the other, it opens the door to potential conflict regarding whose definition of community will be 
the one conventionally accepted (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991:4; Butchart and Seedat, 1990). 
2. The term middle dass is understood here to refer not to a separate dass but to a relatively privileged sector 
of the working class comprised of certain unionised manual labourers as well as clusters of nonmanual 
labourers, both unionised and non-unionised (Ehrenreich, 1989:10-12; Ortner, 1991 :169). The working class 
may be considered to indude 'all those dependent on a salary or wage for their livelihoods and has a changing 
structure largely determined by the changing needs of capital and its level of developmenr (Teeple, 199527). 
The working class in contemporary capitalist society is highly differentiated in terms of income and status. 
These 'internal cleavages, almost too numerous to mention, [have not changed] the essential position of the 
working class vis-a-vis capital, but they [are] real and remain objective and experienced and therefore 
significant factors in dividing the working class within itself (leeple, 199529). 
3. The postmodemist period (Jameson, 1991 :x) also has been characterized as late-modernity (Giddens, 1990; 
Hall, 1992c:277), high modernity (Giddens, 1991:4), and late capitalism (Mandel, 1975; Jameson, 1991:~~). 
Definitions of postmodemism alone are many and elusive (Featherstone, l988:2O7; Ross, 1988:~). Perhaps 
it is easiest to agree upon what postmodemism is not: modernity. In sociological terms, modernity can be 
understood as the historical period in which European society experienced a confluence of events which would 
transform how people lived and thought. Industrialization and the growth of the urban population brought about 
an upheaval in social and economic differentiation and a substantial shedding of the constraints of the feudal 
social order including the discarding of the blinders of religious dogma. A multidimensional project (Hamilton, 
1992:23), Enlightenment thought is commonly associated with its dominant tendency: a radical intellectual 
tradition devoted to the tenets of a foundational system of knowledge based on universal rationality. 
Conventionally known as positivism, this perspective bases itself on the premise that any object of knowledge - 
another person or a group of people, for instance - can be understood independent of our relationship with that 
researched object (Bologh, 19795). Characteristic features of this perspective include an allegiance to the 
experimental model of social research in which the relationship between quantitative variables is assessed with 
reference to universal laws. Emphasis is placed upon the ability to generalize from the research findings with 
the use of statistical probability currently finding particular favour. Procedures of observation seek to achieve 
neutrality by employing allegedly value free terminology and standardized practices. This is intended to 
eliminate - or, at least, drastically minimize - the possible effects of the researcher on the data, thereby aiding 
verification of the findings by replicating the research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 19833-5; Fay, 197520-21). 
The mutual interaction between positivist social science and conventional beliefs has been far-reaching, the 
boundary between the two modes of thought appearing at times to be virtually undetectable (Aronowitz, 
1988524). Dichotomous thinking tends to be the order of the day with distinctions commonly being made 
between science and common sense (Marsh, 1988:xii), mind and body, self and other, individual and society. 
It is precisely the legacy of the Enlightenment - modernist thought's stated or implicit daims to objectivity - 
which has come under virulent attack. What has emerged is an ironic scepticism towards all authoritative 
claims concerning reality, truth, power, knowledge, language, the self. The target of postmodernism's campaign 
of suspicion is the belief that science with its value-free methods constitutes the correct use of reason whereby 
it is possible to represent objective reality through the allegedly neutral means of language (Flax, 1990: 41-42). 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, by contrasts, argues that language favours certain aspects of the objects, enabling the 
form and content of rational discourse to be manipulated to serve the interests of those in positions of power 
(Hare-Mustin and Marecek, 1988:455). Feminism has launched an equally devastating attack on the gender 
biased concept of the transcendent self, blithely referred to as the guardian of reason. Where once the notion 
of the self was seen to house unchanging universals, current opinion is more likely to emphasize its 
embeddedness in historically specific social relations with all the partiality and vested interest that implies (Flax, 
1990: 43). Edward Said skewers the mutually constitutive relationship between European cultural practices 
and the economic and political enterprise of imperialism by citing Frantz Fanon's caustic observation that "[flor 
the native, objectivity is always directed against him [sic]" (Fanon, 1963:77; Said, 1993:162). This portrayal 
accentuates the intimate connections between knowledge and power (Foucault, 1980:131; Hall, 1992d:295). 
Indeed, it is now a virtual commonplace to assert that the dominant discourse has the means to assert its 
claims to truth - or neutrality - by which the experiences of certain groups are denied or suppressed (Flax, 
1990:4849). While positivist social theory is most readily asociated with Enlightenment beliefs currently under 
siege, interpretive social theory or hermeneutics and critical interpretive social theory (Fay, 1975) also may be 
identified as forms of modernist thought. These three approaches are alternately known as empirical-analytical, 
historical hermeneutic and critical emancipatory social sciences, respectively (Sullivan, 198428). The critical 
interpretive stance adopted by this thesis agrees with the aforementioned criticisms raised by so-called 
postmodernist thought. It disagrees, however, with the apparent rejedion of - or, at best, ambivalence toward 
- the use of knowledge for social betterment (McLennan, 1992:330). 
4. Anthropology is one of the many disciplines reeling in the wake of the postmodemist assault on claims of 
reason. Anthropology's present susceptibility to criticism lies not with an allegiance to empiricism - the 
scientific documentation of causal relationships - nor with rationalism - the use of deductive logic. At issue 
is the way in which anthropologists endeavour to establish claims to authority in the course of depicting the 
reality of the "cultural other" (Clifford, 1986; Rosaldo, 1 989Il993; Fox, 1991 b). The centre of the quandary is 
the concept of culture itself, traditionally the filter through which anthropology constructs its relationship with 
its research subjects. Variously defined as ways of lie or meaning creating practices (Bocock, 1992:234), the 
notion of culture employed by anthropologists to conceptualize differences between groups of people is too 
often silent regarding differences within groups (Coombe, 1991:1W191). Moreover, the convergence of soda1 
differentiations such as class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age and the like means the individual 
is "[mlore a busy intersedion through which multiple identities crisscross than a unified coherent self' (Rosaldo, 
1989/1993:194). With the loss of its traditional object of knowledge, the homogeneous cultural Other, 
anthropology faces the realization that its very raison d'etre is in doubt. This crisis of confidence can be used 
to good advantage, the lessons drawn from anthropology's dis-illusionment being transformed into a general 
project of demystification of the modemist constructs inherent in the perspectives of other social sciences. As 
we will see, the role of imposing order played by anthropology globally is duplicated domestically by academic 
counterparts from political science to sociology, psychology to economics disciplines whose practices play an 
integral part in the production of social facts (Rabinow, 1986:260). Fixed conceptions of self and other need 
dismantling, situating both within the constitutive processes of power that characterize daily life. 
Anthropologists must seek to grasp these patterns of social constraint, domination, resistance and 
transformation that traverse societies both here and away. And anthropologists must arrive at a better 
understanding of the part they play in these interactions, for the danger of (re)imposing oppressive relationships 
remains all too real. As James Clifford - ethnographer of the ethnographers - reminds us, cultures don't sit 
still for their portraits. Doing ethnography always involves simplifying and excluding, choosing a specific time 
frame, and imposing or negotiating a self-other arrangement (Clifford, 1986:lO). Thus, the political nature of 
the anthropologist's involvement continues to be problematic. The onus is on the anthropologist to explore and 
to develop representational forms and forums supportive of "the right of formerly un- or misrepresented human 
groups to speak for and represent themselves in domains defined, politically and intellectually, as normally 
excluding them" (Said, 1986:215). Minorities traditionally identified according to class, race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexual orientation and caste should be included in this number but so too should "children, the physically and 
developmentally handicapped, the incarcerated" (Coombe, 1991 :194). 
CHAPTER TWO: THE LENS OF PERCEPTION 
1. Brian Fay (1 975; 1987) and Stuart Hall (1992) use the terms critical interpretive science and soda1 science, 
respectively to describe this approach. Both analysts can be understood to consider the practice of social 
science to consist of being 'committed to providing systematic, rigorous, coherent, comprehensive, conceptually 
clear, wellevidenced accounts, which makes their underiying theoretical structure and value assumptions dear 
to readers, and thus accessible to argument and criticism' (Hall, 1992:12). Such objedives are not at odds with 
the ones I attempt to realise in this thesis. However, I am mindful that the conventional understanding of the 
notion of science has implications of neutrality, objectivity (Aronowitz, 1988) and uni-vocal rationality, distinct 
ideological features which run counter to my purposes. For these reasons, I elect to t e n  my outlook a critical 
interpretive perspective. 
2. With this insight, Maoc anticipates what modem anthropology has only lately come to acknowledge (Kessler, 
1987:44). For example, Clifford Geertz observes that humans are simultaneously cultural producers and its 
produd, a realization he considers to herald a novel rethinking of culture patterns less as constraints on human 
nature and more as processes through which it is actualized (Geertz, 1977:26-31). Sherry Ortnet's update 
emphasizes exploring those forces which promote prevailing cultural patterns and the manner by which 
alternate possibilities are suppressed or denied (Ortner, 1984:152-153). As we shall see, the sum total of these 
contemporary views brings us full circle back to Man. 
3. Dialectics is derived from Hegelian philosophy, an idealist formulation documenting the process in which 
Spirit creates the social and natural world and comes to recognize its own nature by reflecting on the produd 
of its labours. For Hegel, the notion of labour refers only to abstract, mental labour with alienation referring to 
a transitory moment when individuals, an expression of Spirit, fail to recognize their fundamental unity with the 
external world, Spirit in objectified form (Plamenatz, 1963). Marx criticizes Hegel's idealist conception of Spirit 
which renders humans to be dependent upon an abstract notion which is, in fad, of their own creation. In 
addition, he dismisses Hegel's focus on contemplation, expanding the concept of labour to include all pradical 
adivity. Yet Marx would find much of value in Hegel's treatment of dialectics, the most decisive aspect being 
Hegers grasp of human setfdevelopment as a process in which people create themselves as a result of their 
labour (Marx, 192711964202). 
4. This issue is complicated by the fact that the discussion of the relationship of human consciousness to 
existing social conditions is given relatively limited attention in Mads writings. Mads contribution to the 
understanding of capitalist culture, in particular, appears to be limited primarily to his examination of alienation 
in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and to the section in Capital devoted to commodity fetishism 
(Kessler, 1987:45). 
5. Mads accomplishment is compromised almost from the outset by a form of rationalism which credits the 
existence of supposedly objective laws for guiding society's progressive, unilinear movement w~lliams, 
1977:18-19). For example, Mads stated objective with the appearance of Capital is one of providing a 
scientific account of modem capitalism much as Darwin had developed a theory of biological evolution 
(Bottomore, 1963:xv; Maoc, 188711 967: 372 ftnte). This position has had profound repercussions on the study 
of the role of consciousness and ideology, in particular, and culture, in general. By the early years of this 
century, Marxism had become synonymous with Soviet orthodoxy which downplayed the capacity of individuals 
to intervene to affect history, privileging instead the momentum generated from the presence of contradictions 
fundamental to capitalist economic relations. This minimized the significance of consciousness and ideology 
by relegating them to an epiphenomena1 status in relation to the so-called economic "base." In the reductionist 
thinking of Soviet economism, culture was considered to be a mere reflection of the relationship of specific 
classes to the means of production. Scratch the surface of a cultural process or cultural product and the 
economic underpinnings would be revealed. The founding premise for this depiction of culture was that the 
interpretation and interests of the dominant class would dominate cultural life in general. This mechanistic 
interpretation drew support from Engels' use of "false consciousness," in which working class awareness was 
counterpoised to the free standing reality of capitalism's oppressive social relations with ideology providing the 
mystifying filter. This instrumental interpretation stripped culture of its capacity to shape social relations and 
to resist political domination (Grossberg and Nelson, 1988:3). 
6. Lukacs maintains that an examination of these partial totalities can disclose helpful insights into the 
tendencies implicit in either the social system as a whole or in one particular class within that system. He points 
to the propensity of dramatists to use family conflicts as subject matter for tragedies, thus enabling them to 
vividly expose social currents which might otherwise pass unnoticed. Lukacs remarks that "an Aeschylus Or 
a Shakespeare draw pictures of family life that provide us with such penetrating and authentic portraits of the 
social upheavals of their age that it is only now, with the aid of historical materialism, that it has become at all 
possible for theory to do justice to these artistic insights" (Lukacs, 1971:176). 
7. Historical necessity takes on a new meaning in Lukacs' account, one which rejects a causal inevitability 
implied in a mechanistic materialism (West, 1991:149). Working people are shown to have a conscious choice 
of whether to take an active part in the transformation of existing conditions, the interplay of dass 
consciousness and concrete conditions ultimately being decisive factors to the realization of their objectives 
(Lukacs, 1971:197-198). The choice that faces the working class is judged to be an ethical one for it involves 
selecting one body of norms over another (West, 1991: 152). This choice is not considered to involve lofty 
ideals as such. Instead, the motivation is due to the perception of specific needs and interests which are 
grounded in the existing circumstances (Lukacs, 1971 :177-178). On the surface, Lukacs would appear to be 
a radical historicist as norms are not addressed in an abstract or universal manner. He argues that ethical 
decisions must be approached from the point of view of actual people who find themselves involved in a specific 
economic system with particular social relations, legal apparatus and a distinct way of life. As a Marxist with 
intentions to change the world, Lukacs judges effective normative discourse to require a linkage with a Social 
theory capable of offering an account of the ongoing process of historical reality (West, 1991:153-154). 
8. It is an historical materialist premise that knowledge is a human product, created by specific people in the 
course of creating themselves and their social world within the constraints of particular material conditions. To 
claim knowledge of timeless laws is to violate the grounded nature of human understanding, seeking to base 
allegedly universally applicable assertions on what are, in fad, historically contingent foundations. By contrast, 
a radical historicist view would attempt to build agreement around a theoretical account which documents the 
perceived nature of - and means of surpassing - the discrepancies between existing normative rhetoric and 
reality. Implicit in such a stance is the acknowledgement of the inherent circularity of interpretive accounts, 
whereby the essential nature of reality may be proposed but can never be proven. It is at this point that Lukacs 
moves beyond a radical historicist approach. Rather than simply arguing for an agreement with a Marxist 
conception of dialectics in order to build a working consensus necessary to change society, Lukacs founds his 
claims on the assertion that reality actually unfolds according to these dialectical principles (West, 1991 :166). 
9. "If the philosophy of praxis [Marxism] affirms theoretically that every 'truth' believed to be eternal and 
absolute has had practical origins and has represented a 'provisional' value ..., it is still very difficult to make 
people grasp 'practically that such an interpretation is valid also for [Marxism] itseK, without in so doing shaking 
the convictions that are necessary for action .... As a result even [Marxism] tends to become an ideology in the 
worst sense of the word, that is to say a dogmatic system of eternal and absolute truths' (Gramsci, 1971 :406- 
407). 
10. Louis Althusser would add the family to this list and categorise this grouping as "ideological state 
apparatuses" (Althusser, 197011971). However, greater clarity is achieved by making a distinction between 
those institutions of political society directly controlled through state policy - the education and legal systems, 
for example - and civil society with its structures of religion, the family and the media. 
11. The realm of ideology with its presumption of a consciously aiticulated belief system is but part of the 
puzzle. As Gramsci's notion of hegemony suggests, our identity is shaped by social forces that go beyond 
conscious values and ideas. Equally important are the practices and lived sensations that commonly elude 
comprehension. For example, emotions are cultural constructions through which people learn to respond to 
certain situations in specific ways (Lutz, 1988:9). Assumptions borne of hegemony and neglected due to their 
perceived ordinary, routine nature form part of this complex as do elements that have been actively suppressed 
or repressed. Deferential and exploitive attitudes, acquisitiveness and individualism, chauvinism and altruism, 
competitiveness and consumer mindedness - all are practices or ways of living that may be experienced by 
individuals as other than consciously held beliefs (Gottlieb, 1992:51). 
12. Sartre's notions of project and praxis resemble ideas contained in Marx's conception of human labour 
perhaps best illustrated in a section of Capital where Marx differentiates between human and non-human 
production. "A spider conducts operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many 
an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees 
is this: that the architect raises his [sic] structure in his imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of 
every labour process we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its 
commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but also realizes a 
purpose of his own' (Marx, l887ll967:l78). 
13. Husserl's perspective draws more upon Kant than Marx, postulating as it does the primacy of a 
transcendental self, albeit one conditioned through its interactions with its immediate surroundings. Here the 
notion that human nature is culturally embedded, context dependent and changeable over time takes a back 
seat to timeless inherent organizing capacities of the human brain which are only secondarily influenced by 
social circumstances. However, alternate currents of existential phenomenology associated with Martin 
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty anive at positions more compatible with a radical historicist reading of 
Maocist materialism. Merleau-Ponty, for instance, stresses that the individual's experience is organised by the 
lived body rather than the transcendental ego and, as such, would not submit readily to the analytic logic and 
formal rules proposed by Husserl. Heidegger underlines the significance of context in the formation of the 
individual, asserting that social formations and practices - culturally meaningful though they may be - comprise 
a complex backdrop which does not lend itself to a comprehensive understanding (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 
1982:~~-xxi; Marsh, 1988:88). The views of Merleau-Ponty and of Heidegger qualify the nature of the dialectical 
interaction between self and other documented in Sartre's treatment of alienation. Their commentaries caution 
us to set limits on our expectations for arriving at definitive explanations of human behaviour. They challenge 
the notion of human reason as a relatively uniform universal by emphasising the context dependent nature of 
knowledge production. It is a lesson Sartre (196311968) is reluctant to learn as he asserts that the rigorous 
application of this methodology will permit the total comprehension of others. 
14. The "look" provides the paradigm for Sartre's initial conception of relations with others (Marsh, 1988:144- 
146). This conception evokes the prior existence of a transcendental self, a self comprised of innate 
characteristics independent of social encounters. In addition, Sartre's preMandst depiction of all intersubjective 
encounters as inevitably negative is an overgeneralization. Here Sartre's notion of freedom presumes total 
independence of other people. Mutuality is an impossibility for the subjectivity of individuals is considered to 
be in conflict, each vying for domination so that they are not objectified - hence, alienated - by the other. He 
later rejects this individualistic view (Sartre, l952/1963: 590; Flynn, l984:l77) and with a conception of freedom 
which includes the possibility of the choice of a receptivity to the wodd and to others, mutuality once more 
becomes a possibility. 
15. Hegel is especially sensitive to the detrimental aspects of this tendency to objectify human beings. He 
judges the attribution of fixed qualities to be harmful to the ongoing creation of self. A series of words or deeds 
may be construed by others to be an adequate representation of the individual. The person, in tum, may come 
to view these momentary externalisations as being self-definitive absolutes. Hegel terms such objectifying 
consciousness to be abstrad thinking. To illustrate this phenomenon, he cites the attitude of many people upon 
being confronted with a person convicted of murder: "[tlhis is abstract thinking: to see nothing in the murderer 
except the abstrad fad that he [sic] is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in him with this simple 
quality" (Shroyer, 1971 :88). But how can such abstrad thinking be avoided? Certainly a case could be made 
for it being a universal feature of the human species, restricted neither to a particular historical period nor to 
a specific group of people. Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg, for example, maintain that the tendency to 
define oneself and others in terms of fixed characteristics is inherent in the human condition (Berger and 
Pullberg, 1966:74). Trenton Shroyer (Shroyer, 1971:88-90) agrees that this propensity to objectify is a real 
possibility for all individuals, yet he argues that an adequate comprehension of each externalisation is sufficient 
to prevent abstract thinking. In other words, distortive conclusions can be avoided if both the actor and the 
observer are able to reconstnrct the nature of the project behind the act. Thus, the dialectical process of human 
self-creation must be acknowledged by both parties. Any breakdown in self-reflection or mutual recognition 
will promote abstract thinking. 
16. James Marsh (1988:10%127) provides an account of abstract thinking and its relationship to alienation 
compatible with Sartre's Maocist account. As an embodied self living in specific social and historical conditions 
and possessing particular attributes, the individual is positioned and has limitations. Yet the person has the 
capacity for practice, to move beyond existing circumstances by undertaking possible projects. Alienation here 
entails an attitude of in authenticity or infidelity not to an essential or transcendental self but to the state of 
freedom - limited though it may be - embodied by the self. One form of alienation involves ceasing to question 
and refraining to undertake new projects, existing as though the self was a fixed entity or thing. Another ignores 
the particular limitations of existing circumstances by engaging in projects which overreach the capacities of 
the self and the situation. By contrast, thematization is an objectification of the self which potentially adds to 
our self-understanding. It allows us to reflect on the outcome of our actions and to accommodate another 
person's perceptions of ourselves thereby contributing to our self knowledge. Insofar as this reflection 
recognizes the sel to be conscious, intentional and capable of self-creation within historical limitations, it is not 
an a d  of alienation. In a similar sense, objectification of another person in the form of thematization does not 
necessarily entail alienation. For example, scientific knowledge used to objectify the body in the course of 
medical treatment need not entail alienation if the totality of the encounter respects the individual as a 
conscious, selfdetermining agent. However, alienation does occur if this objectification reduces the person 
to an object with fixed characteristics andlor if degradation or humiliation is the intent. 
17. This must not be misunderstood to be psychological determinism any more than the precipitating incident 
which catalyzed the formation of the reified complex should be judged as causal or determinant. Neither the 
event nor the memory cause the person to act in a particular manner. Instead, they set limits and exert 
pressure, thereby constraining the person to respond in a particular way (Williams, 1977:87). This distinction 
is an important one if we are to understand the notion of individual initiative and responsibility in the midst of 
structuring structures which impose limits on practice. Gayatri Spivak states that determination is a critique of 
causality which has been transformed, with great harm, into the notion of determinism. According to Spivak, 
Hegel's original critique of causality takes the point of view that determination consists of the possibility of 
inaugurating or initiating discourse. This is very different from determinism, which involves the establishing of 
definitive causes (Spivak, 1990: 54-55). 
18. Elements of this analysis are evident in narrative therapy (Giddens, 1991:76), a form of contemporary 
psychotherapy which encourages the reconceptualization of purportedly decisive formative incidents and 
childhood relationships (Rainwater, 1989; White and Epston, 1990; Gilligan and Price, 1993; Sanders, 1993; 
Nicholson, 1995). 
19. Sartre's collaboration with Jean Genet provides one of the most famous accounts of the possible long term 
consequences of these constraining encounters (Sartre, 195211963). An orphan, Jean Genet was raised in 
a rural community which placed a high value on the ownership of property. According to Sartre, the boy began 
to steal in a halfcomprehending attempt to compensate for his constant obligation to be grateful for all that he 
received as a ward of the state. His ads of thievery, little more than unreflected diversions, were transformed 
into objective violations when Genet was accosted and declared to be a thief. Genet believes that this decisive 
event occurred when he was ten years old. Playing alone in the kitchen, he was about to take a knife from a 
drawer when he realized that he was being watched. Under the gaze of another person, Genet in effect came 
to his senses for the first time: "[tlhe thief was a monstrous prinaple which had been residing unperceived within 
him and which was now disclosed as his Truth, his eternal essence" (Cooper, 1964c:72). What was but a 
momentary alienation of his unreflective subjectivity became a lasting reification of consciousness. The local 
authorities, responsive to the virtually sanctified status of private property, identify Genet to be a criminal and 
banish him to a reformatory. Sartre proposes that Genet's subsequent activities as a self-professed thief are 
in response to these values. 
20. Sartre's reconstructions of the perceived formative experiences of artists such as Tintoretto, Baudelaire, 
Genet and Flaubert seek to demonstrate the decisive influence of disruptive events. Sartre's study of Gustave 
Flaubert (1971/1981), for instance, begins with the child who feels deprived of affection due to the attention 
conferred upon his brother, a brilliant medical student. Sartre believes that Fiaubert strives to be different from 
his successful brother by initially electing to be inferior to him, the young Gustave thereby rejecting his 
representation by the dominant culture while being in complicity with it. Flaubert reacts by first becoming a 
mediocre student and then by entering law school, a profession which he realises his physician father regards 
with disdain. When faced with the prospect of gaining some degree of respectability as an attorney, Flaubert 
responds with attacks of "hysteria", once again seeking to hold success at bay. Sartre's three volume study 
traces Flaubert's movement through repeated breakdowns to his eventual profession as a committed writer. 
Sartre indicates how each mcial phase in Flaubert's life appears to be only a repetition of his initial childhood 
identity crisis. The accompanying sense of shame can be understood to be due to 'anxiety about the 
adequacy of the narrative by means of which the individual sustains a coherent biography' (Giddens, 1991:65). 
These episodes of acting out may also be viewed as expressions of a learned idiom of distress (Kleinman, 
1980; Kenny, 1986), a response of relatively fixed content precipitated when a person encounters situations 
which threaten the integrity of the self-narrative. 
21. Sartre focuses on what occurs within the sphere of relations where primary emotional and physical needs 
of the infant and child are at play. However, Paul Willis' study of working class youths (Willis, 197711981), on 
the other hand, provides an illustration of how significant constraining circumstances are neither confined to 
family relationships nor to these early years. Willis' investigation is part of an upsurge of interest in working 
class culture galvanized by the founding of Birmingham's Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in the mid 
1960's, an institution whose legacy continues to this day in cultural studies (Nelson et al., 1992:9) and beyond. 
Age (Hebdige, 1979), gender (McRobbie, 1981), race (Hall, 1980~) and sexual orientation (Weeks, 1990; 1992) 
represent additional critical sites in the perpetuation of positions of dominance and subordination. The 
challenge of tracing the simultaneous impad and the interconnections of these differentiations in multiple fador 
analyses continues to preoccupy theorists across such disciplines as women's studies (Flax, 1990; Fraser and 
Nicholson, l99O), cultural studies (Hall, 1992~; West, 1991 : niii), ethnic studies (Stasiulis, 1 WO), sociology 
(Rutherford, 1990; Weeks, 1990, 1992) and anthropology (Gaines, 1990; Ortner, 1991). 
22. The consideration of elements such as gender, sexual orientation, dass, race, ethnicity and age (Sullivan, 
198476) are highlighted by my study but this list is by no means intended to be exhaustive. These merely 
comprise some of the more significant distinctions within contemporary capitalist culture. Depending on the 
circumstances, this conceivably could be expanded to include religion, urban and rural contradictions, 
correspondence to cultural definitions of physical beauty to name but a few. 
23. The focus shifts from explanations based on the meaning derived from the experience of individuals and 
groups of individuals within a cultural totality to privilege the structural realm as the causative agent affecting 
individual behaviour. Structuralism argues that experience is simply an effect, the consequence of cultural 
meaning systems and categories that predate the individual and that cause the person to arrive at predefined 
cultural interpretations. With this bold stroke, the individual is no longer perceived as a significant cultural 
agent. Instead, each person is defined by the language and the subject positions made available by the social 
structure (Hall, 198056; 1992c:286). In structuralism's view, individuals tend to be reduced to an instrumental 
status, the function of broader ideological forces. Implicit in such a view is a functionalist passivity or 
acquiescence in the face of dominant power structures. 
24. Following the lead of tum of the century linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, language tends to be viewed as 
a structured entity, a self-contained unitary system subject to its own laws rather than an historically specific 
social pradice capable of being altered by human agency. See Poster, 1975: 307-31 1; Williams, 1977:27-44; 
Bourdieu, l98O/l99O:31-32; Callinicos, 1989:73-75; Hall, l992c:288 for critiques of Saussure's influence from 
Claude Levi-Strauss' structuralism through to Jacques Demda's poststructuralism. Some poststructuralists 
abandon the normative realm altogether by dismissing criteria for the evaluation of the exercise of power as 
being foundational (Aronowitz, 198111990). Others reduce power to a local consideration, as in Michel 
Foucault's early conception of micro-politics, thereby limiting normative considerations from being situated 
within a larger social totality. Many appear intent on rebuffing efforts to outline collective objectives or to 
envision a shared human destiny. They choose to ignore the fact that while these elements are essential 
requisites for a commitment to human emancipation, they need not demand an allegiance to either 
foundationalist science or Enlightenment inspired progress (Slack and Whitt, 1992: 582-584). In Fredric 
Jameson's estimation, poststructuralist campaigns against notions of totality and totaliation represent 
theoretical assaults on the human potential for individual reflection, innovation and resistance. Jameson notes 
that the concepts of totality and totaliation imply contingent interpretations rather than foundational knowledge. 
He considers totalization - 'a Sartrean coinage9[refemng to a] 'partial summing up ' (Jameson, 1991:332) - 
'as an equivalent for 'praxis1 itself (Jameson, 1991 :323). Significantly, 'praxis or totalization always aims at 
securing the fragile control or survival of an even more fragile subject within a world otheNvise utterly 
independent and subject to no one's whims or desires' (Jameson, 1991:333). 
25. In the case of dominant Euro-North American traditions, this impulse to find meaning has sought 
inclusiveness. It has given rise to systems of thought which Jacques Derrida has termed logocentric, 
subscribing to the belief Wat there is some underlying, perfect, unified truth that contrasts with the imperfect, 
plural, world of experience' (Trawick, 1992:261). What Demda considers to be the compulsion to produce truth 
takes the form of totalizing narratives, interpretations which attempt to be all encompassing. 
26. Once "a psychology becomes socially established (that is, becomes generally recognized as an adequate 
interpretation of objective reality), it tends to realize itself forcefully in the phenomena it purports to explain" 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967:178). 
27. The early Greeks, for example, established geometry as one such truth-producing mechanism. The 17th 
century favoured the scientific method while the current century has witnessed the rise of statistics as an 
authoritative discourse (Rabinow, 1986:237). Power plays a vital role in determining what discourse comes to 
be favoured and, consequently, what facts will be deemed to provide an accurate depiction of reality (Danziger, 
l99O:l8O; Hall, l992d:295). 
28. With this formulation, Foucault sheds light on the social conventions which profoundly shape our 
conceptions of self. Much of his discussion complements Sartre's innovative treatment of alienation. For 
example, Foucault fills in many of the details alluded to in Sartre's observation that '[tlhe individual interiorizes 
his [sic] social determinations: he interiorizes the relations of production, the family of his childhood, the 
historical past, the contemporary institutions, and he then re-exteriorizes these in acts and options which 
necessarily refer us back to them' (Sartre, 1974:350). Foucault dismisses any notion of a subject who creates 
meaning on the basis of cognitive capacities which are universally bestowed and which exist independent of 
specific sodo-historical conditions. In a position reminiscent of both Marx and Merleau-Ponty, Foucault 
emphasizes the constitution of knowledge through the lived experience of the body, the aclual practice of 
individuals within particular cultural contexts. 
29. This valuable commentary notwithstanding, poststructuralists such as Foucault appear to fall prey to the 
very phenomena they are attempting to document. Intent on capturing the nature of contemporary 
consciousness, poststructuralism itself provides vivid testimony to the effects of commodity fetishism (Jameson, 
1991 :315-317). Seemingly autonomous forces are depicted as being capable of shaping human affairs as 
wave upon wave of constraining discourses buffet the individual, pushing the sense of self and other in 
constantly shifting directions. Lost from view is human agency's ability to examine, reflect, and resist social 
determinants, past, present and anticipated (Aronowitz, 1981J1990; Callinicos, 1987:23; Giddens, 1987:98; 
Harp, 1991:210). The wholesale commodification of culture also dictates that our meaning creating practices 
have their use-value eclipsed by an emphasis on exchange-value. Increasingly disconnected from the 
transformative capacity of culture as knowledge producing, we become seduced by the transitory gratification 
promised with its consumption as a commod'i. This serves to diminish our consciousness of our CorWUctive 
powers, self creativity and species being (Jameson, 1991 :315317). In Jameson's depiction, postmodemism 
as a mind set preoccupied with pastiche, ahistorical images and a rejection of all meta-narratives (Rabinow, 
1986:247-250) is both a cause and a consequence of this distinctive mode of postmodemist sensibility. 
30. In FoucauKs view, the feudal era was primarily characterised by struggles against social, religious or ethnic 
domination. Opposition to economic exploitation held sway in the nineteenth century, while resistance to 
subjection currently occupies centre stage, although the other two continue to be significant (Foucault, 19821 
1983b:212-213). 
31. Gramsas conception of hegemony incorporates a recognition of state intervention in areas previously held 
to be outside the political realm, a targeting which has only increased with the rise of the welfare state. .A 
central paradox ... of the Welfare State is the way in which it developed as a system of massive State 
intervention, a web of bureaucratic control with strands clinging to every niche and comer of society and of 
private life, out of a society in which the dominant ideology was of individualism' (Wilson, 1977:28). 
32. '[Pleople are affected by what we call them and, more importantly, by the available classifications within 
which they can describe their own actions and make their own constrained choices. People act and decide 
under descriptions, and as new possibilities for description emerge, so do new kinds of action' (Hacking, 
1985256-257). 
33. The socially constructed category of childhood offered a convenient site for the manufacture of standards 
of normality. By the early 1800s, the causes of allegedly deviant behaviour among children were located in the 
social environment. Urbanization, industrialization and the dismantling of the traditional social order weighed 
in as contributing factors with parental neglect regarded as the primary reason for delinquency. The asylum 
with its ordered existence was considered the most promising antidote to this social breakdown. Acting as a 
substitute parent, the asylum offered a clear structure and a cohesive community legitimated by the principle 
of parens patrie. By the 1890's, problematic children were re-conceptualized as juvenile delinquents who 
needed to be rescued from themselves rather than from their parents. Chicago's juvenile court was the 
undisputed model for similar initiatives in other countries and reformatories became the treatment of choice 
(Hacking, 1991 ; Matters, 1986). 
34. FoucauWs definition of "conduct" is instrudive:'to 'conduct' is at the same time to 'lead' others (according 
to mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more or less 
open field of possibilities. The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in 
order the possible outcome" (Foucault, 19821 1983b:220-221). 
35. Medical sociology has long paid heed to the unequal distribution of power in society and to the manner in 
which medicine can function as a mechanism of social control. In addition, it has demonstrated how medicine 
under capitalism mirrors the values of the society as a whole, including those related to gender, race, dass and 
age, etc. However, it is only latterly that both sociologists and anthropologists have made the actual content 
of medical knowledge a subject of analysis (Lock, 198856). Once mistakenly thought to be off limits to 
examination due to its scientific nature, Westem medicine, or biomedicine, is now recognized to be a cultural 
construct, fair game for criticism. 
36. See Bibeau, 1988; Farmer, l988:76; Pappas, l99O:203; Singer, l989:ll96; 1 W:287; 1990b: 182; 1992:2; 
Singer, Baer, and Lazarus, 1990:~-vi; Waitzkin, l976:3l7; l990:530. 
CHAPTER THREE: TOOLS, TOOLKIT, PRACTICE 
1. Roslyn Bologh (1979:l) observes that Marx's methodology came to be termed dialectical materialism to 
emphasize its anti-idealist character. She suggests dialectical phenomenology, stressing its anti-positivist 
stance, is more suited to the current situation in the social sciences. 
2. My application of this methodology includes a rejection of the positivist conception of the unified self as a 
stable reference point of individual agency. Identity is less a discrete, autonomous, fixed entity than an ongoing 
ensemble of social relations in which a central organa~ng principle interprets the dynamic constituents (Moore, 
1994). Neither are these identity attributes constituted independent of each other. One's sense of gender or 
dass is intertwined with specific experiences related to ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, etc. (Moore, 198831 1; 
Abu-Lughod, 1991 :140). This view is equally opposed to the poststructuralist conception of the fundamentally 
decentred, fragmented self, a legacy of Althusseh emphasis on the primacy of contingent social structures 
which allegedly call specific soda1 identities into existence (Hall, 1992c: 286). The individual has the ability to 
integrate experientially based interpretations in a manner which provides some semblance of continuous 
personhood over time (Giddens, 1991:54). In addition, the person has the means to reflect upon past practice 
and upon historical constructions of self, thereby providing the basis to negotiate and, ultimately, to resist the 
subject positions which the current repertoire of social structures call into play (Probyn, 1980:182; Ingleby, 
198594). It is this capacity for seH-reflexivity which offers a means for '[e]nlightenmenq,] ... man's [sic] release 
from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction 
from another' (Kant, 1959:8586; Fay. 1987:66). Kant is but one figure in a long tradition of religious and 
secular thinkers who believe people willingly collude in their own oppression by uncritically complying with the 
dominant social rules and customs of the day. While the positivism associated with Kant may differ from the 
critical interpretive approach, his characterization of enlightenment as the questioning of existing circumstances 
in order to rid ourselves of oppressive arrangements is a goal shared by both perspectives (Fay, 1987:67). 
3. The inevitable limitations of self-knowledge stem from the fact that 'no one can ever be fully aware of the 
conditions of their own construction' (Moore, 199453). In addition, '[mlemory never slams a door - it's always 
persistently ajar, open enough to admit the ghosts of experience, which slip through and reinterpret the 
indefinite pastm (Dy kk, l9W:lO). 
4. "Autobiography can...be a condition of (rather than an impediment to) ethnographic objectivity in the sense 
that it allows the writing subject's actual history and involvement to be considered critically' (Fabian, 
1991 b:382). The danger, of course, is that ethnographers can become preoccupied with documenting the 
intricacies of their own way of seeing to the detriment of representing the cultural other (Rosaldo, 198911 9933. 
The self-indulgence of certain postmodemist experiments in textual representation has not gone unnoticed in 
this regard (Geertz, 1988:78; Polier and Roseberry, 1989). 
5. 7he demographic profiles of youths who were included in the current study (n=89) were also examined to 
determine whether or not this sample was representative of typical cases admitted to the program. A 
comparison between the profiles of the two groups revealed that they were very similar with the exception that 
youths included in the current study were more likely to reside with their natural parents (45%) than was typical 
for all youths admitted to the program. In addition, youths included in the current study were also more likely 
to be in the care of their guardian (47%) than was typical for all youths admitted to the program. These 
differences most likely reflect the greater stability of the living arrangements of respondents whom we were 
successful in contacting for the program evaluation' (Crossroads, 1993:426-427) 
6. 1 was unable to observe the mental status exam which involves a brief psychiatric assessment to confirm 
that the difficulties of the newly admitted youths are behavioural rather than psychiatric in nature. It was not 
uncommon for this interview to involve a treatment complex psychiatrist other than one assigned to the 
Crossroads' Program. During the period of my fieldwork, it was routine for this procedure to occur during the 
initial period of the admission. I could not be in attendance due to the examination's impromptu scheduling 
which typically conflicted with the social history interview with family members. 
7. This speaks to the timelessness and coherence of essentialist formulations which ignore the discontinuities, 
contradictions and inconsistencies that mark the daily experience of actual individuals. It also provides one 
more strategy to objectify the research subject, thereby promoting a detached distance which safeguards the 
professional from possible challenges to authority which might be forthcoming from the cultural other. 
8. The selection of the psychiatrist and the former community support supervisor for individual profiles was due 
to their central role as architects of the Facilitating Program. 
CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
1. Transcripts of interviews have been edited minimally for clarity and coherence. 
2. Wherever possible, I have endeavoured to use transcriptions of inte~iews with the staff of the Facilitating 
Program and materials produced by the staff of the treatment complex as a whole. The latter include position 
papers, minutes of meetings, annual reports, journal articles and other public documents including graduate 
theses in sociology (Mate, 1972), social work (Campbell, 1990) and criminology (Vetlaan, 1991). In addition, 
a graduate thesis by an external researcher in sociology (Mainprize, 1988) was consulted for material pertaining 
to the period between 1972 and 1988. 
3. '[Spatements reinforcing the delinquents' conception of irresponsibility are an integral part of the ideology 
of child welfare shared by soda1 work, psychoanalysis and criminology. This ideology presents a causal theory 
of delinquency which, when it attributes fault, d i m s  it to parent, community, sodety or even to victims of crime' 
(Matza, 196):95). 
4. Anthony Platt's The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (Platt, 1969) is especially insightful in 
depicting the class differences which exist between those designated to be deviant and their self-appointed 
saviours. Marlene Webber (1 991 :189) and Don Handelman (1978:26) note that working class individuals tend 
to be more exposed to state surveillance, thus partially accounting for their disproportionate numbers in 
corrective facilities. Elliot Leyton (1 986:193) confirms the largely underemployed background of youths in 
detention, attributing their problematic behaviour to their marginalised treatment in families which themselves 
have been excluded from mainstream social life. 
5. Richard Gelles (1970; 1975) and David Gil(1970; 1979) were perhaps the most conspicuous dissenters to 
this psychopathological conception of child abuse. They cite the neglect of the social context of child abuse, 
asserting that the near exclusive focus on the care giver does violence to the multidimensional nature of the 
situation. Gelles draws attention to figures which indicate the apparently disproportionate number of offenders 
who are from the working class or who are women. He attributes these findings to the presence of stressors 
such as unemployment and unwanted pregnancies. Noted as well is the possible differential application of the 
label of abuser which suggests the need to examine the process by which these individuals came to be 
identified. Gil, on the other hand, broadens the definition of child abuse to include poverty, malnutrition, 
inadequate education and medical s e ~ c e s  and he targets institutionalty based physical abuse. His proposals 
take a preventative turn. He agitates for the abolition of corporal punishment in institutions, increased family 
planning, education in family responsibilities, comprehensive neighbourhood medical and social services and 
concerted efforts to eliminate poverty (Conrad and Schneider, 1980). 
6. By the early 1970's, legislation in the United States was passed which set the terms of child abuse in a more 
comprehensive frame but one which was susceptible to a spectrum of interpretations. 'Child abuse and neglect 
means the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child under the 
age of eighteen by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare under circumstances which indicate that 
the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby ....( Gelles, 1975365) '[Clhild abuse is not a 
naturalistic category - nothing is 'naturally child abuse' (Parton, 1985:~. 148). Child abuse 'is not an absolute 
entity but, rather, is socially defined and cannot be divorced from the social contexts in which it occurs. We 
further posited that mistreatment is not a unitary phenomenon but encompasses a broad range of ads, acts 
that can be distinguished from one another both conceptually and operationally" (Giovannomi and Becerra, 
1979: 239). "There is no objective behaviour we can automatic& rec&nize as child abuse' Gelles, 1975:364). 
End Notes - Chapter Five 
1. 'mreatment and care can be provided in community programs and facilities for all but the most seriously 
mentally ill ... Underlying this move to community-based treatment is the firm belief that the mentally ill should 
be united as much as possible with their family, friends, and local community environments in order to reinforce 
the whole normalization effort underlying mental health rehabilitation' (Ministry of Health, 19877) 
2. The term children is used to mean all children and youths 'from birth to 18 years inclusive, divided in the 
following groupings: pre-school- 0 to 4 years; elementary - 5 to 12 years; youth - 13 - 18 years. ['At risk' refers 
to] 'children who are exposed to environments associated with higher rates of mental health problems; for 
example, poverty, dysfunctional family situations, or poor physical health' (CYARSC, 1991:2). 
3. 'Defining 'community' is a challenge. In this case we are referring to the whole population of a given 
geographic area. By parents, we mean parents and guardians of children who are in the system of care. 
Consumers include these parents and their children. Methods of how to choose community and parent 
representatives need to be developed. This could involve public elections or appointments from community 
boards. The involvement of staff and non-government organizations may be important, but they should not be 
seen as filling the role of community representatives' (CYARSC, 1991:57). 
4. A. POVERTY 
Familv Income; 
-' Without a solution to poverty, there can be no fundamental resolution of 
a range of related issues (Chudnovsky, 1990). 
Based on the best data currently available for Canada, it appears that the health problems 
of poor children begin before birth and continue to place these children at greater risk of 
death, disability and other health problems throughout infancy, childhood and adolescence 
(Canada: Supply and Services, l99O:ll) 
Poverty is recognized as the single most significant indicator of health status. The poor die 
younger, have more accidents, more suicides, and a higher incidence of mental health 
problems (Avard, 1989). Offord found that, The prevalence rate of psychiatric disorders in 
children on social assistance is 31.2%' (Offord, 1986:20). This is almost 40% higher than 
the average urban prevalence rate of 19.6%. The Canadian Counal on Sodal Development 
states that 20.2% of children in [the province] live in poverty (Ross, 1989) .... 
Subsidized housing: 
Poverty affects a family's ability to obtain housing. When families turn to large subsidized 
housing developments for housing, they find that this community has a concentration of 
problems. Offord found that, in Ontario, 'Almost one-third of the children in subsidized 
housing (30.4%) have a psychiatric disorder, which is over twice the rate in non-subsidized 
housing (14.2%)' (Offord, l99O:l2) .... 
Sinaleoarent families: 
The risks for young children in single-parent families are largely associated with poverty. The 
association of a single parent "with psychiatric disorder is explained in large part by the 
effects of low income and family dysfunction' (Offord, 1990:iii). Young children in single- 
parent families are particularly at risk of developing conduct disorder and hyperactivity 
(Offord, 1990). 
Almost 4 times as many single-parent families, as compared to two-parent families, are on 
income assistance (Ministry of Social Sewices and Housing, 1990:s). 82.9% of singleparent 
families in the [urban] area are headed by females (Planning Department, 1988:52). These 
families tend to be poor because of the separation of the family, the low eaming power of 
women, and the difficulties of accessing child care. It should be stressed that this issue 
predominately affects females and is rooted in the lack of equal opportunities for jobs and 
income level that women face in today's society. Attention to female poverty issues will go 
a long way toward alleviating the poverty of children. The solution to children's poverty 'must 
first address the need for adequate family incomes.' In addition, services 
are needed that 
include 'recreational, health, educational, and family support programs thatare accessible, 
affordable, and non-stigmatizing' (Chudnovsky, 1990)' (CYARSC, 1991 : I61  7). 
Concerning community involvement, the report noted that first nations children: 
are faced with disproportionate levels of poverty, alcohol abuse, and health problems. Native 
people have a shorter life expectancy than the average Canadian. The suiade rate for native 
youth is seven times higher than the total rate for Canada. A disproportionate number of 
native children are in care. In working toward solutions to the issues facing native families, 
we need to examine native control of and participation in service delivery, training of native 
professionals, and planning around access to services and gaps in the system (CYARSC, 
1991 :59). 
5. Yet it stresses that its advocacy of community involvement and community development is not: 
an excuse for government to escape its responsibility to provide resources or se~ces  on the 
grounds that We community can do f. The government must meet its statutory obligations 
to deliver services, while accepting the community's entitlement to shape those services 
(Community Panel, 1992: 24). 
6. Certain psychodynamically-oriented tendencies within psychiatry have gained ground on occasion, 
particularly during the D.S.M.4 (1952) and I3.S.M.-II (1968) eras when psychological, psychosocial and 
psychoanalytical interpretations made their presence felt on the dassifactory system (Gaines, 1992:7-9; 
Ingleby, 1985:89). This reflected a range of influences including but not restricted to a n-Freudian 
psychoanalytic interpretive dimension (Fromm, 1955; 1962; Erikson, 1950; 1968), on the one hand, to a more 
wholly phenomenologically based objed relations approach (Laing, 195911 965; 196111 971 ; Laing and Esterson, 
1964), on the other. Latterly, biological etiology has become entrenched as the defining determinant of the 
D.S.M.'s structure (Young, 1991:176; Gaines, 1992:9) from the appearance of the D.S.M. Ill in 1980 through 
to the publication of the D.S.M.-IV in 1994. Whether drawing on this perspective or one which attempts to take 
the interpersonal context into account, the focus in psychiatry tends to be relatively desodalied, the individual- 
in-the-family tending to be the broadest category or unit of analysis. Critical socially contextualized accounts 
do exist (Coles, 1967; Kovel, 1980; 1988; l988b) but these are considered to be of marginal importance to the 
field. 
7. The introduction of Medicare in Canada in 1966 with its guarantee of payment for services rendered made 
office and dinic-based outpatient psychiatric services economically viable. This was accompanied by an 
insurgency among non-medical mental health occupations to overthrow the dominance of the medical 
profession in the prevailing division of labour. Saskatchewan has been a particular hot bed for this 
development. The period between 1970 and 1985 revealed a drop of 29% in the number of psychiatrists in 
the mental health branch while psychologists and social workers enjoyed a 72% increase, outnumbering their 
medical counterparts almost 3 to 1. The scenario was similar in the United States where psychiatrists currently 
constitute less than 20% of mental health professionals. Sheer numbers don't do justice to the extent of this 
challenge, however. The mid 1970's brought the installation of a clinical psychologist as the replacement for 
the medical superintendent of a regional mental hospital. This event galvanized psychiatrists and non medical 
practitioners alike to stake out their positions. The former adamantly stated that a physician must lead the 
clinical team as mental ihess was a medical issue. The psychologists and social workers were willing to 
concede that while this might be the case in terms of inpatients, where community outpatients were concerned, 
mental health was the focus and daily psychosocial problems of living fall within the nonmedical mental health 
professionals' realm of expertise (Dickinson and Andre, 1988:304-305). 
8. According to physician and medical anthropologist Michael Taussig, '[tlhe manifestations of disease are 
like symbols, and the diagnostician sees them and interprets them with an eye trained by the social 
determinants of perception. Yet this is denied by an ideology or epistemology which regards its creations as 
really living 'out-there' - solid, substantial things-in-themselves' (Taussig, 19805). 
9. Paul McGrane argues that psychiatws use of science has imposed a monologue regarding reason and 
madness similar in manner to anthropology's use of positivist science which has silenced the voices of 'alien 
cultures" (McGrane, 1989:127). 
10. Despite his insights, Joel Kovel tends to characterize social relational factors as being decisive in the 
etiology of all mental illness, thereby neglecting certain psychopathology which may be due to biological factors. 
This commits an error similar to that perpetrated by those who advocate biological explanations to the exdusion 
of alternate interpretations. Both impose totalizing discourses which suppress dialogue and debate by positing 
a univocal perspective. 
11. The troubled circumstances which result in a person becoming a patient or client tend to shifl the power 
balance in the health professional's favour (Taussig, 1980:4). The situating of this encounter within a scientific 
discourse erodes even further the possibilities of an equitable exchange. 
12. Gaines refers specifically to the D.S.M. current at the time of writing, the D.S.M.-III-R (1987). In general, 
I consider his analysis to be applicable from the D.S.M.-Ill (1980) to its contemporary version, the D.S.M.-IV 
(1 994). Gaines regards his self styled cultural constructivist perspective to stand in opposition to a Marxist- 
inspired critical medical anthropology. He claims critical medical anthropology depicts psychiatric dassifications 
as empty categories which are deployed to control social deviance or as actual conditions imposed by forces 
such as capitalism, class antagonisms, etc. This evaluation appears to be based on an ahistoncal, dogmatic 
reading of Marxism, in the former instance, and a mechanistic and deterministic interpretation, in the latter. In 
fact, I would argue that Gaines' arltural constructivist account is compatible with the version of cultural Marxism 
used in my project. 
13. In public presentations, Keith Johnson typically states that youths referred to the Facilitating Program tend 
to fall within the severe end of the behaviour continuum. He also mentions that the time frame of six months 
and the threshold of three or more significant events are arbitrary figures. To increase the incidence of condud 
disordered youths, the time frame is extended and/or the minimum number of symptoms required is reduced. 
Significantly, the D.S.M.-IV revises the criteria to specify the presence of three symptoms during a 12 month 
period with at least one occurring in the past six months. Behaviour disturbances are now grouped according 
to four categories - 'Aggression to people and animals', 'Destruction of property', Deceitfulness or thew and 
'Serious violations of rules', with 'often stays out at night despite parental prohibitions, beginning before age 
13 years' (American Psychiatric Association, 199490) an additional indicator appearing under the fourth 
heading. 
14. Robin Horton uses 'social psychology' to refer to the societal response to an individual's personal 
problems, difficulties in living derived from the organization of the society itself. 
15. Abenant patterns of conduct ... carry a message even if no one intended to send it. The message reads: 
'I am this kind of person in this kind of situation; now what are you going to do about it?" (Kenny, 1986:12). 
CHAPTER SIX: ATTACHMENT THEORY 
1. Bowlby's biographer Jeremy Holmes (1993:46) acknowledges that anthropological fieldwork supports the 
view that child care tends to be the domain of a relatively intact group of adults and older children whose 
composition is usually, but not atways, characterised by kinship relations and usually, but not always, comprised 
of females. He argues that while attachment theory is consistent with the notion of the mother as the principal 
care giver, the theory does not rule out the possibility that fathers may play this central role (Holmes, 1993: 
213). Recent ethnographic findings also challenge the belief in a universal and automatic attachment to each 
newborn. For example, one study argues that the high rate of infant mortality in Brazilian barrios appears to 
have informed a conscious strategy of selective emotional investment based on the likelihood of survival of any 
given infant (Scheper-Hughes, l987b; 1992). 
2. Bowlby is commonly cited to lend credence to a feminist perspective supporting the absence of the mother 
from the home with the exception of a brief, yet critical interval shortly after birth. The credibility of this position 
rests on the supposedly limited nature of the bonding experience. While Bowlby notes the importance of the 
attachment relationship during infancy, he does not propose the existence of a 'sensitive period' (Crouch and 
Manderson, 1995:838). 
3. It is nevertheless true that Bowlby emphasizes the female parent over her male counterpart. In infancy, he 
comments, fathers have their uses, but normally play second fiddle. Their prime role is to provide emotional 
support to their partners' mothering (Bretherton, 1992:761). This interpretation is considered by some 
contemporary attachment theorists to be reflective of the era in which Bowlby authored his report rather than 
of scientific findings (Holmes, 1993). 
4. Much as perceived facts can support a variety of theories including ones which stand in contradiction with 
each other, so too can theories themselves support a variety of interpretations. Attachment theory is no 
different from any other theory in this regard. However, its particular genius would appear to lie in its 
increasingly demonstrated potential to become a totalizing discourse. 
5. The diversity of these presentations and the reverence with which Bowlby's memory was evoked was 
captured by conference documents which proclaimed that: 'John Bowlby built a solid bridge between 
psychoanalysis, ethology and the behavioural sciences ...As Anthony Storr wrote, 'Posterity will recognize that 
John Bowlby's contributions to pdychiatric knowledge and to the care of children mark him as one of the three 
or four most important psychiatrists of the twentieth centuv (Hincks Institute, 1993). 
6. Over the past thirty years, research in infant and child development has ballooned largely due to these 
efforts by Bowlby and Ainsworth to recast psychoanalysis in terms amenable to empirical testing. Unlike 
conventional psychoanalysis which relies on speculation on past events, attachment theory bases its findings 
on adual observation of the child's interaction with his or her parents. This direct approach lends authority to 
claims that empirical data, rather than retrospective inferences, are used to fashion a yardstick of allegedly 
normal development. These studies are judged to support the thesis that a pattern of attachment is fashioned 
and interiorised in the early years of life based on the prevailing interactional dynamics between the child and 
significant adults. Developmental psychology's preoccupation with early attachment styles intemalised as 
personality clearly converges with psychoanalytic object relations theory which also regards childhood 
relationships to be critical to the formation of a person's character (Holmes, 1993; Greenberg and Mitchell, 
1983). The resulting discourse verges on being totalizing in nature as attachment theory encompasses both 
scientific and hermeneutic sensibilities in a language spoken by psychiatrists and psychologists alike. 
7. Recent contributions to attachment theory have emphasised a more interactive view of the self and a view 
of psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic enterprise in which therapist and client combine to construct a coherent 
narrative account of the client's situation (Holmes, 1993). While these contemporary attachment theorists 
acknowledge humans as fundamentally meaning creating beings, an important current in attachment research 
continues to extrapolate from the study of the observable behaviour of animals (Hincks Institute, 1993). 
8. The Strange Situation procedure involves the video-taping of a twenty minute scenario in three acts which 
begins with the mother and her one year old daughter, for example, first entering a playroom with a researcher. 
The child is left with the researcher for three minutes before being reunited with her mother. The child is then 
left entirely alone for another three minute interval at the end of which time she is rejoined by her mother. The 
data is rated according to the child's different coping responses to separation and reunion. Secum attachment 
is considered to be demonstrated by behaviours expressing overt distress on separation followed by a 
receptivity to the parent's arrival before resuming contented play. Insecure-avoidant attachment reveals little 
evidence of distress upon separation and an ignoring of the parent upon her re-appearance. Insecue 
ambivalent behaviour is shown by the child's extreme distress while separated, refusal to be pacified upon 
reunion and clinging behaviours alternating with anger and rejection inhibiting exploratory play. The smallest 
group is that of insecumdisoryanized attachment with reunion movements ranging from stiffly immobilized, 
confused to stereotyped. None of these patterns are fixed but may be altered as the mother's own working 
model of attachment becomes more or less secure. Evidence supports the view that the mother or adult is the 
decisive factor in this relationship as even a child who is considered to be difficult is likely to form a secure 
attachment with a parent who is sensitive to her needs (Holmes, 1993:112). Ainsworth has expressed concern 
that the Strange Situation technique has upstaged the long term observation of interaction patterns between 
mother and infant in their home setting which informed the use of this research tool (Bretherton, 1992:765). 
9. Holmes (1993:179) stresses that core attachments are critical as they form fundamental determinants of 
present and future relationships, shaping a person's selfconceptions, the sense of well-being and the capacity 
to act effectively and to realize projects. In addition, they set in motion a feedback loop that reinforces this 
relationship template. For example, avoidance leads to neglect; clinging invites rejection; depression fosters 
negative experiences which affirm the sense of despair; mistrust creates the conditions for disappointment 
reinforcing a lack of trust. 
10. In the first situation, for example, one model is accessible to awareness and is responsive to the parents' 
explanation of the incident. In this representation, the parent is portrayed as good with the offending behaviour 
construed as being due to the child's inherent badness. Meanwhile, the alternate model incorporates what the 
child has experienced but defensively excluded from consciousness and represents the disappointing or, 
potentially, hated side of the parent (Bretherton, 1992:768):, 
11. Michael Rustin (1991) characterizes the history of psychoanalysis to have passed through each of the three 
domains of truth identified by lmmanuel Kant: the scientific, the ethical and the aesthetic. Freud considered 
his work to fall within the realm of science as he sought to discern general truths about normal and abnormal 
behaviour. Melanie Klein cast her investigations in an ethical doak, exploring dimensions of personal splitting, 
destructiveness and the reconciliation of bad and good. Rustin regards contemporary psychoanalysis to be 
preoccupied with aesthetics, understood here to refer to questions of meaning (Holmes, 1993:144). 
12. '1 believe that our discipline can be put on to a scientific basis. A lot of people think you can't or don't know 
how to. There are people who think that psychoanalysis is really a hermeneutic discipline. I think that's all 
rubbish quite frankly' (Bowlby et al., 1986). 
13. In Holmes' reading, Tubing's semantic memory includes attitudes, assumptions and practices which may 
not be conscious but which affect the person's behaviour (Holmes, 1993:158). Psychotherapy can be 
understood as the process whereby semantic materials are rendered conscious and are woven into an explicit 
narrative. In attachment terms, this would involve the avoidant client allowing pain associated with past 
separations into conscious awareness or the ambivalent person giving symbolic meaning to feelings of distress, 
thereby finding the means to objectify them and to begin to discard them. Memory fragments dissolve with the 
simultaneous construction of a more continuous account. The heightened sense of inner security which 
accompanies this process enables the person to shed coping mechanisms and to explore new experiences with 
a renewed sense of competence. Significantly, the nature of memory was virtually the only issue raised at the 
Toronto conference which generated heated and extended debate. One position holds that episodic memory 
in the form of visual recollections are non-interpreted accounts which accurately reflect historical occurrences, 
a position advocated by Freud (Freeman, 1993:149). The opposing view, which I happen to share, considers 
all mental representations to be interpretations by definition. As such, the act of remembering is a social 
practice, influenced in form and content by present circumstances and future expectations as well as by 
occurrences in the past. 
14. Here I am less concerned with reification's definition as "the transformation of social relations into things" 
than with its reference to the "effacement of the traces of production" (Jamieson, 1991:314). 
15. Recently, the emergent subdiscipline of developmental psychopathology (Cicchetti and Richters, 1993; 
1993b; Richters and Cicchetti, 1993) has spawned a number of longitudinal studies using an attachment 
orientation to investigate the situations of families with children with perceived behaviour problems and those 
considered to be characterized by maltreatment (Cicchetti and Barnett, 1991), depression or low social support 
(Belsky and Nezworski, 1988). Cross cultural accounts indicate variation in terms of attachment patterns as 
imperatives differing from culture to culture impinge upon early childhood arrangements (Bretherton, 1992:771; 
Scheper-Hughes, 1992). Differential access to economic security and social stability is blamed for the 
detrimental impact on attachment relations experienced by those who find themselves subordinate to or 
marginalized by powerful interests (Manis, 1991). This recalls Bowiby's remark that '[ilf a community values 
its children, it must cherish their parents' (Bowlby, 1951:84) and denotes the ongoing relevance of social policy 
issues to this area of research. 
16. This recalls the cultural context in which Bowlby formulated the premises of what was to become his life's 
work. Progressive circles in England during the 1930s were sharply divided between allegiance to the ideas 
of Freud and Marx, blueprints for human emankipation which charted the personal and the social, respectively. 
As reconstructed by Bowlby's contemporary, psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim, the terms of debate were framed 
by two questions: '[iln order to create the good society, was it of first importance to change society radically 
enough for all persons to achieve full self-realisation? In this case psychoanalysis could be discarded, with the 
possible exception of a few deranged persons. Or was this the wrong approach, and could persons who had 
achieved full personal liberation and integration by being psychoanalysed create such a good society? In the 
latter case the correct thing was to forget for the time being any social or economic revolution and to 
concentrate instead on pushing psychoanalysis; the hope was that once the majority of men [sic] had profited 
from its inner liberation they would almost automatically create the good society for themselves and all others" 
(Bettelheim, 1960; Holmes, 1993:19). 
17. The preoccupation with immediate, intimate relationships and their long term impact is addressed by 
Russell Jacoby in his critique of the work of R.D. Laing ancc David Cooper (Jacoby, 1975:136; Sedgwick, 
1982:lll-114). Jacoby acknowledges the importance of primary relationships, but argues that concentration 
on these interactions to the exclusion of their social context results in an analysis which is 'supeficial' (Jacoby, 
1975: 143). In his view, '[~[ociety as the determining structure dictates more than the husk of a relationship; 
it cuts into the living germ' (Jacoby, 1975:136). 
CHAPTER SEVEN: SOCIAL HISTORY 
1. Transcripts of reports have been edited minimally for brevity. 
2. One definition of representation is to act by proxy, with the sense that an individual acts on behalf of or in 
the interests of another person in his or her absence. A second meaning of representation involves re- 
presenting in which one person provides his or her own account or interpretation of another (Spivak, 1988). 
It is not clear what version of representation motivated the parents and professionals who contributed to the 
social history. It is likely that both senses of the word informed their intentions. 
3. In general, the dass horizon of expert-professionals is rarely considered as part of the self-reflexive process 
of disciplines. In other words, one could say that it is almost in poor taste to think that professionals would be 
affected by their origins. Professional distance, which is a bun  word for expem'se, is assumed to be operating 
in all segments of the professional's life' (Sullivan, 1984132). 
4. Many professionals, quasi- and paraprofessionals, scientific and technocratic strata, skilled workers, and vast 
numbers of public servants, all part of the working dass, have found a certain interest in maintaining the status 
quo, if only because their occupational existence has been defined in part by the stratification' (Teeple, 
1995:29). 
5. Once again, it is reiiication's reference to the "effacement of the traces of production" (Jamieson, 1991:314) 
that concerns us here. 
6. The Facilitating Program makes a point of screening out youths with I.Q's of 70 or below prior to admission 
to the care plan process, arguing that the needs of these individuals are better served by government Ministries 
responsible for the health of the mentally challenged. 
7. The initial journal article produced by the Facilitating Program contains the following 'typical case referral: 
Tim is an attractive 15 year old who is living in his sixth placement away from his biological parents. He 
engages in behaviour that both adults and peers find problematic. He lies, steals, both from home and in the 
community, and is aggressive when he feels threatened. He uses drugs and alcohol whenever he can. He has 
no ongoing intimate relationships, only transient involvement with similar adolescents. He does not respond 
to, like, depend on, or care about adults. He appears to lack concern about the future, either in terms of 
intimacy in relationships or the consequences of his behaviour. He does not attend school. Tim has been 
diagnosed on a number of occasions. As a child, a diagnosis of Attention Deficit disorder was suggested. At 
other times, a diagnosis of separation anxiety disorder was considered. Later, in early adolescence, after an 
episode of slashing his arm, a diagnosis of depression was suggested. Tim has difficulty expressing himself 
affectively. His WISC-R scores show that his overall level of cognitive functioning lies at the low end of the 
average range with higher non verbal than verbal functioning. Tim's biological parents have divorced and are 
in new relationships with new families. Both families have significant psychological and psychosocial 
difficulties, although they are managing instrumental tasks reasonably. The family's history shows a pattern 
of transgenerational problems in intimate relationships associated with physical and emotional abusiveness. 
There is an unresolved question of sexual abuse in one of Tim's placements. Tim's current diagnosis is 
conduct disordef (Crossroads, 1993:423). 
8. The psychiatrist chose to speak in similar general terms when asked his opinion of the criteria I should use 
in selecting a case study. He said that for each of the youths admitted to the Facilitating Program, the 
community had either reached a point where they had decided that they were unable to cope with the person 
or they feared that they might soon reach that point. He also stressed that many individuals who would benefit 
from the care plan process had not been referred because their difficulties had not been identified as such by 
the community health professionals. 
9. For example, Plato indicated the importanm,of the selection of specific events to comprise a plot to reveal 
the character of a person or an event (Fay, l987:l72). 
10. The comprehension of self and other cannot be substantiated with reference to genuine or authentic 
narratives (Fay, 1987:172). What the critical interpretive approach does offer is a reflexive recognition of the 
limitations of its own truth claims. This perspective rejects the authority claimed by modemism's univocal 
rationality. Instead, it argues that rationality takes multiple forms. As a style of reasoning, rationality is socially 
and historically grounded, informed by general historical traditions as well as personal interpreted experience. 
These qualifications render it incapable of producing a definitive, objective account. 
11. For example, Sartre (196311968) claims that the perusal of historical documents can be instructive in 
gaining a sense of what it meant to be an individual during a particular period or within a particular culture. 
Conversely, he also argues that an examination of biographies can provide vivid evidence of the social 
structures and contradictions at play over the course of the individual's life. 
12. "[A] personal life is a path through a field of practices which are following a range of collective logics, and 
are responding to a range of structural conditions which routinely intersed and often contradid each other ... The 
structure of personality is not the structure of an object. It is a particular unification of diverse and often 
contradictory practices' (Connell, 1987:222). 
13. When such support is forthcoming, as it usually is within the labyrinth of clinical reasoning, it is not treated 
as one approximation of the reality of the situation, but as the reali ty.... Thus the professional's stock of 
knowledge provides explanations that ovenide and subsume the reality of the client's life-world by denying its 
relevance, and by replacing it with a reality which has greater meaning for the official or professional in the 
conduct of his [sic] routine tasks" (Handelman, 1978:21). 
14. This alternate conception included conditions which stigmatized the youth, a succession of care givers 
which undermined the youth's sense of community, ethnic differences which appeared to result in Asian youths 
being diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder while non-Asian youths exhibiting the same presenting behaviour 
were assigned a behaviour disorder, a history of an abuse of power by a male care giver and the existence of 
unpredictable behaviour on the part of care givers. 
15. A similar range of opinion on the nature of A.D.H.D. (Attention DeficitMyperadivity Disorder) exists beyond 
the walls of the Facilitating Program. One view holds that this syndrome is entirely the result of the 
medicalization of social problems, a consequence of the advent of Ritalin-based therapy (Conrad and 
Schneider, 1980). By contrast, a recent article in the Journal of the American Medical Association attributes 
a significant factor in the incidence of hyperactivity to be exposure to deteriorating lead paint associated with 
tenement buildings inhabited by 'children who are minorities, poor and living in urban areas' (Brody et al., 
1994283). The verification of a connection between lead poisoning - this time due to automobile pollution - 
and certain hyperactive behaviour was cited by Peter Sedgwick as a cautionary example of the dangers of 
reducing all concems about hyperactivity to social control tactics used in the medicaliition of deviance. David 
lngleby considers Sedgwick's illustration to be a timely reminder of the dangers of criticising without 
investigating the particular circumstances and of mounting a totalizing meta-narrative (the social construction 
of deviance) in opposition to another meta-narrative (the biological basis of mental disorders) (Ingleby, 
198599). 
16. Wife battering is a widespread social phenomenon (Conway, 1990:147) which, to a great extent, traces 
its roots to the interplay of sexism, property and power (United Way Task Force on Family Violence: 1979, 
quoted in [Province] Task Force on Family Violence, 1992:75). 
17. Social policy scripts the lives of women as family care ivers and as dependents (Fraser, 1987). 7 h e  
privatized nuclear family, in which members can rely on ea other instead of on the State, fits well with the 
business and State paradigm of fiscal responsibility. Women become defined by State policy as familial first 
and foremost, their entitlement to State support deriving more from their family status than from their work 
status. It is rare indeed for men to make claims on the public purse on the basis of family status; they much 
more often make claims as individuals based on labour market status, as in claims for UIC, pensions, job 
retraining or workers' compensation. Women, on the other hand, are filtered through social policy largely on 
the basis of family status, as in the case of mothers with dependent children, widows' pensions and so 
on ..... Social policy creates and recreates women as dependents, both economically and socially, and reinforces 
the centrality of women's family status as well as their secondary status as wage earners' (McDaniel, 1993: 
1 73). 
18. "The very word 'mother' identifies a particular social role, and a certain pattern of behavior is expected from 
the individual occupying that role. The word mother normally calls to mind a woman who loves, feeds, and 
protects her children, and if she does not meet her role expectations, she is thought of as a 'bad mother'. But 
women's mothering is not merely described as a reality, it is being prescribed and insisted upon. And this norm 
of full-time devotion to children was itself a contributing cause of neglect itself, a factor in causing the 'apathy- 
futility syndrome' so prevalent among neglectful mothers' (Gordon, 1988/1993:164). 
19. 'In 1985 a Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women study reported that 50 to 85 per cent of 
divorced husbands and fathers default on such payments, and the situation has not improved much' (Conway, 
1990: 124). 
20. One of the concems raised by a social worker during the initial period of the Facilitating Program was that 
its emphasis on community support for youths would mask the reality that the main burden for care and 
protection would fall to women, specifically biological mothers and foster mothers (Campbell, 1990). 
21. The comments regarding differential diagnoses of Asian and non Asian youths made by Ken Lancaster's 
social work colleague also warrant further investigation. 
22. The contradiction facing First Nations people was highlighted recently in land claims cases in which they 
were required to demonstrate that their present lifestyles were faithful to traditional practices in order qualify 
as bona fide Natives (Dyck, 1991 :I 50; Culhane, 1994). 
23. "The suicide rate for native youths is seven times higher than the total rate for Canada. A disproportionate 
number of native children are in care' (Children and Youth at Risk, 1991:59). 
CHAPTER EIGHT: PSYCHOLOGY REPORT 
1. In the following transcribed interviews, my interventions appear in italics. 
2. The subtests comprising the W.I.S.C. include picture completion, information, coding, similarities, picture 
arrangement, arithmetic, block design, vocabulary, object assembly, comprehension, symbol search, digit span 
and mazes. 
3. The Chedoke Self-report is a multiple choice format questionnaire which addresses feelings and behaviours 
(104 questions [never or not true; sometimes or somewhat true; often or very true]- e.g. 'I feel I have to be 
perfect'), possible effects of these feelings and behaviours (8 questions [none; a little; a lot] - e.g. 'How much 
have you been irritable or fighting with friends as a result of any of the problems you've identified on the 
checklist in Part A?" ), school (3 questions [check appropriate box] - e.g. 'At which level do you take all or most 
of your coursesr), feelings, friendships and activities (47 questions Icheck appropriate box; yes or no; strongly 
agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree] - e.g. 'How old were you the first time you smoked cigarettes every 
day for a month or longeff The report is scaled to measure symptoms of conduct disorder, hyperactivity, 
overanxiousness, somatization as well as comparing the responses of the youth and caregiver related to 
attachmenttseparation items. 
4. The B.D.I. is a multiple choice questionnaire consisting of 21 items in which the description which best 
describes how the youth has been feeling during the past week is circled - e.g. 'I don't feel I am being 
punished; I feel I may be punished; I expect to be punished; I feel I am being punished'. 
5. The Jesness Inventory consists of a 155 item true or false questionnaire - e.g. 'A lot of fathers don't seem 
to care if they hurt your feelings' - which is scored according to 11 scales: Social Maladjustment (63 items) 'a 
set of attitudes associated with inadequate or disturbed socialization, as defined by the extent to which 
individuals share the attitudes of persons who do not meet environmental demands in socially approved ways'; 
Value Orientation (39 items) 'a tendency to share attitudes and opinions characteristic of persons in the lower 
socioeconomic classes'; Immaturity (45 items) "the tendency to display attitudes and perceptions of self and 
others that are usual for persons of a younger age than the subjecf; Autism (28 items) 'a tendency, in thinking 
and perceiving, to distort reality according to one's personal desires or needs"; Alienation (26 items) We 
presence of distrust and estrangement in a person's attitudes toward others, especially toward those 
representing authoriv; Manifest Aggression (31 items) 'an awareness of unpleasant feelings, especially of 
anger and frustration; a tendency to react readily with these emotions; and an obvious discomfort concerning 
the presence and control of these feelings"; Withdrawal-depression (24 items) "the extent of a youth's 
dissatisfaction with self and others, and a tendency toward isolation from others'; Social Anxiety (24 items) 
'conscious emotional discomfort in interpersonal relationsg; Repression (15 items) ?he exclusion from 
conscious awareness of feelings and emotions that the individual normally would be expected to experience; 
or it reflects his [sic] failure to label these emotions'; Denial (20 items) 'a reluctance to acknowledge unpleasant 
events or conditions encountered in daily living'; Asocial (items not numbered) 'a generalized disposition to 
resolve social or personal problems in ways that show a disregard for social customs or rules'. 
6. The F.E.S. is a true or false questionnaire of 27 items - e.g. 'We are usually careful about what we say to 
each other'. 
7. Kohut (1971), for example, refers favourably to the assessment that delinquents are 'unable to form object- 
relations' (Kohut, 1971 :161) due to peculiarly narcissistic tendencies. 
8. 'First, each interview is a social encounter between an adult who questions an adolescent who may 
recognize this relationship. Second, the line of questioning reflects a particular adult theory of adolescence. 
whereas the response reflects a particular adolescent view of adulthood. Third, each interview provides the 
impetus for the presentation of a managed identity. Finally, adolescent socialization may be influenced by the 
interview process' (Baker, 1983; Weber et al., 199443). 
9. 1 am not proposing that other significant social considerations such as those of gender, sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, race, and age can be reduced to a question of class. Instead, it is necessary to understand these 
aspects of social relations within their concrete particularity, terms of reference which demand a dass analysis. 
As 'constitutive features of productive relations' (Ng, 1988:88), these phenomena are mutually implicated and 
mutually interconnected. 
10. "Disturbed' and 'delinquent' appear to be used as synonyms. 
11. The first ten statements of which read as follows: '1 .) When you're in trouble, it's best to keep quiet about 
it. 2.) It makes me nervous to sit still very long. 3.) 1 get into a lot of fights. 4.) 1 wony too much about doing 
the right things. 5.) 1 always like to hang around with the same bunch of friends. 6.) 1 am smarter than most 
people I know. 7.) It makes me mad that some crooks get off free. 8.) My feelings get hurt easily when I am 
criticized. 9.) Most police will try to help you. 10.) Sometimes I feel like I want to beat up on somebody' 
(Jesness, 19691 1972: pages not numbered in original). My criticism of the limitations of decontextualized 
questions and answers is applicable here. 
12. According to the Jesness Inventory, males are five times more likely to be susceptible than are females 
(Jesness, 1966/1972:27). The scores from the delinquent sample and the nondelinquent control sample were 
grouped according to age. No mention is made of race or ethnicity. 'Failure in masculine identificationw 
(Jesness, 1 966/1972:7) - which presumably includes those favouring a homosexual or bisexual orientation - 
is included as an attribute of 'social maladjustmenr. 
13. In a related critique, Allan Young (1980) examines how standardized test inventories and questionnaires 
are administered in order to disclose the level of stress confronting an individual. Here a professional's 
decontextualized text is presumed to provide a universal calibration of environmental stressors, all the while 
remaining silent on the issue of the uniqueness of each person's embodied cultural logics. A variant on this 
process is evident in the testing which informs the psychologist's report to the care plan meeting. Where 
traditional anthropologists might consider the response of a particular individual at a specific time and place 
to be representative of the cultural character of an entire people caught in the timelessness of the 'ethnographic 
present', the psychologist administering the Jesness lnventory compares the test scores of an individual to 
determine their correlation to those representative of a particular group. The youth's reaction to a uniform 
battery of questions provides the basis for determining the degree to which he or she is a juvenile 
delinquent/condud disordered youth. This cultural category has been constructed through the analytical and 
methodological practices of a group of professionals which has deemed that the presence of a particular set 
of behaviours, regardless of their context, is evidence of the existence of the behaviour disordered 'culture'. 
14. 'The evidence is now overwhelming pointing to a relationship between delinquency and behavioural, 
environmental, and personal variables. More specifically, deprived sociaVeconomic background, being a male, 
unsatisfactory home attitudes and environment, low school ability and achievement, immoderate and 
aggressive behavior, and personality variables (e.g., antisocial and antiauthority attitudes, hedonism, low self- 
esteem, etc.) all need to be considered in any attempt to predict or identify delinquency. The attitudes and 
perception measured by the lnventory are, therefore, only one part of the picture and for some youths will make 
a greater or lesser contribution to the prediction. The use of the lnventory will find, for example, that even when 
using the same norms with females (i.e., using male norms) females do not differ markedly from males in their 
scores on Social Maladjustment and the Asocial Index; yet their rate of serious delinquent and adult criminal 
involvement is roughly only one-fifth of that of males. Control theory might suggest an explanation in greater 
attachment shown by females for parents or school; biological theory might suggest greater autonomic 
responsivity (females do score higher on Social Anxiety which negatively correlated with persistent 
delinquency); subcultural theory would point to differential environments; social learning theory would point to 
different parental expectations and behaviour; and so forth. We believe all these theories and hypotheses may 
have a small comer on the truth. Delinquents differ from one another as well as from nondelinquents, and 
some of the inconsistencies in the validation data may be a consequence of differences in the types of 
delinquents in the various samples. Use of the Jesness Classification System described briefly in this report, 
along with measures of other domains, can help us reach a better understanding of the causes of delinquency. 
We believe that those h o  focus on one causal theory and assume that delinquents are all alike are bound to 
be disappointed in their results. It appears that the Index distinguishes successfuly among identified groups. 
The lnventory should, therefore, be of considerable use in many practical settings, such as in deciding which 
first offenders need intervention-treatment sevices, and which probably will not become chronic delinquents 
if not given services' (Jesness, 1962/1972:27). 
15. The book is not an attempt to give a full anthropoIogical account of the full range of the whole life process 
of twelve individuals - which indeed would have had to take in much else, including their physical and 
emotional development, sexuality, experience in the family, and their detailed existence in a whole 
neighboumood and sweep of local life. I was concentrating on certain cultural and symbolic processes within 
a relatively discrete 'cultural form', focused mainly in the school, and of the transition to work which touched 
upon many of these things .... ('Willis, 197711981:217-21; original italics). 
16. "It is impossible to be 'politically correct.' For the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion ... are played out on 
multiple and shifting fronts, and all ideas (no matter how 'liberatory' in some contexts or for some purposes) 
are condemned to be haunted by a voice from the margins already speaking (or perhaps presently muted but 
awaiting the conditions for speech), awakening us to what has been excluded, effaced, damag& (Bordo, 
1990:138). Not only are alternate readings suppressed, the preferred interpretation may have more to do with 
the viewer's preconceptions than with the actual situation. With their emphasis on counter school culture as 
a form of politically conscious resistance, Willis and other practitioners of British subcultural theory appear to 
be guilty of projecting their own political agendas onto youthful behaviour (Tanner, 1996:83-86). 
17. Psychologist Edmund Sullivan observes that, ' Sarason (1 974), in speaking of psychologists, notes that 
by self-selection and training they 'naturallf think in terms of motivation, attitudes, personality, and many other 
interpsychic factors. Because, by background and training, their unit of analysis is the individual, their horizon 
in general masks or conceals the effects of social structure on personal development. Left to their own devices, 
you might say that psychologists usually attribute social dass dynamics to intrapsychic factors (cf. Ryan, 1974)' 
(Sullivan, 1984:132-133). 
CHAPTER NINE: EDUCATION REPORT 
1. '[Psychology] is the one discipline that I know of that has no well-developed self-reflexivity as to its own 
place in a larger social structure. As a discipline, psychology negates its own class origins and, in practice, 
ignores its effects in the psychological phenomena that it attempts to give an account o f  (Sullivan, 1984:132). 
2. 'Psychology cannot attain the certainty and exactness of the physical sciences unless it rests on a 
foundation of experiment and measurement. A step in this direction could be made bv a ~ ~ l v i n a  a series of 
mental tests and measurements to a large number of individualsm (Cattell, 19803373, cj;oiedvin Hollway, 
l984:55). 
3. Paul Willis' comments about the North American tendency to psychologise social problems such that 'one 
day, perhaps, every disaffected child will be given an individual counsellof(Willis, 1977/1981:216) are 
supported with Eric's observations that the identification of students with learning disorders creates the 
expectation that professionals are provided to address their individual needs. 'And so it spreads ...." 
4. Maoc was no exception to this tendency. By the 1850's, the radical historicist perspective which dominated 
in his early work was increasingly superseded by a conception of historical materialism based on scientific 
premises and procedures (Hamilton, 1992:21). 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: CARE PLAN 
1. As mentioned, parent-child conflict typically is used in place of conduct disorder in discharge diagnoses. 
However, A.D.D. and A.D.H.D. would appear to occupy grey areas between behaviour based categories due 
to social origins and psychiatric problems ostensibly due to physiological abnormalities. In the first instance, 
a lack of temperamental 'fit" between care giver and child is thought to result in ontological insecurity which 
generates the objectionable behaviour. The lack of acceptance by one is believed to set in motion a similarly 
rejecting response on the part of the other. This disjuncture is perpetuated and further aggravated in a 
feedback loop. This tends to result in A.D.D. or A.D.H.D. designations by the time the child enters kindergarten 
or elementary school. It is at this point that the child's socially aberrant actions become a liability to group 
management. The child's distress may produce physiological irregularities which are amenable to treatment 
with Ritalin, affirming the diagnosis of A.D.D. or A.D.H.D. The second instance involves physiological 
irregularities leading to behaviour which prevents secure attachment from occurring. One school of thought, 
the social constructionist medicalitation of social problems stream, pinpoints the advent of A.D.D.1A.D.H.D. to 
the introduction of Ritalin. This diagnosis-by-drug scenario argues that A.D.D.1A.D.H.D. did not exist as 
psychiatric categories until certain troublesome social behaviours could be shown to be alleviated with a 
regimen of the drug, the disorders and their medical treatment emerging concurrently (Conrad and Schneider, 
1980). What this otherwise compelling line of reasoning neglects are those individuals whose behaviour may 
be associated with actual biochemical imbalances (Ingleby, 1985; Sedgwick, 1982). What it highlights, on the 
other hand, is the danger of an empiricist driven psychiatric profession which prides itself on reliability of 
diagnosis. This approach appears to give little thought to its possible negative consequences, whether in terms 
of masking the possible social origins of the behaviour or of initiating a drug based course of treatment 
frequently associated with a D.S.M. designation. 
2. Perhaps the most notable example of this tendency appears in The Courage to Heal: A Guide for Women 
Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse (1988). This influential self-help handbook includes the statement that: '[ilf 
you think you were abused and your life shows the symptoms, then you were' (Bass and Davis, 1988:22). 
3. 'The fundamental mistake that a social constructionist approach can help to correct is embodied in the 
pervasive assumption that the categories we use in the course of empirical investigation correspond directly 
to the 'natural kinds' that exist in a real world outside the framework of our investigative and intellectual 
practices .... Only when we have gained some insight into the kind of historically situated reality to which a 
received framework has been tied can we raise the question of whether it was ever able - or will ever be able - 
to transcend that reality' (Danziger, 1990: 1951 96). 
4. The construction of narrative accounts necessarily involves the designation of certain incidents as having 
a decisive impad on a person's interpretation of the world and upon subsequent behaviour. Yet the assigning 
of significance to particular occurrences is a matter of speculation and cannot claim to represent a single, 
genuine or authentic narrative (Fay, 1987:172-173). 
5. By contrast, an ontologically secure person rhrough early trust relations, has established a protective 
cocoon which 'filters out', in the practical conduct of day-today life, many of the dangers which in principle 
threaten the integrity of the self (Giddens, 1991 :53-64; original italics). 
6. 'The dualism typical of Cartesian thought was institutionalized in the split in the social sciences between 
psychology and the other disciplines. The study of the individual and its mental processes became 
psychologvs special and privileged object of study .... Sociology, however, provided a critique of the 'rational 
individualism' of the Cartesian subject. It located the individual in group processes and the collective norms 
which, it argued, underpin any contract between individual subjects. It therefore developed an alternative 
account of how individuals are formed subjectively through their membership of, and participation in, wider 
social relationships; and, conversely, how processes and structures are sustained by the roles which individuals 
play in them' (Hall, 1992c:284). 
7. One of Mads fundamental insights into the role of the state concerns its function of conferring the status 
and rights of full citizenship without distinction on the basis of race, class, religion, etc. while legitimating 
ongoing arrangements which preserve inequalities on precisely this basis. Unwittingly or otherwise, the care 
plan's qualifying remarks duplicate this function, depriving the Native youth of his distinctive voice, of his right 
to self-determination. Non-Native youths have the possibility of shedding the yoke of age related tutelage by 
the simple passage of time. Adult status will be conferred at the end of adolescence. If conventional attitudes 
and pradices persist, Native people will be saddled with tutelage in perpetuity (Dyck, 1991 :24). The basis for 
this chronic representation lies in the dominant group's refusal to acknowledge the rights to land and resources 
and the right to selfdetermination (Dyck, 1991:29) which are forthcoming to Native people as the founding 
peoples of this country. To add insult to injury, it is this system of enforced guardianship with its oppressive 
surveillance which contributes to expressions of acting out that justify its continuing existence (Marcus, 
l992:ll2; Dyck, 1991 :l62). 
CHAPTER TWELVE: CONVERGENCE OF CULTURAL LOGICS 
1. "Results ... indicate that case managers and caregivers generally perceived the care plan as useful in 
ensuring care for the youth .... Reports at six, 12 and 18 months indicate that the majority of youths felt that they 
had benefitted from the program (77%, 64% and 82%, respectively). Overall, these results indicate that 
program participants and their communities generally responded favourably to the program and found the care 
plan helpful in providing care for youths' (Crossroads, 1994:365). 
2. Bart comments that many people enter the care giving professions in order to have their narcissistic needs 
met. These individuals have a strong need for their clients to be cured or fixed as they are dependent on judging 
their own worth on the basis of someone else's behaviour. 'If they can just be good enough at their jobs, they 
will get a message back saying they're O.K.' Bart observes that these people have set themselves 'pretty 
tough standards' and 'face a crisis in their job' because 'conduct disordered kids have a chronic condition.' 
3. 'Every mythology has to do with the wisdom of life as related to a specific culture at a specific time. It 
integrates the individual into his [sic] society and the society into the field of nature. It unites the field of nature 
with my nature. I ts a harmonizing force. Our own mythology, for example, is based on the idea of duality: good 
and evil, heaven and hell. And so our religions tend to be ethical in their accent. Sin and atonement. Right 
and wrong" (Campbell, 1988:55). 
4. Confronted with a feminist outcry, Miller qualified her critical remarks on motherhood: "ply 'mother' I here 
understand the person dosest to the child during the first years of life. This need not be the biological mother 
or even a woman. In the course of the past twenty years, quite often the fathers have assumed this mothering 
[sic] function' (Miller, 1990:129). 
5. The Becvars outline the prinaples of their outlook as follows: '1. A reality may exist independent of us, but 
we cannot know that reality. 2. The reality that exists for us and the reality we can observe is relative to the 
theory we use as a metaphor for that reality. 3. What we can observe is a function of the means (instruments, 
tools and machines) we use to measure the phenomena of interest (phenomena that exist and are meaningful) 
and of our theories which suggest what might be 'out there.' 4. Real i  is a dynamic, evolving, changing entity. 
5. To observe a phenomena is to change the nature of the phenomenon observed. 6. Phenomena observed 
take on characteristics of the theory or model used to guide and systematize the observations. 7. The 
appropriate unit of analysis is not elementary parts but relationships, which should be the basis of all definitions' 
(Becvar and Becvar, 1988:297). 
6. They do so despite oblique references to the importance of this issue. For example, their historical overview 
of the forerunners of the systemic framework indudes favourable mention of John Dewefs observation on the 
relationship of psychological theory to political ideology. '[A] theory about human behavior, Dewey asserted, 
could not be independent of the ideological foundations of a society and the psychologist's place in that social 
ordef (Sarason, 1981:137; Becvar and Becvar, 1988:49). In addition, they note that it is crucial to be able to 
appreciate differences in ways of l ie assodated with ethnicity, sexual orientation and dass rather than consider 
their departure from the norm to be deviant (Becvar and Becvar, 1988:126). Elsewhere, they note that payment 
for services by mental health professionals requires that a client's diagnosis comply with those outlined in the 
D.S.M. They offer no answers to this predicament. They simply eled to pose the question: 'What are the 
consequences for the larger society of our creating and maintaining a pathology defined as individual rather 
than contextual? (Becvar and Becvar, 1988:105). 
7. This serves to further a functional circularity between psychology and the dominant culture: While 
psychological concepts are molded by the dominant values of the society of their origin, the teaching of such 
concepts, and the practice of therapeutic techniques based on them, in tum strengthen the same values in the 
culture" (Paranjpe, 1984: 309). 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
1. See Paul Rabinow (1986; 1991), Comel West (1993), bell hooks (1990), Merrill Singer (1993) and Arturo 
Escobar (1 992). 
2. The work of educator Paulo Friere (1 97011 990; l992Il994) and diredor Augusto Boal (1 979; 1995) provide 
especially insightful accounts of this encounter in which conventional dichotomies of teacher-student and ador- 
spectator, respectively, are transcended. 
3. Although rarely reflected upon in this discipline, psychology usually follows the movements of the larger 
sociopolitical and economic context. When the temper is liberal and progressive and the economy is 
expanding, there is a greater emphasis on transformation (change) models and optimism about the effects of 
the environment for psyc hological and social change. .... When the soda1 temper became more conservative, 
conservative biogenetic metaphors (e.g. Jensen) become more popular' (Sullivan, 1984:132-133). 
Psychology's impad on conventional wisdom is such that these factors increasingly apply across disciplines. 
Conservative times combined with their relatively privileged position can lead professionals to subscribe to 
political views opposed to the general interests of working people as a class (leeple, 1995:29). 
REFERENCES 
Abrams, Jeremiah (1990) "Introduction: The Psychology of the Child Archetypew, Abrams, 
Jeremiah (ed) Reclaimina the Inner Child, Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc., pp. 24-25 
Abu-Lughod, Lila (1991) 'Writing Against Culture", Fox, Richard G. (ed) RecaDturina 
Anthrop-: Workina i n  the Present, Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American 
Research Press, pp. 134-1 62 
Abu-Lughod, Lila and Catherine A. Lutz (eds) (1990) U a e  and the Poltt~cs of . . 
Emotion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Adams, H.P. (1 965) Karl Marx in His Earlv Writingg, New York: Russell and Russell 
Alanen, Leena (1 988) "Rethinking Childhood", -, Vol. 31, No. 1 :53-67 
Althusser, Louis (1 970) For M m ,  New York: Vintage Books 
Althusser, Louis (197011 971) Lenin and Philosophv and other ess-, London: New Left 
Books 
American Psychiatric Association (1980) Piaanostic and Statistical Manual of  Mental 
Disorders-Ill, Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association 
American Psychiatric Association (1987) Piaanostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders-Ill-R, Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association 
American Psychiatric Association (1994) m o s t i c  and S w t ~ c a l  Manual of Mental . . 
Disorders-N, Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association 
Aries, Phillipe (1962) Centuries of Childhooa, London: Jonathan Cape 
Aronowitz, Stanley (1 98111 990) The Crisis of Historical Materialisru, London: MacMillan 
Aronowitz, Stanley (1 988) "The Production of Scientific Knowledge: Science, Ideology and 
Marxism", Grossberg, Lawrence and Cary Nelson (eds) C
of Culture, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 51 9-541 
Arthur, C.J. (1 94711 970) "Editor's Introduction", Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels 
German Ideology, New York: International Publishers, pp. 4-34 
Austin-Broos, Diane J. (1 987) "introduction", Austin-Broos, Diane J. (ed) Creatina C u l t u ? ~  
Profiles in the studv of culture, SydneylLondon/Boston: Allen & Unwin, pp. xix-xxxi 
Avard, Denise (1989) The Health of Canada's Children: A ClCH Profile, Ottawa 
Baker, C. D. (1 983) "A 'Second Look' at Interviews with Adolescentsw, - 
Adolescence, No. 1 2:5Ol-519 
Barnett, Steve and M. G. Silverman (1979) J d e o l o u d  F v e w w e :  AnthTopology, 
Neo-Marxist Thouaht. and the Problem of ldeoloav and the Social Whole, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press 
Barrett, Michele (1980) yrlomen's Qp~ression T o w  Problems in IKarxist Feminist 
&&&, London: Verso 
Bass, Ellen and Louise Thomton (eds) (1 983) J Never Told Anvone: Wrltl-v Women . . 
Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse, New York: Harper and ROW 
Bass, Ellen and Laura Davis (1988) The Couraae to Heal: A Guide for Women Survivors 
of Child Sexual Abuse, New York: Harper and Row 
Bates, J. E., K. Bayles, and D. A. Bennett et al. (1991) 'Origins of externalizing behaviour 
problems at eight years of age", Pepler, D. J. and K. H. Rubin (eds) The Devel- 
tment of Childhood Aggression, Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum, pp. 93-120 
Bateson, G. (1956) "Towards a Theory of Schizophrenia", Behavioral Science, Vol.1, 
N0.4:251-264 
Beck, Aaron T. (1 978) Beck Depression Inventory, San DiegoMew York/ChicagolAustin: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Becker, Howard S. (196311973) Outsiders: Stud~es In the Sociology of D e v i m ,  . . 
Glencoe: Free Press 
Becvar, Dorothy S. and Rafael J. Becvar (1988) Familv Therapv: A Svstematk 
m r a t i o n ,  Boston: Allyn and Bacon 
Belsky, J. and T. Nemorski (1988) Clinical lm~lications of Attachment, Hillsdale, 
N. J.:Erlbaum 
Benhabib, Seyla (1990) "Epistemologies of Postmodemism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Francois 
Lyotard", Nicholson, Linda J. (ed) ~ n ~ s r n l P o s t m o d e r n i s r n  . . , New YorkILondon 
Routledge, pp. 107-1 30 
. . Benhabib, Seyla (1991) Situatina Self: Gender. C o m e  and Postmodern~sm la 
Contemporary Ethics, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Bentley, G. Carter (1987) "Ethnicity and Practice", W a t i v e  Studies in Society and 
H m ,  NO. 29:24-55 
Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckmann (1966) The Social Construction of Reality, Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday 81 Co. 
Berger, P. and S. Pullberg (1966) "Reification and the Sociological Critique of 
Consciousness", New Left Review, Vo1.35:56-71 
'ectivism and & l a t ~ v ~ s m  . . Bernstein, Richard (1 984) Bevond Obj , Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Bettelheim, Bruno (1 960) The Informed H a ,  New York: Free Press 
Bibeau, Gilles (1988) "A Step Toward Thick Thinking: From Webs of Significance to 
Connections across Dimensions", Medical A n t b ~ o l o g y  Q u m ,  Vo1.2, No.4:402-416 
Bly, Robert (1990) Iron John: A Book About Men, Reading, Mass : Addison-Wesley 
Boal, Augusto (1979) The Theatre of the Oppressed, translated by Charles A. and Marie- 
Odilia McBride, London: Pluto Press 
Boal, Augusto (1 995) The Rainbow of Desire: The Boal Method of Theatre and Therapy, 
translated by Adrian Jackson, London/New York: Routledge 
Bocock, R. (1 986) I f e a e m o ~ ,  LondonMew York: Tavistock 
Bocock, Robert (1992) 'The Cultural Formations of Modem SocieK, Hall, Stuart, David 
Held, and ~ o n e ~ ~ c ~ i e w  (eds) Modernity and Its Fu-, cambidge: polity press, pp. 
230-274 
Bologh, Roslyn Wallace (1979) Dialectical Phenomenologv: Marx's Method, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Bordo, Susan (1 990) 'Feminism, Postmodemism, and Gender-Scepticism", Nicholson, Linda 
L. (ed) FeminismlPostmodernisrn, New York: Routledge, pp. 133-1 56 
Bottomore, Tom (1 963) 'Introduction", Bottomore, Tom (ed) -1 Marx: Early Writings, New 
Yorl<TTorontolLondon: McGraw-Hill Book Company, pp. vii-xix 
Bottomore, Tom (1983) "Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism", Bottomore, Tom (ed) A 
Dictionary of Marxist T h o r n ,  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 247-249 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1 977) Outline of a Theow of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1 98011 990) The Loaic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1984) Distinctions: A Social Crltlgsle of  the Judgment of Taste, . . 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1 989) 'Social space and symbolic power', weal Theory, Vol. 7:14- 
25 
Bowlby, John (1951) Maternal Care and Mental Health, Geneva: World Health 
Organization 
Bowlby, John (1969) Attachment and Loss. Vol. 1: Mdm@nl1 New York: Basic Books 
Bowlby, John (1973) m c h m e n t  and Loss. VQL 2: S e ~ m t i o n ,  New York: Basic Books 
Bowlby, John (1 980) Attachment and Loss. Voi. 3: Loss. sadness and depraggjpn, New 
York: Basic Books 
Bowlby, J. (1 982) "Attachment and loss: retrospect and prospectn, h u a l  of 
Proaress in Child Psvchiatw and Child Develo~mer& 1982:29-47 
Bowlby, John (1988) A Secure Base: Parent-child -ent and Healthv H u m  
PeveIoDment, New York: Basic Books 
Bowlby, John, K. Figlio and R. Young (1986) 'An Interview with John Bowlby", 
ong, No. 6:36-64 
Bradshaw, John (1990) "Liberating Your Lost Inner Child", Abrams, Jeremiah (ed) 
Beclalmlngthe Inner Ch . . ild, Los Angeles: Tarcher, pp. 224-233 
Brassard, M. R., R. Germain, S. N. Hart (1987) "The challenge: To better understand and 
combat psychological maltreatment of children and youth', Brassard, M. R., R. Gennain and 
S. N. Hart (eds) Psvcholoaical Maltreatment of Children and Youth, New York: 
Pergarnon, pp. 3-24 
Breines, Wini and Linda Gordon (1983) 'The New Scholarship on Family Violence", Sians, 
Vol. 8, No. 3:490-531 
Brenkman, John (1987) Culture and Dominatim, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 
Bretherton, 1. (1991) "Pouring new wine into old bottles: the social self as Internal Working 
Model", Gunnar, M. and L. Sroule (eds) Self Processes and Develpgment, Hillsdale, N. 
J.: Erlbaum 
Bretherton, I. (1 991 b) 'Roots and growing points of attachment theory", Parkes, C. M., J. 
Stevenson-Hinde, and P. Marris (eds) Attachment Across the Life Cvcle, London: 
Routledge 
Bretherton, lnge (1992) "The Origins of Attachment Theory: John Bowlby and Mary 
Ainsworth", Qevelo~mental Psvchology, Vol. 28, No. 5:759-775 
Brewster, Ben (1966) "Comment: Reification and the Sociological Critique of 
Consciousness", New Left Review, No. 3572-77 
Brewster, Ben (1 966b) "Presentation of Gorz on Sartre", New Left Review, Vo1.37:29-32 
Briggs, P. F., R. D. Wirt, and R. Johnson (1961) "An application of prediction tables to the 
study of delinquency", J ou r nal of Consultina Psycholoay, No. 25:46-50 
Brody, Debra, James L. Pirkle, Rachel A. Kramer, Katherine M. Foegal, Thomas E. Matte, 
Elaine W. Gunter, Daniel C. Paschal (1 994) 'Blood Levels in the U.S. Population", Journal 
of the American Medical Assoc- . . , Vol. 272, NO. 4:277-283 
Bronfenbrenner, Urie, Frank Dessel, William Kessen and Sheldon White (1986) "Toward a 
Critical Social History of Developmental Psychology", A-an Psv- Vol. 41, No. 
11:1218-1230 
Brown, G. and T. Hams (1 978) The S o m s  of De~resslon, London: Tavistock 
Bulhan, Hussein Abdilahi (1985) g v  of Oppression, New 
York/London: Plenum Press 
Butchart, Alex and Mohamed Seedat (1 990) ''Within and Without: Images of Community and 
Implications for South African Psychology", S o & J  Science an- . . , Vol. 31, No. 
10: 1093-1 102 
Cain, Roy (1 993) "Community-Based AIDS Services: Formalization and Depoliticization:, 
bternational Journal of  Health Services, Vol. 23, No. 4:665-684 
Callinicos, Alex (1 989) Aaainst P o s t m o ~ s m :  A Marxist Critigyg, Cambridge: Polity 
Press 
Campbell, Janet (1990) 'An Analysis of a Provincial Psychiatric Treatment Centre for 
Adolescentsn, M.S.W thesis, School of Social Work, [University], unpublished 
Campbell, Janet (1990) "M.A.T.C. Clinical Models", School of Social Work,[University], 
unpublished 
Campbell, Joseph and Bill Moyers (1988) The Power of Myth, Flowers, Betty Sue (ed) New 
York/London/Toronto/Sydney/Auckland: Doubleday 
Campbell, Joseph (1 990) 'Killing the Dragon", Abrams, Jeremiah (ed) Reclam~ng the inner . . 
Ghild, Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc., pp. 259-260 
Campbell, S. B. (1990) 
Qevelo~mental Issues, New York: Guilford Press 
Campbell, S. B., E. W. Pierce, C. L. March et al. (1991) 'Noncompliant behavior, over- 
activity, and family stress as predictors of negative maternal control with preschool childrenw, 
Qevelopmental Psvchopathology, No. 3: 175-1 90 
Canada: Senate (1 908) Qebatea, Ottawa: Queen's Printer 
Cattell, J. M., Eber and Matsuoka (1970) Handbook for the 16PF, Columbia: IPAT 
Chambers, E. (1 985) &lied -: A Practical Guide, Prospect Heights, Illinois: 
Waveland Press 
Chodorow, N (1978) The Rep roduct ion of Motherina: Psvchoanalvsis and the 
Socioloav of Gender, Berkeley: University of California Press 
Children and Youth at Risk Steering Committee (1991) Children and Youth at R i s k  
Towards a Mental Health Plan, Social Planning Department, [City] 
Chudnovsky, Rita (1990) m d r e n ' s  Advocate Proaress Report, Social Planning 
Department, [City] 
Chularton, K. (1 976) The Va l~d~tv  of the Jesness Inventow in Delinauencv Pred~ctlon . . . . 
and lnter~ersonal Maturitv-level Classificatipn, Adelaide, S. A.:Department of Welfare 
Cicchetti, D. and D. Barnett (1991) 'Attachment Organization in Maltreated Preschoolers", 
Development and Psvchopathology, No. 3:397411 
Cicchetti, Dante and John E. Richters (1993) "Developmental considerations in the 
investigation of conduct disorder", Develo~ment and Psvchpgathology, Vol. 5331-344 
Cicchetti, Dante and John E. Richters (1993b) "Toward a developmental perspective on 
conduct disorder", Development and P s v c ~ o l o g y ,  Vol. 5:l-4 
[City], Social Planning Dept. (1992) Asian Youth Task Force Str- S o c k b W i m  
Plan: The Dilemma of New Canadian Youth - A  Discussion Paper, [City]:[City] Social 
Planning Dept. 
Clement, Catherine (1983) The Lives and Leaends of Jacques Lacm, New York: 
Columbia University Press 
Clifford, James (1986) "Introduction: Partial Truths", Clifford, James and George Marcus 
(eds) Writina Culture: The Poetics and Pohtlcs of EthnoaraDhv. . . Berkeley1 Los 
AngelesJLondon: University of California Press , pp. 1-26 
Clifford, James (1988) The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnoaraphv, 
Literature. and Art, Cambridge, Mass.1London: Harvard University Press 
Cohen, Anthony P. (1 985) T he Svmbolic C o o f  , LondonMew York: 
Tavistock Publications 
Cohen, Anthony P. (1 992) "Self-conscious anthropology," Okely, Judith and Helen Callaway 
(eds) &lthropolonv and Autobioaraohv, LondonMew York: Routledge, pp. 221-241 
Cohen, Stanley (1985) Visions of Social CQnfiPI, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Cohen, Stanley and Andrew Scull (eds) (1983) , London: 
Martin Robertson and Company 
Cohen-Solal, Annie (1 987) Sartre: A Life, New York: Pantheon Books 
Coles, Robert (1967) Children of Cr~sts. Volume One: A Studv of Couragg and Fear, . . 
Boston/Toronto: Little, Brown and Company 
Comaroff, Jean (1982) "Medicine: Symbol and Ideology", Wright, P. and A. Treacher (eds) 
The Problem of Medical Knowled- the Social Construction of Me-, 
Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, pp.49-68 
Comaroff, Jean and John Comaroff (1991) Of R e v e m  and Revolution: Chr~stlanltv. . .  . 
Colon~ahsm and Co . . nsciousness in South Africa. Vol. 2, Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press 
Community Panel: Family and Children's Services Legislation Review of [Province] (1992) 
Makina Chanaes: A Place to Start. 
Connell, Robert (1983) ~ L U Q ,  
Sydney/London/Boston: George Allen & Unwin 
Connell, Robert (1987) Gender and Power: S o c i a .  the Pe-d Sexual Pol~t~cs, . . 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
Connerton, Paul (1 989) How soc~et~es r w m b e r  . . , CambridgetNew YorklPort 
Chester/Melbourne/Sydney: Cambridge University Press 
Conrad, Peter (1980) "On the Medicalization of Deviance," Ingleby, David (ed) 
Psvchiatry, New York: Pantheon, pp.102-I19 
Conrad, Peter and J.W. Schneider (1980) Deviance and Medicalization: From Badness 
to Sickness, St. Louis: Mosby 
Conway, John F. (1990) The Canadian Familv in Crisis, Toronto: James Lorimer & 
Company 
Coombe, Rosemary J. (1991) "Encountering the postmodern: new directions in cultural 
anthropology", Canadian Review of SociolQgy and A n ~ o ~ o l o g y ,  Vol. 28, No. 2:188-205 
Cooper, D.G. (1 964) "Sartre on Genet", New I eft Review, Vo1.25-69-73 
Cooper, D.G. (1964b) "Question of Method", Laing, R.D. and D.G. Cooper (eds) Reason 
jrnd Violence, London: Tavistock Publications, pp.31-64 
Cooper, D.G. (1964~) "Sartre on Genet", Laing, R.D. and D.G. Cooper (eds) Reason and 
Violence, London: Tavistock Publications, pp.67-90 
Crapanzano, Vincent (1990) 'An Introduction", mure.  Medicine and Psvchiatry, Vol. 14, 
NO. 2:145-152 
Crick, Malcolm (1 992) "Ali and me: an essay in street-comer anthropology", Okely, Judith 
and Helen Callaway (eds) Anthro~oloav and A u m ,  LondonMew York: 
Routledge, pp. 175-1 92 
Crittenden, Patricia (1 992) "Quality of attachment in the preschool years", Development and 
Psvchopathology, Vol. 4:209-241 
Crossroads (1 990) "The Response Program: Facilitating Communities jn the Provision of 
Care and Development of Affiliation with Disaffiliated Youths", unpublished paper 
Crossroads (1 990b) "Review Panels: All You Need to Know", unpublished document 
Crossroads (1 992) "Conduct Disorder and its Various Expressions", unpublished draft paper 
#2, preparation for the [Canadian psychiatry conference], Montreal 
Crossroads (1992b) "Conduct Disorder: The Response Programn, unpublished paper 
presented at the [Canadian psychiatry conference], Montreal 
Crossroads (1 993) "Attachment and Conduct Disorder", [Canadian psychiatric journal], Vol. 
38, NO. 6~420-431 
Crossroads (1 993b) "Reaching Outn, unpublished paper 
Crossroads (1993~) "[Facilitating Program - Annual Report: Summary of Presentation]", 
unpublished paper presented at a Canadian psychiatry conference, Banff 
Crossroads (1 994) "Long Term Outcome of an Attachment-Based Program for Conduct 
Disorder",[Canadian psychiatric journal] , Vol. 39, No. 6:360-370 
Crouch, Mira and Lenore Manderson (1995) "The Social Life of Bonding Theory", Soci;cl 
Science and Medicine, Vol. 41, No. 6:837-844 
Dalal, Farhad (1988) "The Racism of Jungn, Race and Class, Vol. 29, No. 3:1-22 
Danica, Elly (1 990) Don't: A Woman's Word, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 
Danziger, Kurt (1990) C o n st  ru ct  in a _ t h e subiect: Historical oriains of  ~ s v c h o  l ai cal 
research, CambridgelNew YorWPort Chester/Melbourne/Sydney: Cambridge University 
Press 
Davies, M. (1969) The Use of the Jesness Inventory on a s m ~ l e  of Brltlsh . . 
probationetg,London: HMSO 
Davis, Laura (1991) Allies in Healing, New York: HarperCollins Publishers 
Descartes, Rene (163711 960) Discourse on Method, Baltimore: Penguin Books 
Dickens, Charles (1 84311 965) A Christmas Carol, New York: Harper & Row 
Dickinson, Harley D. and Glenn Andre (1988) "Community Psychiatry: The Institutional 
Transformation of Psychiatric Practice", Bolaria, B. Singh and H. Dickinson (eds) 
Sociolpgv of Health Care in Canada, Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, pp. 296-308 
di Leonardo, Micaela (1 991) "Introduction: Gender, Culture and Political Economy: Feminist 
Anthropology in Historical Perspective," di, Leonardo, Micaela (ed) Gender at the 
Crossroads of Knowledae: Feminist Antbopology in the Postmodemist Era, 
BerkeleyILos Angeles/Oxford: University of California Press, pp. 1-48 
di Leonardo, Micaela (1 996) "Patterns of Culture Wars', I- April 8, 1996:25-29. 
Donzelot, Jacques (1 979) The Po l~c~ng  of Fa . . m, New York: Pantheon 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow (1982) Michel F o m :  Bevond Structuralism a d  
Hermeneutics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
Dyck, Noel (1985) "Aboriginal Peoples and Nation-States: An lntroduction to the Analytical 
Issues", in Dyck, N. (ed) l m e n o u s  Peo~les and the Nation St&: Fourth World 
Politics in  Canaa. Australia and N o r w ~ ,  Social and Economic Papers No. 14, 
Newfoundland: Memorial University of Newfoundland, pp. 1-26 
Dyck, Noel (1991) What is the m a n  Problem . T u w e  and Resistance in C a e  8 @. 
lndian Administration, St. John's: Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Dyck, Noel (1993) "'Telling it like it is': Some Dilemmas of Fourth World Ethnography and 
Advocacy," Dyck, Noel and James B. Waldram (eds) (1993) AnthrQgplpgygublic Policv, 
ve Peo~les in Canada, Montreal/Kingston/London/ Buffalo: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, pp. 192-21 2 
Dyck, Noel and James B. Waldram (eds) (1993) Anthro~ologv. Public Policv. and Native 
Peo~ les  in Canada, Montreal/Kingston/London/ Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press 
Dykk, Lloyd (1994) "Creaky structure of Ibsen's House renovated by superb stage 
mechanics," The Vancouver Sun, April 23,1994:ClO 
Eagleton, Terry (1978) Criticism and Ideology, London: Verso 
Eagleton, Terry (1991) jdeoloav: An Introduction, LondodNew York: Verso 
Egan-McKenna, G. (1990) "'May I help you?': The applied anthropologist and Indian self- 
determination," P racticina Anthro~oI~gj&, Vol. 12, No. 7 
Ehrenreich, Barbara (1989) The The Inner Life of the Middle Clasg, New 
York: HarperCollins 
Ellenberger, Henri F. (1970) The Discovew of the Unconswus. The H . istow and 
Evolution of Dvnamic PsvchiatLy, New York: Basic Books, Inc. 
Epstein, Steven (1987) "Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Construction", 
Socialist Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 & 4:9-54 
Erikson, Erik (1950) Childhood and Society, New York: Norton 
Erikson, Erik (1968) Jdentity. Youth and Crisis, New York: Norton 
Escobar, Arturo (1992) "Culture, Practice and Politics," Critiaue of Anthrooobgy, Val. 12, 
NO. 4:395-432 
Escobar, Arturo (1 993) "The Limits of Reflexivity: Politics in Anthropology's Post- Writing 
Culture Era," Journal of Anthro~Qlpgjcal R e s a ,  Vol. 49:377-391 
Everton, Bob (1 996) "The Autonomy of Civil Society', paper presented at the Congress of 
the Learneds, Toronto 
Fabian, Johannes (1 990) "Presence and Representation: The Other and Anthropological 
Writing," Critical Inquiry, Vol. 16:753-772 
Fabian, Johannes (1991) "Dilemmas of Critical Anthropology", Nencel, Lorraine and Peter 
Pels (eds) Constructina Knowledae: Autbr i ty  and C r ~ w u e  in Social Science, . . 
LondonINewbury ParkINew Delhi: Sage, pp. 180-202 
Fabian, Johannes (1 991 b) "Ethnographic Objectivity Revisited: From Rigor to Vigor," Annals 
o f  Scholarship, Vol. 8, No. 3/4:381-408 
Fabian, Johannes (1993) "Crossing and Patrolling: Thoughts on Anthropology and 
Boundaries", Culture, Vol. 13, No. 1 :49-53 
Fabrega Jr., Horacio (1 98211 984) "Culture and Psychiatric Illness: Biomedical and 
Ethnomedical Aspects", Marsella, Anthony J. and Geoffrey M. White (eds) Cultural 
Conce~tions of Mental Health and Theragy, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
pp. 39-68 
Fanon, Frantz (1 963) The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove 
Fay, Brian (1 975) Social Theory and Pol~t~cal  Pract . . ice, London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd. 
Fay, Brian (1987) Critical Social Science: Liberation and its Limits, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press 
Featherstone, Mike (1 988) "In Pursuit of the Postmodem: An Introduction", Theory. Culture 
and SociuQ, Vo1.5: 195-21 5 
Federal Working Group on the Mental Health of Children and Youth (1990) "Foundations for 
the Future", Ottawa: Health and Welfare Canada 
Finkelhor, David (1984) Child S e x u w s e :  New Theory and Research, New York: The 
Free Press 
Fisher, R. M. (1 967) "Acquiescent Response set, the Jesness Inventory, and implications 
. . . . for the use of foreign psychological tests", 
Psvchology, No. 6: 1-1 0 
Flax, Jane (1 990) "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory", Nicholson, 
Linda J. (ed) Feminism1 Post rnodern i~ ,  New York: Routledge, pp. 39-62 
Fl~nn, Thomas R. (1984) Sartre and M m t  Existentialism, ChicagoLondon: University 
of Chicago Press 
Foley, Barbara (1 990) "Marxism in the Poststructural Moment: Some Notes on the Problem 
of Revising Marx", Cultural Cr i t iau, Spring11 990537 
Fonagy, Peter, M. Steele and H. Steele (1991) 'Intergenerational Pattems of Attachment: 
Maternal Representations During Pregnancy and Subsequent Infant-Mother Attachments", 
Child Development, No. 62:278-297 
Fonagy, Peter, Miriam Steele, Howard Steele, Tom Leigh, Roger lennedy, and Mary Target 
(1 993) "The Predictive Specificity of Mary Main's Adult Attachment Interview: Implications 
for Psychodynamic theories of Emotional Development", paper for presentation at 
conference on "John Bowlby's Attachment Theory: Historical, Clinical and Social 
Significance", Toronto, October 20-23, 1993 
Foucault, Michel(1961 11 988) -andon: A Histow of lnsanlty In the Age . .. . . . 
of Reason, trans. R. Howard, New York: Vintage 
Foucault, Michel (196311975) The Birth of the Clln - i .  c. An Archaeol~gy of Med ical 
P e r c e ~ t i o ~ ,  New York: Vintage 
Foucault, Michel (196611970) The Order of Thinas: An Archeoloav o f  the Human 
Sciences, New York: Vintage Books 
Foucault, Michel(196911972) Archeoloav of KnowleBge, LondonMew York: Tavistock 
Publications 
Foucault, Michel (197511979) Discipline & Punish: The Birth of  the Prison, New York: 
Vintage Books 
Foucault, Michel (1980) PowerlKnowledae: S- lntewiews and Other Wrltlngg . . 
3972-1977, trans. Colin Gordon et al., Brighton: Harvester Press 
Foucault, Michel (1982l1983) "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in 
Progress", Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow (eds) (1982l1983) Mchel  Foucault; 
Bevond Structuralism and Hermeneuticg, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 
229-252 
Foucault, Michel (198211983b) "The Subject and Power", Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul 
Rabinow (eds) (1 982ll983) Michel Foucault: B e v o d  Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp.208-216 
Foucault, Michel(1991) "Govemmentality," Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller 
(eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies In Governme- . . , Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 87-1 04 
Fox, Renee (1977) "The Medicalization and Demedicalization of American Society", 
Paedalus, Vol. 106:9-22 
Fox, Richard G. (1989) Gandhian Utopia: Fxperiments with Culture, Boston: Beacon 
Press 
Fox, Richard G. (1991) "Introduction: Working in the Present", in Richard G. Fox (ed) 
Rec-a An-: W o r k i n w e  Presed, Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of 
American Research Press, pp. 1-16 
Fox, Richard G. (1991b) "For a Nearly New Culture History", Fox, Richard G. (ed) 
Recapturina Anthro~ologv- the Present, Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of 
American Research Press, pp. 93-1 13 
Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth (1 990) "My Statue, My Self: Autobiographical Writings of Afro- 
American Women", Gates, Henry Louis Jr. (ed) - Black. Re- Feminist: A 
Anthology, New York: Meridian, pp. 176-203 
Frankenberg, Ronald (1988) "Gramsci, Culture and Medical Anthropology: Kundry and 
Parsifal? or Rat's Tail to Sea Serpent?", Medical Anthro~ology Quarterly, Vo1.2:324-337 
Fraser, Nancy (1987) "Women, Welfare and the Politics of Needs Integration", Hv~atia: A 
Journal of  Feminist Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 1:103-121 
Fraser, Nancy (1 989) Unrulv Practices: Power. Discourse. and Gender in Contemporary 
Social Theory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
Fraser, Nancy (1992) "The Uses and Abuses of French Discourse Theories for Feminist 
Politics", Theorv. Culture & Society, Vol. 9:51-71 
Fraser, Nancy and Linda J. Nicholson (eds) (1990) "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An 
Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism", Nicholson, Linda J. (ed) 
FeminismlPostmodernis~q, New YorWLondon: Routledge, pp.19-38 
Fred, Randy (1988) "Foreword", Resistance and Renewal: Suwlvlng the I n d h  . . 
Residential School, Vancouver: Tillacum Library, pp. 1 1-20 
Freeman, Mark (1 993) Rewriting the self: Historv. -, LondonMew York: 
Routledge 
Freire, Paulo (1 97011 990) Fed-v of the Oppressed, New York: Continuum 
Freire, Paulo (199211994) Pedaa~gv o f  Hope: Reln~r(g Pedagpgv of the Oporessed, . . 
New York: Continuum 
Fromm, Erich (1955) The Sane Society, Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett 
Fromm, Erich (1962) Bevond the Chains of I l l u s i ~ ,  Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett 
Furniss, Elizabeth (1995) Victims of Benevolence: The Dark m c v  of t h e m  . . 
Lake Residential School, Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press 
Gaines, Atwood (1 98211 984) "Cultural Definitions Behaviour and the Person in American 
Psychiatry", Marsella, Anthony J. and Geoffrey M. White (eds) -al Conceptions of 
Mental Health and Therapy, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp.2167-192 
Gaines, Atwood (1 991) "Cultural Constructivism: Sickness Histories and the Understanding 
of Ethnomedicines beyond Critical Medical Anthropologiesl', Pfleiderer, Beatrix and Gilles 
Bibeau (eds) (1 991) A n t w e s  of Med~cme: A C o l l o m  on West w e a n  . . 
North American Pers~ectives, Heidelberg: Vieweg, pp. 221-258 
Gaines, Atwood (1992) "From DSM-I to Ill-R; Voices of Self, Mastery and the Other: A 
Cultural Constructivist Reading of U.S. Psychiatric Classification1', Social Science (k 
Medicine, Vol. 35, No. 1 :3-24 
Gaines, Donna (1991) Teenaae Wasteland: Suburbla s Dead End K . I  ids, New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers 
Geertz, Clifford (1 973) The Interpretation of Culture: Selected E s s w ,  New York: Basic 
Books 
Geertz, Clifford (1977) "The Transition to Humanity", Tax, S. and L.G. Freeman (eds) 
j-lorizons of Anthropology, Chicago: Aldine, pp. 21-32 
Geertz, Clifford (1 984) "From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding", Shweder, Richard and Robert LeVine (eds) Culture Theory, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 123-1 36 
Geertz, Clifford (1988) Works and Lives: The Anthropploaist as Author, Cambridge: 
Polity Press 
Gelles, Richard J. (1970) "The Social Construction of Child Abuse", Cook, Joanne Valiant 
and Roy Tyler Bowles (ed) Child Abuse: Cornnug-nd Om~ss~on  . . . . , Toronto: 
Butterworths, pp. 341-349 
Gelles, Richard (1973) 'Child Abuse as Psychopathology: A Sociological Critique and 
Reformulation", American Journal of  Orthopsvchi&y, No. 43:611-621 
Gelles, Richard (1975) 'The Social Construction of Child Abuse", American Journal of 
-, No. 45:363-371 
George, C., N. Kaplan and M. Main (1984) 'Adult Attachment Interview", unpublished paper, 
University of California, Berkeley 
Geras, Norman (1 971) "Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism in Marx's Capital", 
New Left Review, Vo1.66:69-85 
Geras, Norman (1990) Discourses of E D  . 
T x t r a v ~ n c e ~ ,  LondonlNew York: Verso 
Gergen, Kenneth J. (1991) The Saturated Self: D i l e u  of Identiw in Conter~porary 
life, New York: Basic Books 
Giddens, Anthony (1 976) New Rules of S o c i o l a  Method, London: Hutchinson 
Giddens, Anthony (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory, Berkeley: University of 
California Press 
Giddens, Anthony (1982) Sociology: A Brief but Cr~ t~ca l  IntroUction . . , San DiegoINew 
York/Chicago/Austin: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Giddens, Anthony (1987) Social Theorv and M e r n  Sociolpgy, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 
Giddens, Anthony (1 990) Jhe Conseauences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Giddens, Anthony (1991) Moderniv and Self-ldentihr: Self and Societv in the Lijfe 
Modern Aae, Stanford: Stanford University Press 
Gil, D.G. (1 970) Violence Aaainst Children, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
Gil, David G. (1 979) "Unraveling Child Abuse", Bourne, Richard and Eli H. Newberger (eds) 
Critical Perspectives on Child Abuse, Lexington, Mass./Toronto: Lexington Books, pp.69- 
79 
Gilligan, Steven and Reece Price ( eds) (1993) Thera~eutic Conversation, New York: W. 
W. Norton 
Giovanni, Jeanne and Rosina Becerra (1979) Defining Child Abuse, New York, Free Press 
Godard, Barbara (1 990) "The Politics of Representation: Some Native Canadian Women 
Writers", New, W. H. (ed) flative W r i t e m d  Can-, Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, pp. 183-225 
. . .  Goffman, Erving (1961) Asvlums: Fssavs on the Soc~al w o n  of Mental Patients and 
other I n m m ,  New York: Doubleday 
Goffman, Erving (1963) m a :  Notes on the MatmgQmat of Spoiled Id-, 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 
Goldmann, Lucien (1969) The Human Sciences & Philosophy, London: Jonathan Cape 
Gordon, Linda (1985) "Child Abuse, Gender and the Myth of Family Independence: A 
Historical Critique", Child Welfare, Vol. LXIV, No. 3, pp. 21 3-224 
Gordon, Linda (198811989) Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Pol~tlcs and His- . . 
Familv Violence, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books 
Gordon, Linda (1 988) 'The Politics of Child Sexual Abuse: Notes from American History", 
Review, No. 2856-64 
Gordon, R. M. (1988) "Mental Disorder, Law, and the State", University of British Columbia, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 
Gorz, Andre (1 959) The Traitor, New York: Simon Schuster 
Gottlieb, Roger S. (1992) Marxism 1844-1990: onam.  betaval. reb . . irth, New 
Yorknondon: Routledge 
Gramsci, Antonio (1 971) S S s d ,  
New York: International Publishers 
Gramsci, Antonio (1 988) Eramsci's Prison Letters: A Selection, London: Zwan 
Greenberg, David F. (1981) "Praxis and Marxian Criminology", Greenberg, David F. (ed) 
Crime and Caoitalism: Readinas in Marxist C r~m~no  . . loay, Palo Alto, Calif.: Mayfield 
Publishing Company, pp. 484-495 
Greenberg, Jay R. and Stephen A. Mitchell (1983) Q4&ct Relations in Psvcho- 
Jheocy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
Greenberg, Mark T., Matthew L. Speltz and Michelle DeKlyen (1993) 'The role of attachment 
in the early development of disruptive behaviour problems", Development a d  
PsvchopatholQgy, Vol. 5:191-213 
Grossberg, Lawrence and Cary Nelson (1988) "Introduction: The Territory of Marxism", 
Nelson, Cary and Lawrence Grossberg (eds) m s m  and the Interpretation of Culture, 
UrbanatChicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 1-13 
Grossberg, Lawrence, Cary Nelson, Paula Treichler (eds) (1992) CultmU&&~, New 
YorWLondon: Routledge 
Gusfield, Joseph R. (1978) The Culture o f  Public Problems: Dr~nlyng D r ~ v ~ n g m d  the. . . . 
Svmbolic Order, ChicagoILondon: University of Chicago Press, pp.1-23 
Hacking, Ian (1991) "How Should We Do the History of Statistics?", Burchell, Graham, Colin 
Gordon and Peter Miller (eds) Jhe Foucault Effect: Stud~es In Government&& . . , Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, pp. 181-195 
Hacking, Ian (1991) "The Making and Molding of Child Abuse", C r i t i c a l ,  Vol. 17:253- 
289 
. . Haig-Brown, Celia (1988) R e s i s t a n w d  Reney~;rl:Survlvlnstheladian Residentid 
School, Vancouver: Tillacum Library, pp. 11-20 
Hall, Catherine (1 992) "Missionary Stories: Gender and Ethnicity in England in the 1830s 
and 1 8 4 0 ~ " ~  Grossberg, Lawrence, Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler (eds) C u l W  
Studies, New YorWLondon: Routledge, pp. 240-276 
Hall, Stuart (1980) "Cultural studies: two paradigms", Media. Culture m d  Society, Val. 
257-72 
Hall, Stuart (1 980b) "Cultural Studies and the Centre: Some Problematics and Problems", 
Hall, Stuart, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (eds) Wture.  M e w  
-, London: Hutchinson, pp. 15-47 
Hall, Stuart (1 98Oc) "Race, articulation and societies structured in dominance", SocidQghl  
Theories: Race and Colonialism, Paris: UNESCO 
Hall, Stuart (1 988) "The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists", Nelson, 
Cary and Lawrence Grossberg (eds) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 
UrbandChicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 35-73 
Hall, Stuart (1990) "Cultural Identity and Diaspora", m. Community. Cultua, 
Difference, London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 222-237 
Hall, Stuart (1991) "Brave New World, Soc~al~st  Review . . , Vol. 21, NO. 1 :57-64 
Hall, Stuart (1 992) "Cultural Studies and Its Theoretical Legacies", Grossberg, Lawrence, 
Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler (eds) Cultural Studies, New YoMondon: Routledge, pp. 
277-294 
Hall, Stuart (1992b) "Introduction", Hall, Stuart and Bram Gieben (eds) Formations of 
JUloderniQ, London: Polity Press, pp. 1-17 
Hall, Stuart (1992~) "The Question of Cultural Identity", Hall, Stuart, David Held and Tony 
McGrew (eds) JUloderniwd Its Futures, London: Polity Press, pp.274-325 
Hall, Stuart (1 9924) "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power", Hall, Stuart and Bram 
Gieben (eds) Formations of Modernity, London: Polity Press, pp. 276-331 
Hall, Stuart, Chas Chricter, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts (1978) Policing 
the Crlsl . M u w  - Os. 'na. the State. and Law and Ordec, New York: Holmes and Meier 
Publishers 
Hamilton, Peter (1 992) "The Enlightenment and the birth of social science", Hall, Stuart and 
Bram Gieben (eds) Formations of Modernity Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 1-69 
. . Hammersley, Martyn and Paul Atkinson (1983) EthnoaraDhv: Prlncl~les in Practice, 
LondonNew York: Tavistock 
Handelman, Don (1978) "Bureaucratic Interpretation: The Perception of Child Abuse in 
Urban Newfoundland", Handelman, Don and Elliott Leyton, ]krareaucracv and World View; 
Studies in the Loaic of Official Interaretation,Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 
1 5-69 
Handelman, Don (1987) "Bureaucracy and the Maltreatment of the Child: Interpretive and 
Structural Implications" in Scheper-Hughes, Nancy (ed) (1987) Wid Survival; 
cal Pers~ectives on the Tre-ant of Children, Boston: 
D. Reidel Publishing Co., pp. 359-376 
Hanks, Lucien M. Jr. and Hane Richardson Hanks (1950) Jribe Under Trust: A SUdv of 
the Blackfoot Reserve of Alberta, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
Harding, Susan (1990) 'Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques", 
Nicholson, Linda J. (ed) Feminismlpostmodernism, New York: Routledge, pp. 83-106 
Hare-Mustin, Rachel T. and Jeanne Marecek (1988) "The Meaning of Difference: Gender 
Theory, Postmodemism, and Psychology", American Psvcholoaist, Vol. 43, No. 6: 455464 
Harp, John (1 991) "Political economy/cultural studies: exploring points of convergence", 
Canadian Review of Socioloav and Anthropology, Vo. 28, no. 2:206-224 
Harre, Rom (1 987) 'The social construction of selves", Yardley, K. and T. Honess (eds) u f  
pnd Identity: Psvchosocial Perspectives, New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 41-52 
Harris, Marvin (1 968) "Culture and Personality: Pre-Freudian," The Rise of A n t h r o ~ o h g i d  
Theory, New York: Thomas Crowell, pp. 393421 
Hathaway, S. R. and E. D. Monachesi (1953) Anal- and Pred~c- Juve . . nilg 
Delinauencv with the MMPI, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
Hawkesworth, Mary E. (1989) "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of 
Truth", S i a n s. Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 14, No. 3:533-555 
Healy, W. (1934) Twentyfive Years of Child Guidance: Studies from the Institute for 
Juvenile Research, Series C, No. 256, Illinois Department of Child Welfare 
Healy, W. and A. F. Bronner (1936) New Liaht on Delinauencv and its Treatment, New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 
Hebdige, Dick (1 979) Subculture: The Meanina of Stv I Q , London: Methuen 
Henriques, Julian, Wendy Hollway, Cathy Unnrin, Couze Venn and Valerie Walkerdine 
(1984) Changina the Subiect: Psvchol~ay. soda1 r&tion and sub!ectlvlty, . . .  
LondonJNew York: Methuen 
Hill, Robert F. and J. Dennis Fortenberry (1992) "Adolescence as a Culture-Bound 
Syndrome," Social Science and Med~cme . . , Vol. 35, NO. 1:73-80 
Hincks Institute (1 993) "John Bowlby's Attachment Theory: Historical, Clinical and Social 
Significance", conference documents, Toronto 
Hoffman, Lynn (1992) "A Reflexive Stance for Family Therapy", Sheila McNamee and 
Kenneth J. Gergen (eds) (1992) T h e r ~ v ,  Londoflewbury 
Park/New Delhi: Sage, pp. 7-24 
Hollway, Wendy (1 984) "Fitting Work: psychological assessment in organizationsn 
Henriques, Julian, Wendy Hollway, Cathy Urwin, Couze Venn and Valerie Walkerdine , 
Chanaina the Subiect: Psv-v. social r-on a n w e c t i v & ,  London1 New 
York: Methuen, pp. 26-59 
Holmes, Jeremy (1 993) John Bowlbv & Attachment Theory, LondonMew York: Routledge 
Holstein, James A. and Gale Miller (eds) (1993) m s i d e r i n a  Social Constrwtumsum: . . 
Pebates in Social Problems Theory, New York: Aldine de Gruyter 
Honour, H. (1 976) Jhe New Golden Land: E u r o ~ e m e s  of Amerim, London: Allen 
Lane 
hooks, bell (1981) Ain't I A Woman: Black Women and Femmsrn . . , Boston, Mass: South 
End Press 
hooks, bell (1990) yearnina: race. gender and cultural politics, Toronto: between the 
lines 
Horn, Margo (1 986) "Gee, Officer Krupke, What Are We To Do? The Politics of Professions 
and the Prevention of Delinquency, 1909-1 940", Research in Law. Deviance and Social 
Control, Vol. 8:57-81 
Horton, Robin (1 983) "Social Psychologies: African and Western", Fortes, Meyer D e d d u  
. . and Job in West Afr can R e l l ~ ~ ~ n ,  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.41-89 
Howard, Roy J. (1982) Three Faces of Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Current 
Theories of Understandiw, BerkeleyRos AngelesRondon: University of California Press 
Hsu, F.L.K. (1985) "The self in cross-cultural perspective", Marsella, A.J., G. De Vos and 
F.L.K. Hsu (eds) Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectiveg, London: Tavistock, 
pp. 24-55 
Hymes, Dell (1991) "Foreword," Nencel, Lorraine and Peter Pels (4s)  Consku l ing  
Knowledae: Authoritv and Crlfigue in Social Science . . , Londoflewbury ParWNew Delhi: 
Sage, pp. ix-xii 
Ingleby, D. (1983) "Mental Health and Social Ordet", Cohen, Stanley and Andrew Scull (eds) 
Social Control and the State, Oxford: Martin Robertson and Company, pp. 141-188 
Ingleby, David (1 985) "Professionals as Socializers: The 'Psy Complex'," Research in 
Deviance and Social Control, Vol. 7:79-109 
Ignatieff, Michael (1983) "State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A critique of recent social 
histories of punishment, " Cohen, Stanley and Andrew Scull (eds) Social Control 
m, Oxford: Martin Robertson and Company, pp. 75-105 
Ignatieff, Michael (1993) Blood & B e l o w  J o ~ e v s  i n t u e  New Nati-, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Jackson, Michael (1996) "Introduction", Michael Jackson (ed.) m s  as Thev are: New 
Directions in Phenomenoloaical Anthro~ology, Bloomington/lndianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, pp. 1-50 
Jacoby, R. (1975) Social Amnesia. A Critiaue of Conformist Psvchology from Adler t~ 
u, Boston: Beacon Press 
Jaffe, Peter G., David A. Wolfe and Susan Kaye Wilson (1990) 
Momen, Newbury ParklLondonlNew Delhi: Sage Publications 
Jameson, Fredric (1972) Marxism and Form: Twentieth Centuw Dialectical Theories of 
Literature, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 
Jameson, Fredric (1981) The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Sociallv Symbolic 
&& Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 
Jameson, Fredric (1983) "Postmodernism and Consumer Society", Foster, Hal (ed) Ib 
Anti-Aesthetic Essavs on Postmodern C u l m ,  Port Townsend, Wash: Bay Press, pp. 
11 1-125 
he Cultural Lonic of Late Cap~tallsnl, . . Jameson, Fredric (1991) Postmodernism. or. T 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 
Jantti, Hannele (1989) "The Social Control Auction: Privitization of Youth Corrections in 
[Province]", unpublished M.A. thesis 
Jesness, Carl F. (1 96611 972) The Jesness Inventory, Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists 
Press 
Johnson, F. (1 985) 'The Western concept of self", Marsella, A.J., G. De Vos and F.L.K. Hsu 
(eds) Culture and Self: Asian and Western Perspectiveg, London: Tavistock, pp. 91-138 
Johnson, M. M. (1988) Strona Mothers. Weak Wives, Berkeley: University of California 
Press 
. . Jones, Maxwell (1 952) Social Psvchiatry: A Stydv of T m u t i c  CQnD.un~beg, London: 
Tavistock Publications 
Jouriles, E. N., Murphy, C.M. Murphy, and K. D. O'Leary (1989) "Interspousal . . aggression, 
marital discord, and child problemsw, Journal of  Consulting Cllnlcal Psvcholpgy, No. 
57:453-455 
Jung, C. G. (1990) 'The Psychology of the Child Archetype", Abrams, Jeremiah (ed) 
Recla~mmg the lnne . . r Child, Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc., pp. 25-30 
Kant, lmmanuel(1959) The Foundations of the M e u i a  of M e ,  trans. L.W. Beck, 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 
Kazdin, Alan E. (1985) Treatment of Antisocial m a v i o r  in w e n  and Adolescents, 
Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press 
Keat, R. and J. Urry (1 975) Social Theow as Scienm, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
Kempe, C. H. F., F. N. Silverman, B. F. Steele, W. Droegenmueller, and H. K. Silver (1962) 
'The Battered Child Syndrome", Journal of the American Medical Assoc~at~on . . , No. 
181:17-24 
Kenny, Michael G. (1986) The Passion of Ansel B ~ w e :  Mul t i~ le  P e r s w  . . 
American Culture, Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press 
Kenny, Michael G. (1 990) "Medical Anthropology and Social Policy Issues", Social Policy 
Jssues Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 1: 2-3 
Kenny, Michael G. (1 995) 'The Recovered Memory Controversy: An Anthropologist's View", 
unpublished paper 
Kessen, W. (1979) "The American Child and Other Cultural Inventions", American 
Psvcholoaist, Vo1.34815-820 
Kessler, Clive S. (1987) "Marx as cultural theorist: the prehistory of modem anthropology", 
Austin-Broos, Diane J. (ed) Creatina Culture: Profiles in the studv of culture, 
Sydney/London/Boston: Allen & Unwin, pp. 35-49 
Kirk, Stuart A. and Herb Kutchins (1 992) Jhe Sellina of DSM-Ill: The Rhetoric of Science 
in Psvchiatry, New York: Aldine de Gruyter 
Kittrie, N. (1971) The Riaht to be Different: Deviance and Enforced T h e r w ,  Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press 
Klaus, M. H. and J. H. Kennell (eds) (1976) Maternal-lnfant Bondlng, St. Louis: C. V. 
Mosby Co. 
Kleinman, Arthur M. (1980) Patients and Healers in the Context of  Culture: An 
Exploration of the Borderland between AnthrQgplpgy. M e m e .  and Psvc!.&&y, . . 
Berkeley: University of California Press 
iains of Distress and Disease: De~ress ioa  Kleinman, Arthur M. (1986) Social Or 
Neurasunia and Pain In M o w n  C b ,  New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press 
Kleinman, Arthur and Thomas J. Csordas (1990) "The Therapeutic Process", 
t h ro~ohW:  C o n t e r r l p ! T h e o n r ,  Johnson, Thomas M. and Carolyn F. 
Sargent (eds), New YorldWestport, Conn./London: Praeger, pp. 1 1-25 
Kohut, Heinz (1971) The Analysis of the Self, New York: International Universities Press 
Kohut, Heinz (1 977) The Restoration of the Self, Madison, Connecticut: International 
Universities Press, Inc. 
Kotlowitz, Alex (1991) m r e  Are No Children Here, New York: Doubleday Dell 
Kovel, J. (1980) "The American Mental Health Industry", Ingleby, D. (ed) Critical 
psvchiafiy, New York: Pantheon Books 
Kovel, Joel (1 988) "A Critique of DSM-Ill," R e s e a r c u  Law. Devian-01, 
NO. 91127-146 ' 
Kovel, Joel (1988b) The Radical Seirit: Essavs on Psvchoanalysis and Society, London: 
Free Association Books 
Kovel, Joel (1 988) "A Critique of DSM-II1,"Research in Law. Deviance and Social Control, 
NO. 9:127-146 
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1 970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutiotlg, Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press 
Lacan, Jacques (1 966) Ecrits translated by Catherine Clement, Paris: Seuil 
Laing, R.D. (1 9Wl965) The Divided Self, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Laing, R.D. (196111971) Self and Others, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Laing, R.D. and A. Esterson (196411971) Sanitv. Madness and the Family, London: 
Tavistock 
Lambrou, Diana (1 992), [Provincial psychiatric conference], unpublished documents 
Larrain, Jorge (1983) Ma, rxi London and Basingstoke: The MacMillan 
Press Ltd. 
Lasch, Christopher (1 97711 979) Haven in a Heartless Ugld: The Famill, Beseigga, New 
York: Basic Books, Inc. 
. . Lash, Scott and John Uny (1987) Jhe End of Organized Cagubl~sm, Madison, Wisconsin: 
University of Wisconsin Press 
Laurence, Robin (1991) "A Tasteful Discord: The Koemer Ceramics Gallery at the Museum 
of Anthropology" UBC A b i  ChronI&, Fall 1991 :14-16 
Lefebvre, Henri (1 971) Au-dela du structuralismg, Paris: Anthropos 
Leupnitz, D. (1988) The Familv Inter~reted, New York: Basic Books 
Levi-Strauss (1 969) Jtiste T r o ~ i w ,  New York: Atheneum 
Leyton, Elliott (1 97911986) The Myth of Deliwen-v of Juvenile N I ~ ,  . .. 
Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited 
Lichtheim, George (1 970) Lukacs, London: Fontana/Collins 
Lichtman, Richard (1982) The Production of Desire: The Intearation of P s v c h o m  
jnto Marxist Theory, New York: The Free Press 
Lithman, Yngve Georg (1 984) The C m u n i t y  &gut: A Case Studv of a Cana- 
Reserve Community, Winnipeg, Man.: The University of Manitoba Press 
Lock , M. (1 986) "Plea for Acceptance: School Refusal Syndrome in Japan", Social Science 
& Medicine, Vol. 23:99-112 
Lock, M. (1987) "DSM Ill as a Culture-Bound Construct: Commentary on Culture-Bound 
Syndromes and International Disease Classifications", Culture. Med~c~ne and Psvct&&y, . . 
Vol. 1 1 :35-42 
Lock, Margaret (1 988) "A Nation at Risk: Interpretations of School Refusal in Japan", Lock, 
M. and D. Gordon (eds) Biomedicine Examined, Dordrecht: Klower Academic Publishers, 
pp. 377-414 
Lock, Margaret (1992) "The Fragile Japanese Family: Narratives about Individualism and 
the Postmodern State", Leslie, Charles and Allan Young (eds) Paths to Asian M e d i d  
)<nowledqa, Berkeleyflos Angeles/Oxford: University of California Press, pp. 98-1 25 
Lock, Margaret and Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1 990) "A Critical-Interpretive Approach in 
Medical Anthropology: Rituals and Routines of Disciple and Dissent", Johnson, Thomas M. 
and Carolyn F. Sargent (eds) Medical Anthr-: Contempomp Theory and Method, 
New YorWWestport, Conn.1London: Praeger, pp. 47-72 
Lorde, Audre (1 984) 'Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference", Sister 
Outsider, Freedom, Calif: The Crossing Press Feminist Series, pp. 114-123 
Lukacs, Georg (1971) Jistow and Class  conscious^, London: Merlin Press 
Lutz, Catherine (1988) Unnatural Emotions: E v e r v d g & S e n t i m e l l t s m  
Atoll & Their Challenae to Western Theory, ChicagoRondon: University of Chicago Press 
Lyons-Ruth, K., D. Zoll, D. Connell et at. (1991) 'Family deviance and family disruption in 
childhood: associations with maternal behavior and infant maltreatment during the first years 
of lifen, Pevelo~mental Psvchopathology, No. 1:219-236 
Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1 984) m p  
Manchester: Manchester University Press 
Macdonell, Diane (1 986) m o r i e s  of Discourse: An Introductioq, OxfordMew York: Basil 
Blackwell 
Mainprize, Steven (1988) "A Case Study in Institutional Change: Power and Politics in the 
Social Organization of Residential Treatment", Department of Anthropology and Sociology, 
[University], unpublished 
Malinowski, B. (1 92Zl96l) "Introduction: The Subject, Method and Scope of this Inquiry", 
Malinowski, B. Araonauts of  the Western Pacific, New York: E.P. Dutton, pp. 1-25 
Mandel, Ernest (1 975) Late C a e b l ~ s m  . . , London: New Left 
Manning, Nick (1987) "What is a social problem?", Loney, Martin (ed) The State or the 
Market: Politics and Welfare in  contemporary m, London: Sage, pp. 8-23 
Manser, Anthony (1 971) "Praxis and Dialectic and Sartre's Critique", Warnock, Mary (ed) 
Sattre, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., pp.337-356 
Manuel, George and Michael Posluns (1974) The Fourth World: An Indian Reality, Don 
Mills, Ont.: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd. 
Manzani, Carl (ed) (1 957) The Open Marxism of Antonio Gramsci, New York: Cameron 
Associates 
Maracle, Lee (1 988) J Am Woman, North Vancouver, B.C.: Write-On Press 
Marcus, George E. and Michael M. J. Fischer (1986) pnthroeoloav as Cultural Critique; 
An Exerimental Moment in  the Human Scienceg, ChicagoLondon: The University of 
Chicago Press 
Marcus, Julie (1992) 'Racism, Terror and the Production of Australian auto/biographies", 
Okely, Judith and Helen Callaway (eds) A n t h r o o o l o ~ d  Autobiography, LondonINew 
York: Routledge, pp. 100-1 15 
Marris, P. (1991) 'The Social Construction of Uncertainty', Parkes, C. M., J. Stevenson- 
Hinde, and P. Marris (eds) Attachment Across the Life Cvcl~, London: Routledge, pp. 77- 
90 
. . Marron, Kevin (1 992) Apprenticed in  Crime: Young Offenders, the Law and C r ~ ~  
Canada, Toronto: Seal Books/McClelland-Bantam, Inc. 
Marsella, Anthony J. (1 98Z1984) "Culture and Mental Health: An Overview", Marsella, 
Anthony J. and Geoffrey M. White (eds) Cultural Conce&?lbns of Me-alth and 
Theraey, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.359-388 
Marsh, James L. (1988) Post-Cartesian MeBtat~ons: An Essav in Dialectics . . 
Phenomenology, New York: Fordham University Press 
Marshall, Barbara (1 994) -odem: Feminism. S o & j  T h e ~ t y a ~ d  Socjal 
Cambridge: Polity Press 
Martin, Emily (1987) The Women in the Bodv: A C m r a l  A n a s i s  of  R~production, 
Boston: Beacon Press 
Marx, Karl (184411967) "The Holy Family", Easton, Lloyd D. and Kurt H. Guddat (eds) 
of the vouna Marx on Philosoghv and Society, Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, pp. 
361 -398 
Marx, Karl (1 84711 963) Jhe Poverhr of Phil-, New York: lnternational Publishers 
Marx, Karl (1963) ,New York: International 
Publishers 
Marx, Karl (1 88711 967) Gapital, Vol.1, New York: lnternational Publishers 
Marx, Karl (1 88811 967) 'Theses on Feuerbach", Easton, Lloyd D. and Kurt H. Guddat (eds) 
YVritinas of the vouna Marx on Philosophv and Society, Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, pp. 
400-402 
Marx, Karl (1 92711959) The Economic and Phi losmical  Manuscri~ts of 1844, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart 
Marx, Karl (1 92711 964) "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", Bottomore, T.B. (ed) 
Karl Marx: Earlv Writingg, New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 61-219 
Marx, Karl (192711971) Jhe Economic and Philosophiml Manuscripts of 1844, Struik, 
Dick (ed) New York: lnternational Publishers 
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels (185911970) "Introduction to a Critique of Political 
Economy", Arthur, C.J. (ed) Jhe German Ide-, New York: lnternational Publishers, pp. 
124-1 51 
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels (1 94711 970) The German Ideology, Arthur, C. J. (ed), New 
York, lnternational Publishers 
Mascia-Lees, Frances E., Partricia Sharpe, and Colleen Ballerino Cohen (1989) 'The 
Postmodernist Turn in Anthropology: Cautions from a Feminist Perspective," m, Vol. 15, 
No. 1 1 :7-33 
Mate, John (1972) "[Crossroadsn]: The Evolution of a Therapeutic Community: A Case 
Study", unpublished M.A. thesis 
Matters, Indiana (1986) "To check their evil tendencies: the early operations of the 
Vancouver Juvenile Court'", unpublished paper presented at the B. C. Studies conference 
Matza, David (1 964) Pelinauencv and Driu, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Matza, David (1969) B e c o m a  Deviad, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Maxmen, J. (1985) The New P s v c h r m  . . ,New York: New American Library 
McCabe, Colin (1987) "Foreword", Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty Icl Other VhrIda, New 
York: Mentheun, pp. ix-xix 
McDaniel, Susan (1 993) 'Where the Contradictions Meet: Women and Family Security in 
Canada in the 1 990s", National Forum on Family Security (ed) m v  S e c u r r w  Insecure . . 
Times, Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, pp. 163-1 80 
McDonald, Maryon (1987) 'The politics of fieldwork in Brittany", Jackson, A. (ed) 
Anthro~oloav at Home, London: Tavistock, pp. 120-1 38 
McGrane, Paul (1989) Bevond Anthr~poloav: Society and the Other, New York: 
Columbia University Press 
McKnight, John (1984) 'John Deere and the Bereavement Counsellor", Bulletin of Science, 
Technoloav and Society, Vol. 4:597-604 
McKnight, John (1984b) 'Optimum Tools for Community Health", Bulletin of Science, 
Jechnologv and Society, Vol. 4340-344 
McKnight, John (1986) "Politiciszing Health Care", Conrad, Peter and Rochelle Kerr (eds) 
The Socioloav of Health and Illnesg, New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 10-23 
McKnight, John (1989) 'Communities as Problem-Solving Places", unpublished paper 
McKnight, John (1 990) "Preparing for a Healthier Tomorrow: Keynote Address", unpublished 
address to the B. C. Medical Association, Vancouver 
McLean, Athena (1 990) "Contradictions in the Social Production of Clinical Knowledge: The 
Case of Schizophrenia", Social Science and M e d ~ c m  . . , Vol. 30, No. 9:969-985 
McLennan, Gregor (1992) "1ntroduction:The Post-Modemist Condition", Hall, Stuart, 
David Held and Tony McGrew (eds) Modernity and its F u t w ,  Milton Keynes: Polity 
Press, pp. 328-331 
McNamee, Sheila (1 992) "Reconstructing Identity: the Communal Construction of Crisis," 
McNamee, Sheila and Kenneth J. Gergen (eds) (1 992) Jherwv as Social Constructiorl, 
LondonINewbury P a m e w  Delhi: Sage, pp. 186-1 99 
McNamee, Sheila and Kenneth J. Gergen (eds) (1 992) Therwv as Social ConstructiQn, 
LondonMewbury ParWNew Delhi: Sage 
McRobbie, Angela (1 981) "Settling Accounts with Subcultures: A Feminist Critique", Bennett, 
Tony, Graham Martin, Colin Mercer and Janet Woollacott (eds) Culture. l d e o u  
Social Process: A Reader, London: Open University Press, pp. 1 12-1 24 
Mead, Margaret (192811949) Comina of m e  in  S a m :  A Psvchologkal Studv of 
, New York: Mentor Books 
Mead, Margaret (1 962) "A Cultural Anthropologist's Approach to Maternal Deprivation*, 
f M-rnal Care: A Reas- of its Effects, Geneva: World Health 
Organization Publications 
Meszaros, lstvan (1 970) Marx's Theory of A l i e m ,  London: Merlin Press 
Miller, Alice (1 981) The Drama of the Gifted Child, New York: Basic Books 
Miller, Alice (198111986) Jhou Shalt Not Be Awa I re: Soc~etv s B e t w a l  of  the Ch 
ScarboroughINew York: New American Library 
Miller, Alice (1990) "Advocating for the Child", Abrams, Jeremiah (ed) Reclalmlna the Inner . . 
Child, Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc., pp. 189-192 
Ministry of Health (1987) Mental Health Consultation Report: A Draft Plan to Replace 
JSomrnersetl Hos~ital ,  [City] 
Ministry of Social Services and Housing (1 990) Quarterlv Statistical Re~ort ,  [City] 
Mitchell, J. Clyde (1983) "Case and Situation Analysis", Socioloaical Review, Vol. 31 :187- 
21 1 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade (1 984) "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses," Boundary, Vol. 12, No. 3 - Vol. 13, No. 1:333-358 
Moore, Henrietta L. (1988) Feminism and A n ~ o ~ o l o g y ,  Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 
Moore, Henrietta (1 994) A Passion for Difference: E m s  In Anthr- and G&, 
Bloominghamllndianapolis: Indiana University Press 
Morgan, Patricia (1 980) "The state as mediator: alcohol problem management in the postwar 
world," Contem~orary Drua Problemg, No. g:lO7-136 
Morgan, Patricia (1 981) "From battered wife to program client: the state's shaping of social 
problems", Kapitalistate, Vol. 9:17-39 
Mott, J. (1969) Jhe Jesness In . . ventorv: Appl~cahons to approved school boyg, London: 
HMSO 
Muller, John P. (1 996) B P t h e P s v c h o a n a l v t i c  Sem~eml~tl~s . .  . 
Freud. Peirce and Lacan, LondonlNew York: Routledge 
Narayan, Kirin (1 993) "How Native is a 'Native' Anthropologist," American An-, 
VOI. 931671-686 
Nelson, Barbara (1 984)  
Social Problemg, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Nelson, Cary, Paula Treichler and Lawrence Grossberg (1992) "Cultural Studies: An 
Introduction", Grossberg, Lawrence, Cary Nelson, Paula Treichler (eds) Cultural Studies, 
New YorklLondon: Routledge, pp. 1-22 
Ng, Roxana (1 988) T he Politics of Communitv Services, Toronto: Garamond Press 
Nicholson, Susan (1995) 'The Narative Dance - A Practice Map for White's Therapy", 
Australian and New Z e a b d  Journal of F-, Vol 16, No. 1:23-28 
Office of the Ombudsman: [Province] (1 990) Public Services to Children. Youth & their 
Families in CProvincel. The Need for Inmration, Public Report No. 22, [City] 
Office of the Premier: [Province] (1989) Government Restructuring: Statement of 
Principles, [City] 
Offord, Dan (1986) Ontario Child Health Studv: S u m  of Initial Fin-, Toronto: 
Queen's Printer for Ontario 
Offord, D. R.., Boyle, M. H., Szatmari, P., et al. (1987) 'Ontario Child Health Study 2: Six 
month prevalence of disorder and rates of service utilization", A- 
Psvchiatry, No. 44:832-836 
Offord, Dan, Michael H. Boyle, Jan E. Fleming, Heather Munroe Blum and Naomi I. Rae 
Grant (1989) 'Ontario Child Health Study: Summary of Selected Resultsn, Canadian 
Journal of Psvchiatry, Vol. 34, No. 6:483-491 
Offord, Dan, Michael H. Boyle, Jan E. Fleming, Heather Munroe Blum and Naomi I. Rae 
Grant (1990) gntario Child Health Studv: Children at Risk, Toronto: Queen's Printer for 
Ontario 
Okely, Judith (1 992) "Anthropology and autobiography: participatory experience and 
embodied knowledge," Okely, Judith and Helen Callaway (eds) (1992) &thro~oIogy and 
Autobi~graphy, LondonINew York: Routledge, pp. 1-28 
Okely, Judith and Helen Callaway (eds) (1992) m v  and A u t o b i o m ,  
LondonINew York: Routledge 
Ortner, Sherry 6. (1 984) 'Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties", Com~arative Stud ie~ 
jn Anthropoloav Since the Sixties, Vo1.26, No. 1:126-166 
Ortner, Sherry B. (1991) "Reading America: Preliminary Notes on Class and Culture", Fox, 
Richard G. (ed) Reca~turina Anthrp~ologv: Working in the Present, Santa Fe, New 
Mexico: School of American Research Press, pp. 163-1 89 
Paine, Robert (1 977) "The Nursery Game: Colonizers and the Colonized", R. Paine (ed) Iha 
White Arctic: Anthro~oloaical - Essavs on Tutelaae and Ethnicib, Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press 
Paine, Robert (ed) (1977b) The White Arctic: v s a v s  on Tutelage and 
mn ic i t y ,  Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
Pappas, Gregory (1 990) 'Some Implications for the Study of the Doctor-Patient Interaction: 
Power, Structure and Agency in the Works of Howard Waitzkin and Arthur Kleinman", 
Science and Med~c~ng . . , V01.30,N0.2:199-204 
Paranjpe, A.C. (1975) jn Search of I d e m ,  New York: Wiley 
Paranjpe, A.C. (1984) Theoretical Psvchology: The Mee t iu  of East and West, New 
York: Plenum Press 
Paranjpe, A.C. (1993) "Style over Substance: The loss of Personhood in Theories of 
Personality", unpublished paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Western 
Society for Theoretical Psychology, Banff, Alberta, October, 1993 
Paranjpe, A.C. (1995) "Self and identity in contemporary psychology and Indian thought", 
unpublished manuscript 
Parker, I. and J. Shotter (eds)(1990) I , London: 
Routledge 
Parkinson, G.H.R. (1970) "lntroduction", Parkinson, G.H.R. (ed) Geow Lukacs: The Man, 
His Work and His Ideas, New York: Random House, pp.1-33 
Parsons, Talcott (1 951) The Social Svstem, New York: The Free Press 
Parton, Nigel(1985) The Politics of Child Abum, New York: Wiley 
Patterson, G. R. (1 982) , Coercive Family Procesg. Eugene, Ore: Castilia 
Patterson, G. R (1 986) "Performance models for anti-social boys", American Psychologbk 
Vol. 41 NO. 41432-444 
Paul, Robert (1976) "The Sherpa Temple as a Model of the Psyche," American 
E t h n o l o w ,  No. 3:131-146 
Pedersen, Paul (1 982l1984) "The Intercultural Context of Counselling and Therapy", 
Marsella, Anthony J. and Geoffrey M. White (eds) Cultural Conce~tions of Mental Health 
and Thera~y, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.333-358 
Pelton, Leroy H. (ed) (1981)  New 
YorkILondon: Human Sciences Press 
Plamenatz, John (1963) Man and Society, Vo1.2, London: Longmans 
Planning Department (1 988) ml Local Areas 1986.100% Data from Canada Census, 
[City] 
Platt, A.M. (1 977) The Child Savers: The l n v ~ t i o n  o f e n c y ,  Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press 
Polier, Nicole and William Roseberry (1 989) "Triste tropes: post-modern anthropologists 
encounter the other and discover themselves," m v  and Society, Vol. 18, No. 2:245- 
264 
Poster, Mark (1975) Existential Marxism in Postwar France, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press 
Pratt, Vernon (1 978) The Phi loso~hv of the Social Sciences, London: Methuen 
Probyn, Elspeth (1 990) "Travels in the Postmodern: Making Sense of the Local", Nicholson, 
Linda J. (ed) FeminismlPostrnodernism, New YorkRondon: Routledge 
[Province] Task Force on Family Violence (1 992) Js Anvone -7, [City]: Queen's 
Printer for [Province] 
Psychological Corporation (1 97111991) Weschler lntelliggace Scale for Children - Third 
Edition, San DiegoINew York/Chicago/Austin: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Rabinow, Paul (1977) Reflections on fieldwork in  Moroccg Berkeley: University of 
California Press 
Rabinow, Paul (1 986) "Representations are Social Facts: Modernity and Post-Modernity in 
Anthropology", Clifford, James and George E. Marcus (eds) Writina Culture: The Poetics 
and Politics of Ethnoaraphy, BerkeleyRos AngelesRondon: University of California Press, 
pp. 234-261 
Rabinow, Paul (1 991) For Hire: Resolutely Late Modem", Fox, Richard G. (ed) pec- 
Anthropoloav: Workina in the Present, Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American 
Research Press, pp. 59-71 
Rabinow, Paul and William M. Sullivan (1 979Il987) 'The Interpretive Turn: A Second Look", 
Rabinow, Paul and William M. Sullivan (eds) mrp re t i ve  Social Sciences: A SecQna 
Ippk, BerkeleyRos AngelesRondon: University of California Press, pp. 1-30 
Rainwater, Janette (1 989) Self-Therapy, London: Crucible 
Ratner, R. S., John L. McMullan, and Brian E. Burtch (1987) 'The Problem of Relative 
Autonomy and Criminal Justice in the Canadian Staten, Ratner, R. S. and John L. McMullan 
(eds) State Control, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press 
Read, Kenneth (1955) "Moralitry and the Concept of the person Among the Gahuku-Gama," 
Oceania, No. 25:233-282 
Rhodes, Lorna Amarasingham (1990) "Studying Biomedicine as a Cultural System", 
Medical A n t h r o ~ o l ~ v :  Contem~oraw Theow and b t h o d ,  Johnson, Thomas M. and 
Carolyn F. Sargent (eds), New YorWWestport, Conn./London: Praeger, pp. 159-1 73 
Richer, Stephen (1 988) "Fieldwork and the commodification of culture: why the natives are 
restless", Canadian Review of Sociology and Ant-, Vol. 25, No. 3:406-420 
Richters, Annemiek and Eduard Bonsel(1987) "The relevance of Jurgen Habermas' work 
for counselling", International Journal for t b  A d v ~ c e m e n t  of Co-, Vol. 10:85- 
102 
Richters, John E. And Dante Cicchetti (1993) 'Mark Twain meets DSM-Ill-R: Conduct 
disorder, development, and the concept of harmful dysfuctionn, Develo~ment and 
Psvchpgathology, No. 5: 1-29 
Richters, John E. And Dante Cicchetti (1993b) 'Toward a developmental perspective on 
conduct disorder," D ~ o ~ s v c h o p a t h o l p a y ,  No. 51-4 
Robins, Eli and Smuel B. Guze (1 970) "Establishment of Diagnostic Validity in Psychiatric 
Illness: Its Application to Schizophrenia", American Journal of Psvchiatry, No. 126:983- 
987 
Rogers, Rex Stainton and Wendy Stainton Rogers (1992) Sfpries of Childhood: Sh~ft lng . . 
W n d a s  of Child Concern, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf 
Rosaldo, Michelle (1 980) Knowledae Passion: l l o n g w  
m, New York: Cambridge University Press 
Rosaldo, Renato (198911993) Culture and Truth: The Remakina of Social Analvsis, 
Boston: Beacon 
Ross, David P. (1 989) The Canadian Book on POVERTY 1989, Ottawa: Canadian Council 
on Social Development 
. . Ross, Andrew (1 988) "Introduction", Ross, Andrew (ed) Univem&&andon? The Pohtlcs 
gf Postrnodernisq, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. vii-xviii 
Rustin, M. (1991) Jhe Good Society and the Inner World, London: Verso 
Rutherford, Jonathan (ed) (1990) m. Community. Culture. Difference, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart 
Rutherford, Jonathan (1 990b) "A Place Called Home: Identity and the Cultural Politics of 
Difference", Rutherford, Jonathan (ed) m. Community. Culture. Difference, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 9-27 
Rutter, M., Tizard, J., Whitmore, K. (1970) Educdon. health and behaviou, London: 
Longman 
Ryan, J. (1974) 'Early language development: Towards a communicational analysis', 
Richard, M. P. M. (ed) The I-ion of a C u  a Social Wodd, London: Cambridge 
University Press 
Ryan, William (1 971) Blamina the Victim, New York: Vintage 
Said, Edward W. (1978) Qrientalism, New York: Methuen 
Said, Edward W. (1986) "Orientalism Reconsidered," Barker, Francis, Peter Hulme, 
Margaret lverson and Diana Loxley (eds) -Politcs and Theory: Pawrs f r m  
sex Conference. 1976-1 984, London: Methuen, pp. 21 0-240 
Said, Edward W. (1 989) "Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's Interlocutors", Critical 
m, Vol. 15, NO. 2:205-225 
Said, Edward W. (1993) Culture and Im~erialism, New York: Alfred A. Knopf 
Salter, Mary (1940) An Evaluation of Adiustment based the Conce~ t  of  Securitv; 
Child Deveio~ment Series, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
Sanders, Colin (1 993) "Narrative Imagination in Evoking a Language of Mind', unpublished 
paper presentedat the International Conference of Narrative Ideas and Therapeutic Practice, 
April, Vancouver, B.C. 
Sarason, S.B. (1 974) The Psvcholoaical - Sense of Community, San Francisco: Jossey- 
Bass 
Sarason, S (1 981) P-, New York: The Free Press 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1 95ZI 963) Saint Genet. Actor and Martyr, translated by Bernard 
Frechtman, New York: Mentor Books 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1 959) "Foreword: Rats and Men", Gorz, Andre The Traitor, pp. 1-36 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1 96011 976) Critique of Dialectical Reason, London: New Left Books 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (196111963) "Preface', Fanon, Frantz -Wretched, New 
York: Grove Press, Inc. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1 96311 968) Search For a Method, New York: Vintage Books 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1969) "Itinerary of a Thought", New Left Review, Vo1.58:43-66 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1 971) Situations. IX, Paris: Editions Gallimard 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (197111981) Jhe F m v  Idiot: Gustave F I ~ ~ ~ X C U W ? ~  vol. 1, 
translated by Carol Cosman, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1 974) Between Existentialism and Marxism, New York: Pantheon 
Books 
Sayer, Derek (197911983) Marx's Method: Ideology. Science Critlaue in Cap&d, . . 
Sussex: The Harvester Press 
Sayer, Derek (1987) The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytic Foundations of 
Historical M a t e r m  . . , London: Basil Blackwell 
Schacht, Richard (1971) Alienation, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co. 
Schaffer, H. R. and P. E. Emerson (1964) 'The Development of Social Attachments in 
hfan~y", Man-~hs of the Societv for Research in Child Development, No. 29, Serial 
no. 94 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy (ed) (1987) Child Survival: ~ th ropo loa ica l  Perspectives o n  
,Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy (1987b) "Culture, scarcity, and maternal thinking: mother love and 
child death in Northeast Braziln, Child Survival: Anthro~oloaical Perg~ectives on thg 
Treatment and Maltreatment of Children, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 
187-208 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy (1 992) Peath Without Weepina: The Violence of Evewdav Life 
i n  Brazil, BerkeleylLos AngeleslOxford: University of California Press 
Scheper-Hughes, N. and M. Lock (1987) "The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future 
Work in Medical Anthropology", Medical Anthro~olQgy Quarterly, No. 1 :6-41 
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy and Howard F. Stein (1987) "Child Abuse and the Unconscious in 
American Culture", Scheper-Hughes, Nancy (ed) Child Survival: AnthropolQgId 
ves of the Treatment and Maltreatment of Ch Idren, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
pp.339-358 
Schlossman, Steven L. (1 977)  The Theory and 
Practice of 'Pr~gresswe Juvenile Justice. 1825-1 924 . I , Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 
Schur, Edwin M. (1973) Radical Non-Intervention: Re- Delinauencv Problem, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Scriven, Michael (1 984) Sartre's Existential Biowaphieg, LondonIBasingstoke: The 
MacMillan Press 
Scull, Andrew (1 97711 984) Pecarceration: C m u n i t y  Treatment and the Deviant, 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall 
Sedgwick, Peter (1 982) Psvcho Polltics . . : LainalFoucaultlGoffmanl Szasz and the Futum 
of Mass Psvchiatry, London: Pluto Books Press Ltd. 
Shotter, John (1 986) "A sense of place: Vico and the social production of social identities", 
British Journal of Social Psvchology, No. 25:199-218 
Shweder, Richard A. and Edmund J. Bourne (1 98211 984) "Does the Concept of the Person 
Vary Cross-Culturally?", Marsella, Anthony J. and Geoffrey M. White (eds) Culturd 
Conce~tions of Mental Health and Therapy, Dordrecht: D. ~ e i d e l  publishing Company, 
pp. 97-1 37 
Sider, Gerald (1987) 'When Parrots Learn to Talk, and Why They Can't: Domination, 
Deception and Self-Deception in Indian-White Relations", m t i v e  StucLiag in Society 
Stow, Vol. 29:3-23 
Singer, Menill (1 989) 'The Coming of Age of Critical Medical Anthropology", Social Science 
. . 
a d  M e d ~ w ,  Vo1.28,No.11:1193-1203 
Singer, Merrill (1990) "Postmodernism and Medical Anthropology: Words of Caution," 
Medical Anthropology, Vol. 12:289-304 
Singer, Memll (1 990b) "Reinventing Medical Anthropology: Toward a Critical Realignment", 
Social Science and Medicine, Vo1.30,No.2:179-187 
Singer, Memll(1992) 'The Application of Theory in Medical Anthropology: An Introduction," 
Medical Anthro~oloay. Vol. 14:l-8 
Singer, Merrill (1993) "Knowledge For Use: Anthropology and Community-Centred 
Substance Abuse Research," Social Science and Medicing, Vol. 37, No. 1 :15-25 
Singer, Merrill(1994) 'Community-Centered Praxis: Toward an Alternative Non-dominative 
Applied Anthropology," Human Oraanization, Vol. 53, No. 4:336-343 
Singer, Merrill (1995) "Beyond the Ivory Tower: Critical Praxis in Medical Anthropologyln 
JVledical Anthropoloav Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1:80-106 
Singer, Merrill, Hans A. Baer and Ellen Lazarus (1990) "Introduction: Critical Medical 
Anthropology in Question", Social Science and Med~cme . . , Vol.30.No.2:V-VIII 
Slack, Jennifer Daryl and Laurie Anne Whitt (1992) "Ethics and Cultural Studies", 
Grossberg, Lawrence, Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler (eds) Cultural Studies, New 
YorkJLondon: Routledge, pp. 571-592 
Slugoski, B.R. and G. P. Ginsburg (1989) "Ego Identity and Explanatory Speech", Shotter, 
John and Kenneth J. Gergen (eds) Texts of Identi&, LondonMewbury ParWNew Delhi: 
Sage Publications, pp. 36-55 
Smart, Barry (1985) Michel Foucaralf, Chichester, Sussex/London/New York: Ellis 
Horwooddrravistock Publications 
Smart, Barry (1 992) Modern Conditions. Postmodern Controversies, LondonMew York: 
Routledge 
Smith, Dorothy E. (1986) "Institutional ethnography: a feminist method", Resources For 
Feminist Research, Vol. 15, no. 1: 6-13 
Solomon, Robert C. (1 972) From Rationalism to Fxis- . . , New York: Harper & Row 
Spector, Malcolm and John I. Kitsuse (1977) C o ~ t r u c t i w  Social PrQblemg, New York: 
de Gruyter 
Spence, David (1982) Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meanina and Inter~retation 
jn Psvchoanalvsis, New YorWLondon: W.W. Norton & Company 
Spitzer, Robert L. and Janet Williams (1980) "Classification in Psychiatry", Kaplan, H. I., A. 
Freedman and B. J. Sadock (eds) Com~rehensive Textbook in PsvchiatrylU1,3d. ed., 
Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, pp. 1035-1 072 
Spitzer, Steven (1975) "Towards a Marxian Theory of Deviancew, Social Problems, Vol. 22, 
NO. 5:638-651 
Spitzer, Steven (1983) "The Rationalization of Crime Control in Capitalist Society:, Cohen, 
Stanley and Andrew Scull (eds) Social Control and the State, London: Martin Robertson 
and Co., pp. 312-334 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1 988) "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Nelson, Cary and Lawrence 
Grossberg, Marxism and the Interwetation of Culture, Urbana, IllinoisIChicago, p. 271- 
31 3 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty with Sarah Harasym (ed) (1990) The Post-Colonial Critic; 
Interviews. Strateaies. Dialoaueg, New YorWLondon: Routledge 
Sroufe, L. A. and J. Fleeson (1986) "Attachment and the construction of relationshipsw, 
Hartup, W. W. and Z. Rubin (eds) Relationships and Development, Hillsdale, N. J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 1-54 
Strathern, M. (1 989) The Gender of the Gift, Berkeley: University of California Press 
Suarez-Orozco, Marcelo M. (1987) ''The Treatment of Children in the "Dirty War": Ideology, 
State Terrorism and the Abuse of Children in Argentina", Scheper-Hughes, Nancy (ed) Child 
Survival: Anthropolqgical Perspectives on the Treatment and Maltreatment of 
Children, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp.227-246 
Sullivan, Edmund V. (1 984) A Critical Psvchology: Interpretation of the Personal World, 
New YorkRondon: Plenum Press 
Swartz, Leslie and Ann Levett (1 989) "Political Repression and Children in South Africa: The 
Social Construction of Damaging Effects", Social Science and Medicine, Vo1.28,No.7:741- 
750 
Tanner, Julian (1 996) Teenage Troubles: Youth and Deviance in Canada, Scarborough, 
Ont.: International Thompson Publishing 
Taussig, Michael (1 980) "Reification and the Consciousness of the Patient", Social Sciencg 
and Medlclne . . , V01.14:3-13 
Taussig, Michael (1987) Shamanism. Colon~al~sm. and the Wild Man: A Studv in Terror . . 
and H e a m ,  Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Taylor, 1. (1983) Crime. Ca~ital ism and Communitv: Three Essavs in S o w  . . 
Criminology, Toronto: Butterworths 
Taylor, Charles (1 97911987) "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man", Rabinow, Paul and 
William M. Sullivan (eds) Jnter~retive Social Sciences: A Second I ook, Berkeleykos 
AngelesJLondon: University of California Press, pp. 33-81 
Teeple, Gary (1995) , Toronto: 
Garamond 
Thompson, E. P. (1968) The Makina of the Enalish Workina Clasg, Middlesex: Penguin 
Tobias, John L. (197611983) "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of 
Canada's Indian Policy", Getty, Ian A. L. and Antoine S. Lussier (eds) As L o w  as the Sun 
Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studigg, Vancouver: Nakoda 
Institute Occasional Paper No. 1, University of British Columbia Press, pp. 39-55 
Trawick, Margaret (1992) Notes on Love in a Tamil Family, Berkeleykos AngelesIOxford: 
University of California Press 
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph (1991) "Anthropology and the Savage Slot: The Poetics and Politics 
of Otherness", Fox, Richard G. (ed) Pecapturina Anthropol~gv: Workina in the Present, 
Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, pp. 17-44 
Tulving, E. (1972) "Episodic and Semantic Memory", Tulving, E. and W. Donaldson (eds) 
f Memory, San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 382-403 
Turner, Bryan (1 987) Medical Power and Social Knowledae, London: Sage 
Turner, Graeme (1990) British Cultural Studies: An Introduction, Boston/LondonlSydneyl 
Wellington: Unwin Hyman 
Turner, Victor (1 974) Dramas. Fields and Meta~horg, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 
Ulin, Robert C. (1984) Understandina Cultures: Pers~ectives in A n t h r o ~ o l ~ g y  an4 
Social Theory, Austin: University of Texas 
Ulin, Robert (1991) "Critical Anthropology Twenty Years Later: Modernism and 
Postmodemism in Anthropology," Critique of AnthrQpplpgy, Vol. 11, No. 1:63-89 
Valiance, R. C. and A. R. Forrest (1 971) "A study of the Jesness Personality Inventory with 
Scottish childrenn, British Journal of  Educational Psvchology, No. 41:338-344 
van Gennep, Arnold (190811 960) Rites of Pass-, Chicago: Chicago Universit)c Press, pp. 
65-1 15 
Venn, Couze (1984) "The subject of psychology", Henriques, Julian, Wendy Hollway, Cathy 
Urwin, Couze Venn and Valerie Walkerdine Cha- the Subiect: Psvchology, s o u  
mu la t i on  and su biectivity, LondonlNew York: Methuen, pp. 1 19-1 52 
Verlaan, Vincent Leo T. P. (1991) "'Riding the Decentralization Wave': Social Control 
Implications of Youth Mental Health Reform", unpublished thesis 
von Sturmer, John (1987) "Claude Levi-Strauss", Austin-Broos, Diane J. (ed) Creatiw 
ture: Profiles in the studv of culture, London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 107-123 
Voss, Harwin L. (ed) (1970) Soc i etv. _ Delinauencv. and Delinauent Behaviour, Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company 
Wadel, Cato (1 97311 989) Now. Whose Fault is That? The St rua le  for Self-Esteem in 
the Face of Chronic Unemplovment, St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and 
Economic Research 
Waitzkin, Howard (1981) "A marxist analysis of the health care systems of advanced 
capitalist societies", Eisenberg, Leon and Arthur Kleinman (eds) The Relevance of Social 
Science for Medicine, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 333-371 
Waitzkin, Howard (1990) "Discrimination in Social Science & Medicine?," international 
Journal of  Health Sewiceg, Vol. 20, No. 3:525-531 
Waitzkin, Howard (1 991) The Politics of Medical Encounters: How Patients and Doctors 
Peal with Social Problemg, New HavenILondon: Yale University Press 
Wakefield, J. C. (1992) "The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between 
biological facts and social values", American Psvcholoaigf, No. 47:373-388 
Walker, Gillian (1990) Familv Violence and the Women's Movement: The Con- 
Politics of Stru-, Toronto/BuffalolLondon: University of Toronto Press 
Walkerdine, Valerie (1 984) "Developmental psychology and the child-centred pedagogy: the 
insertion of Piaget into early education*, Henriques, Julian, Wendy Hollway, Cathy Urwin, 
Couze Venn and Valerie Walkerdine Chanaing the Subiect, London: Methuen,, pp. 153- 
202 
Walsh, Richard T. (1987) "A Social Historical Note on the Formal Emergence of Community 
Psychology", American Journal of  Community Psvchology, Vol. 15, No. 5:523-529 
Watson, Graham (1991) "Rewriting Culture", Fox, Richard G. (ed) Reca~turing 
Anthro~oloav: Workina in the P r e s w ,  Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American 
Research Press, pp. 73-92 
Webber, Marlene (1991) Street Kids: The T r w d v  of Canada's Runawavs, 
Toronto/BuffalolLondon: University of Toronto Press 
Weber, Linda R., Andrew Miracle, and Tom Skehan (1 994) 'Interviewing Early Adolescents: 
Some Methodological Considerations", HumanOraanlzation, Vol. 53, NO. 1:42-47 
Webster-Stratton, C. (1990) 'A potential disrupter of parent perceptions and family 
interactions", Journal of  C l~n~ca l  Child Psvchology . . , No. 19:302-312 
Weeks, Jeffrey (1 990) "The value of difference", Rutherford, J. (ed) Identitv. Community. 
Culture. Difference, London: Lawrence & Wishart:88-100 
Weeks, Jeffrey (1992) 'The Body and Sexuality", Bocock, Robert and Kenneth Thompson 
(eds) (1 992) Social and Cultural Forms of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 220- 
266 
West, Cornel (1991) The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist T h o r n ,  New York: Monthly 
Review Press 
West, Cornel (1993) K e e ~ i n a  Faith: Philoso~hv and Race in America, New 
York/London:Routledge 
White, M. and P. Epston (1 990) Narrative Means to Theramutic En&, New York: W. W. 
Norton 
Wilden, Anthony (196811981) 'Lacan and the Discourse of the. Other", Lacan, Jacques 
S ~ e e c h  and Lanauaae in Psvchoanal~sis, translated by Anthony Wilden, 
BaltimorelLondon: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 157-31 1 
Williams, Raymond (1 958) Culture and Society: 1780-1950, London: Chatto and Windus 
Williams, Raymond (1 976) bywords: A Voc- of C w  and Society, Croon Helm: 
Fontana 
Williams, Raymond (1977) Marxism and L i t e w ,  Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Williams, Raymond (1979) Politics and Letters: Interviews with New L e f t ,  
London: New Left Books 
Willis, Paul (1976) "The Man in the Iron Cage: Notes on Method", 
Cultural Studies, Vol. 9:135-146 
Willis, Paul (197711981) Learnina to Labour: How WorlCingl;lass Kids Get Working 
Class Jobs, Aldershot: Gower 
Willis, Paul (1 978) "Theoretical Appendix", Willis, Paul Profane Culture, London: Routledge 
Kegan & Paul 
Wilson, Andrew (1 994) "Looking out for the City's Youth', -la StrdgM, (October 14- 
21):9-11 
Wilson, Elizabeth (1977) Women and the Welfare S-, London: Tavistock Productions 
Wilson, M. (1993) "DSM-Ill and the transformation of American psychiatry", American 
Journal of  P s v c m ,  Vol. 150:399-410 
Winstanley, Lori (1 992), personal communication 
Witheford, Nick and Richard Gruneau (1 992) "Between the Politics of Production and the 
Politics of the Sign: Post-Marxism, Postmodemism and 'New Times"', unpublished paper 
Wolf, Ma rjery (1992) P Thrice-Told Tale: F e m ~ m .  Posbnodernism and Ethnoaraphic . . 
s~ons ib .U ,  Stanford: Stanford University Press 
Women's Research Centre (1 989) Recollectina Our Lives: W w n ' s  Euerience of 
ChildhoodSexual Vancouver: Press Gang Publisherse 
Young, Allan (1980) "The Discourse on Stress and the Reproduction of Conventional 
Knowledge", Social Science and Medicine, Vol. 148: 133-1 46 
Young, Allan (1982) "The Anthropologies of Illness and Sickness", American Review of 
Anthropology, Seigel, B.J. et al (eds) Palo Alto: California Annual Reviews Inc. Vol.l1:257- 
285 
Young, Allan (1987) "How Medicine Tamed Life", Culture. Medicine and Psvchiatry, Vol. 
11: 107-121 
Young, Allan (1991) "Emil Kraepelin and the Origins of American Psychiatric Diagnosis", 
Pfleiderer, Beatrix and Gilles Bibeau (eds) (1991) Anthro~oloaies of Med~cme: A . . 
Colloquium on West Euro~ean and North American Pers~ectiveg, Heidelberg: Vieweg, 
pp. 175-181 
Young, Allan (1992) "Making Facts and Making Time in Psychiatric Research: An Essay in 
the Anthropology of Scientific Knowledge", unpublished paper 
Young, Allan (1995) The Harrnonv of Illusions: I n v e m  Post-Traumatic Stresa 
Disorder, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
